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Abstract
Previous histories of the establishment of Spanish rule in Louisiana have centered 
primarily on its first two officials, Governor Antonio de Ulloa and Captain-General 
Alejandro O’Reilly. This work focuses on Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, governor of 
Spanish Louisiana from 1770 to 1776. It challenges previous interpretations of Unzaga’s 
tenure which have traditionally viewed the Bourbon Reforms as detrimental to the colony 
and viewed the governor as merely benign and transitional in the colony’s history.
Comparison of shipping records and governor’s records from Cuba and Louisiana 
indicate that the colony actually maintained the same volume of shipping with Havana that 
other portions of empire did and that it often received exceptional freedoms unavailable to 
the remainder of empire. The colonial documents show that Unzaga integrated the 
colony’s economy into the new reforms and that he fostered domestic industry. Treasury 
records also attest to the governor’s stewardship which filled Louisiana’s failing coffers.
An exploration of the judicial records and correspondence of the post 
commandants points to a stabilized population re-oriented toward the rule of Spanish law 
because of the governor’s conciliatory diplomacy. Unzaga’s abilities also aided in 
establishing alliances with formerly hostile Indians and maintaining peace with the British 
under difficult circumstances. This dissertation argues that effective implementation of the 
Bourbon Reforms in Spanish Louisiana took place not in 1769-1770 with Alejandro 
O’Reilly, but in the arduous seven-year administration of Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga.
be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter One 
Introduction
Borderland's history is not a new topic in the study of Latin American history. For 
U.S. historians, its roots lie in the work done by Herbert Eugene Bolton. He taught at the 
University of California at the beginning of the twentieth-century, writing on Spain's North 
American hinterlands, which he called the “Spanish Borderlands.”1 Bolton’s 1921 seminal 
work, The Spanish Borderlands: A Chronicle of Old Florida and the Southwest, began a 
drive to awaken U.S. historians to the integral part Spain played in the early history of the 
United States.2
From 1911 to 1935, Bolton worked to give his students a vision of what he called 
“Greater America.”3 During that time he published over a dozen major works on his 
beloved borderlands and passed on that interest to over three hundred masters students 
and more than a hundred doctoral students who continued his scholarship. Bolton's
'In his biography of Bolton, John Francis Bannon indicates that Bolton used a term 
from several titles offered by his editor. John Francis Bannon, Herbert Eugene Bolton:
The Historian and the Man (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1978), 120-21.
Herbert Eugene Bolton, The Spanish Borderlands: A Chronicle of Old Florida and 
the Southwest (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921).
3Herbert Eugene Bolton’s work which expanded the historic vision of Spain in 
America was The Colonization of North America. 1492-1783 (New York: The 
MacMillan Co., 1920). See also Wider Horizons of American History (South Bend, IN: 
University ofNotre Dame Press, 1939; reprint 1967). He also published a guide for 
teachers interested in using the theory of a “Greater America” in their teaching titled, A 
History of the Americas: A Syllabus with Maps (Boston and New York: Ginn and Co., 
1935). Bolton’s term “Greater America” finally entered the title of a book in a festschrift 
published in 1936, Greater America: Essays in Honor of Herbert Eugene Bolton 
(Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press; reprint 1968).
1
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students went on to train new borderlands historians and the combined efforts of these 
two generations of scholars have filled journals and library shelves.4
Despite continual scholarship, extensive research and an extraordinary variety of 
topics explored in Borderlands studies, historiographically it remained a marginal topic to 
Latin American programs across the country until the last two and a half decades. Many 
Latin American historians deemed it more a U.S. Colonial topic. This was a peculiarly 
ironic idea since the borderlands contain some of Spain's first settlements in the Americas 
and its last, beginning with San Miguel de Gualdape in 1526 and ending with the founding 
of San Francisco in 1776.s
Bolton focused, as did other early Latin Americanists, on exploration, biographies 
and political histories of the establishment and administration of Spanish institutions in the 
borderlands. More recently, borderlands historians have added breadth and depth to the 
historiography following the Armales approach of studying such topics as ethnohistory 
and historical archeology, ecology and historical geography, demography and disease. 
Scholarly works include ecological histories by Timothy Silver, A New Face on the 
Countryside: Indians. Colonists, and Slaves in South Atlantic Forests 1500-1800 and 
Albert E. Cowdrey, This Land. This South: An Environmental History, as well as studies 
on the role of disease in demographics such as Henry F. Dobyns, Their Numbers Became
4David J. Weber, The Spanish Frontier in North America (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1992), 7.
5See, Paul E. Hoffinan, A New Andalucia and a Wav to the Orient: The American 
Southeast during the Sixteenth Century (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1990); and Herbert Eugene Bolton, Outpost of Empire: The Story of the Founding of San 
Francisco (New York: Alfred A. Knop£ 1931).
2
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Thinned: Native American Population Dynamics in Eastern North America. There have
also been numerous archeological examinations of the explorers’ routes, and studies of 
city planning including Gilbert R. Cruz’s Let There Be Towns: Spanish Municipal Origins 
in the American Southwest 1610-1810.6
Borderlands research is complicated by the very richness of the area’s history, and 
the fact that it includes several different colonies. Adding to this complexity is the 
tendency of its historians to focus their studies exclusively on either the eastern 
borderlands (Louisiana and Florida) or the western borderlands (Alta California and 
Spanish Texas). Only John Francis Bannon’s Spanish Borderlands Frontiers. 1513-1821 
and David J. Weber’s, The Spanish Frontier in North America have sought to give a 
comprehensive vision of the area since Bolton’s first volume.7
The Louisiana territory entered the Spanish borderlands during the reign of 
Spain’s fourth Bourbon Monarch, Charles ID. Despite the feet that it was originally 
explored by Hernando de Soto in the 1500s, Spain failed to settle the area and by the end 
of the seventeenth century it fell into the hands of the French through re-discovery and
timothy Silver, A New Face on the Countryside: Indians. Colonists, and Slaves in 
South Atlantic Forests 1500-1800 (London and New YorlcCambridge University Press, 
1990); Henry F. Dobvns. Their Number Become Thinned: Native American Population 
Dynamics in Eastern North America (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983); 
Albert E. Cowdrev. This Land. This South: An Environmental History (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1983); see Jeffrey Brain, “The Archeology of the Hernando 
de Soto Expedition,” in Alabama and the Borderlands from Prehistory to Statehood, eds. 
R. Reid Badger and Lawrence A. Clayton (University: University of Alabama Press, 
1985); Gilbert R. Cruz, Let There Be Towns: Spanish Municipal Origins in the American 
Southwest 1610-1810 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1988).
7John Francis Bannon, Spanish Borderlands Frontiers. 1513-1821 (New York: 
Holt, Rhinehardt and Winston, 1970) and Weber, Spanish Frontier.
3
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subsequent settlement. While Spain never relinquished her ownership she did little to 
reclaim the region. By the time the Spanish did regain control of the Louisiana 
borderlands in 1763, it held little in common with the rest ofJLatin America. Louisiana 
offered no profitable mineral deposits, no large, sedentary Indian populations with 
exploitable mineral wealth, and the colony was already populated by non-Iberian 
Europeans, as well as Africans. The new colony also entered Spain’s empire at a time 
when, as David J. Weber so aptly puts it, “Spain came to regard its North American 
[borderlands] colonies as defensive money-losing outposts.”8 Consequently, the Spanish 
crown never invested the men or money in Louisiana that it had in its earlier colonial 
endeavors.
Despite the territory’s complex problems, Charles HI strove to develop his 
Louisiana borderlands through the introduction of the Bourbon Reforms. These imperial 
reforms promoted centralizing administrative and military reorganization, lightened 
commercial regulations, and enhanced agriculture and immigration to the Louisiana 
borderlands. While Louisiana historians have decried the effects of Spanish mercantilism 
on Louisiana’s trade, the colony was one of the first to receive and later benefit from the 
new trade regulations, a centralized government, the establishment of the rule of law 
enforceable by colonial authorities, and enlightened economic reforms which worked to 
create domestic industry and markets. Although the colony struggled with the reforms in 
its early years under Spanish control, by the end of the Bourbon period trade became less 
restricted and one-third of the ships coming into the port of New Orleans remained
*Weber, Spanish Frontier 175.
4
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Spanish in origin. In an age when Britain ruled the seas and the Anglo-American trade 
dominated the Mississippi River, maintaining Spain’s presence at that level was a 
remarkable feat of perseverance.
An abundant bibliography exists on the Bourbon Reforms. Earlier works include 
such publications as Troy S. Floyd's edited study-text, The Bourbon Reformers and 
Spanish Civilization: Builders or Destroyers? which furnished students with essays and 
questions on the problems of the reforms, its monopoly systems, the disposition of older 
ideas like fueros (grants of privilege by the crown), the effects of the reforms on the 
independent spirit of Americans, and the progress of material wealth in the colonies.
There are a number of monographs which cover different aspects of the reforms, 
including economics, the military and political and administrative changes.. Such works 
include books on economics like Roland Dennis Hussey's, The Caracas Company 1738- 
1784: A Study in the History of Spanish Monopolistic Trade. David Anthony Brading's, 
Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico 1763-1810. Brian Hamnett’s, Politics and 
Trade in Southern Mexico 1750-1821. Jacques A. Barbier and Allan J. Kuethe's edited 
work, The North American Role in the Spanish Imperial Economy 1760-1819. and 
Keuthe's work with G. Douglas Inglis in “El consulado de Cadiz y el reglamento de 
commercio libre de 1765.”9
’Troy S. Floyd, The Bourbon Reformers and Spanish Civilization: Builders or 
Destroyers? (D. C. Heath and Company, 1966); Roland Dennis Hussey, The Caracas 
Company: 1738-1784: A Study in the History of Spanish Monopolistic Trade (Cambridge, 
MA* Harvard University Press, 1934); David Anthony Brading, Miners and Merchants in 
Bourbon Mexico 1763-1810 (Cambridge. England: Cambridge University Press, 1971); 
Brian Hamnett, Politics and Trade in Southern Mexico 1750-1821 (Cambridge, England- 
Cambridge University Press, 1971); Jacques A. Barbier and Allan J. Kuethe, eds. The
5
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The largest portion of work on the Bourbon era involves the military and political 
reorganization and includes such publications as Christian I. Archer's, The Army in 
Bourbon Mexico. 1760-1810. Leon G. Campbell's. The Military and Society in Colonial 
Peru. 1750-1810 and Allan J. Kuethe's two works, Military Reform and Society in New 
Granada. 1773-1802 and the more recent Cuba. 1753-1815 Crown. Military, and 
Society.10
Jacques A. Barbier and Mark A. Burkholder with Dewitt Samuel Chandler offer 
insight into the administrative reforms with their respective works Reform and Politics in 
Bourbon Chile. 1755-1796 and From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the 
American Audiencias. 1687-1808. The reactions of the colonists can be found in John 
Leddy Phelan's The People and the King: The Comunero Revolution in Colombia. 1781. 
Additionally, there are several studies on the Intendant system such as Lillian Estelle 
Fisher’s seminal work, The Intendant System in Spanish America and John Lynch's,
North American Role in the Spanish Imperial Economy 1760-1819 (Manchester, England: 
Manchester University Press, 1984); Alan J. Keuthe and G. Douglas Inglis, “El 
consulado de Cadiz y el reglamento de commercio libre de 1765,” Joumados de Andalucia 
v America IV (Seville. 19851. /
I0Christian I. Archer, The Armv in Bourbon Mexico 1760-1810 (Albuquerque: 
University of Mexico Press, 1977); Leon G. Campbell, The Military and Society in 
Colonial Peru 1760-1810 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1978); Allan J. 
Kuethe, Military Reform and Society in New Granada 1773-1802 (Gainesville: University 
Presses of Florida, 1978); Allan J. Keuthe, Cuba 1753-1815 Crown. Military, and Society 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986).
6
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Spanish Colonial Administration. 1783-1810: The Intendant System in the Vicerovaltv of
the Rio de La Plata.11
Louisiana's place in the Bourbon Reforms has been discussed, if at all, largely in 
the work of biographers and institutional historians. Louisiana's historians have 
traditionally focused on the reforms, primarily as a local topic rather than placing the 
colony in the imperial perspective, though there are such exceptions as Paul Hoffinan's 
1992 synthesis Luisiana. A great number of biographies exist on its earliest Spanish 
leaders, especially on governors, Antonio de Ulloa, and Bernardo de Galvez, as well as 
Captain General O’Reilly who is often referred to as the colony’s second governor. Other 
popular biographies exist on major characters in the colony’s Spanish period, such as 
Francis Bouligny and Gilbert Antoine de St. Maxent. Institutional works on the Intendant 
system and the Cabildo include Brian Coutt's work on Martin Navarro, and Gilbert C. Din 
and John Harkins recent volume on the Cabildo.12
"Jacques A. Barbier, Mark A. Burkholder and Dewitt Samuel Chandler, Reform 
and Politics in Bourbon Chile 1755-1796 (Ottowa: University of Ottowa Press, 1980); 
Mark Burkholder and Dewitt Chandler, From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish 
Crown and the American Audiencias 1687-1808 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri 
Press, 1977); John Leddy Phelan, The People and the King: The Comunero Revolution in 
Colombia. 1781 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Lillian Estelle 
Fisher, The Intendant System in Spanish America (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1929); John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration 1783-1810: The Intendant 
System in the Vicerovaltv of the Rio de La Plata (London: University of London, Athlone 
Press, 1958).
12On Ulloa see Arthur P. Whitaker, “Antonio de Ulloa,” Hispanic American 
Historical Review (hereinafter referred to as HAHR)15 (1935), 155-94 as well as his 
discussion of Ulloa's work for the Bourbon king in Peru, The Huancavelica Mercury 
Mines: A Contribution to the History of the Bourbon Renaissance in the Spanish Empire 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941); John P. Moore “Antonio de Ulloa: A 
Profile of the First Governor of Louisiana,” Louisiana History (hereinafter LH) 8 (1967),
7
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The work of Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, Louisiana's second governor, is hardly 
discussed. Despite the manifest significance of Unzaga's administration, colonial historians 
usually mention him in passing, speaking of the years between 1770 and 1776 as an 
uneventful, transitional phase of colonial development, distinguished only by the 
governor's conciliatory paternalism and his willingness to bend Spanish mercantilists laws 
to stabilize the colony's fragile economy.13 This neglect is also a common occurrence 
among Louisiana's historians. Only two of the colony’s first historians, Charles Gayarre,
recent short monograph by Hilda S. Krousel, Don Antonio De Ulloa: First Spanish 
Governor to Louisiana (Baton Rouge, LA, 1998). O'Reilly has a number of books 
dedicated to him the primary authors being David K. Bjork, “The Establishment of 
Spanish Rule in Louisiana,” Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1923), David 
Ker Texada, “The Administration of Alexandra O’Reilly, Governor of Louisiana 1769- 
1770" (Ph.D diss., Louisiana State University, 1968), and Bibiano Torres Ramirez, 
Alejandro O’Reilly en las Indias (Sevilla, Spain: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones 
Cientificas, 1969). Galvez is covered in John W. Caughey*s Bernardo de Galvez in 
Louisiana. 1776-1783 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1934); Paul E. 
Hoffman’s, Luisiana (Madrid: MAPFRE, 1992). See also Gilbert C. Din, Francisco 
Boulienv: A Bourbon Soldier in Spanish Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1993) and James Julian Coleman, Gilbert Antoine de St. Maxent: The 
Spanish-Frenchman of New Orleans (New Orleans: Pelican Publishing House, 1968); 
Gilbert C. Din and John E. Harkins, The New Orleans Cabildo: Colonial Louisiana’s First 
Citv Government 1769-1803 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996); 
Brian E. Coutts, “Martin Navarro, Treasurer, Contador, Intendant 1766-1788: Politics 
and Trade in Spanish Louisiana,” (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 1981).
“Perhaps the worst offense is in the introduction to the archival documents for 
Santo Domingo by Earnest J. Burrus which completely ignores Unzaga’s administration 
with the words “Alexandra O'Reilly came in 1769 with enough military might to make 
opposition unthinkable and to introduce Spanish institutions into the colony. Within a 
year he was able to hand over the command of a peaceful colony to Luis de Unzaga.
A capable governor reached Louisiana during the year 1779 in the person of Bernard de 
Galvez.” Jose de la Pefia y Camara, et al (ed.), Cataloeo de documentos del Archivo 
General de Indias. Section V. Gobiemo Audiencia de Santo Domingo sobre la Epoca 
Esnafiola de Luisiana (Madrid, Spain: Direction General de Archivos y Bibliotecas and 
New Orleans: Loyola University Press, 1968).
8
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History of Louisiana and Alcee Fortier, A History of Louisiana, paid attention to 
Unzaga’s tenure as governor. Charles Gayarre devotes some sixty-pages out of four 
volumes to the governor's pacification of the French colonists, his disregarding contraband 
and illegal commerce, and his conciliatory work between the religious orders. Gayerre's 
description of contraband British goods aboard what he calls “floating warehouses” can be 
found in many later studies of the period including Fortier’s. Unfortunately, both 
Gayerre’s and Fortier’s portrayal of Unzaga as the conciliator is too shallow.14
The majority of the next generation of Louisiana's historians covered even less of 
Unzaga's term in office. In his work Les Demieres Annees de la Louisiane Francaise.
Marc de Villiers du Terrage devoted almost no space to Spain's government in Louisiana, 
much less Unzaga's administration. Vicente Rodriguez Casado's, Primeros afios de 
dominacion esoanola en la Luisiana stops with the end of O'Reilly's administration in 
1770.15
14Charles Gayarre’s, History of Louisiana, was published in several separate 
volumes before 1885. Volume one came out as Louisiana: its Colonial History of 
Romance (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1851); Volume two was listed as Louisiana: its 
History as a French Colony (New York: J. Wiley, 1852); Volumes three and four were 
published between 1854 and 1866 as part of a full series know as History of Louisiana 
(New York: Redfield, 1854-66). A complete edition of four volumes was finally available 
in 1883. Alcee Fortier, A History of Louisiana 4 vols., especially volume two The Spanish 
Domination (New York: 1904).
I5Marc de Villiers du Terrage, Les Demferes Annees de la Louisiane Francaise le 
Chevalier e Kerlerec. d’Abbadie-Aubrv. Laussat (Paris: F. Guilmoto, 1904; see also the 
English version, translated by Hosea Phillips, edited and annotated by Carl A. Brasseaux 
and Glenn R. Conrad. (Lafayette, LA: Center for Louisiana Studies, 1982); Vicente 
Rodriguez Casado, Primeros afios de dominacion espanola en la Luisiana (Madrid, Spain: 
Institute Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo, 1942).
9
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The history of Unzaga's tenure in Louisiana has found its way into a number of 
book and articles. Among the books are Herbert Eugene Bolton's Athanase de Mezieres 
and the Louisiana-Texas Frontier 1768-1780. John Walton Caughey’s biography of 
Bernardo de Galvez, John G. Clark's discussion of British merchants in his New Orleans 
1718-1813: An Economic History and Din and Harkins’ 1996 volume on the New Orleans 
Cabildo, Light Townsend Cummins', Spanish Observers and the American Revolution
1776-1783 and Paul Hoffinan's, Luisiana.16
The abundant writings of Jack D. L. Holmes and Gilbert C. Din involve Louisiana 
during the Unzaga era, but none deal specifically with the governor himself. Other notable 
articles discussing narrow topics during his administration are Brian E. Coutts and Henry 
P. Dart on the tobacco and indigo industries, respectively; Bjork on education; Dart on 
fire protection; and Laura Porteous on torture and debtors prison.17
16Herbert Eugene Bolton, Athanase de M&rieres and the Louisiana-Texas Frontier 
1768-1780. (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1914; Kraus Reprint, 1970); both 
Bernard W. Caughey’s biography of Galvez and Paul E. Hoffinan’s, Luisiana devote a 
chapter to Unzaga; John G. Clark. New Orleans 1718-1813: An Economic History 
(Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1970); Din and Harkins refer to 
Unzaga’s administration throughout their previously cited work on the Cabildo; Light 
Townsend Cummins, Spanish Observers and the American Revolution 1776-1783 (Baton 
Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1991) discusses Unzaga’s network of spies 
and aid to the revolutionaries.
17A sampling of Din’s articles which discuss Unzaga’s tenure include, “Protecting 
the ‘Barrera. ’ Spain’s Defenses in Louisiana, 1763-1779,” LH 19 (1978): 183-211 and 
“The Spanish Fort on the Arkansas, 1763-1803,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly. 
(hereinafter cited as AHQ) 42 (1983): 270-93; Jack D. L. Holmes’ articles include 
“Indigo in Colonial Louisiana and the Floridas,” LH 23 (1961): 329-49; Joseph Piemas 
and the Nascent Cattle Industry of Southwest Louisiana,” McNeese Review 17 (1966), 
13-26: “Louisiana Trees and their Uses: Colonial Period,” Louisiana Studies (hereinafter 
referred to as LS) 8 (1969): 36-37; “Medical Practice in the Lower Mississippi Valley 
during the Spanish Period, 1769-1803,” Alabama Journal of Medical Sciences 1 (1964):
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A broader, more thorough investigation of Unzaga's career remains to be done. I 
examined his term briefly in my M. A  thesis, “Effective Inefficiencies” using research from 
the mircrofilm copies of Unzaga’s correspondence in the Archivo de Indias: Papeles 
procedentes de Cuba, and the Audienca de Santo Domingo: the W.P. A  translations of the 
Dispatches of the Spanish Governors of Louisiana and the Archives Nationales, Paris, 
France: Archives des Colonies.18
Like most earlier writing on colonial Louisiana, my thesis also concentrated on 
Unzaga as a Louisiana governor, rather than a Spanish official in the empire. This study 
hopes to correct that mistake. I have focused primarily on Unzaga’s capable 
administration of Charles Ill's commercial reforms and their effect on Louisiana. In order 
to give the work a larger perspective I chose to add to my original investigations by 
comparing Louisiana to Havana in the records of the Spanish archives. Studying in the
332-38; Military Uniforms in Spanish Louisiana, 1766-1804,” Military Collector and 
Historian 17 (1965): 115-17; Naval Stores in Colonial Louisiana and the Floridas,” LS 7 
(1968): 295-309; and “Some Economic Problems of the Spanish Governors of Louisiana,” 
HAHR 42 (1962): 521-43. See also Brian E. Coutts, “Boom and Bust: The Rise and Fall 
of the Tobacco Industry in Spanish Louisiana, 1770-1790,” Americas 42 (1986): 289-309; 
Henry P. Dart, “A Louisiana Indigo Plantation on Bayou Teche, 1773,” Louisiana 
Historical Quarterly (hereinafter cited as LHQ) 9 (1926): 565-589 and ‘Tire Protetion in 
New Orleans in Unzaga’s Time,” LHQ 4 (1921): 201-240; David K. Bjork, “Documents 
Relating to the establishment of Schools in Louisiana, 1771,” Mississippi Valiev Historical 
Review (hereinafter cited as MVHR) 11 (1924): 361-69; and Laura L. Porteous, ‘Torture 
in Spanish Criminal Procedure in Louisiana,” LHQ 8 (1925): 5-22 and Porteous as editor 
and translator in “Governor Unzaga Decides that the Family Meeting has no Place in 
Spanish Probate Procedure in Louisiana, 1771.” LHQ. 12 (1929): 288-99.
18I examined microfilm of the legajos from the Archivo General de Indias in the 
Center for Louisiana Studies, at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette and the Hill 
Memorial Library at Louisiana State University. The W.P.A papers were typescript 
copies in the Hill Memorial Library.
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Archives in Seville allowed access to Cuba’s shipping records and the correspondence of 
Governor and Captain-General in Havana, the Marques de la Torre. While in Spain I also 
explored the Secretaria de Guerra legajos in the Archivo General de Simancas, as well as 
the Biblioteca Nacional. Working with the letters of Louisiana’s post commanders also 
opened new avenues of investigation into the effects of the Bourbon Reforms on the 
colony and the effectiveness of their implementation. Lastly, a perusal of the colony’s 
judicial records allowed a more exacting vision of the governor’s authority and the 
application of Spanish law.19
The documentary evidence on Louisiana clearly shows that Unzaga used his office 
to enhance and stabilize the colony at the time of its most difficult transition into empire. 
Exploration of the documents on Havana's shipping records indicates that Louisiana, with 
the exception of one or two years, maintained the same volume of trade with Havana that 
other portions of empire did and that she often received exceptional freedoms unavailable 
to the remainder of empire. This particular study shows that under Unzaga's capable 
government Louisiana's declining population stabilized; its commerce became integrated in 
the new mercantilistic reforms, formerly hostile Indians were brought under Spanish 
influence if somewhat tenuously, military defenses were maintained and fortified by 
Unzaga's use of espionage. Lastly, his stewardship filled Louisiana's failing coffers leaving 
in the hands of the next governor, a stable, growing colony, reconciled to Spanish rule. It
I9My research also included extended study of the microfilm found in the Hill 
Memorial Library, at Louisiana State University, the Center for Louisiana Studies at the 
University of Louisiana at Lafayette; the Historical New Orleans Collection and the 
Notary Records in New Orleans.
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is evident, then, that effective Spanish colonial control of the Louisiana borderlands was 
not created solely by Alexandra O'Reilly, but in the arduous, seven-year administration of 
Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga.
13
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Chapter Two 
Spanish Louisiana: The Fruit of the Mameyes
“Now is the hour of the mameyes!”
(Warning used by the Habaneros for an impending crisis)
At exactly ten o’clock, on the morning of June 7, 1762 the English surged ashore 
at the River Cojimar, east of Havana. Under the protective fire of their ships, 3,963 
Redcoats overran the fort near the river and the following morning advanced westward to 
the small village of Guanabacoa, which they took "in time for lunch."1 Admiral (Sir) 
George Pocock then directed a flanking move to the west of the city, conquering the 
promontory of the Cabana. By early July, the English were besieging the massive 
fortifications of Morro Castle. It took forty cannon and mortars on land, three ships firing 
from the bay, and mines to breach the walls; but on July 30*’ the British broke through and 
the Morro fell, killing Havana's greatest hero, Luis de Velasco, in the process.2
As this last bastion collapsed, fresh reinforcements from North America arrived to 
aid the British, turning their guns on the city. On the 13* of August the unthinkable 
happened—Havana, the key to Spain's wealth and power in the Caribbean, surrendered to 
the hated British. Henceforth, the citizens of Havana referred to any impending crisis as
Juliet Barclay, Havana: Portrait of a Citv (London: Cassell, 1993), 112.
^ o r  details of the actual siege see: David Syrett, Ph.D., The Siege and Capture of 
Havana 1762 (London: Navy Records Society, 1970) for British viewpoint. Juliet 
Barclay’s Havana (see above note) presents the Spanish perspective. An interesting 
account from those involved can be found in Sonia Keppel, Three Brothers at Havana 
1762 (London: Michael Russell, Ltd., 1981). See also Francis Russell Hart. The Seice of 
Havana 1762 (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, and George Allen & 
Unwin, Ltd., 1931).
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the “hour of the mameyes,” a red fruit with black shiny seeds representing the uniforms of 
the Redcoats and their devastation of the city.3
It was the second time the British had defeated Charles HI, el Ilustrado. In the 
summer of 1742, during the War of Austrian Succession, when Charles was still King of 
the Two Sicilies, some six-thousand English troops under Maximilian Brown had 
surprised his army at Velletri, and threatened to bombard his palace in Naples forcing 
Charles to briefly abandon his brother Philip in the North of Italy. While Charles 
eventually won at Velletri, the British affront to his sovereignty while King of the Two 
Sicilies made the capitulation at Havana, while he was King of Spain, even more 
embarrassing.4
Spain and England were old enemies and the Wars of Spanish Succesion (1701- 
1713) and Austrian Succession (1744-1748) had done little to mitigate the conflict. Still, 
when Charles came to the throne in 1759, he had not been anxious to involve Spain in the 
Seven Years War (Polish Succession). His first order of business was to ensure the Italian 
and Spanish successions.3 Too, he had inherited diplomatic problems in the Caribbean 
where the British were logging in Spanish territory and smuggling in various Spanish
3Barclay, 1993,123.
4Anthony H. Hull, Charles IQ and the Revival of Spain (Washington, D.C.: 
University Press of America, 1981), 43; Enciso Recio, L.M. etal Los Borbones en el Siglo 
XVm U 700-1808’) (Madrid: Editorial Gredos,1991), 610-611.
s Carlos' son, the future Charles IV had not been educated in Spain and without the 
approval of the Cortes could not become king. Carlos also placed Don Felipe, his third 
son on the throne over the Italian possessions so that more hostilities would not ensue in 
the peninsula, Enciso Recio, Los Bourbones. 608.
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ports. Despite the King's dislike of the British, he offered his services as a mediator 
between the warring parties in Europe and was promptly rebuffed by William Pitt's 
government. Charles took British rejection as a personal insult to the Spanish throne and 
to the Bourbon dynasty.6
Irrespective of British insolence in this instance, Spain's final entry into the Seven 
Years War (1756-1763) was determined by other factors-primarily the existence of a 
series of familial alliances between the thrones of France and Spain. The Bourbon crowns 
of France and Spain had already created two family compacts and a third was not 
unthinkable. The Minister of the Indies, Zenon de Somodevilla, Marques de la Ensenada, 
attempted, through secret negotiations, to create an alliance against British influence at the 
Spanish Court in 1754. Ensenada's overzealous actions cost him the king's favor and his 
post.7 At the time, Spain's Minister of War, Sebastian Eslava, and Ricardo Wall, Minister 
of State, kept Spain neutral, but not for long.
In 1756, the hostilities between England and France had developed into a full­
blown conflict. Within the next three years, France's losses in the Americas and Asia, and 
her impending defeat in Germany, occasioned another attempt at a family coalition with 
Spain. Several key elements determined Spain's actual entrance into the conflagration. As 
Charles EQ became monarch in 1759, Sebastian Eslava died. The following year the
6Ibid, 609.
7Ensenada had not only overstepped his office by entering into diplomatic 
negotiations, he had given an order to put the Spanish fleet on stand by because of 
hostilities over Colonia do Sacramento. Ensenada was deprived of his ministry and 
promptly sent into retirement. John D. Bergamini, The Spanish Bourbons: The History of 
a Tenacious Dvnastv (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1974), 82.
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young king recalled Ensenada, who soon overshadowed Ricardo Wall's stubborn 
neutrality. The King's Francophile leanings might have been tempered by his Queen,
Maria Amalia of Saxony, but she died on September 27, 1760. Ultimately, Charles' 
forbearance broke when Britain ignored Spain's requests that she stop illegal logging in 
Honduras and smuggling from Jamaica.8
Events moved quickly. Charles secretly signed the Third Family Compact on 
August 15, 1761 and declared war on Great Britain May 1, 1762. It was a costly move. 
Precisely one year after signing the compact, Spain stood defeated. Worse, the court soon 
received news that Manila had capitulated to English forces on September 24th. The only 
bright spot for Spain was the capture of Colonia do Sacramento from the Portuguese with 
an added bonus o f twenty-six English ships "richly loaded with merchandise and military 
stores amounting to more than 924,000,000 sterling."9
At the peace table in November, the British reigned. The terms of the treaty were 
a crushing defeat and an economic disaster for the French. Great Britain took all of 
France’s possessions in India and Canada and the Gulf Coast. France retained only a few 
sugar Islands in the Caribbean. The British forced Spain to renounce its fishing rights off 
the Grand Banks of Newfoundland, legitimize British logging in Honduras, and submit 
disputes on the high seas to British admiralty courts. The Spanish regained Havana only
8Spain's investigations in 1759 showed British smuggling in Jamaica cost her 
upwards of six-million pesos per year. Enciso Recio, Los Bourbones. 611.
9There were other successes in South America and Europe but none of this caliber. 
David Knuth Bjork, "The Establishment of Spanish Rule in the Province of Louisiana, 
1762-I770,"(PhX). diss., University of California, Berkely, 1923), 15.
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by ceding Florida to Britain and granting navigation rights on the Mississippi River. The 
sudden proximity of the British in North America threatened the silver mines in New Spain 
(Mexico). Through another series of secret negotiations with France, Spain gained the 
huge province of Louisiana as the sole barrier between her wealth in the New World and 
the acquisitive English.10
Charles had little time to spend on his newest possession. His first concern was 
to implement a series of reforms aimed at restructuring the administration, finances and 
defenses of the Indies. The most imperative reforms were defensive as it had become 
painfully apparent that the American armies were for the most part undermanned, the 
militias “without arms, organization, or training” and the fortifications were 
impoverished.11 Havana appeared to be the heart of the problem.
After the Treaty of Paris had been officially executed (February 10, 1763), the 
King summoned Cuba's governor, Juan de Prado y Portocarrero Malleza, and the 
members of his war council to face charges in Spain.12 As the Conde de Aranda began
10See Sir Charles Petrie, King Charles II of Spain: an Enlightened Despot (New 
York: The John Day Company, 1971), 111, for a discussion of the Treaty of Paris and 
British logging rights. The secret negotiations between France and Spain can be found in 
Arthur S. Aiton, "The Diplomacy of the Louisiana Cession," MVHR. 36 (1931): 701- 
720.
“Allan J. Kuethe, Cuba. 24; this idea is supported in Archer's, The Armvin 
Bourbon Mexico. Campbell's, The Military and Society in Colonial Peru. 1750-1810. and 
Kuethe's, Military Reform and Society in New Granada. 1773-1808.
12Prado's council consisted of Field Marshal Diego de Tabares, retired governor of 
Cartagena, Lieutenant General Conde de Superunda, previously Viceroy of Peru, and the 
Marques del Real Transporte, of the royal navy. Jaime Delgado, ""El Conde de Ricla, 
capitan general de Cuba," Revista de Historia de America. 55-56 (1963): 54.
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Prado's court martial, his cousin, Ambrosio Funes de Villalpando, the Conde de Ricla, 
sailed for Cuba.13 Ricla, now Captain General of Cuba, went to his new post with a full 
battalion of soldiers, engineers, a support team of technicians and laborers and emergency 
funds. Accompanying him was his close friend, Field Marshal Alejandro O'Reilly, an 
accomplished soldier with orders to reorganize the defenses at Havana.
O'Reilly and Ricla proceeded to implement the King's order to rebuild Havana so 
that there would be no repetition of the ignominy of 1762. In a relatively short period of 
time O'Reilly restructured the fixed battalion and the artillery corps, improved their skill 
and manpower and reduced their cost some 200,000 pesos per year.. He also built a 
larger militia of creoles14 and pardos15 with the added inducement of the fuero militar. 
By 1765 O'Reilly's militia reforms had become regulation.16
13Royal order of appointment, Buen Retiro, March 16, 1763, cedula of 
appointment, March 25, 1763, AGI, SD 1211.
14There are numerous definitions of the world Creole, in this work, as within the 
Spanish empire, the word Creole stands for anyone of European blood bom in the 
Americas, and usually does not represent a person of mixed heritage.
I5Pardo refers to persons who were of African descent, free blacks or mulattoes, 
who were literally “pardoned of their blackness” by the crown so that they might serve in 
the military or marry someone of a higher social status. This was necessary because the 
crown had established laws regarding limpieza de Sangre or the cleanliness (Europeaness) 
of blood being a prerequisite for such positions.
16This gave the soldiers similar protection and advantages to the regular Spanish 
forces and allowed them the chance at upward mobility, Kuethe, Cuba. 45; It is this
particular action, argues Lyle McAlister, that created the creole army which ultimately 
freed portions of Latin America during independence (though not in Cuba), see McAlister,
The Fuero Militar. for O'Reillys regulations see “Reglamento para las militias de 
infanteria, y caballeria de la Isla de Cuba,” Havana, 1765, AGI, SD 2120.
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Ricla, meanwhile, focused on rebuilding the fortifications and restructuring 
finances. He ordered that the Mexican subsidy to Cuba's treasury be used exclusively to 
rebuild the fortifications, and in 1764 levied new taxes on the creole population in Havana 
to assist in the project. O'Reilly filed an additional report on the condition of the rest of 
the island recommending economic development and more effective government. He 
suggested that the crown reduce the taxes on commerce (especially the slave trade) and 
open new ports to stimulate the economy. In October, at the behest of both Ricla and 
O'Reilly, the Cubans drafted a petition to the crown outlining the commercial reforms they 
felt necessary to restructure their economy and ultimately their defenses. This petition 
helped convince Charles HI that commerce in the Indies needed reform and reorganization 
appointing a committee to investigate problems with commerce in Empire.17
The military reforms at Havana impressed the King enough that he extended 
similar techniques to the reorganization of the armies in the rest of the colonies. In 1764, 
the crown also reorganized its ministries, placing military expenditures under Esquilache 
as Minister of War rather than the Ministry of the Indies. Working on O'Reilly's 
recommendations, Esquilache then established an intendente de guerra which helped 
centralize the army’s administration in Havana under crown officials. With reorganization 
underway and the proper administrative infrastructure in place the Minister of War turned 
to commercial reform to finance his military needs.18
17Ricla to Esquilache, Havana, Dec. 14, 1763, AGS, Hac 2342.
18Kuethe, Cuba. 70.
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At Esquilache's suggestion Charles HI appointed a special committee to investigate 
the problems affecting commerce within the Empire. The commission reported that there 
were eight major causes for the “decay” in colonial trade. They pointed to the Cadiz 
monopoly, high export duties and shipping costs, expensive and restrictive licensing 
practices, smuggling, the neglect of agriculture, and the diversion of silver specie to 
colonial ports before it reached the metropole. In response to the report and the petition 
from Havana, the Crown opened several major Caribbean ports in Cuba, Puerto Rico, St. 
Domingue, Margarita, and Trinidad, to trade with eight Spanish cities (Cadiz, Seville, 
Alicante, Cartagena, Malaga, Barcelona, Santander, La Coruna, and Gijon), discontinued 
licensing and lowered other duties and fees, replacing them with a small “impost o f six or 
seven percent ad valorem.”19
Havana immediately benefited from the reforms of 1765. As legal trade increased, 
Cuba's revenues soared, reaching 375,000 pesos annually during the 1760s and 562,500 
during the 1770s.20 Ricla's hard work and foresight regenerated the colony's 
administration and O'Reilly's military reforms invigorated its defenses, giving the 
Habaneros a new sense of prestige in the empire and primacy in the Caribbean. Charles 
rewarded Ricla with an appointment at court and O'Reilly with an assignment to begin 
reform in Puerto Rico.21
19The ordinance of 1765 was actually extended to Louisiana by decree in 1768. 
John G. Clark, New Orleans. 171-173.
“ Kuethe, Cuba. 73-74.
2lTorres Ramirez, Alejandro CReillv. 49, 55-94.
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Charles HI tried to create the same transformation in his colonies on tierra firmer1 
but with varied success. He appointed Jose de Galvez as visitor general (an overarching 
administrative and investigative position) of New Spain and the borderlands territories, 
with instructions to “check procedures in law of the audiencia judges, reform the 
collection of revenue, improve public order, and work with the Viceroy, the Marques de 
Cruillas, and the military inspector, Juan de Villalba, in organizing defenses.”23 
Additionally, the Comanche and Apache tribes were committing new atrocities in the 
northwestern borderlands and Charles ordered Galvez to reorganize the mission-presidio 
system and protect the colonists or move them to safety.24
Despite his competence, Galvez was not particularly popular, especially since he 
was part and parcel of the Crown's eviction of the Jesuits in the Americas (1767). He had 
also recently replaced the then current viceroy of New Spain and the military inspector in 
an effort to root out official corruption. Alan Kuethe notes that the people and 
bureaucracy of New Spain resisted his reforms, sometimes to the point of violence. 
Violence and contention also darkened the reforms in Peru, Chile and Central America.25
“ The mainland colonies of the Americas.
“ Hull, Charles UL 209-10.
24A system by which the crown first sent missionaries into Indian territory and if 
they survived followed up with soldiers to establish a local garrison known as a presidio.
25 Kuethe, Cuba. 76; See also Herbert Eugene Bolton, Texas in the Middle 
Eighteenth Centurv: Studies in Spanish Colonial History and Administration (Original 
Manuscript,1915; Reprint New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1962 and Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1970)
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Galvez and his mission were only part of the larger plan by the Crown to shore up 
its defenses in North America, which were being undermined in several places. In addition 
to fending off Indian attacks, Charles HI was increasingly concerned with invading 
Europeans along the Pacific Coast. He was aware that Russian trappers and traders 
searching for pelts along the coast of Alaska could easily occupy the islands along the 
California coast. They might also quietly erect military posts with little fear of Spanish 
intervention.26 Complicating matters was the British claim to the port of San Francisco as 
New Albion. This stirred Charles to action because Spain held territorial sovereignty in 
the area based solely on historical precedence, but Great Britain and Russia might easily 
claim the territory through effective settlement.27
Spain's monarch also faced European intrusion elsewhere in the Empire. In 1764 
the French and the British had established settlements in the Malvinas (Falklands). The 
British in the Pacific were contesting Spanish rights to the rich port o f Manila. Despite the 
fact that it had returned Manila to Spain in the Treaty of Paris, Great Britain claimed the 
territoiy “by virtue of Spain's abandonment of the Philippines.”2* Once again, lack of 
Spanish settlement might rob Spain of its territory.
“ For a larger discussion of the Russians see the Nootka Sound Controversy in 
Warren L. Cook, Flood Tide ofEmnire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest 1543-1819 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).
P etrie . King Charles. 137-38.
2*Hull. Charles ITT 215: Hargreaves-Mawdslev. Eighteenth-Centurv Spain: 1700- 
1788: A Poli tical. Diplomatic and Institutuional History (Totawa, NJ: Rowan and 
Littlefield, 1979), 121: Petrie. King Charles. 138.
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If problems with the hated British in the Malvinas and Manila weren't enough, by 
1765, France again began to agitate affairs in the Atlantic. Britain was temporarily 
distracted from European matters by dissension in her Atlantic colonies and she was also 
busy with the usual dismantling of the armed forces after her victories in war. France took 
the opportunity, while British backs were turned, to bum the naval arsenals at Plymouth 
and Portsmouth-to more or less speed up British disarmament. Although Spain had not 
taken part in the plot, her alliance with France had not ceased after the Treaty of Paris.
Not only was Spain expected to provide “quiet cooperation” for France's machinations, 
Charles also faced the very real possibility of new problems with Britain in Europe, as well 
as the Americas.29
At the same time Charles struggled with empire he became embroiled in a war of 
wills with the Madrileiios over “proper” dress. Esquilache, the King's favorite but the 
most unpopular minister with his subjects, had prompted the monarch to try and decrease 
the demand for wool so that more land could be converted to grain production. Charles 
and his minister reasoned that by banning the use of long coats, extravagant dress and 
wide brimmed hats they could discourage crime in the city and lower the demand for wool 
cloth at the same time (long coats hid swords and the hats hid criminal faces). Actual 
enforcement of his minister's ideas produced a full-blown riot in Madrid in 1766 which 
Charles barely escaped by dismissing both Esquilache and Ensenada and retreating with his 
family to the palace at Aranjuez.30
Petrie , King Charles. 138.
Petrie . King Charles. 121-123.
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Ultimately, the king blamed failure of his domestic reform on the general 
intransigence of the Jesuits toward change. Charles' anti-clerical opinions were well 
known and he had already dismissed an Inquisitor General for anti-reformist actions in 
1761.
In 1767, he gave the order for the expulsion of the Jesuits in the Indies. It was an 
unfortunate and unpopular decision for the colonies. The King's own actions now 
hampered those of his visitor general. To ensure defensive Spanish settlement in 
California and the Southwest, Galvez needed the mission-presidio system precisely when 
Charles ordered it emptied of the Jesuits. Instead, the often less capable and less 
experienced Franciscans and Dominicans arrived to press into the frontier.31
Thus preoccupied with imperial ambitions and domestic frustrations, Charles had 
little time to consider the fate of his latest colony in the borderlands, although Louisiana's 
importance to Spain had never truly diminished. As early as 1761, Spain had received 
reports from the Quereteran missions in Texas that the English presence in Louisiana 
endangered their position.32 Later, in the Seven Years War and its ensuing treaty, the 
Spanish monarch's willingness to negotiate was due, in part, to a desire to gain the 
territory of Louisiana as a buffer zone. Spain's minister informed the French court that it
31The king felt that the Jesuits had affronted his authority in ecclesiastical matters 
and in 1767 ordered them expelled from the colonies-an unpopular act in the colonies 
which crippled the mission system in many parts of the empire. W. N. Hargreaves- 
Mawdsley, Eighteenth-Centurv Spain. 114-15; John Edward Fagg, Latin America: A 
General History. 34th ed. (New York: Mcmillian Publishing Co., Inc., 1977), 223-23; 
Petrie, King Charles. 147.
32Bolton, DeMezieres-1,68.
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was not “free to dispose of possessions, the right to which Spain, as the legitimate owner, 
has never conceded.”33 Instead he suggested that a neutral zone be-established below 
Southern Canada and west of Georgia but was rebuffed by the British, who wanted the 
Mississippi. The French cession of Louisiana to Spain only alleviated problems with the 
British for a short while.34
The Treaty of Paris actually marked the beginning of a determined Anglo advance 
toward the Mississippi, despite the Line of Demarcation drawn in the Appalachians. 
Indeed, as early as 1763 the British proposed that two colonies be established in the 
Northwest territories on the Ohio and Illinois Rivers and a third at Natchez. Robert 
Farmer entered Mobile by July of 1763 and that same month George Johnson was 
commissioned to occupy Pensacola with a Major Loftus who would take control of the 
Illinois district.35 In the vastness of the Louisiana territory west of the Mississippi and the 
proximity of the British on its long, open borders, Spain again freed the interminable 
problem of creating a defensive barrier against encroachment and of establishing effective 
Spanish settlement in the area.36
“ Shepherd, “The Cession of Louisiana to Spain,” Political Science Quarterly. 19 
(1904), 442-443.
“ Bjork, “Establishment of Spanish Rule,” 13.
35Farmer took official control of Mobile whose western borders were stated as the 
Mississippi River, to the Iberville River, across lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain and out 
to the Gulf. AN, Col., C13A, 43: 234. George Johnstone didn't arrive until 1765.
“ Bjork, “The Establishment of Spanish Rule,” 21; Clarence E. Carter, Great 
Britain and the Illinois Country. 763-1764. (Washington, D.C.: The American Historical 
Association, 1910), 105; Clarence W. Alvord, The Illinois Country. 1673-1818. 2 vols. 
(Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1965), 1: 164, 166.
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Louisiana presented the Spaniards with a number of puzzles. The first was the 
areal extent of the colony. The colony’s huge territory was essentially bounded on the 
east by the Mississippi River with the exception of the Isle of Orleans, bounded by a line 
which flowed Southeast from the mouth of the Iberville River, through Lakes 
Pontachartrain and Maurepas, creating a boundary with western Florida. Above the 
Iberville it extended northward, along the river through “Indian territory” to an area 
surrounding the previously French town of St.Genevieve (St. Louis was founded later). 
The north-south expanse of the colony was so vast that the Spanish referred to everything 
above the mouth of the Arkansas River as Upper Louisiana and everything below it as 
Lower Louisiana. Above the French settlements and toward the northwest it was difficult 
to tell where Spanish Louisiana ended and British Canada began. Fur traders and Indians 
dominated that uncharted territory and neither had forts west of the mouth of the Missouri 
River. In the Southeast Louisiana's boundaries started at the Rigolets, moving westward 
across the Gulf of Mexico and ending at the boundary of Spanish Texas, marked only at 
the forts of Natchitoches and Los Adaes and the Sabine River. The area between the two 
colonies was so uncertain that it was called “no-mans” land for the next century, harboring 
many miscreants and criminals who sought to escape the authorities in Texas and/or 
Louisiana. North and west of the Sabine there was no certain western border and much 
of the territory was still uncharted. It was extremely difficult for Spain to guard such 
ambiguous and far flung boundaries.37
37Femando Solano Costa, “Los Problemas Diplomaticos de las Fronteras de la 
Luisiana Espafiola,” Cuademos de Historica Diplomatics 4 (1968): 121-54; See Louis R. 
Nardini, No Man’s Land: A History of El Camino Real (New Orleans: Pelican Press,
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The second puzzle was how to bring about Spanish settlement. The colony held 
no particular draw for Spaniards seeking life on the hacienda (large estates) or rich urban 
towns. The lack of mineral wealth, no large and wealthy, sedentary Indian communities, 
and a small population of African slaves was further complicated by the fact that Louisiana 
also held groups of non-Spanish colonists who had been established there for over half a 
century.
Louis XVs behavior toward his old colony did not make Spain’s burden any 
easier. The French king had deliberately let the colonists in Louisiana believe that he had 
“only entrusted the colony to his Bourbon cousin Carlos to satisfy the honors of all the 
kings involved.”3® This belief and Spain's tardiness in claiming her last colony led many of 
the French in New Orleans to convince themselves that the transfer had not actually taken 
place. In fact, by 1764 they believed that the peace between England and France was just 
another lull in the continual wars of the eighteenth-century and that France was merely 
waiting to retake the colony at the end of another war.39 The following year, to force
1961) regarding the southwestern strip between the two colonies. Also see Eugene 
Morrow Violette, “Spanish Land Claims in Missouri,” Washington University Studies 8 
(1921): 167-200, for problems with the confusing boundaries of Spanish Louisiana which 
extend into the nineteenth century.
“ Thomas Neil Ingersoll, Old New Orleans: Race, class, sex, and order in the early 
Deep South. 1718-1819. (Ph.D. diss., University o f California, Los Angeles, 1990), 404.
39Report by Governor d'Abbadie, July 3,1764, in Carl A. Brasseaux, A 
Comparative View of French Louisiana. 1699 and 1762: The Journals of Pierre LeMovne 
dTberville and Jean-Jacques-Blaise d'Abbadie (Lafayette: University of Southwestern 
Louisiana, 1981 [1979]), 120.
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Charles' hand, Louis told his cousin that Spain must take possession of Louisiana or 
consider giving it back.
Charles HI moved, perhaps not in the direction Louis had hoped. In May of 1765, 
he appointed Don Antonio de Ulloa to implant a Spanish government in Louisiana.40 
Ulloa, who was in Havana, began gathering men and provisions. He also wrote a letter to 
the Superior Council in New Orleans, to announce his arrival, telling them that he had 
been instructed by the king “to take possession of it [Louisiana] in his name, and in 
conformity with the Orders of his Most Christian Majesty”and had taken a moment to 
“acquaint” them with his mission.41
Ulloa was an adept diplomat and had previously served the crown in delicate 
situations both in the Indies and Europe. In the 1740s he had exposed the corrupt 
conditions of the Viceroyalty of Peru and again in that colonies' mercury mines at 
Huancavelica in the 1760s. The unhappy, corrupt officials had ousted him from the 
colony. Ulloa had arrived in Havana in 1765 expecting to be recalled to Spain, but his 
analytical and observational skills, not to mention his fluency in French, meant a 
governorship in Louisiana instead.42
40Ulloa's appointment and instructions are in AGI, SD 2542.
4lUlloa to Superior Council in New Orleans, Havana, July 10, 1765, AN., Col. 
C13A, 45: 161, and Gayarre, 131.
42Ulloa's work with the vicroyalty can be found in Irving A. Leonard, ed. Jorge 
Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, A Voyage to South America, trans. John Adams (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopfj 1964): 3-19. His work at the mercury mines can be found in Whitaker, 
Huancavelica Mercury Mines. General works on Ulloa include Whitaker, “Antonio de 
Ulloa,” and Moore “Antonio de Ulloa; and Krousel, Don Antonio de Ulloa
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Provisioning his ships and gathering men took longer than expected and Ulloa's 
retinue did not reach the Mississippi River until March 5 ,1766.43 Even then, the Spanish 
arrival was not awe-inspiring. A single frigate anchored ofFNew Orleans just as a 
torrential downpour struck. Even less impressive was the slight figure of the governor 
and his small contingent of ninety soldiers.44
The new governor's orders were to take possession without changing the existing 
colonial order. While Louisiana was to be strengthened militarily, resistance against the 
British onslaught was not to be achieved through the normal mission-presidio system. 
Instead he was to create and maintain a group of Indian allies, populate the border at the 
Mississippi and bolster the military by putting the French soldiers on an equal footing with 
the Spaniards. He also faced the unpopular task of dissolving and replacing the existing 
French government.45
The colony’s reception of their new governor was at best luke-warm. Some of the 
elite in New Orleans eventually became friendly with Ulloa but, for the most part, they
43The expeditionary force of a hundred men sent to Louisiana did not reach 
Havana until December of 1765. By then it had been reduced in strength by death and 
illness on the way over to a meager force of ninety men. KrouseL, Ulloa. 2; and John 
Preston Moore, Revolt in Louisiana: The Spanish Occupation 1766-1770 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1976).
“ Ulloa was short and extremely thin. The Spanish government had equipped him 
with the bare minimum of two companies of infantry, and he was accompanied by Loyola, 
the commissary of war and intendant, by Esteben Gayarre the new comptroller and by 
Martin Navarro, the treasure. Bjork, “Establishment of Spanish Louisiana,” 84. In 
Louisiana, Ulloa’s contingent of ninety men were soon reduced to seventy-five by disease 
and desertion. Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez. 9.
45Bjork, “Establishment of Spanish Louisiana,” 84.
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remained aloof and even mocking. At the time Ulloa took command, the colony was on 
the verge of collapse from the malfeasance of its officials and neglect by the crown.
Neglect had left the colonists unruly, distrustful of government, and independent-minded. 
Ulloa realized the impossibility of his position and tried to make the transfer as painless as 
possible. Without raising the Spanish flag he retreated with his ship to the mouth of the 
Mississippi, where he established his fort at Balize. There he met quietly with acting 
French governor Charles-Philippe Aubry to complete the exchange. With few troops and 
fewer officials he decided to leave the Superior Council intact for the moment and turned 
to building forts along the Mississippi while he waited for more troops and money.
During his tenure in Balize, Ulloa began to collect information so the government in 
Madrid could decide what to do about Louisiana.
The colonists were insulted and confused. Paradoxically, they feared Spain's 
mercantilists regulations on commerce, yet they entertained dreams of Spanish silver 
flooding the colony to replace their own paper currency, now depreciated to one-fourth of 
its face value. Unfortunately, Ulloa had little money to spend on the colony. The crown 
had given him only 34,030.38 pesos for expenditures in 1766. The situado for regular 
expenditures, supplies, and salaries amounted to 28,490.25 pesos and extraordinary funds 
of 3,333.25 pesos had to pay for lodging the troops, rents on housing for the officials, and 
debts incurred by the French officials. Only 2,204.13 pesos could be expended on naval 
stores, docks, and rations for sailors. Ulloa had nothing forpoblaciony amistad de
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Indios, the normal funding for new immigrants and gifts to the Indians.46 These funds 
were hardly the flood of Spanish silver the colonists expected and after expenditures left 
little to save the floundering currency of the colony. Thankfully, Spain did send more 
funding. By 1767, Ulloa convinced the Spanish government to agree to increase the 
annual appropriation, but it was never enough. Over the next two years Spain's 
investment in Louisiana grew, though the monies were often misdirected as the following 
figures indicate. In 1767 the crown increased expenditures from the 34,030.38 pesos 
originally sent with Ulloa to 145,771.65 pesos, including 7,536.5 pesos for settling 
immigrants and buying Indian gifts. By 1768 it raised it expenditures to 155,397.25 pesos 
but the new monies were directed toward the Marina (the navy, its men, ships and ports) 
and troops and Ulloa found it increasingly difficult to deal with immigrants and Indians.47
With Ulloa at Balize, Aubry stayed on as acting governor under orders from his 
king. Louisiana fell under dual French and Spanish rule. Aubry hoped the French crown 
would ease the situation but in the summer of 1766 he received a royal order that the 
French would make no more payments on bills of exchange. The colonists were 
contemptuous and rebellious. Both governors were embarrased and disappointed.4*
46This last oversight by the crown was particularly damaging because Ulloa was 
supposed to continue the French policy of giving gifts to the Indians to win them as allies. 
Without gifts it would be difficult for him to win the favor of Indians who previously had 
been Spain’s enemies. Figures in a letter from Navarro to Jose de Galvez, July 18,1787, 
AGI, SD 2684.
47Rodriguez Casado, Primeros afios. 116-29. Accounts of the Royal Treasury in a 
letter from Martin Navarro to Jose de Galvez, July 18, 1787, AGI, SD 2684.
^ jo rk , “Establishment of Spanish Rule,” 88; Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez. 10; 
Arthur Preston Whitaker, “Antonio de Ulloa,” 155-95; Moore, “Antonio de Ulloa: A
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Despite the tense situation in the colony Ulloa endeavored over the next thirty 
months to continue on as ordered. He tried to appease the troops by offering French 
soldiers the same pay as the Spaniards, which required that the Spanish soldiers take a 
reduction of one-fifth of their normal pay. In protest, the Spaniards deserted and the 
French unanimously refused.49 Spain sent replacements, but slowly and in small 
numbers.50 The governor attempted to establish a fort at the mouth of the Mississippi, 
one on the Red River, one opposite Natchez, one on the Iberville opposite Fort Bute, as 
well as two in Missouri, giving Captain Riu strict orders to resist to the “uttermost” and 
English interference or claim to the northern side of the Missouri River.51
Indian problems plagued the governor, the French gave them brandy and the 
English bribed them with presents that Ulloa couldn't match. Trade with the Indians was 
confined to licensed traders, primarily the firm of Laclede and St. Maxent. Only a few
Profile,” 189-318; see also Rodriguez Casado, Primeros afios.
49Common soldiers supposed to be paid 8 pesos per month but actually received 
only 5 pesos and 2 reales because the rest was used to pay for their clothing and 
“maintenance” a common occurrence in Borderland's posts and a common reason for 
desertion since maintenance included food and drink. Pay also often came late during 
Ulloa's tenure, another reason for dissent. Abraham P. Nasatir, “Government Employees 
and Salaries in Spanish Louisiana,” LHO. 29 (1946): 890-91.
“ Gilbert C. Din, “Protecting the Barreda',” 184-92. All replacements stopped in 
Havana for training before they arrived in Louisiana to enter what eventually became the 
Fixed Louisiana Infantry Battalion.
51Captain Riu was the Lieutenant Governor of Spanish Illinois from 1766 to 1770 
when O'Reilly replaced him with Pedro Piemas, Louis Houck, The Spanish Regime in 
Missouri: A Collection of Papers and Documents Relating to Upper Louisiana. Principally 
within the Limits o f Missouri during the Dominion of Spain 2 vols. (Chicago: R. R. 
Donnelly, 1909; Reprint, Amo Press, 1971), 1: 1-3,20-28.
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soldiers could be sent to the outlying forts and Aubry wrote Choiseul in March that he 
feared the forty men sent to Illinois would “make little impression on the Indians or the 
English”52
The governor also placed immigrants at strategic points along the Mississippi to 
form a defensive line of settlements, often a difficult task since newcomers often wanted to 
stay near already settled families (often relatives) and resented the governor's interference. 
Also, these families needed at least two years worth of provisions at the expense of the 
Spanish government.53
Ulloa's attempts to control commerce met with continual failure. French 
discontent grew because his licensing of Indian trade appeared to be a monopoly for 
Laclede and St. Maxent. The Indians were not impressed with the governor’s forts, 
soldiers or gifts. He tried to curb smuggling and control prices by issuing a decree in 
September of 1766 requiring all merchants to have licenses or passports from his officials 
and sought to control the slave trade. The merchants either ignored him or grew furious 
when they had to comply. Throughout 1767 they worked against Spanish rule with a 
mounting distrust of Ulloa and his officials. The governor wrote to the Captain-General in
52Bjork, “Establishment of Spanish Rule, 97.
^Ulloato Grimaldi, September 29, 1766, AGI, SD 2585. The governor was 
denounced on more than one occaision for interfering with the Acadians settlement plans. 
Rodriguez Casado, Primeros afios. 104-105. For further information on Ulloa and the 
Acadians see Richard E. Chandler, “End of an Odyssey. Acadians Arrive in St. Gabriel 
Louisiana,” LH 18 (1977), 69-87.
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Havana desperately seeking money and warning that everything seemed to cause “revolts 
and seditions” in Louisiana.54
The governor's unbending insistence on Spanish regulations further soured 
relations and provoked Aubry to note that had he but treated the French with a little 
“douceur ” (sweetness) it might have helped. He also warned the French crown that the 
colonists and Indians were angry enough over the transfer that they were considering 
offering the colony to Great Britain.55 Ulloa's notable absence in the community made 
resistance easier and by 1768 when he returned from an inspection of the lower colony he 
was confronted with open opposition under the leadership of Attorney General Nicolas 
Lafreniere.
In 1768 the Spanish crown promulgated new and restrictive commercial 
regulations. Ironically, Louisiana was the first Spanish colony to receive almost 
unrestricted trade with other Spanish ports but the order forbade trade, with non-Spanish 
ports and required the use of Spanish owned ships. (This also included colonial ships.)
The French in Louisiana were used to a much larger zone of trade including the Islands of 
the West Indies. While the duties Louisianians were to pay were reasonable, the 
threatened disruption of their normal trade patterns both frightened and infuriated them. 
When Ulloa proclaimed the new royal order, the colonists rebelled. During the revolt, the
54Thomas Neil Ingersoll, Old New Orleans. 413 and Ulloa to Bucareli, March 3, 
1767 in Lawrence Kinnaird, ed., Spain in the Mississippi Valiev. 1765-1794: Translations 
of Materials from the Spanish Archives in the Bancroft Library, (hereinafter SMV) 3 vols., 
Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1945. (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 1: 20-21.
55Aubry to Praslin, March 30, 1767, Archives Nationales, AC, C13a, 47:6-9.
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Superior Council banished Ulloa in an act of defiance. Thus Louisiana's first Spanish 
governor left without taking effective control of the colony.56
The motivation of the rebels was complex. Many believed that the revolt would 
oust Spanish rule completely and that when Ulloa's ship, the Volante, sailed for Havana 
they might convince either Great Britain or France to take possession. Neither did. The 
colonists were even more disappointed when it became apparent that Spain was still 
interested in her rebellious colony. As the colonial authority descended into chaos the 
colonists grew nervous waiting for some “good king” to take them under protection.
They did not have to wait long.57
As the colonists pleaded for help in France, Spain's ministers debated the 
appropriate reaction. Suggestions flew in the capital as to what might be done and what 
might happen. One Swiss mercenary who remained in the colony suggested that it might 
become a republic. Others knew Charles m  would make no such agreement. Spain must 
answer Louisiana’s challenge.58 Ulloa arrived in Spain in February and delivered a report
“ For a more comprehensive account of the insurrection from the Spanish 
viewpoint see AGI, SD 2543 and Moore, Revolt in Louisiana. Whitaker, “Antonio de 
Ulloa,” 155-95, Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez. 10-15. The French side has recently been 
examined by Carl Brasseaux, in Denis-Nicolas Foucault and the New Orleans Rebellion of 
1768. (Ruston, LA: McGinty Publications, 1987).
^Richard E. Chandler, “O’Reilly’s Voyage from Havana to Balize,” LH 20 
(1981): 199-207.
58Ingersoll, Old New Orelans. 1: 430, indicates that both England and French 
Saint-Domingue suggested a republic jointly governed by the Bourbon thrones but there is 
no evidence to support this claim. England did not want to get involved in the conflict and 
told colonial representatives as much when they visited London. For other suggested 
solutions to the “Louisiana problem” see Moore’s Revolt in Louisiana.
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to Grimaldi on the rebellion, including the names of its key leaders.59 In response to 
Ulloa’s report, Grimaldi immediately admonished the French for not punishing the 
Louisiana delegates present at their court. The Ministry of the Indies then met to discuss 
the situation, and with the exception of treasurer Don Miguel de Muzquiz, decided to 
keep Louisiana after comparing the cost of retaking the colony and to the cost of losing it 
to the British.60 Added to these reasons was the danger that the idea of revolution might 
spread to other Spanish colonies-a reasonable fear considering the rising independence of 
many creoles within Spain's empire.
The King acted quickly. He ordered Don Alejandro O'Reilly to recover the 
colony, punish the ringleaders of the rebellion and install Spanish government, including a 
new governor. A Royal Cedula dated April 21, 1769, identified that new governor as 
Lieutenant Colonel Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, an officer with a reputation as a good 
commander and organizer, then serving in Havana.61
By June of 1769 Louisiana had its answer. Spain was still interested. In response 
to requests for funding from Aubry, Captain-General Antonio Maria Bucareli sent 
situation funds from Havana to pay the troops, buy gifts for the Indians and support what
59Ulloa to Grimaldi, February 14, 1769, AGI, SD 80.
60Muzquiz was convinced that Louisiana would never equal in worth what it would 
cost the Spanish to defend it.
6lRoyal Cedula to O'Reilly, Aranjuez, April 16, 1769, AGI, Cuba 2357; for Unzaga 
see “Hoja de Servicio de Unzaga y Amezaga,” AGS, Secretaria de Guerra 7259, Folio54; 
Jacobo de la Puzuela, Diccionario Geografico. Estadistico. Historia de la Isla de Cuba. 2 
vols., (Madrid: Imprenta del Establidmiento de Mellado, 1863), 2: 631.
38
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
was left of the Spanish officials in the colony.62 That same month O'Reilly arrived in 
Havana where he selected troops, equipment, supplies and support personnel and 
contacted Unzaga.63 In a fortnight O'Reilly organized his expedition and early on July 6, 
1769 he and Unzaga set sail for Louisiana. This time there would be no expulsion, for 
waiting beneath the sails of their twenty-one ships were 2056 troops, firearms and 
ammunition.64
The fruit of mameyes in Havana secured a new colony for Spain and produced 
Louisiana’s first three governors. UUoa, sadly dismissed from his post by his own 
citizenry, had given valuable information to the crown about its newest colony. Within a 
year, O'Reilly set in place the structure of government and military defense. Effective 
control of the Louisiana borderlands, however, came after seven long years of government 
in the capable hands of Luis Unzaga y Amezaga.
®Aubry wrote to Bucareli in February requesting money for medical personnel, 
interpreters, and government employees, as well as gifts for the Indians. Aubry to 
Bucareli, February 24, 1769, AGI, Cuba 1054. Bucareli sent some 12,783 pesos, 3 reales 
to New Orleans, 8,000 of which was for the troops, Indian gifts and officials. Bucareli to 
Aubry, June 22,1769, AGI, Cuba 1054.
“Bucareli to Grimaldi, June 24, 1769, AGI SD 80, fol.1130.
“ O'Reilly also carried 150,000 pesos to cover unexpected expenses. Bucareli to 
Arriaga, July 7, 1769, AGI SD 80, fol. 1135.
39
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Three 
O’Reilly
“There is nothing that makes a government milder and more respected than to render to 
each misdeed the justice which is due it. ” Alejandro O’Reilly1
In 1769, Charles III, sent one of his most capable officers to Louisiana to subdue 
the rebellion of its colonists and firmly establish Spanish rule. The crown afforded 
O’Reilly far more troops, money and munitions than it originally sent with Ulloa. In short, 
swift strokes O’Reilly stopped the rebellion and planted the Spanish flag. Working toward 
the goals of the Bourbon Reforms, over the next year he redistributed the meager troops 
in a defensive barrier around the colony and built a colonial militia along the same lines as 
the one in Havana. At the same time he established a new framework of Spanish 
government, enforced Spain’s economic decrees, encouraged agriculture through 
immigration, and establish a Spanish ecclesiastical presence in the colony. It was a 
tremendous task but the King had chosen wisely.
O'Reilly's ship the Volante reached the mouth of the Mississippi in two weeks but 
he delayed his entrance into New Orleans due to inclement weather. He did send notice to 
Aubry of his arrival. When the news of the Spanish presence leaked to the general 
populace of New Orleans, many of them, notably a number of the rebels, came to meet 
with the captain-general at Balize to plead their case. He listened but was stem and 
evasive in his answers. Finally, the captain-general and his ships appeared at dawn off 
New Orleans on August 17,1769. Numerous cannon volleys announced his presence to
‘Bjork, “Establishment of Spanish Rule,” 136.
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the startled town. Again O’Reilly waited, this time for a day before he made his dignified 
entrance, ceremoniously lowering the French flag and replacing it with that of Spain.2
After taking formal possession, the Spaniards turned their attention to the matter 
of the rebellion. Three days later O'Reilly invited the ringleaders to his house where they 
were arrested. He then posted a general clemency for the city and ordered all adult males 
in the colony to sign an oath of allegiance to Charles ID. After a lengthy trial O’Reilly 
convicted and passed sentenced on the leaders of the revolt. He appointed a commission 
headed by Treasurer, Martin Navarro to dispose of their estates appropriately. The 
ensuing executions so shocked New Orleans that afterwards its citizens referred to the 
Field Marshal as Butcher or Bloody O'Reilly.3
There still remained the matter of the merchant class in New Orleans who posed a 
distinct threat to both Spanish authority and its intended commercial policies. O'Reilly 
began by expelling approximately two dozen merchants and their families, a number of 
them English Protestants and Jews who refused to abjure their religion. It has been 
suggested by Thomas Ingersoll, in his recent dissertation on New Orleans, that with this 
move O’Reilly effectively purged the French elite that stood against Spanish authority. 
Other historians disagree. The first problem was that the merchant class was not the only 
French elite. There was also a landed, slave-owning planter class who distrusted the
^ jork , “Establishment of Spanish Rule,” 131, Texada, Alejandro O’Reilly and the 
New Orleans Rebels. 25-32.
3 A more lengthy discussion of the trial and convictions can be found in John 
Preston Moore, Revolt in Louisiana and Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros afios. 328-43. A 
good biography of Navarro can be found in Brian E. Coutt’s dissertation, “Martin 
Navarro.”
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Spanish government and constantly tried to circumvent Spanish laws and regulations, 
especially concerning slavery. Second, the remaining Superior Council was filled with 
decidedly anti-Spanish members. Gilbert C. Din notes, in his recent work on the New 
Orleans Cabildo, that French planters and merchants competed for offices in the Cabildo’s 
government where they could continue to apply the law for their own benefit. Where the 
remaining merchants are concerned, Margaret Fisher Dalrymple’s work on John 
Fitzpatrick indicates that a number of New Orleans French merchants continued to 
covertly funnel illegal trade and money to ousted English merchants during 1769 in direct 
disobedience to O’Reilly’s orders. Lastly, it should be noted that many of the elite 
families, both planters and merchants, wanted a stable government in Louisiana and were 
not adverse to Spain’s presence. The French elite never truly lost its power, it merely 
continued the fight through different channels. O’Reilly believed, however, that he had 
removed any overt challenge to Spanish authority and that the remaining populace would 
gradually acquiesce.3
With the first of his goals met, during October O'Reilly began an assessment of the 
rest of the colony and turned his attention to the military and government. His remaining 
orders required not only that he establish Spanish control, but that he create a suitable 
defense against the British, and finally that he make prosperity in Louisiana possible so
3IngersolL, Old New Orleans, 1,433 ; See the introduction to Margaret Fisher 
Dalrymple’s, Merchant of Manchac: The Letterbooks o f John Fitzpatrick. 1768-1790. 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978) and peruse the list of names for 
the officials in Din and Harkins’, New Orleans Cabildo. Also see Din’s recent volume 
Spaniards. Planters and Slaves (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1999) who 
indicates that the French planters continually resisted the imposition of Spanish law.
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that eventually it would pay for itself.4 In a letter to Arriaga, dated October 17, 1769, he 
listed what he considered the necessary steps to bend Louisiana to Spanish rule. He 
requested that Louisiana be subject to the same laws as other Spanish colonies and that all 
official proceedings be done in Spanish. Additionally, he felt justice would be best served 
by a new tribunal of judges who spoke both French and Spanish and that the Captain- 
General’s court in Havana should serve as the Court of Appeals, followed by the Council 
of the Indies in Spain. The Crown agreed. The new law was an abridged version of the 
Recopiliacion de Leyes de las Indias, which, combined with parts of the French Code 
Noir, became known as the “Code O'Reilly” and included an unprecedented system of 
strict enforcement of the law, equally new in the laissez-faire community.5
The next step was to remove French opposition in government, more precisely the 
Superior Council, which was a nest of wealthy, French planters. The council had 
originally been a court but over the years had assumed both administrative and legislative 
powers and the attorney general dominated local politics and law. Despite its importance, 
most of the councilors had no law degrees and many members had become complacent 
about their duties.6 UUoa had originally been ordered to abolish the council but his orders
4Jack D. L. Holmes, “O'Reilly's 1769 Commission: A Personal View,” I I I  24 
1983: 307-313.
’O'Reilly to Arriaga, October 17, 1769, AGI, SD 87, Folio 5.
6Jerry A. Micelle, “From Law Court to Local Government: Metamorphosis of the 
Superior Council of French Louisiana,” III , 9 (1968): 103-07; Carl A. Brasseaux, Denis- 
Nicolas Foucault and the New Orleans Rebellion of 1768 (Ruston, La, 1987), 58-61; and 
Henry P. Dart, “Courts and Law in Colonial Louisiana” LHO. 4 (1921): 255-70; See also 
Ulloa's remarks about the inability of the council members in Gilbert C. Din and John E. 
Harkins, New Orleans Cabildo. 42.
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were changed to establish a judicial tribunal with a legal advisor, a French and a Spanish 
clerk, and the governor as chief judge. Because he did not have enough troops or political 
power, he left the Council unaltered, which created further havoc during his governorship. 
O'Reilly didn't hesitate; he abolished the Council and replaced it with a Spanish cabildo.7
The cabildos of Spain's borderlands varied greatly in size and power. With the 
exception of San Antonio, military officers controlled the courts which thus had limited 
independence. In Louisiana, the governor as President, ex officio, controlled the cabildo 
and the governors were military officers whose authority was theoretically limited only by 
the crown.* Beneath him in descending order were the voting members which included 
two alcaldes ordinarios, or judges who were elected annually, six regidores perpetuos, or 
permanent councilors, five of which held additional duties (see Table 1) and a sixth as 
Regidore perpetuo sencillo. The nonvoting members of the Cabildo included an annually 
elected Sindico Procurador General or mayordomo de propios (guardians of city 
properties), and the escribcmo, a permanent clerk of court who also acted as the court 
recorder and registrar of mortgages 9
7Orders to abolish the Superior Council are in Ulloa to Bucareli, August 28, 1767, 
57, SMV I, 32; Din, Cabildo. 43.
*There were, however, checks on any capricious behavior by these strong 
governors. Louisiana's governors as others posted bond against possible malfeasance in 
office and were compelled to undergo a residencia or official review of is term in office. 
Additionally, the Cabildo could send records and grevances directly to the crown if 
threatened with unscrupulous behavior on the part of their governor.
9Din, Cabildo. 56-60, Jo Ann Carrigan, “Government in Spanish Louisiana,” LS 11 
(1972): 216-217; for information on borderlands cabildos see Weber, Spanish Frontier. 
322-25; also see Cruz, Let There Be Towns: Marc Simmons, Spanish Government in New 
Mexico (Albuquerque: University o f New Mexico Press, 1968); and Florian F. Guest,
44
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ironically, O'Reilly only tempered the control of the French elite. As stated before, many 
of them remained as perennial regidores whose offices became inheritable personal 
property and the ambiguous nature of their duties allowed them far greater control than 
other colonial officials in Spanish America. Prime examples of this power are Nicolas 
Forstall, whose time in office covered thirty-one years, and the Ducros family, which 
maintained control of the office of regidor-depositario general throughout the entire 
Spanish period. The only factor which limited Louisiana's creoles from building huge 
empires through government office was the short duration of Spain's rule in the colony.10
The duties of the New Orleans Cabildo were deliberately ambiguous. Within the 
heirachy of the Spanish Empire, the cabildo was merely a government of local authority, in 
this case for New Orleans and its environs. In order of importance and power it stood at 
the bottom of the Spanish governmental system, which was multi-layered and overlapping 
(see Table 2). In addition to being limited by the governor, the Cabildo also shared its 
power with the office of the Treasurer or Intendant and church officials. The office of 
Intendant, however, was not active in Louisiana until Martin Navarro received title in 
1780.11 The Cabildo under O'Reilly and Unzaga, therefore, in reality did not share power
“Muncipal Insititutuions in Spanish California, 1769-1821" (Ph.D. diss., University of 
California, Los Angeles, 1961).
l0Din, Cabildo. 84; for a comparison to other creole dynasties see Peter Marzahl, 
“Creoles and Government: The Cabildo of Popayan,” HAHR 54 (1974): 654-655.
uIn theory the office was extant in 1766 but it was not officially given duties until 
Navarro whose intendancy can be found in Coutt's “Martin Navarro.” From 1766 to 1780 
the duties of the intendent were shared by Juan Jose de Loyola, Esteban Gayarre, and 
Martin Navarro, as well as Governors Luis de Unzaga and Bernardo de Galvez.
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_______________________________ Table 1_______________________________
Offices of the Louisiana Cabildo
Person Duties
Governor or his agent President, ex officio
Voting Members of the Cabildo 
Alcaldes ordinarios
Alcalde de Primer Voto Annually elected judges who were senior voting
Alcalde de Segundo Voto members of the council
Regidores perpetuos, with collatoral offices by order of rank 
AlferezReal Royal Standard Bearer
Alcalde Mayor Provincial Chief Provincial Magistrate
Alguacil Mayor City Magistrate and Warden of the Royal Jail
Depositario General Custodian of Properties and Funds
Receptor de Penas
de Camara Receiver of Court Fines
Regidores perpetuos sencillos, without collateral offices. Only one present until 1797, 
when six new regidores were added, ranked according to seniority.
Nonvoting Members o f the Cabildo 
Sindico Procurador General12 and 
mayordomo de proprios
Escribano of the Cabildo
Lesser Employees
Lesser Elective Offices include 
Alcaldes de Barrio and syndics 
of the New Orleans District 
(sindicos de distritos) and 
serenos
Sources: Gilbert C. Din, The New Origans rahildn 57.
12Sindico Procurador General was responsible for protecting public rights and 
investigating municipal problems. It was perhaps the most demanding and challenging 
position of all.
46
Annually elected, both had executive functions
Permanent clerk of the council; also court 
recorder
And registar of mortgages
Porters, public crier, public printer, serenos,
Appraisers, interpreters, inspector of weights and
Measures, jail employees, keeper of fire pumps,
etc.
Justices of the Peace in the city {de Barrio) and 
outlying districts {de distritos). The serenos 
acted as night watchmen.
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Table 2
Latin America's Administrative System
King
11





(Courts of Law whose President was 
often the Viceroy) and the 
Judges (Oidoresj
i
Corregidores16 -  
(Municipal councils)
I
alcalde mayors -  gobemadores 
Judges for minor crimes and (governors) 
Mayors of local towns)
1




14The closest Viceroyalty to Louisiana was that of New Spain, but O'Reilly placed 
the colony under direct control of the Captaincy-General in Havana.
15The title of Captain-General could be confusing. True Captain-Generals held 
political and military power over certain strategic locations such as Havana and 
Guatemala. The title captain-general was also offered to men like O'Reilly who took care 
of military disturbances in the colonies before turning them back to the officials. In some 
cases the captain-general could be subservient to the viceroy and in others the degree of 
disturbance warranted the crown giving him supreme command. In some cases the 
captain general, as a trouble shooter, stood above all other officials, but in others had no 
power over treasury officials or the Intendant.
16Corregidores where often found in large, rural provinces and their powers 
differed from colony to colony. They were sometimes accompanied by Corregidores de 
Iruhos whose duties lay solely with the Indian population.
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with an intendant, but they worked with the Treasury and annually had to submit their 
expenditures and accounts to a treasury official who then forwarded it to the 
Treasury office in Havana. The judicial responsibilities of the Cabildo were also checked 
by similar and sometimes shared fiscal responsibilities with the Treasury especially that 
concerning the circulation of money in the colony.17 Louisiana's chain of command went 
from the King, through the Council of the Indies, to the Governor and Captain-General of 
Havana, and then to Louisiana's Governor and finally the Cabildo.
The other reciprocity the Cabildo shared was with the church. The Cabildo held 
the surprising power of appointing the steward of the St. Louis church in New Orleans. 
Additionally it might question the fees charged by church officials. The members of the 
Cabildo were required by the Code O'Reilly to attend church on special feast days as an 
example to the rest of the community. In return the church presided over and blessed 
official ceremonies.18
Funding the Cabildo was another matter. The Spanish government sent far more 
money with O'Reilly than Ulloa but expenditures were also larger. O'Reilly wrote to 
Arriaga in November that he had a balance of 1,930,186 reales in the royal treasury, but 
that the bills stood at over 750,000 reales. The Cabildo must be supported from New 
Orleans, not Spain. O'Reilly then levied duties on shops, taverns, gaming houses and 
other money making establishments to help meet expenses. Inns were taxed twenty pesos
17Din, Cabildo. 96.
l8For further information on the church see Roger Baudier, The Catholic Church in 
Louisina (New Orleans, 1939).
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per year, taverns forty pesos, and billiard halls forty pesos which added 840 pesos annually 
to the city’s finances. He also taxed imported brandy and butchers. He also ordered the 
collection of rent on government properties. These funds were put to use paying city 
officials and offsetting the expenses of public festivals. The citizens of New Orleans 
acquiesced.1®
Unlike many cabildos, the Cabildo in New Orleans theoretically held legislative 
power over the entire province of Louisiana, but given the colony's size this was 
impossible. Din and Harkins maintain in their work on the New Orleans Cabildo, that the 
only real powers which the Cabildo extended beyond New Orleans were the regulations 
concerning levee maintenance outside of New Orleans proper and those on slavery, but 
the latter were limited to the lower colony.19
To administer the huge expanse of provincial Louisiana outside New Orleans, 
O'Reilly, Unzaga and military personnel next visited the various posts, taking loyalty oaths 
and gathering information. O’Reilly sent Captain Don Eduardo Nugent and Don Juan 
Kelly to Opelousas and Natchitoches. He and Unzaga went personally to Pointe Coupee . 
During these proceedings O'Reilly always introduced Unzaga as their governor, carefully 
keeping in the background. The captain-general then solicited separate reports on Upper 
Louisiana from Captain Riu and Don Pedro Pieraas.20
^O'Reilly to Arraiga, November 10, 1769, AGI, SD 80 and again December 10, 
1769, AGI, SD 80.
19Din. Cabildo. 81.
^O'Reilly to Arriaga, December 10, 1769, AGI, SD 80, Folio 18.
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Using information collected from these visits, O'Reilly decided to split provincial 
Louisiana between two Lieutenant Governors. Pedro Piemas at Illinois would serve as 
Lieutenant-Govemor in Upper Louisiana and the southwestern territory would fall under 
Don Athanazio de Mezieres at Natchitoches. O’Reilly established nine smaller districts 
under the supervision of French militia lieutenants and commandants. (See Table III for 
his appointments).
Table 3
List of Post Officials Appointed by O'Reilly 
Lieutenant Governors
Ylinueses (Illinois') District- Captain of Infantry,-Don Pedro Piemas 
Replacing Captain Riu 
Natchitoches-Caotain of Militia-Don Athanazio de Mezieres
Post Commanders
Acadian Coast or La Fourche de Chetimachas Captain of Militia, Don Luis Judice 
Atakapas (Opelousasl-Don Gabriel Fuselier de la Claire
First German Coast or St. Charles -  Captain of the Infantry, Don Francisco Simard de 
Bellisle who replaced Chevalier D'Arensbourg (1734-1769)
Second German Coast or St. John's - Captain of Militia, Don Roberto Robin de Laugni 
(sometimes spelled Logny)
Santiago de los Alemanes (St. James Parish, Cabanocey) - Captain of Militia, Don 
Nicolas Verret (continuing)
Natchitoches - Don Luis Borme who replaced Balthazar de Villiers (1766-1769)
Point Coupee - Captain of Militia, Don Francisco Allain and Balthazar de Villiers, 
transferred from Natchitoches.
Rapide - Don Estevan Mardefret Layssard
St. Genevidve-Captain of Militia, Don Francisco Valid
San Carlos III de Arkansas - Don Alejandro De Clouet (continuing)
Sources: Report by O’Reilly, February 4, 1770, AGI, Cuba, 1055; and Derek Noel 
Kerr, “Petty Felony, Slave Defiance and a Frontier Villany: Crime and Criminal Justice 
in Spanish Louisiana, 1770-1803.” (Ph.D. diss., Tulane University, 1983), 409-412.
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A small junta (or committee) under the auspices of Unzaga then examined the 
conditions of the forts and their strategic strengths. They decided that Ulloa's Fort Real 
Catolica at the mouth of the river was not of strategic importance and cost too much to 
maintain. At their suggestion O'Reilly evacuated the fort and re-established the troops at 
French Balise, Pointe Coupee, New Orleans, and Natchitoches. He also terminated Fort 
St. Luis de Natchez, opposite British Natchez, and agreed to allow the Acadians there to 
move to the Iberville district opposite Fort Bute. The remaining forts stood at St. 
Genevieve and St. Louis.
By maintaining Frenchmen in important official posts, O'Reilly created a smooth 
transition of power in the province, despite his insistence on loyalty oaths and the use of 
Spanish language in official business. On the conditions of the forts in general, O'Reilly 
wrote to Arriaga that it was “impossible to construct anything but a moat and a palisade” 
around most forts and that the moats were constantly filled “with mud brought down by 
the winter floods” and the wood of the palisades rotted quickly.22
Defense of Louisiana, O'Reilly surmised, could not rest entirely on the forts and a 
small number of Spanish troops. Louisiana already had a fixed infantry battalion created 
under Captain-General Bucareli in Havana. Pulled from various units in Europe, four 
hundred and fifteen men stood ready to defend the colony. Many of the troops were 
stationed in New Orleans, but detachments sent to surrounding forts had thinned their 
number. In October one-hundred and seventy-nine men of the Lisbon Regiment chose to
22W. James Miller, “The Militia System of Spanish Louisiana, 1769-1783,” in The 
Military Presence on the Gulf Coast ed.,William S. Coker (Pensacola: Gulf Coast 
Humanities Conference, 1978), 37-41.
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remain in Louisiana, but to build troop strength and cut costs, O'Reilly focused his 
attention on organizing militia units for Louisiana as he had done in Havana.23
In February of 1770, O'Reilly conscripted 1,040 men, dividing them into thirteen 
militia companies who were drilled by regular army officers and supplied from the royal 
warehouses. He stationed four units at New Orleans and one unit at the other posts.
While the crown absorbed the initial costs for training the militia the soldiers themselves 
were to be responsible for their equipment and future supplies. O'Reilly made the post 
commandants responsible for the maintenance of their palisades, an ongoing problem.24
The troops under O'Reilly had handled themselves well in Louisiana and the 
colonists had warmed to their respectful behavior. O'Reilly hoped that this mood would 
allow an esprit de corps to develop within the militia. Pursuant to that hope, he had the 
militia drill on Sundays. Drills included marching and shooting practice. Because Spain 
was then engaged in a conflict over the Falklands with Britain, General Gage (in charge of 
the English forces in America) grew suspicious of these maneuvers. O'Reilly, however, 
had given the commanders along the Mississippi different orders than Ulloa. Where Ulloa 
had instructed them to prepare for a British offensive and to attack if threatened, O'Reilly's 
instructions were to maintain peace with the British and retreat to New Orleans if
^Bucareli, Havana, May 2, 1769, AHN, Estado 3883; O'Reilly to Arraiga, 
December 19,1769 in Kinnaird, SMV 1:144-48.
“ O'Reilly to Arriaga, December 19,1769 ibid, Folio 25; Jack D. L. Holmes,
Honor and Fidelity. (Birmingham, AL: Louisiana Collection Series, 1965), 18-19; O'Reilly 
to Bucareli, November 10,1769, AGI, Cuba 1055, Folio 38.
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necessary. O'Reilly wrote to Gage, informing him of Spain’s peaceful intent and Gage
informed his superiors, which relieved the tension along the Mississippi for the moment.25 
With an embryonic militia and a skeletal line of forts in place, O'Reilly turned to
creating a series of Indian alliances. He continued the French practice of gift giving and
distributing medals to the small tribes (“petite nations”) in the Lower Mississippi Valley.
He gave Lieutenant-Governor Athanase de Mezieres the task of dealing with the western
Indians, many of whom were decidedly unfriendly to the Spanish. He directed the French
commandant to pacify hostile bands of Indians, license all traders and forbid any trade with
unfriendly tribes. He gave similar instructions to Pedro Piemas at St. Louis, making sure
that Piemas did not antagonize the British by enticing friendly Indians to migrate into
Spanish territory.26
British sensibilities were not important, however, where contraband was
concerned. English traders had often crossed into French territory to trade with the
Indians and Spain was aware of the British propensity for using Indians against its
enemies. He was determined to restrict contraband at its hot spots in New Orleans, along
the Mississippi, especially at the new settlement at St. Louis, and on the border with
Spanish Texas where the fort at Los Adaes had a long history of contraband with
Natchitoches. To reinforce his directives, the captain-general ordered Lieutenant-General
Piemas at St. Louis to build a prison withjailkeepers, and allow residence only to
“ Miller, “Spanish Louisiana,” 39-40.
“ Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez. 37-38; Correspondence between O'Reilly and de 
Mezieres in Bolton. Athanase de Mezieres. 1: 130-137.
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colonists with special permission from the Governor. No trade with the English was to be 
allowed.. As an added check he was to give annual reports to the governor on the 
amounts of flour and skins in the district.27
At Natchitoches, O'Reilly attacked the problem differently. Relations with the post 
at Adaes and with the viceroy of Mexico were not to be strained. In fact he asked that de 
Mezieres give them aid if necessary. In order to keep the colonists from “straying” 
O'Reilly authorized the commandant to license two “cabarets” at Natchitoches to sell wine 
and taffia,28 and to use the money from those sales to police the area. There was, 
however, to be no trade with Spanish Texas, as it was a separate colony, and no whiskey 
or guns were to be sold to the Indians.29
New Orleans received even stricter measurers. O'Reilly reinstated the Ordinance 
of 1768 which had caused Ulloa's ouster. While he decreased the export tariff on 
Louisiana's goods, he did not allow the colony to export good cash crops like tobacco to 
Havana because of their poor quality. He tore at the main fabric of the colony's trade and 
heavily enforced the new mercantilistic rules, expunging British smugglers in New 
Orleans, as well as Manchac (across from British Manchac) and enforcing the law with 
troops. The merchants and traders involved in contraband found themselves abruptly 
expelled from the colony and their ships and goods confiscated to prevent their return.
^Instructions to Piemas, November 24, 1769, AGI, Cuba 187.
28A coarse alcoholic drink like aguardiente.
^instructions to Athanase de Mezieres in Bjork, “Establishment of Spanish Rule,” 
174, Approval of plan in Royal cedula dated August 17, 1772, AGI, SD 86.
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With the British gone, O'Reilly hoped to end a booming illicit trade which absorbed 
approximately ninety percent of the money circulating in the colony. To buttress his 
efforts he refused anchorage to British ships in Louisiana ports.29 This last effort struck 
heavily at the colony's economy.
Changes in New Orleans and problems for its planter elite had not hindered the 
outlying provinces until O'Reilly came to Louisiana. The reason for this was that outside 
the environs of the capital the colonial hinterlands were entirely another world. There the 
colonists, their slaves and Indian neighbors had created a subtle network of trade and 
alliances unhampered, until now, by colonial officials. Commercial agriculture in a large 
portion of the colony was limited by a lack of population, slaves for labor, and inadequate 
financing by the French crown. Instead, those settlers spawned a “frontier exchange 
economy,” of small farms augmented by hunting, fishing and trapping. These pioneers 
constantly enhanced their meager lifestyle by smuggling and illegal inter-colonial trade.30
The Indians often taught new settlers to hunt and fish and came to their aid during 
times of famine since Louisiana's climate and soil were not always hospitable. Colonists 
also intermarried with the Indians, moved into deserted Indian villages or used abandoned 
fields and frequently developed the same woodland economy. Native Americans also
^Clark, New Orleans. 175.
“ For furthur information please see Daniel H. Usner, Jr., Indians. Settlers. & 
Slaves in A Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valiev before 1783. 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); The French slave trade failed in 
Louisiana. Slave shortages inhibited commercial agriculture, made worse by the shortage 
of currency. Slave traders often kept their slaves against a better time but this worked 
against both them and the colonists by continuing the cycle o f shortages. Clark, New 
Orleans. 133.
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furnished transportation for goods and messages between colonial settlements, even across 
colonial borders. They also collaborated with the Europeans in the Indian slave trade. In 
order to maintain alliances the colonists often furnished their Indian friends with guns and 
ammunition, as well as European trade goods.32
Despite the introduction of plantation agriculture and black slavery in the 1720s, 
the hinterlands were changed little by the arrival of the Spanish. Black slaves were such a 
precious commodity that they often became part of the local community and its families. 
Many were given guns to help augment the meager agriculture of their owners and 
allowed to trade with the Indians as well. Indian tribes along the frontier had developed a 
new set of trade linkages, exchanging “salt meat, hides and furs, bear's grease and buffalo 
suet, for European (especially British) trade goods, guns, powder and shot.” These 
products had also attracted tribes from the west-the Witchita and the Comanche who now 
immigrated to the Red River area. These particular tribes often smuggled horses, mules, 
and cattle from Spanish Texas for the promise of European products. By the time O'Reilly 
took control regular routes for contraband such as the Sante Fe Trail existed between 
Louisiana and the Spanish southwest. The settlements at Natchitoches, Arkansas and 
Opelousas frequently received such contraband. Natchitoches also had a relationship with 
the post of Los Adaes which served to funnel illicit goods to Louisiana.33
32Usner, Indians. Settlers. & Slaves. 56-76; Stephen Weber, “The Problem of 
Indian Slavery in Spanish Louisiana, 1769-1803.” LH 11 (1984): 117-135.
33Usner, Indians. Settlers. & Slaves. 41-43,154-156;Stanley Faye, “The Arkansas 
Post of Louisiana: Spanish Domination,” LHO 27 (July, 1944): 635; Antoine Le Page Du 
Pratz. Histoire de la Louisiane. cotenant la decouverte de ce vasste navs: sa description 
geographique: un voape dans tes terres: rhistoire naturelle. les moeurs. costumes &
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The posts along the Mississippi also experienced the same trade between Indians 
and colonists. On the eastern bank British traders, the Chickasaw and Choctaw trafficked 
contraband items to Louisiana where they made their way westward into Spanish Texas 
and New Mexico. British settlements at Manchac and Natchez also supplied Louisianians 
with accessible markets and ready credit. Trade between Spanish and British Manchac 
was so common that the term “going to Little Manchac” was synonymous with 
smuggling.34
Before 1769, settlers, Indians, and slaves collectively prospered, often oblivious to 
the troubles of their fellow colonists in New Orleans. Indeed the self-supportive system 
had continued in relative peace and harmony until the advent of captain-general, Alejandro 
O'Reilly. His onslaught against the British now sent ripples through Louisiana's frontier 
economy, upsetting the sensitive balance in the hinterland between the Indians and the 
European colonists.
O'Reilly was concerned with the colonists in the “imperial sense.” He saw them as 
part and parcel of the defensive structure of Louisiana. As a Bourbon official he sought to 
encourage domestic agriculture by encouraging farmers in the colony. He believed the
religion des naturels avec leurs originies: deux voyages dans la nord due nuveau Mexique 
don’t un iusqu’a la Mer de Sur: omee de deux cartes & de 40 planches en taille donee 
Edited by Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975 
facsimile reproduction of 1774 edition), 317; Elizabeth A. H. John, Storms Brewed in 
Other Men's Worlds: The Confrontation of Indians. Spanish, and French in the Southwest. 
1540-1795. (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1975), 304-374; Henri 
Folmer, “Contraband Trade between Louisiana and New Mexico in the 18* Century,” 
New Mexico Historical Review 16 (1941): 270-74.
^Clark, New Orleans. 169; Usner, Indians. Settlers & Slaves. 122; Caughey, 
Bernardo de Galvez. 11.
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influx of farming families would improve the economy and provide a denser population, 
able to act as a defense against the encroaching British. To promote the goals of 
agriculture and population, he brought order to the chaos of settlement, fixing the extent 
of land grants and regulating land enclosures so that cattle could be penned in during the 
summer. Aware of the problems inherent in Louisiana's environment he compelled 
Louisiana's inhabitants to keep their bridges, roads and levees in good repair and ordered 
that colonists who settled along the river must build levees within the first three years. 
Wishing to create permanent, good sized settlements, O’Reilly ordered that landowners 
could not sell or give away their land until they had owned it for three years, and only then 
with permission from the governor general.35
To take care of his colonists’ religious needs, O'Reilly created thirteen parochial 
districts and assigned eighteen priests who spoke both French and Spanish to them. (See 
Table 4) He also encouraged the colonists to build churches because he felt that they had 
received little “spiritual nourishment” under the French system.36
By the end of November, O'Reilly deemed his work finished. He had already 
evacuated the troops, and now it was time to yield control of Louisiana to its new 
governor, Luis de Unzaga. On December 1, 1769, O'Reilly installed Unzaga as governor 
with an annual salary o f6,000 pesos. By letter on February 23, 1770, O'Reilly delivered 
the crown's instructions, his own reports and correspondence to Louisiana's new
35Bjork, “Establishment of Spanish Rule,” 180-183; Reglamento de 1770, AGI, PC
652.
“ Bjork, “Establishment of Spanish Rule,” 177-180.
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____________ Table 4____________
O’Reilly’s Assignment of the Clergy
City of New Orleans and Environs  6 Priests
German Coast, St. Charles and St. John's Parish  2 Priests
Cabahannose and Fourche de Chetimachas  2 Priests
Iberville Parish  1 Priest
Punta Cortada (Pointe Coupee)  I Priest
Opelousas  1 Priest
Rapids Parish and the Apalache Indians37  1 Priest
Natchitoches  1 Priest
Illinois District, St. Louis and St. Genevieve............................  2 Priests
Total Number of Regular Clergy Needed for Louisiana 18 Priests
Source: Coutts, “Martin Navarro,” 59; Enclosure No. 1, Reglamento de 1770, AGI, 
Cuba 652.______________________________________________________________
governor. In March, O'Reilly sailed for Havana and after the required paperwork 
officially relinquished command of the colony.3*
37The Apalache tribe, refugees from the collapse o f the Spanish missions in 
Northern Florida, had been converted in the late 1600s.
3*Unzaga's appointment by the crown dates from April 21,1769, though O'Reilly 
remained in control until December first. Confusion over the inception of Unzaga's 
government has arisen because the instructions and papers were not sent to Unzaga until 
February of 1770, and O'Reilly didn't officially relinquish control on paper until October. 
Also confusing to scholars is the difference between the act and its acceptance. Unzaga 
accepted his appointment in a letter to Don Juan Gregorio Muniain on December 1,1769 
but the crown's acceptance did not come until January 28, 1771. Unzaga's acceptance,
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O’Reilly had previously been part of a team that had successfully reorganized the 
defenses and economy of Havana. In 1770, O'Reilly believed he had also succeeded in 
executing similar orders, as well as saving the crown money in Louisiana.. He had created 
a defensive barrier of forts and colonial settlements against the British and set the colonists 
on the path for commercial success within empire. The colony’s success, however, lay in 
a different direction and took place under another governor’s hand. O'Reilly created a 
Spanish infrastructure in Louisiana. He hispanicized the government and military but not 
the people. Colonial reorganization, then, had not created colonial reorientation. That 
remained for Louisiana's new governor, Don Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga.
December 1, 1769, AGI, SD 86; O'Reilly’s delivery of the instructions and 
correspondence in ‘Tnventorio que explica los papeles relatives al Gobiemo general de 
esta Provincia que entrego hoy dia de la fee has a mi successor el coronel Don Luis de 
Unzaga”, February 23, 1770, AGI Cuba 2357. Pezuela, Jacobo de la, Dicionario 
Geografio. 38; Holmes, Honor and Fidelity. 20; Dawson, Louisiana Governors. 53.
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Chapter Four 
Economic Problems and Solutions
‘I t  is not as it has been described, and only needs labor to increase production, 
especially indigo.”
Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, July 8, 17701
Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga faced three mandates from his predecessor, defend the 
border, create orderly and loyal citizens and make the colony economically successful. 
Although the Spanish crown focused its attention on defenses against the growing British 
presence in the Caribbean, in 1770, it was apparent to Unzaga that he would not be able to 
comply with the requests for loyalty and defense if he did not correct the economic woes 
of the colony. Louisiana’s historians have commonly pointed to Unzaga’s use of illegal 
commerce with the British as the cause of economic recovery. Illegal trade alone, 
however, did not enable Unzaga to correct the colony’s commerce, nor increase the 
colony’s treasury, which he had accomplished by the end of his administration.
The following discussion views Louisiana’s economic problems as an extension of 
the crown’s reforms in Havana and places them within the spectrum of the Bourbon 
empire. It shows that Unzaga worked steadily within the structure of Spanish government 
to organize and expand the colonial economy while addressing Louisiana’s pressing 
domestic problems. During the early 1770s, Unzaga and his superiors in Havana balanced 
the needs of empire and of their colonists by adopting a policy of observation and quiet 
resistance to the British advance while focusing on internal economic concerns.
lUnzaga to Bucareli, July 8,1770, Dispatches of the Spanish Governors of 
Louisiana. 11 Vols., W.P.A. Survey of Federal Archives in Louisiana, Vol. 2.
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In Spain, Minister of the Indies Julian Arriaga had warned the Crown, as early as 
1764, that the “haughtiness” of the British commanders and governors in the Caribbean 
left him no assurance that they would honor their peace with the Spaniards, nor abide by 
Spanish law in the New World.2 Recent British movements into the Caribbean and 
growing reports of British ships in Havana threatened Spain’s wealthy colonies in Cuba, 
Cartagena and possibly Mexico.
Bucareli reported to Arriaga that increasing amounts of British ships were 
“stopping” in Havana and other Caribbean ports for questionable reasons. Despite Spanish 
mercantilists laws against trade with foreign ships, in January a British merchant ship was 
reported to have boldly entered the port of Veracruz, although port officials said they 
asked it to leave~a few days later and probably after quietly disposing of illegal goods.3
This sort of behavior increased in 1770. While the Captain-General constantly 
decried the open attempts at smuggling in his reports to Spain, he was forced at the same 
time to aid British ships according to diplomatic necessities. For instance, when a British 
ship sank in the Colorados, Bucareli sent help, losing a Cuban ship in the process, but 
saving the British crew and successfully sailing them to Jamaica. He mentioned to the 
British that it might be appropriate to reimburse the captain of the lost Cuban ship but was
2Arraiga to the Conde de Ricla, September 22,1764, AGI, SD 1194.
3Bucareli to Arriaga, February 6, 1770, AGI, SD 1214, Folio 1353.
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ignored4 Other ships in less distress, or those merely seeking to enter Havana’s bay, were 
rebuffed during the last two years of Bucareli’s tenure.
Toward the end of 1770, the pace quickened. Carlos HI landed troops from 
Buenas Aires in the Malvinas (Falklands) and evicted the British from Port Egmont. 
Diplomatic negotiations ensued to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.5 Bucareli took to 
detaining and confiscating illegal ships, British or French, and ordering Spanish officials in 
New Spain, Louisiana, and elsewhere to follow suit. The only exception was a British 
merchant ship whose crew had mutinied and whose captain was injured. It took only one 
evening in port, however, for the Cubans to tend to his wounds, give the crew victuals and 
send them on their way the next morning. Bucareli would not chance leaving a merchant 
ship laden with British goods in port. By 1771 with war between Spain and England a 
distinct possibility, the confiscation of illegal ships increased and in February four British 
ships were taken because of illicit commerce and their crews returned to the British in 
Pensacola.6
4Bucareli to Arriaga, March 9,1770, AGI, SD 1214, Folio 1353; Bucareli to 
Arriaga, June 4, 1770, AGI, SD 1214, Folio 1438.
5Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez. 44.
6British ships often stopped and tried to enter Havana, and Bucareli dutifully 
reported every attempt, for example in both July and October of 1770 he rebuffed a 
British merchant and a frigate respectively, though he did send a ship out to meet the 
frigate and retrieve a message. Bucarelli to Arriaga, July 10, 1770, and October 15, 1770, 
AGI, SD 1214, Folios. 1467 and 1563; reports of British ships captured in illicit 
commerce from ibid, Bucarelli to Arriaga, August 1, 1770, Folio 1482 (Puerto Principe), 
August 3, 1770, Folio. 1486, November 10, 1770, Folio 1575, January 6,1771, Folio 
1663, February 4, 1771, Folio 1691, and May 10, 1771, Folio 1805. The mutinied ship 
was reported in Bucareli to Arriaga, December 8,1770 and December 9,1770, ibid, 
Folios 1628 and 1629.
63
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
What really concerned the Captain-General of Havana, however, were financial 
difficulties and the rebuilding of Havana. In February of 1770, Bucareli replaced Unzaga 
with Don Juan Dabar, Lieutenant Colonel of the Fixed Regiment. He then focused on the 
return of O’Reilly and his Louisiana troops who must be housed and fed. There were also 
the expected requests for money and aid from Unzaga. Troops began arriving from the 
new colony as early as January. O’Reilly himself, arrived in March and set up 
housekeeping in Havana in order to gather his papers and report to the king.7
By August, Bucareli received notice that Spanish reinforcements for Louisiana 
would also be victualed in Cuba on the way to their new post. Bucareli finally 
complained. His finances, never enough in the first place, were now strained to the 
breaking point by the affairs in Louisiana. Havana was still rebuilding its defenses and 
city from the confrontation of 1762. Additionally, Havana’s commerce had experienced 
difficulties under the Bourbon reorganization, especially in the transportation and 
packaging of its exports.8
Before the Seven Years War tobacco and hides had been Cuba’s principle revenue 
producing goods. The first Bourbon kings had granted Havana commercial monopolies 
which helped the economy recover, but the creation of a royal monopoly on tobacco with 
its fixed prices and quotas discouraged investment in that crop. By 1770 sugar had 
become Cuba’s main export but that also had problems. Cuba, like other Spanish ports
bucareli to Arriaga, February 18,1770 (replacement of Unzaga), and June 6, 
1770 of Captain-General O’Reilly and troops, in AGI, SD 1214, Folios 1347 and 1445.
*Bucareli to Arriaga, August 30, 1770, Reservada, AGI, SD 1214, Folio 1529.
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suffered from a lack of legal markets and the oppression of the Consulado (merchant 
monopoly) in Cadiz. Transportation and packaging were made more difficult because the 
population of Cuba was increasing and with it the consumption of wood used for housing. 
This usage of Cuba’s limited forests was in direct competition with both the sugar growers 
who needed wood for shipping boxes and the Royal Navy which reserved large trees for 
ship masts and spars. The Crown had promised during Ricla’s administration in the late 
1760s to aid the Cubans and make concessions for Cuba’s exports if they would consent 
to higher taxation. The Cubans had accepted higher taxes with the expectation of the 
crown’s reciprocity.9
During both Ricla’s and Bucareli’s administrations, however, crown concessions 
had never met Cuban expectations. Royal funds sent to Ricla and O’Reilly to rebuild the 
military and the militia were reduced during Bucareli’s government and despite the fact 
that situado funds often reached over 900,000 pesos annually they were never adequate 
to cover on-going expenses. The Crown also “designated” much of its funding, and 
situado monies had to be split between the Navy or the port and its expenses, specified 
amounts used to buy tobacco (a crown monopoly), and “attention de tierra” or the 
ongoing rebuilding of Havana.10 Lastly, situado funds were sent first to Veracruz for 
reallocation to Havana and its subsidiaries. The Viceroy of New Spain notoriously 
siphoned monies from the Caribbean’s situado funds and a frustrated Bucareli told 
O’Reilly, that “The debts increase and the creditors clamor. . .  The Viceroy (Carlos
'’Keuthe, Cuba 1753-1815. 53-54.
10AGI, Cuba 149-A, Folios 20,22, and 29.
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Francisco de Croix) does not dare address me on the matter, and is content with informing 
the Intendant that on this occasion he can send nothing . . .  The funds which arrive do not 
cover loans and troops and salaries . . .  My letters to the Viceroy are pathetic.”11
To make matters worse, the Kings’ latest mercantilistic rules made Louisiana more 
dependent on Havana as an outlet for her commercial goods and Unzaga frequently wrote 
to Bucareli asking for extra money or aid with the colony’s failing economy. The added 
strain of Louisiana, its revolt, and now its commercial exigencies led Bucareli to ask 
Arriaga to inform the king that he (Bucareli) could no longer command the island 
“efficiently” on the funds allotted, saying:
I’ve been the head of government for five years and the same 
number [of years] I have suffered the continuous lack of funds and lack 
the spirit to endure the pressure of not doing my duty as we agreed. All 
this has injured my health to the point of wishing that the pity of the king 
would take me from this command and return me to Spain to finish my 
duties as a soldier of his Majesty.12
Poor Bucareli did not go home as he entreated, instead the King rewarded his “untiring
efforts” to the crown by appointing him Viceroy of New Spain in 1771.
While Havana wrestled with its financial problems, Luis de Unzaga, the new
governor of Louisiana, took stock of his surroundings. As military and political
commander of the new colony, for the first time in his career Unzaga was no longer
second in command. He settled into government housing with his servants (slaves brought
“Bucareli to O’Reilly, August 30, 1770, in Bernard Bobb, The Viceregencv of 
Antonio Maria Bucareli in New Spain 1771-1779. The Texas Pan-American Series, 
(Austin: University of Austin Press, 1962), 20.
l2Bucareli to Arriaga, August 30,1770, Reservada, AGI, SD 1214, Folio 1529.
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from Havana), and pondered O’Reilly’s orders to keep the unruly colonists subservient to 
his majesty and Spain, to make the colony profitable to Spain and to defend the 
“Barrera” as historian Gilbert Din calls the Louisiana borderlands.13
Loyalty alone would be a difficult task as Unzaga later confided to Arriaga:
.. although this is a Spanish province...  I cannot flatter His Majesty so much to say 
that the people have ceased to be French at heart, and that in them is not to be found the 
spirit of independence which causes resistence to oppressive laws.”14 The oppression 
seemed to come from the same O’Reilly’s insistence on adhering to Spanish mercantilists 
laws. The governor decided to assess the problem among his citizens by socializing with 
prominent members of the community.
Compared to Havana, New Orleans must have seemed to Unzaga like the 
backwater of empire it has often been called. Settled in a place that flooded regularly, the 
city was often filled with mud despite the levee built in 1729. Less than five-hundred 
houses sprawled only four streets back from the river. Most were one story affairs, made 
of colombage (brick between wooden posts and sometimes stuffed with mud and moss), 
built on posts approximately eight feet above the ground as flood insurance and enhance 
with kitchen gardens and fruit trees. The homes themselves were in a sorry state of
13Din, “Protecting the ‘Barrera’”, 184.
14Unzagato Arraiga, September 12, 1773, in Fortier, History of Louisiana. 15.
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disrepair caused by the shortage of money and drop in real estate value after the Seven 
Years War.15
Down river from Unzaga’s quarters a casa capitular was under construction to 
house Louisiana’s new Cabildo. In the center of town stood the ruined remains of St. 
Louis church which had rotted in the sweltering city to the point where church services 
were being held in one of the local warehouses. The ubiquitous dampness ruined even 
brick buildings like the Capuchin monastery and often made fortifications a mockery, 
rotting wooden palisades and rusting the iron and brass weaponry. Only the guardhouses 
and the jail had escaped destruction. The wooden palisades and shallow ditch which 
served as a moat must have appeared a joke compared to the stone towers of Morro 
Castle and paved plazas in Cuba. The actual doors of the fort would have been useless in 
a real attack because one of the French matrons had built a smaller door into the gates so 
that she could reach her garden outside the palisades more easily. Thus, the fort around 
New Orleans did little other than deter the local Indians. Regardless of the city’s problems 
Unzaga was a prudent and patient man who desired to make Spain’s “experiment” in 
Louisiana function effectively16
15Stanley Clisby Arthur, Old New Orleans, ed. Susan Cole Dore (1936; rpr.
Gretna, LA: 1990), 15-16 and Captain Philip Pittman, The Present State of the Eruopean 
Settlements on the Mississippi With an Introduction and Index by Robert R. Rea. (1770; 
Facsimile reprint edition, Gainesville, FL: State of Florida Bicentennial Commission,
1973), 1-2 and Paul Alliot, “Historical and Political Reflections on Louisiana” in Louisiana 
Under the Rule of Spain. France, and the United States 1785-1807. ed. James Alexander 
Robertson (2 vols; 1910-11; rpr. Freeport, NY, 1969), 1: 65-67.
16Din, Cabildo. 5; Pittman, Present State of Settlement 11-12; The matron in 
question was Madam Rochemore, the wife of an Ordormnateur, who often defined French 
military and political authorities to get her way. For more on Madam Rochemore see
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In the busy city streets he noticed a complex population of French, Canadian, 
German, Swiss, Creole, African and Indian descent. According to O’Reilly’s census, in 
1769 the city contained some eighteen-hundred white homeowners, businessmen and 
laborers (Creoles and Europeans), juxtaposed to approximately eleven-hundred slaves 
(black and mulatto). Less than one-hundred free persons of color ran shops and provided 
skilled labor for the city’s inhabitants. Slaves and free people of color lined the streets 
with small open-air markets and had coopted a small market (previously Indian), located 
along Bayou St. John. They also manned the famous Congo Market behind the city where 
under the Spanish principle of coariacion many slaves worked to sell excess produce and 
acquire money to buy their freedom.
Unlike the many other Latin America’s colonies, however, Indian slaves (sixty-one 
in the census) were a minority among the workers. In keeping with the Crown’s policies 
O’Reilly had outlawed future Indian slavery but had not removed those already in 
servitude. There were also the men (coming and going) who formed the infantry 
battalion, small groups of sailors who frequented the city, and of course, foreign 
merchants-despite their illegal presence. At the time New Orleans supported at least a 
quarter of the colony’s whole population.17
Villiers du Terrage, Les dernieres annees. 102-103.
17Ibid; O’Reilly’s census in Gayarre, History of I^>uisiana. 2: 355; Stephen Webre, 
“The Problem of Indian Slavery in Spanish Louisiana, 1769-1803,” LH, 25 (1985): 117- 
35; Kimberly S. Hanger, “Avenues to Freedom Open to New Orleans’ Black Population, 
1769-1779,” LH, 31 (1990): 237-64; Robert A  Sander, “The Origin and Spread of the 
Public Market System in New Orleans,” LH. 22 (1981): 281-9.
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Life in New Orleans was frequently “ hot and tiring.” There was little for the elite 
to do. There were no theaters, operas or local museums to attend. The first theater 
company wasn’t created until just after the Seven Years War. Many of the town’s citizens 
were not particularly literate. To quote Gilbert Din, ’’colonial New Orleanians suffered 
from boredom because o f isolation and ignorance.” Public schools did not exist and the 
Ursaline convent only “educated” young women. Although some private libraries existed 
there were no booksellers in the city and the first newspaper wasn’t printed until 1794. 
Indeed, entertainments were few and far between, consisting of dances and dinner parties 
at wealthier homes, visits to neighbors, picnics along the river, gossiping, drinking, 
fighting and visits to the city’s brothels. As Unzaga took office, taverns, billiard parlors, 
and even lemonade stands sold alcoholic drinks to help citizens “forget” the dirt and heat. 
Even trials and public hangings were considered entertainment.1*
Local Indians occasionally created a popular diversion in the town’s “Communes 
de la Ville” (or Congo Plains) with games similar to Lacross which the French called 
raquettes, and various dances. Sometimes even their public drunkenness supplied a
‘*Din, Cabildo. 15,26; Jack D. L. Holmes, “Spanish Regulation ofTaverns and the 
Liquor Trade in the Mississippi Valley,”in The Spanish in the Mississippi Valiev. 1762- 
1804. ed. John Francis McDermott (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois, 1974), 151; Wood, 
“Life in New Orleans,” 685-86 and Jack D. L. Holmes, ed., “Louisiana in 1795, the 
Earliest Extant Issue of the Moniteur de la Louisiane,” LH. 7 (1966): 133-51; Roger 
Philip McCutcheon, “Books and Booksellers in New Orleans, 1730-1830,” LHO. 20 
1937): 152-58..
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spectacle. Slaves also broke the monotony of long hot evenings with songs and dances in 
Congo Square, many of which worked their way into Louisiana’s folksongs.19
Despite its hardships many women fought to build “townhouses” in the city as it 
was more tolerable than the boredom of the plantations around New Orleans. After the 
last harvest of the year whole families “removed” themselves to the city for the winter 
until they had to return for Spring planting. There they entertained each other with dinner 
parties and balls. The local gentry were happy to wine and dine their new governor, which 
offered them an opportunity to air their grievances. These discussions were often 
spearheaded by the prominent Gilbert Antoine de St. Maxent whom Unzaga had met 
earlier with captain-general O’Reilly.20
The colonists most immediate concern was the failing economy. The necessity of 
economic revitalization, however, made the application of O’Reilly’s instructions all the 
more difficult. It became obvious to Unzaga that defense rested upon loyalty and colonial 
prosperity was the first step toward converting the colonists into loyal Spanish citizens. 
This posed a knotty problem because the crisis in the Malvinas had worsened Louisiana’s 
economic crisis by forcing governor Unzaga to apply his limited capital to the colony’s 
security. Spain’s belief that the closeness of the British would make Louisiana’s defense
19 Jerah Johnson, “New Or lean’s Congo Square: An Urban Setting for Early Afro- 
American Culture Formation,” LH, 21 (1990): 237-64;Tunes and dances like the calinda 
from Congo Square became the very popular “Allons danse Colinda” in contemporary 
Louisiana, Shane Bernard and Julia Girouard, “‘Colinda’: Mysterious Origins of a Cajun 
Folksong,” Journal of Folklore Research. 29 (1992): 179-193.
betw een 1762 and 1763 a local plantation wife, Madame Pradel built a house in 
New Orleans which she frequented more than her real home. King, New Orleans. 168- 
169.
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expenditures a problem had been anticipated by Secretary Miguel de Muzquiz in 1769 
who maintained that to preserve Louisiana Spain would have to expend up to 300,000 
pesos annually.21 The real figures worked out to approximately 87,500 + pesos per year 
until the end of the Spanish occupation, somewhat less than Unzaga’s situado, but never 
enough.22
Undermanned and underfunded, Unzaga informed Grimaldi in Spain that he could 
not defend the colony in its present condition, especially since in June a thousand British 
troops had arrived to reinforce Pensacola. Grimaldi could only send a small contingent of 
one-hundred soldiers and equipment to fortify the colony. Realizing Unzaga’s untenable 
condition, he counseled the governor to defend himself with the militia, and retreat if the 
situation grew worse. He also sent secret orders to Unzaga to maintain a strict 
surveillance of all British movements in the area. Unzaga, like Bucareii in Havana, 
continued a quiet vigilance while focusing on more pressing economic concerns.23
Unzaga faced another conundrum in trying to revive Louisiana’s commerce. He 
must abide by the crown’s restrictive commercial reforms and mercantilists policy which 
disallowed foreign commerce in Spanish ports, while at the same time fostering trade 
between New Orleans and Havana. Even O’Reilly, had pragmatically tempered his own 
orders regarding foreign merchants, allowing Oliver Pollock, an Englishman, to sell flour
21Moore, Revolt in Louisiana. 190.
Charles H. Cunningham, “Financial Reports Relating to Louisiana 1766-1788,” 
Mississippi Valiev Historical Review.fhereinafter MVHR16 (December, 1919): 394-397.
^O’Reilly to Grimaldi, June 8, 1770, AGI SD, 2543; O’Reilly to Grimaldi, 
September 30, 1770, ibid; Grimaldi to Unzaga, October 24, 1770, ibid.
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in New Orleans because it was desperately needed and the man’s prices were reasonable. 
The captain-general had also modified the Crown’s laws by allowing five ships from 
Louisiana to trade with their traditional markets in the French West Indies until he could 
notify the king. These moderations, O’Reilly had felt, would at least leave the colonial 
economy viable until it profited from trade within the Bourbon reforms.24
King Carlos HI, however, intended to enrich Spain under his reforms, not the 
colonies. The reforms restricted colonial trade to Spain and a few choice ports, continued 
crown monopolies and favored exporters in larger cities with ties to the Spanish merchant 
class. Louisiana found no advantage in trade with the new metropole. The colony 
exported, in order of importance: indigo, tobacco, lumber and furs. Spain required neither 
furs nor lumber and her markets were flooded with the preferred Guatemalan indigo. 
Tobacco was the colony’s second most import money maker, but Havana held a 
monopoly on the tobacco trade with the crown. In April of 1770, O’Reilly had further 
injured Louisiana’s trade when he banned shipments of tobacco to Havana because it was 
of “inferior quality and its introduction to [the] island [of Cuba] would have grave 
consequences.”25
Despite these problems, Unzaga and his merchants struggled to avoid the 
impending economic disaster and abide by the new reforms. Trade with Havana, however,
^Clark, New Orleans. 174.
2SThe merchants in Havana we re afraid the mixing Louisiana’s tobacco with 
Havana’s would lessen the desirability and the price of their product on the Spanish 
market. O’Reilly to Unzaga, April 3, 1770, Dispatches: Clark, New Orleans. 176; Usner, 
Indians. Settlers & Slaves. 117.
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did not help the situation and often exacerbated it. Merchants who risked such trade 
reaped little or no profit. They often netted losses of up to ten percent in Cuba and 
sometimes up to twenty-five percent when they tried to re-sell Cuban goods in New 
Orleans. Havana desperately needed lumber for building material and for the sugar 
industry but expected to pay low prices for lumber shipped across a dangerous patch of 
water and refused to entertain ideas of raising prices because of the cost to New Orleans 
merchants. There was also little to do if a boat and its cargo were lost at sea. For 
example, one letter from Bucareli to Arriaga tells the sad tale of a French Balandra 
carrying boards and tar lost on the coast of Cuba in February of 1771 on its way to 
Gaurico. Sales of indigo also fared poorly and at least one shipment was sold at a loss. 
There seemed little good about the trade with Havana.26
Loss of capital, goods and ships continued into 1771 and discouraged the 
production within the normal export economy, at the same time encouraging merchants to 
seek other avenues of trade, including those that were illegal. Economic historian John G. 
Clark indicates that the years 1770 to 1771 were the worst years New Orleans merchants 
experienced during peace time. Things couldn’t seem to be any worse until New Orleans 
received a copy of the Royal Cedula, dated January 26, 1770, which extinguished what 
little faith the colonists and Unzaga held in the benefits of Spain’s Bourbon Reforms.27
“ Clark, New Orleans. 174; Bucareli to Arriaga, December 10, 1770 and February 
7,1771, AGI, SD 1214 Folio 1640 shows the boat stopping in Cuba and Folio 1711 tells 
Arriaga of the shipwreck.
^Paul E. Hoffman, Luisiana. 118; Clark, New Orleans. 176.
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This latest Cedula denied Louisiana O’Reilly’s special allowance for licensed trade 
with French islands in the West Indies or with any other Spanish colonies. Unzaga met 
with the Cabildo and encouraged them to petitition the king. Although O’Reilly had 
abolished the Superior Council which consisted mainly of members from the planter and 
merchant class, many of the same people now sat in the Cabildo. The Cedula threatened 
their business and their lifestyle.28 In July of 1770 the Cabildo had asked the King to lift 
the commercial restrictions on trade with the French West Indies, resolving to live with 
the rest of his restrictions. Madrid responded with a refusal in June of 1771. By 
November the Cabildo tried again to reason with the monarchy. The merchants’ requests 
outlined their difficulties by comparing the benefits of Louisiana’s traditional trade 
patterns against the collapse of the economy in 1768 and again in 1770. They clearly 
stated that restoration of trade with the French West Indies was the only alternative to the 
growth in illegal trade with the British. Despite O’Reilly’s ouster of British merchants 
residing in and doing business in New Orleans, the Mississippi was open to traffic by 
British ships and their merchants, who began to reappear along the Mississippi in 1770. 
Their only competition in Louisiana had been the French West Indies. Once Spain 
rendered such trade illegal the British were once again practicing a vigorous trade. The 
Crown still responded negatively.29
As the Cabildo struggled with the King’s reforms, their governor realized that the 
solution to Louisiana’s economic disaster might lie with the British rather than with Spain.
28Din, Cabildo. 59-61.
^ i d ,  167; Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez. 50; Hoffinan, Luisiana. 118-119.
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It was a hard choice because continuation of the old “illegal” trade at places like Manchac 
actually helped depress legal commerce. But something had to be done, trade continued 
to drop throughout 1771 and treasury reports show that “official” trade in the colony, 
including British ships, dropped severely. The number of ships passing through the fort at 
Balize dropped from 144 in 1770 to 97 by 1771.30 Interestingly, Unzaga was not alone in 
his fight. The years 1770 and 1771 show a general depression in commerce in the 
Caribbean. Louisiana’s drop in shipping is matched by declines in the value and number of 
“embarkations” in such ports as Caracas, Maracaibo and Cumana and some ports in Spain 
like Barcelona. Ironically, the shipping at the monopoly ports of La Coruna and Cadiz 
increased.31
Shipping between Havana and New Orleans, unfortunately, did not increase 
substantially during Unzaga’s administration. After the hard years of 1770-1771 it looked 
as though commerce might improve. The following year ships from New Orleans 
accounted for 22 of the 158 ships entering and 22 again of those leaving, but as shipping 
at Havana increased commerce from New Orleans did not follow (See Table 5). It must 
be pointed out, however, that it didn’t decrease appreciably either.
Another important point is that within the Caribbean New Orleans “entradas” into 
Havana were not that far below other ports. For instance, during 1772 ships from New 
Orleans only equaled 22 out of 158, but Campeche only sent 14 ships, Cartagena de Indias
C offm an, Luisiana, 122.
31 AGI, Caracas 932 and AGI, Indiferente General 2410; E. M. Recinos, El 
Commercio Libre entre Espafia and America T^rina, 1765-1824.1987, p. 85-94, 176, and 
212-213.
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sent 6 ships, and even Veracruz, the main port for New Spain sent a scant 31 ships 
including those for mail, silver and the slave trade (See Appendix 2). Veracruz was also a 
rallying point for items from other parts of the Empire before going to Havana which 
would have increased the amount of trade going to Havana. A better comparative figure 
is 22 ships returning to New Orleans compared to 14 to Veracruz (See Table 6).
TABLES
Entrances and Exits from Havana, Cuba 1772-1776
New Orleans
Total Ships Total Ships New Orleans Ships
Year Entering Havana Leaving Havana Ships Entering Leaving
1772 158 166 22 22
177332 131 106 18 7
1774 223 206 31 28
1775 203 206 23 26
1776 243 239 25 15
Sources: Shipping figures from AGI, Cuba 1216, Folio 277; ibid 1217, Folios 305, 347, 
and 437; ibid 1219, Folios 594, 603,623,636, 659, 674,698, 719, 733, 760, 779 and 
807; ibid 1220, Folios 829, 844, 865,876, 892, 912, and 959; ibid 1221, Folios 977, 
995,1014, 1046,1059, 1096, 1118,1155, 1198, 1216 and 125<L
^These figures are lower because the records from February to May are missing 
from the Legajos.
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Table 6























New Orleans 22 22
Omoa 2 1
Puerto Rico 4 0




Sources: AGI, Cuba 1216, Folios 277 and Legajo 1217, No. 305
33Includes a flota and troop transports (only three ships)
^Ships from La Corufia to Havana carried the mail but also harina (flour) while 
the majority of the ships leaving Havana for La Coruna only carried mail, with the 
exception of an occaisional troop transport.
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Spain’s trade with her colonies in Latin America still dominated shipping in 
Havana (especially that from Cadiz and La Coruna) as was expected under mercantilists 
law and definitely under the Bourbon reforms (See Table 6). In perspective, shipping 
figures through the port of Havana show that New Orleans did not have the lowest 
amount of shipping moving through Havana. New Orleans was second only to Veracruz 
in New Spain which frequently transported mail, troops and silver. The problem with 
Louisiana’s commerce was her products, not the amount of shipping allowed by the 
crown.35
It was obvious that trade with Havana had little benefit for Unzaga’s colonists at 
the moment and that their products would never be sold in the metropole. He could not 
offset the trade deficit by buying goods and storing them to help the prices or by using 
funds from the royal treasury. Louisiana’s treasury was one of the smallest in the 
Caribbean, even by 1775, only the tiny frontier port of Cumana received less in situado 
funds (See Table 7). As stated before, Situado monies were forwarded to Veracruz, then 
portioned out by the Viceroy, parceled out to the Captain-General in Cuba and finally to 
the rest of the Caribbean. Because of this formality, the money frequently arrived late 
(sometimes months after it was sent to Havana) and was always just barely enough. After 
funding O’Reilly’s expenses to quell the rebels, the Spanish crown (as it had in Cuba)
35AGI Cuba 1216, 1217, 1219, 1220, and 1221. See Table 6 for specific folio 
numbers.
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lowered Louisiana’s situado expenses to 120,000 pesos annually and again on Viceroy 
Bucareli’s advice in 1773 to a little over 115,000 pesos per year (see Table T).36
Unzaga, furthermore, did not want to use government funding to assuage the pains 
of the colonial economy as it was also his duty to build the government’s treasury in the 
same manner that he was charged with restoring the economy. Another way must be 
found to promote commerce.
The governor began his development by trying to improve Louisiana’s foundering 
tobacco industry. To do this he requested aid from New Spain’s viceroy, the Marquis de 
Croix (Bucareli did not arrive until late 1771). In November of 1771 the Viceroy sent the 
governor ten-thousand pesos fiientes (a special situado) to buy raw tobacco for the royal 
government under the newly formed Renta de Tabaco. a royal monopoly formed by Jose 
de Galvez. Unzaga then had his colonists gather all the tobacco possible (some 98,000 
pounds)and send it to Nachitoches to be shipped aboard the El Santo Cristo de San 
Romas to the port of Veracruz.37 The Crown sent its immediate approval of Unzaga’s 
actions but Unzaga’s victory was short lived. No additional requests for tobacco came 
from New Spain until the end of his administration.3*
“ AGI Cuba, Legajo 149-A, numbers 20,22 and 29-Marques de Croix to Unzaga; 
and 35, 62,65-66,67, 7071, 72-72, 74, and 76 Bucareli to Unzaga, and AGI Cuba 1219 
Bucareli to Arriaga, June 3, 1774, no. 661.
37Brian Coutts, “Boom and Bust,” 289-290.
“ Arriaga to Unzaga, May 20, 1771, Lawrence Kinnaird, ed. Spain in the 
Mississippi Valiev. 1765-1794. (hereinafter SMV) 3 vols. Annual Report of the AHR for 
1945, Washington, D.C. 1946-1949,2:193; Coutts, “Boom and Bust,” 290.
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Table 7
Situados for Louisiana 1771-1776
October 4.1771 to October 3.1772 
Marquis de Croix to Havana 4 February 1771 
Havana to Louisiana 16 April 1771 
Amount: 120,000 pesos*
October 4.1772 to October 3.1773 
Bucareli to Havana 10 April 1772 
Arrived Louisiana 11 July 1772 
Amount 120,000 pesos*
October 4.1773 to October 3.1774 
Bucareli to Havana 31 March 1773 
Reached Havana 31 July 1773 
Arrived Louisiana 27 August 1773 115,722 pesos, 6 tominos, 3 granos
In Moneda Menuda del Nuevo Cufio 
En la de a 4 rrs (quatros?) 1,000 
En la de a 2 rrs (doses) 4,000 
En la de a 1 rrs (reales) 300 
En la de a ‘A rrs (medios) 1,000 
total 6,300
October 4. 1774 to October 3.1775 
Bucareli to Havana 13 Abril 1774 115,322 pesos, 5 tominos, 9 granos
In Moneda Menuda del Nuevo Cufio 
En la de Doses 4,000 
En la de Reales 1,000 
En la de Medios 1.000 
total 6,000
October 4.1775 to October 3.1776 
Bucareli to Havana 27 March 1775 115,722 pesos, 6 tominos, 8 granos
In Moneda Menuda del Nuevo Cufio
En la de Doses 4,000 
En la de Reales 4,000 
En la de Medios 1,000
total 9,000
Continued Following Page
39Includes 1,230 pesos for widow Doha Francisca Cullange de Villemont who 
wasn't receiving her husband's pay.
bucareli noted that this was the amount believed necessary to support the colony.
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Attached Treasurer's report for 1775 (Table 7 Cont’d)
Contadura General de el Exercito v Provincia de la Luisiana
Account of the monies and expenditures up to September of 177S
Pesos v Reales de Plata
-On the account formed due to the corte de cajas and the
additions applied by the treasurer Don Bernardo de Otero
on the 4* of May of this years, resulting in an existing 132,605.7.18
-Entered into the caja from then on for the situado for Oct/75
to Oct/76 115,722.6.08
-Item of the product of others 1.358.0.20
249,686.6.12
Spent from the 4 of May until now:24,367.2.28
We suppose well spend from now




Money set aside for the residencia of the
governor (like a deposit) 3,000.0.00
There should exist: 193,0228.1.2
-Plus the situado for one year 115,322.5.12




Unforseen expenses 1,585.00 -8,243.0.0
Resulting in the following in one year of 69,662.3.24
October 4. 1776 to October 3. 1777
Bucareli to Havana 17 January 1776 115, 322.5.9
Moneda menuda
En la de Doses 1,000
En lade Reales 1,000
En la de Medios 1.000
total 3,000
Sources: Marqu6s de Croix to Unzaga, AGI, Cuba 149-A, Folios 20,22, and 29; 76-
Bucareli to Unzaga, ibid, Folios 35, 62, 65-66,67, 70-71, 72-73, 74
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Table 8
Situado Distribution-27 March 1775
Destination Use
Havana Por Cuenta de las atenciones de tierra 
For Cuenta para las de Marina 
Por Cuenta de la coasignasidn para 
compra de tabacos
Santo
Domingo Por su situado que cumple en fin de Abril 
Para comprar tobacos 
Para Pago del 6p% a la Guamicidn 
Para la satisfaddn de otro 6% al 
Vecindario 













Puerto Rico Por su situado de todo el afio antecedente 278 857.7.6. 487.858.7. 11V4
Por la consignasidn anual para obras de 
fortificaridn 
Por la consign. Para el propio efecto 
Para la extincidn de lo que se dij6 de 
Embiar en el afio del 1770 
Por la limnosaconcedad por una vez 
al convento de Carmelitos




fum ani Por el situado correspondement a toda
el afio anterior 40.235.5.3
i nniriana Por un afio de situado que empieza en
4 de Oct del corriente 115.722.2.IK
Total 1,801.292.2.114






Atenciones de tierra 
































Total 220 000.. 47000.. 33 000.. 300 000.
Source: Bucareli to Arriaga AGI, Cuba 1219, Folio 661
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The lack of follow-up orders from New Spain is unexplained, but had there been 
Louisiana might not have been able to meet them because of labor shortages. While it 
required less slave labor than indigo, to grow tobacco in large amounts one needed more 
labor, either vagrants or slaves.41 French Louisiana’s planters who had enough wealth to 
maintain large amounts of expensive African slaves, usually produced indigo.
Furthermore, Louisiana’s depressed economy had already begun to drive out many 
merchants and planters. The shortage of labor, then, slowed the production.
Prior to the Spanish period tobacco was grown primarily north of Lake 
Pontchartrain. In 1770, at Unzaga’s urging, settlers began expanding tobacco production 
in Natchitoches, Opelousas, Pointe Coupee and Attakapas. By then these settlements had 
over thirteen-hundred and fifty people, having been increased by a number of Acadian 
refugees who arrived in 1765 and 1770.42 Still, the production of tobacco expanded 
slowly.
Part of the slowness was due to the fact that it was far more lucrative for the 
planters to sell smaller harvests to British merchants for higher prices. In July of 1770, 
merchant John Fitzpatrick in Manchac (the heart of smuggling territory), wrote to his 
dealers in Mobile that he had Natchitoches tobacco for sale and that they should hold on
41Clark, New Orleans. 186.
42 In Usner, Indians. Settlers & Slaves. 119-120: Ulloa reported that they could not 
cultivate indigo or tobacco without slaves and would never get beyond producing “wood, 
indigo of very poor quality, and tobacco in small quantities and of ordinary quality.”; 
Coutts, “Boom and Bust,” 292-295: This is even clearer in the late 1770s and 1780s when 
Louisiana was unable to keep up with New Spain’s demands despite financial assistance 
from the Crown, Martin Navarro to Jose de Galvez, September 12, 1782, Informe 127, 
AGI, SD 2633, Folios 219-222.
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to their own tobacco because New Spain’s viceroy had purchased the rest of Louisiana’s 
stock. If they would just hold on to what they had, he said, in a few months the product 
would become scarcer and even more valuable. In August he observed that his 
predictions had been correct and the planters at Point Coupee had grown only enough for 
personal consumption. By 1773 he had run completely out of tobacco and had to send to 
New Orleans to his distributors.43
Another problem that both New Spain and Louisiana faced was transportation and 
packaging. Although it might be shipped out of Natchitoches to Veracruz with relative 
ease, the tobacco then had to be hauled overland to factory warehouses in New Spain. 
Louisiana normally shipped its tobacco in large containers which made land transportation 
difficult. Only planters with larger labor forces could afford to transform the leaf tobacco 
into the andullos or rolls commonly used in Havana and easily turned into cigarros in 
New Spain. Most of the tobacco producers in Louisiana, however, used vagrants to 
harvest tobacco and so used the easier method of pressing tobacco into toneles or 
hogsheads. The labor and packaging problem made transportation harder and also made 
the process of creating cigarros more difficult. Both of these issues had to be settled 
before the tobacco trade could flourish.44
43John Fitzpatrick to McGillvray and Struthers, July 23, 1770, Fitzpatrick to Peter 
Swanson August 30, 1770, October 31, 1770 and June 30, 1773, Dalrymple,
Letterbooks- 90,94 and 97, 152.
“ Informe, Martin Navarro to Jos6 de Galvez, September 12, 1782, AGI, SD 2633, 
Folios 219-222.
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Unfortunately between 1772 and 1773 Louisiana experienced a hard winter 
followed by a severe hurricane. The hurricane was the last straw for many French 
merchants and planters and they left the colony in droves during 1773.45 The planters who 
stayed had to settle both the transportation and production issues before the tobacco trade 
could flourish. It never did during Unzaga’s tenure. By 1779 there were only 138,808 
pounds of tobacco available for Veracruz because of trade with the British, poor labor and 
transportation.46
The governor’s work was not totally in vain. He did stir growth in Louisiana’s 
tobacco industry. As he left office New Spain forwarded another request for tobacco and 
royal contracts to assist Louisiana’s growers. Spain also officially opened trade between 
Louisiana with its traditional markets in France and the French West Indies. Spanish 
officials had been impressed by British production of tobacco in the Natchez area of 
British West Florida during the 1770s. With Royal subsidies and a flood of new orders, 
Louisiana actually experienced an economic “boom” in the tobacco trade in the 1780s. It 
was not to last. Within the decade Seville built-up a surplus of the leaf. The Crown 
followed by lowering production limits and limited all future shipments from Louisiana. 
The surplus in Seville created a glut in New Spain’s market, and the Viceroy quickly set 
ceilings on tobacco importations in the 1790s. For Louisiana, the results were disastrous. 
Many planters had purchased slaves and land as they speculated on the tobacco trade.
45Archives Nationales. Paris. France. Archives des Colonies. Louisiana: General 
Correspondence. C 13A.
^Coutts, “Boom and Bust,” 292-295.
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Most of them were bankrupted by the new limits on production. Few had little choice but 
to return to frontier economies and illicit trade with the British.47
Disappointed with the results of his tobacco “experiment” Unzaga focused on 
Louisiana’s other exports. Indigo would not bring money to Louisiana. It cost too much 
to produce and other Latin American colonies produced a better product for the money.
In fact, the governor and his officials (treasurer Martin Navarro in particular) tried to steer 
their colonists away from indigo production toward other products. The colonists didn’t 
agree and did not diversify their agriculture markedly during the 1770s. Unzaga would 
have to find other products to enhance the failing economy.
The governor considered the fur trade briefly. Furs had been a mainstay of French 
Louisiana’s economy. Trappers fiinneled their trade from the hinterlands in the southeast 
and the northern Mississippi Valley, along the various rivers that fed the Mississippi and 
down the great waterway to New Orleans. By the time Unzaga took office, unfortunately, 
the fur trade had been disrupted by population growth on the eastern bank of the 
Mississippi and war. Traditionally, the majority of the furs came from rich riverine areas 
of the southeast and the primary trappers had been the southeastern tribes. Boundary 
changes during the Seven Years War had disturbed the normal hunting and trapping areas 
along the rivers. The English had changed the balance of trade, disturbing some areas 
with settlement and pushing one tribe against another.48
47Coutts, “Boom and Bust,” 293-309; Clark, New Orleans. 184.
^For a complete account of the rise and decline of the fur trade in the Mississippi 
Valley see Paul Chrisler Philips, The Fur Trade. 2 vols. (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1961).
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Tensions between the Spanish and English along the new boundary of the 
Mississippi also disrupted the normal markets. French fur traders and Indians alike turned 
to the incoming English colonists making their way across the country west of the 
Alleghenies and into the Mississippi river valley for profits. New Orleans now competed 
with English Indian agents and settlers for furs. This might have been a larger problem had 
Unzaga really needed commerce in the product, but Spain did not need furs, neither did 
any of the legal ports open to New Orleans.49
In 1772 Unzaga decided that lumber and naval stores might be the real answers to 
his colony’s commerce. Louisiana produced forests of oak and cypress and other wood 
useful for building. Like the neighboring colony of Florida, it also contained large stands 
of pitch-pine which produced tar, resin, pitch and turpentine used in shipbuilding and 
repairs. Naval stores had never been a profitable industry in Louisiana. The French crown 
had frowned upon the quality of Louisiana’s tar and refused to pay for shipments until 
they reached France. The colonial government had taken to paying at least half the price 
of such shipments to guarantee their merchants at least some return on their investments. 
Toward the end of the French period naval stores continued to be shipped along with 
agricultural products, furs and wood but financially they accounted for just over one 
percent of the total monies received.50
49Clark, New Orleans. 185.
“ N. M. Miller Surrey, The Commerce of Louisiana during the French R&rime 
1699-1763 (New York, 1916), 203, 206,211,218.
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The merchants’ aaxiety had not diminished when Spain took control of the colony. 
Part of the protest against Ulloa had been an argument that Cuban pitch and tar produced 
on the Isle of Pines would ruin Louisiana’s trade.51 O’Reilly assured the merchants he 
would help them and expeditions into the colony’s interior showed the potential of 
Louisiana’s untapped forest resources.52 Merchant fears were realized when, during 
Unzaga’s administration, naval stores continued to be a low income item.
New Orleans had additional competition from the governor of Florida who asked 
the Spanish government to subsidize his industry to fumish naval stores for the Havana 
Company in Cuba.53 That made matters worse because Florida was closer to Cuba and 
could undersell New Orleans’ tar and pitch. The Spanish government, furthermore, never 
sought to actually subsidize naval stores as a commercial export in either colony until the 
1780s.54
Because the naval stores industry appeared only so promising, Unzaga tried create 
a new timber industry, of sawmills, shipyards and cut boards for the Havana market. 
Louisiana’s cypress was in demand because of the wood’s strength, availability and ability
“Memorial of Merchants and Planters of Louisiana on the Events of October 29, 
1768, in B. F. French, ed., Historical Collections of Louisiana. Embracing Translations of 
Many Rare and Valuable Documents Relating to th Natural Civil and Political History of 
that State 5 vols. (New York, 1853), 5: 221,228.
“O’Reilly to Arriaga, October 17, 1769, in Kinnard, SMV. 1:13-104 and the 
report of Nugent and Kelly, January of 1770 in AGI, Cuba 81.
“ Jack D. L. Holmes, “Naval Stores in Colonial Louisiana and the Floridas,” 
Trwisiana History. (Winter, 1968), 303; and John Jay TePaske, The Governorship of 
Spanish Florida. 1700-1763 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1964) 106.
“Jack D. L. Holmes, “Naval Stores,” 304.
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to withstand the weather. Many French planters used cypress for their homes because of 
its longevity. The governor was also aware of the success of men Like Richard Carpenter, 
William Dunbar and James Brown in British Natchez who had made a profit of lumber 
through making staves for delivery. In 1771 Dunbar had already produced 100,000 staves 
for market.55
Unzaga began his attempts at subsidizing the colony’s timber industry through 
Havana. Correspondence between the governor and the new Captain-General of Cuba, 
the Marquis de la Torre, indicates that Spanish officials were willing to contract with 
Louisiana business men to transport cut lumber to Havana. This would ease the tension 
between Cuba’s sugar producers and the royal navy over wood for boxes to transport 
sugar.56
The scheme was shared with several of Louisiana’s prominent citizens, planter 
Santiago Beauregard, his son Luis Toutant Beauregard, and Santiago’s brother Bartolome 
Toutant Beauregard. Prior to Unzaga’s agreement with de la Torre, Santiago had begun 
to prepare for a new venture. In August of the previous year he had mortgaged his 
property, slaves, livestock and household goods to a friend and business associate, 
Francisco Pascale de Le Barre for 9,200 pesos over a three year period. Five thousand 
pesos of the mortgage was to be paid to Beauregard in the form of wood which 
Beauregard would use to complete his ship. It is not clear in the notarial records if de La
55Clark, New Orleans. 184-185.
56Marquis de la Torre to Unzaga, September 26, 1772, Dispatches: Unzaga to 
Toree, October 14, 1772, ibid.
90
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Barre was also helping him build the ship or not. Santiago apparently was setting up to 
transport his own goods and others rather than stay a planter. In the same month he also 
sold his slaves in return for goods he could sell, rather than money.57
Poor weather and bad harvests forced de La Barre to resell the land to Beauregard 
in December of the next year, but Santiago was convinced he could make the 
timber/merchant business work and leased the land to de Le Barre for 800 pesos per year. 
That same month Unzaga completed his arrangements with the Captain-General in Cuba 
and Santiago sent his brother, Bartolome, to Havana with power of attorney to represent 
him in contractual arrangements to ship planks for sugar boxes. He also gave Bartolome 
the right to mortgage his (Santiago’s) house and property in New Orleans for up to 
20,000 pesos if needed. According to the contract between Bartolome and the 
“gentlemen owners of sugar mills near Havana,” he mortgaged Santiago’s New Orleans’ 
home (a 10-room house on Royal and St. Anne streets), and 21 blacks (slaves) who 
worked in Santiago’s “ingenio [sugar mill] in Chapitulas.” By June 25, 1773 the 
Beauregards and Habafieros had struck a deal.5’
57New Orleans Notarial Archives (hereinafter called Notarial Archivess), Juan 
Bautista Garic, Notary, Acts January-December 1771, Sale of Land to de Le Barre, 
August 16,1771; sale of female slave to Don Jan Anoul for 250 pesos to be paid in 
quintals of “clean cotton with no seeds” at 15 pesos per quintal, August, 1771.
S8Notarial Archives. Juan Bautista Garic, Notary, Acts January-December 1772, 
Resale of land and consequent lease of same to Francisco Pascalis de Le Barre and wife 
December 29,1772, Power of Attorney to Bartolome on December 30, 1772, and in Acts 
January-December 1773, Juan Bautista Garic, Notary, the contract between the 
Beauregards and sugar producers in Havana, June 25, 1773.
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Unzaga’s work and his colonists labor seemed to work. In 1773 four ships carried 
half of the colony’s commerce with Havana in the form of wood for sugar boxes. By 
September, an excited Santiago contracted with a friend, Juan Villanova, to build a saw 
mill, placing Juan in charge of the mill’s operations. Again Santiago put up some thirteen 
arpents of land, slaves, and tools as his portion of the contract. The contract is replete 
with the hopes Beauregard and Villanova had for their new venture and it reads “may we 
never cheat each other, many our children never cheat each other, and may we both work 
diligently.”59 By 1774 Beauregard began to buy and sell properties to expand the mill and 
free up cash.60
Within a year, however, Cuban sugar planters began to complain that they didn’t 
want to have to build their own boxes. Instead, wrote de la Torre, they want to receive 
pre-made boxes so that all they have to do is fill them with sugar and send them on their 
way to Europe.61 Other planters contracted with Beauregard to carry not only wood, but 
pre-made boxes. A single contract, with Don Francisco de Levy and Don Juan Baptiste,
59Notarial Archives. Juan Bautista Garic, January-December, 1773, September 13, 
1773 contract between Santiago Toutant Beauregard and Juan Villanova.
“ Shipping information, AGI Cuba, Legajo 1217, Nos. 347-437; Notarial Archives. 
Andres Almonaster y Roxas, Acts January - December 1774, contracts made by 
Beauregard to sell the property of deceased friend who owed him money, Act 120; 
bought property from Louis Ramon near the city for the expansion of the mill, Act 132.
61Unzaga to Torre, January 28, 1773, Dispatches: Ibid, March 7,1773, March 23, 
1773, April 29, 1773, May 17, 1773, June 25, 1773, July 1, 1773 and August 27, 1773.
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asked for 2,600 boxes “bien acondiciodanas” (in good condition) with specific 
measurements which had to be “in fully usable condition” upon delivery.62
Unfortunately, Cuba’s sugar producers were vague about their measurements.
They sent the amount of sugar each box should contain and expected boxes of similar 
width and height. Louisiana’s lumber mills, however, built boxes with a similar internal 
capacity, but not always the same measurements in height or width, not thinking it would 
be harder to ship such boxes. Some of the boxes were refused openly and had to be 
replaced, others were left standing on the docks because the fickle Habaiieros had 
purchased cheaper boxes elsewhere. Despite the inconsistency in dealing with Havana, the 
lumber business continued to thrive and made up a large percentage of the commerce 
between Louisiana’s struggling merchants and Havana (See Table 9). By the beginning of 
the 1800s Louisiana had 30 sawmills producing lumber for sugar boxes.63
One point of interest remains in the lumber trade between Havana and Louisiana. 
At the end of Unzaga’s tenure, Captain-General de la Torre wrote letter after letter from 
Cuba to the government in Spain about Cuba’s wood shortage and the conflict between 
homebuilders and the Marina. The question must be asked historically, why did de la
62Notarial Archives. Andres Almonaster y Roxas, Acts January-December 
1774;contract in Act 91; another obligation between Dezellet and Beauregard for 2,600 
boxes; Act 82.
^ Dispatches. Unzaga to Torre, October 31, 1774; February 14, 1775; the conflict 
continued into the Galvez administration; Ervin Mancil, “Some Historical and 
Geographical Notes on the Cypress Lumbering Industry in Louisiana,” L§, 8 (1969), 18.
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Torre simply not contract with Louisiana for more wood for building purposes as well as 
the “cortes de cajas” for sugar boxes?64
TABLE 9
Shipments of Wood from New Orleans to Havana, 1772-1776






Sources: Figures from AGI, Cuba 1216, Folio 277; ibid 1217, Folios 305,347 and 437; 
ibid 1219, Folios 594,603, 623, 636, 659, 674, 698, 719, 733, 760, 799 and 807; ibid 
1220, Folios 829, 844, 865, 876, 892,912, and 959; and ibid 1221, Folios 977,995, 
1014, 1046, 1059,1096,1118, 115, 1198,1216, and 1259.
Frequently frustrated with attempts to sell Louisiana’s products, Unzaga even 
attempted to make money by sending a boat to Havana with wood, rice, tar, pitch, com, 
indigo, cotton, lard, and hides plus two-thousand pesos. He asked Bucareli to sell the 
goods wherever possible and use the money from the sales along with the two-thousand 
pesos to buy sugar. The sugar was then to be sold in Cadiz and the money from the sales 
of sugar to be returned to Louisiana. It was a round about way to try and get some return
64Torre to Arriaga, November 21,1774, February 24,1775, and March 6, 1776 
AGI, Cuba 1220, Folio 841.
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on Louisiana’s products. Unfortunately Bucareli did not have time to “tend” to 
Louisiana’s commercial problems and the deal fell through.65
Despite his limited successes with legal commerce, the vicissitudes of working 
with the Spanish bureaucracy and being at the mercy of Havana’s merchant monopoly 
prompted governor Unzaga to believe that his first assumptions had been correct. It 
would be the British, not the Spanish, who were the answer to Louisiana’s commercial 
problems. Indeed, the increase in exports of tobacco, indigo, timber and skins in 
Louisiana had “more to do with the exceptions made to commercial restrictions by 
Spanish officials than with any real change in market or availability.”66 Paul Hoffinan, 
aptly states that the reality of the situation was:
“Louisiana’s unique characteristics meant that Spain and her 
empire, by itself and however equipped with new laws and commercial 
institutions, could not provide a context within which the colony could 
prosper, although it might survive in poverty.. . .  In effect, consolidation 
of Spanish rule in economic terms meant at least a short-term adjustment 
of imperial norms to Louisiana realities.”67
The stringent mercantilists polices in place during Unzaga’s governorship meant 
he must use unorthodox means to deal with his colony’s realities and make it profitable for 
Spain. The records at Balize and the Treasury records indicate that Unzaga carefully 
husbanded Louisiana’s economy by applying his assets properly and keeping official funds 
in the treasury. A look at the fees imposed at Balize on ships entering and leaving the
U nzaga to Bucareli, January 15,1771, AGI, Cuba 1055, Folio 137. 
“ Girouard, “Unzaga,” 49; Clark, New Orleans. 179
67Hoffinan, Luisiana. 113.
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Mississippi River, indicates the volume of British shipping on the Mississippi and shows 
how relatively little of all shipping tied up at or departed from New Orleans. Between 
1773 and 1777, however, the Almojarifazgo tax levied on legal imports at New Orleans, 
increased from 2,240 pesos to 16,558, shows a growth in shipping, as well as government 
intake (See Table 10).
TABLE 10
Commerce of Louisiana, 1773-1777
1773 1774 1775 1776 1777
Imp. Baliza (Pesos) 209.5 147 161.5 157 133
Est. Round Trips 104 73 80 78 66
Nuevo Orleans, entrances 9 30 23 11 9
Nuevo Orleans, exits 12 34 20 17 9
Nuevo Orleans, Total 21 64 43 28 18
Nuevo Orleans, % Baliza 10% 44% 27% 18%
Almojarifazgo (pesos) 2,240 4,238 16,690 16,558
Estimated Goods (pesos) 89,600 169,520 667,600 i562,320
Sources: Table 4.2 from Hoffinan, Luisiana. 133.
What is confusing is a comparison of the ships entering and leaving Havana, from 
and for New Orleans. There are discrepancies which require more investigation than this 
study encompasses. For example, Tables 10 and 11 show that, in 1774, a total of 34 
ships left New Orleans and only 31 ships reached Havana. In 1775, however, there are 
only 20 ships leaving New Orleans, but 23 are registered in Havana. Which bookkeeper 
are we to believe? Perhaps there are ships coming from other ports in Louisiana, or the 
extra ships are of those who "knew someone” and slipped through Balize without paying 
fees. There are some interesting choices to pursue(See Table 11).
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Table 11
New Orleans Exits-Havana Entrances 1773-1776






Source: Shippine figures from Hoffinan. Luisiana. 133 and AGL Cuba 1216.1217. 
1219, 1220, 1221.
The governor tried every possible means to make Louisiana’s economy viable. In 
1773 while he pushed lumber and tobacco he also investigated a mine which had been 
discovered some 250 leagues from New Orleans. The mere possibility that it might be a 
silver mine warranted a guard and a letter to the Viceroy in New Spain. In his letter, 
Unzaga asked Bucareli for more men to guard the mine and a royal mining expert from 
Coahuila to assay the minerals. The letter does not indicate in what direction from New 
Orleans the mine was found but Bucareli’s reply hints that it was north and near the 
Mississippi. The Viceroy did not send a specialist or troops, instead he told Unzaga that 
“. . .  we don’t have the manpower to mine or guard it, and that sustaining such an 
operation would not be advisable because we do not want to attract the attention of our 
immediate neighbors on the Mississippi.”6*
“ Unzaga to Bucareli, January 28,1773, AGI, SD 2582, Folio 31; Bucareli to 
Unzaga, April 26, 1773, ibid.
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Unzaga ignored the Viceroy’s concerns and investigated the mine himself. The 
rewards, he felt, would far outweigh the danger if the mine turned out to hold silver.
After investigation, unfortunately, the mine turned out to be one of the numerous lead 
mines. Bucareli was not happy with the governor’s disobedience. In August the Viceroy 
addressed his concerns about the British to the Crown. The Minister of the Indies 
reprimanded Unzaga’s actions and maintaining that the mine was not to be worked, it was 
not silver, and bore no further investigation. Since, however, the governor had already 
drawn attention to the area he must now send annual reconnoiters through the area against 
encroachments or probes by the English.®
Unzaga’s struggles also included attempts at creating cottage industry and a 
domestic market for Louisiana’s handicrafts. In his first two years he encouraged new 
settlers to produce products like cotton which would allow Louisiana to become 
independent of her “illegal” trade. The governor also encouraged a domestic market.
He wrote to post commanders asking them to send various products produced by their 
posts which might be sold to the citizens of New Orleans or traded to other posts. 
Arkansas sent game, especially woodcocks which he felt might add to New Orleans’ 
larder. Unzaga also ordered gloves and stockings from local weavers and encouraged his 
officers to do the same.70 Cotton became a limited product during Unzaga’s tenure
®Bucareli to Arriaga, August 9,1773, AGI, SD 2582; Arriaga, March 8, 1774, 
Aranjuez, ibid.
^Encouragement o f local industry can be found in Judice to Unzaga, October 19, 
1770, AGI, Cuba, 188-A, Folio l-d/32; Unzaga to Judice, October 22, 1770, Ibid. Cotton 
production and its problems are discussed in Unzaga to Verret, June 1, 1772, AGI, Cuba 
189 A, Folio 137.
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because it was often planted in the wrong locations. Another problem was that many of 
the inhabitants of New Orleans, especially the elite chose to buy European goods because 
of their social status.
The foregoing discussion on Louisiana’s commerce has left out a large expanse of 
colonial Louisiana’s territory, Spanish Illinois, but not without reason. The exports from 
Spanish Illinois (Missouri) were primarily flour, lead and furs. In the decade between 
Spanish possession of Louisiana and the last years of Unzaga’s governorship, the colonists 
at Illinois only produced 1,200 and 2,500 barrels of flour. Only thirty percent of the flour 
ever reached New Orleans. The rest went to domestic consumption and feeding the 
troops, traders and trappers in northern Louisiana. Lead production diminished as the 
years went on and never exceeded 60 tons per year. Furs, disrupted by the English forts 
along the eastern bank of the river and a steady influx of troops and English merchants 
were reduced to approximately 100 to 300 packs per year. English merchants competed 
with the settlers in Vincennes, Cahokia and Kaskaskia. The remainder of their exports 
included small amounts of tobacco and salt, never enough for the New Orleans market or 
its shipping business.71
It was not until after Unzaga left Louisiana that the Crown responded to 
Louisiana’s realities. In 1776 they re-opened trade to the French Islands. As mercantilistic 
rules weakened, trade quickened. New Orleans reoriented itself to the foreign market and 
by the end of the Spanish period 31 of the 81 ships which passed through the Mississippi
71Clark, New Orleans. 182,211-212.
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were actually from Spain By all appearances, in 1799 the commercial reforms of Carlos 
m  were a success for Louisiana.72
Although the Crown responded too slowly to Louisiana’s requests for freer 
commerce to assist Unzaga, there is hard evidence that his foregoing struggles to fill the 
treasury were somewhat successful. Historians have often confused personal economic 
gain on the part of Louisiana’s citizens with the public monies collected from taxes, tariffs 
and husbanded by the governor and his treasury officials. The treasurer’s reports for 
Louisiana during Unzaga’s tenure reflect tremendous stewardship by a governor under 
such duress. The accounts, according to Martin Navarro and his replacement, Bernardo 
de Ortero, show a steady increase from year to year, beginning with 927,839.2 
reales/maravedis (115,979.88 pesos) in 1770 and ending with a surplus of 1,876,856.29 
reales/marvedis (234,607 pesos). While the rate of increase, 118.628 reales over seven 
years, a rate of 16,946.86 pesos/year, is not spectacular compared to other colonial Latin 
America treasuries, it is incredible given the circumstances.(See Appendix A)
The governor’s endeavors at improving Louisiana’s commerce were complicated 
by the re-appearance of the British along the Mississippi and domestic concerns.
Unzaga’s predecessor, O’Reilly, had been quite belligerent toward illegal commerce with 
Britain and expelled the majority of its merchants from New Orleans in 1769. Most of 
these men merely moved upriver to British Manchac or Natchez and continued business as
^Shipping figures from Spanish Judicial Records, Historical Center, Louisiana 
State Museum, Report of Juan de Castanedo. Permanent Alderman and Roval Treasurer 
regarding the ships entering through Bavou St. John, lists and anchorage fees. Document 
no. 1799123103. December 31, 1799.
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usual. Some even continued business in New Orleans through Louisiana firms which 
acted as middle-men for the colonists and their illegal clients. In 1770 British ships quietly 
began to reappear on the Mississippi bringing goods upriver to the “expatriate” enclave. 
Within a year merchants like John Fitzpatrick and Thomas Bently had recreated their 
lucrative, but illegal trade in Louisiana.73
Fitzpatrick and others began a new chain of contacts across the Spanish-English 
border through the Amite river. There they did a booming business not only with 
merchants in New Orleans, but with local farmers and planters in both Spanish Louisiana 
and British Florida. They also received and sold goods coming down the Mississippi from 
Spanish Illinois.74 New Orleans’ merchants felt the familiar sting that such illicit trade 
inflicted on their commerce. In November of 1771, merchant Francois Marie Regiio 
complained that the British were taking advantage of the depressed economy and had 
completely “encompassed” the fur trade to the point that “all the pelts which previously 
appeared in this capitol, now come there only in their barges and boats.”73 British 
merchants, like James Jones and his brother Evan even resided in New Orleans, continuing 
business with no complaint from Spanish officials as long as “trade” was continued on the 
river and not in the city.76
^John Fitzpatrick, Letterbooks. 13.
74Ibid, 20.
75Fran$ois Marie Reggio to Monseigneur, November 22, 1771, Reggio Family 
Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Louisiana State University.
76Fitzpatrick, Letterbooks. 21.
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Illicit trade with the British also exacerbated the shortages of supplies and money 
in New Orleans. It also exposed the lack of integration between the economy in New 
Orleans and its hinterlands. For example, in 1770 New Orleans suddenly experienced a 
famine. By August there was a shortage of com and rice, both staples. A shortage of 
wheat the governor could understand, but not crops commonly raised by most farmers. 
Realizing that the farmers were selling to illicit merchants to circumvent tariffs and price 
constraints in New Orleans and to get better prices and/or items manufactured by the 
British, the governor notified the post commandants of his extremity, and requested that 
their grain be sent immediately to New Orleans.77 Amused, the local commandant at 
Pointe Coupee, Francois Allain, explained the dearth of grain in his region. He informed 
the governor that no rice was grown at his post and that the local com crop had been 
damaged by rain and would not mature until October.7*
Unzaga then politely requested that Allain produce a report with the projected 
agricultural production for each farm in his jurisdiction. He added, that the report should 
contain the amount of food each farmer required for home consumption. Any surplus must 
be sent to New Orleans to alleviate the ongoing emergency. Instead of sending the report, 
Allain replied, rather smugly, that all future correspondence from the governor (normally 
in Spanish) must be accompanied by a French translation so that he could avoid 
misconstruing any official orders. Not undone by his Commandant’s obstreperous
U nzaga to Commandant Francois Allain, Pointe Coupee, August 16, 1770, AGI, 
Cuba 188-A.
78Allain to Unzaga, September 5, 1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A.
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behavior the governor gently reminded him that he was now a Spanish official and must 
either learn Spanish or secure his own interpreter. Allain, refused to budge, replying that 
he could not learn a new language because of his “advanced age” and there were no 
trustworthy translators at the Post. Instead, he requested permission to resign his post.79
There are no future letters from Allain on the subject, but he continued his post 
and Unzaga quietly “did battle” with his other commandants to feed hungry New Orleans. 
While he battled with Allain, he also send requests to Commandant Dutisne in the Iberville 
District, as well as Verret on the German Coast requesting food for his hungry citizens in 
the Crescent City. Both denied any illegal traffic with the British and replied that they also 
had a shortage of grain because of the weather.”
By the end of 1770, Unzaga’s solutions began to alleviate the scarcity of food in 
New Orleans and the failing economy in the colony. The French commandants finally 
responded favorably to Unzaga’s patient insistence. The colonists harvested another com 
crop by the end of 1770 and the commandants began to keep an eye on smuggling 
between their residents and the British. Commandant Berard even sent a list of Acadian 
farmers who had surplus com. (See Table 12)81 Slowly the frontier economy of
^Unzaga to Allain, October 13, 1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Allain to Unzaga, 
November 4,1770, ibid; Unzaga to Allain, November 14,1770, ibid; Allain to Unzaga, 
November 30 1770, ibid.
“ Unzaga to Dustine, August 11, 1770, AGI, Cuba 193-B, Folio 281 another letter 
apparently went to Verret who replied on August 27,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A^olio 1-d, 
44.
81Verret to Unzaga, September 25, ;1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Foliol d/ 46; 
Commandant Descoudreaux to Unzaga, November 1,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-B, Folio 182, 
Berard to Unzaga, December 5, 1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Foliol9.
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Louisiana’s hinterlands began to acclimate itself to Spanish control though it never 
completely centered on New Orleans.
Giving way to the exigencies of Louisiana’s frontier did not encourage regular 
commercial growth through New Orleans, in fact it actually helped suppress that trade. 
Daniel Usner contends that frontier markets continued to resist the new economic order. 
Furthermore, British settlements east of the Mississippi devastated the local game and 
confiscated the local fur trade. Officially, Unzaga lamented “even our new subjects sell 
those [furs] which they acquire from the Indians in our own lands [to the British].82 
Treasury reports show that official trade in Louisiana, including British ships dropped 
severely between 1770 and 1771, from 144 ships through Balize to 97 in 1771, but trade 
began to climb afterterwards.83
Ironically, as trade began to assert itself along the Mississippi, the New Orleans 
merchants experienced worse hardships. Another bad harvest in 1772 hurt trade 
and the citizens New Orleans as they depended on food from the surrounding countryside. 
The hurricane of 1773 further injured both the planter and merchant classes of the city. 
Famine and economic woes often created circumstances which prompted less than honest 
action among the colonists. In fact, between 1772 and 1773 a number of men became 
extrodinarily wealthy, buying up the homes and lands of less fortunate citizens. Among 
these men was the well known Notary and member of the Cabildo, Andres Almonester y
U nzaga to Bucareli, July 8, 1770, Dispatches.
“Usner, Indians. Settlers & Slaves. 107; Hoffman, Luisiana. 122.
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TABLE 12
Excerpt from letter of Jean Baptiste Berard, at La Belle Pointe on Wednesday, 
December 5, 1770 which includes a list of his Acadian fanners with corn surpluses
during the famine of 1770
..  en consequence des ordres de monsieur le gouvemeur. J’ait fait faire une assemble 
de tous les habittants de ce quartier comme vous me marque ou chaque’un a fait faire 
un declaration du maye qu’ils a a vendre.”
(“. .  .because of the orders of the governor, I assembled all the inhabitants of this region 
as you asked me to where each one made a declaration of the com they had to sell.”)
Noms et notte de ceaux qui ont due maye a vendre au atacapas. Le toute en epie.
Michel Bernard...................................................................  20 Barils
Charles Guilliebeau............................................................. 15
Francois Guilliebeau........................................................... 20
Simon Le Blanc..................................................................  40
Claude Martin....................................................................  20
Francis Broussard............................................................  20
Rene Traans (Trahan)........................................................  60
Joseph Broussard............................................................... 30
Jean Dugas.........................................................................  20
Pierre Dugas....................................................................... 60
Charles Dugas....................................................................  20
Michel Doucet...................................................................  20
Baptiste Hebert..................................................................  20
Baptiste Semer...................................................................  60
Michel M aut......................................................................  40
Firmien Landry................................................................... 40
Total 505
Source: Berard to Unzaga, December 5, 1770, AGI Cuba 188-A, Folio 5, No. 19
Roxas who besides obtaining a lucrative treasury post in the colony, also acted as an 
attorney for the city. In that position, as a notary for power of attorney and wills, he used
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his knowledge to gain a fortune. By the next decade he would be one of the wealthiest 
men in Louisiana and the Floridas.84
Unzaga could do little to prevent this kind of behavior but he did try and protect 
his colonists in another instance. Some of the planters who did not leave for Cap Framjais 
after the hurricane of 1773 needed debt relief. Others, whose crops were not ruined and 
did not need help, took advantage of the situation, conspiring to get government 
dispensations for their debts also. The ringleader of this last group was Gilbert Antoine de 
St. Maxent (Unzaga’s new father-in-law), who felt he at least could expect favorable 
treatment. St. Maxent, like the other would-be moochers, completely misjudged their 
governor. Unzaga felt responsible for all his colonists and acted impartially toward the 
whole group. Those debtors who could not pay were granted delays, but not excused 
from their debts. Those who had tried to cheat the system were required to satisfy their 
creditors immediately.
Unzaga’s fairness and impartiality gained respect not only for his governorship but 
for the Spanish system. He also stimulated the economy with his actions because the 
merchants realized they would now be able to collect debts and were also more inclined to 
provide their fellow colonists with credit. Additionally, the planters and merchants lost in 
the 1773 emigration to Cap Fran<?ais removed the last rebellious element from the New 
Orleans population. Those families who had been tied to the mutinous rebels of 1768 left
MJack D. L. Holmes, “Andres Almonester y Roxas: Saint or Scoundrel,” LS 8 
(Spring 1968), 49-50.
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with the last ship in 1773 and those who were left were far more inclined toward Unzaga 
and the new Spanish government.85
While the economy in Louisiana’s hinterlands recovered quickly with the 
prompting of British trade, New Orleans limped along until 1774 when trade between the 
hinterlands and the city surged. Corn, beans, wheat and even beef moved downriver to 
New Orleans which by that time had built slaughterhouses. Some farmers even took to 
slaughtering their neighbors cattle for profit.8* Complete economic recovery, however, 
came after Unzaga’s tenure when Louisiana became more fully integrated into the Spanish 
empire. Meanwhile, his equitable treatment of the colonists had begun to stir a sense of 
loyalty toward the new government. His persistence with the French commandants won 
him grudging respect and helped integrate the economies of the capitol and the rest of the 
colony. There was, of course, still the British to consider.
Mercantilists trade rules notwithstanding, Unzaga had orders to report British 
movements to Spain. He, therefore, had to maintain continuous contact with British 
settlements and/or British merchants along the Mississippi. The governor surmised that 
his surveillance could benefit Spain, the British and Louisiana. By keeping an eye on the 
“enemy,” Unzaga could now officially facilitate trade and “contact” with British merchants 
by giving permission to unlicenced vessels to sail up river, delivering illicit goods and
85Gayarre, History of Louisiana, in, 98-99; Carl Brasseaux, The Road to 
T nnisiana: The Saint-Domingue Refugees 1792-1809 (Lafayette, LA: Center for 
Louisiana Studies), 133-many of the last to leave died en route to Cap-Frangais.
“ LeDee to Unzaga, April 18, 1774, AGI, Cuba, 189-A, No. 38; and DeClouet to 
Unzaga, August 30, 1774.
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information. Meanwhile, the governor and the Commandant at Balize gleaned as much 
news from their captains as possible, not to mentioned the taxes alluded to earlier.87
Interestingly, as Unzaga welcomed British ships along the Mississippi, the rate of 
incidences of British ships stopping for supplies and aid increased in Havana as well. Both 
Unzaga and de la Torre took advantage of these contacts with foreign merchants to funnel 
knowledge of England’s plans for war and settlement to the Spanish Court. Unzaga 
licensed illegal merchants and developed a system of British spies to suit Spain’s needs in 
Louisiana. Captain-general de la Torre, accomplished surveillance by questioning the 
captains of injured English vessels, capturing illegal slaving ships and sometimes by openly 
sending messages and requests to Jamaica via British merchant ships. Despite overtures 
of war in late 1770 and 1771, and again toward the end of their tenures, both governors 
took a stance of covert observation and peaceful resistence to the British intrusion into the 
Caribbean and the Mississippi Valley, a policy their king would adopt as the Revolution of 
1776 approached.
In summary, Unzaga made his observation of British merchants both advantageous 
and profitable for the colony. He applied the king’s mercantilistic policies to commerce in 
New Orleans, trying the create remunerative enterprises from Louisiana’s meager exports. 
Working within the Bourbon reforms he began a lumber industry which would continue to 
flourish throughout the colonial period and into statehood. His attempts at tobacco
"Light Townsend Cummins, Spanish Observers and the American Revolution 
1775-1783 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 14; Commandant Juan 
Delavillebeauvre (Balize) to Unzaga, December 28,1770, AGI, Cuba 188; Unzaga to 
Delavillebeauvre, December 31, 1770, ibid.
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proved profitable for a time, albeit after his governorship, and only for a short duration. 
Cotton, also, would become a cash crop for Louisiana in the future. He also stewarded 
public funds and managed to begin filling the colony’s depleted treasury. Lastly, his 
peaceful and conciliatory attitude slowly began to reorient Louisiana’s frontier exchange 
economy toward the colony’s legitimate commerce and began to re-orient his colonists’ 
loyalties toward their new king.
Much has been made of his “winking at” illegal trade along the Mississippi, 
however, the governor merely applied an old Spanish custom known as Obedezco pero 
no cumplo (I obey but do not follow through), to circumstances beyond his control. He 
followed Spain’s imperial laws, within reason. If necessary, he bent them to Louisiana’s 
unusual circumstances, excusing himself to higher officials and trusting in the just 
reasoning of the crown. Control of the British was another matter. He managed to use 
British merchants as a network of spies, but his unorthodox means of surveillance and 
stimulation of the economy meant he also had to constantly guard against contraband and 
illegal trade.
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Chapter Five 
Contraband
“Unzaga acted judiciously for the province and for Spain, when he disregarded the 
Chinese-like regulations which he was commanded to enforce, and when he winked at 
their violation.”
Charles Gayarrd, History of Louisiana1
Charles Gayarrd’s accusation that Unzaga turned a blind eye to illegal commerce 
misconstrues the nature of the governor’s true actions. The Bourbon crown’s reforms 
which opened new ports but eradicated Louisiana’s best trading partners reinforced the 
“informal” and often illegal network of trade that had always been present in the colony. 
In the huge, semi-wild territory, Unzaga’s few troops and little money could not stop the 
majority of Louisiana’s long entrenched, inter-colonial trade although he made examples 
of blatandy illegal activities which threatened Spain’s authority. Through the use of 
obedezco no cumplo, the governor pursued imperial goals by overlooking the colony’s 
informal trade, using it instead as an opportunity to enhance his stifled economy, maintain 
relations with the local Indian tribes and monitor any possible British threat to Louisiana.
Smuggling and illegal commerce were endemic to all colonial systems, not just 
Louisiana. Spain never developed adequate manufacturing to supply its own empire and 
consequently her colonists turned to illegal trade for items which were far less expensive 
from British or French smugglers than those bought second-hand from the metropole. A 
study of the governor’s letters at Havana and New Orleans shows that smuggling and 
illegal trade continued and were often useful occurrences despite the commerce reforms
‘Gayarrd, History of Louisiana, m, 46.
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instituted during Unzaga’s tenure. Indeed, given the size and geography of the Spanish 
empire in the Americas, no colonial Latin American governor or viceroy completely 
controlled all commerce in his region nor did he aspire to do so. As Margaret Dalrymple 
says in her work on John Fitzpatrick, “Spanish colonial officials, recognizing that this 
trade was essential to the prosperity and sometimes the very survival of their colonies, 
tended to ignore or even protect foreign traders, and the entire commercial process, 
although absolutely illegal, became a recognized and highly valued branch of the overseas 
commerce of several nations.”2
Louisiana, straddled the mouth of a river upon which two colonial giants 
transported goods and communicated with two of the most infamous bodies of water in 
the history of American piracy and smuggling—the Gulf of Mexico and its sister the 
Caribbean.3 The constant and aggressive piracy that was the nemesis of Spain’s treasure 
ships had generally disappeared by the eighteenth-century for a number of reasons. Under 
Colbert, the French reorganized their empire and took greater control of its economy. At 
the same time, Spain experienced a depression in its silver imports and a resulting drop in 
shipments of that commodity in many parts of empire (New Spain excluded). Also by the 
1760s, England began to organize her newly-won empire in the Americas, reasserting 
mercantilist principles and limitations on colonial trade to replenish its diminished
2John Fitzpatrick, Letterbooks. 8.
3Good works on piracy include Clarence H. Haring, The Buccaneers of the West 
Indies in the XVII Century (London, 1910; reprinted, Hamden, CN, 1966). There is also a 
brief, but accurate description in Franklin W. Knight, The Caribbean: The Genesis of a 
Fragmented Nationalism. 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 96-106.
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treasury after the colonial wars. Buccaneers and their constant chaos were, therefore, no 
longer welcome and the European monarchies began to make treaties which included the 
elimination of organized piracy.4
Smuggling, however, continued practically unabated between the colonies of France, 
Britain and Spain. It was precisely because of the mercantilist policies practiced by the 
metropoles that their colonies used smuggling and illicit trade to circumvent the system 
and support their often meager existences. Of the three European giants, Spain practiced 
the most rigorous mercantilism, exemplified by its flota or fleet port system. This system 
required that all ships leaving the Americas for Spain gather at Havana once a year and 
travel together, while ships going to the Americas had to trade through selected ports. 
Unfortunately, Spain’s lack of an industrial basis forced it to import manufactured 
products from other Continental nations at exorbitant prices. These inflated prices were in 
turn passed on to American consumers. The fleet-port system left many colonies without 
favorable or even beneficial access to European goods. Inter-colonial smuggling, 
therefore, developed early in Latin America.5
Spain's flota system was revived slightly in the 1700s and this event should have 
brought with it the dwindling of illegal smuggling. Instead, the opposite was hue because
4Anti-piracy efforts date from the 1690s but by the middle of the eighteenth 
century were firmly in place and part of national policy.
5 A larger discussion of the flota system can be found in J. H. Parry, The Spanish 
Seaborne Empire (London: Hutchinson, 1966), John Edwin Fagg, Latin America: A 
General History. 34® ed., (New York: Macmillan, 1977) and most good texts for colonial 
Latin America.
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the rules which limited official trade to select ports remained, enhancing business for the 
merchants in Cadiz and Seville and hurting colonial merchant houses.6 
Latin American merchants who had ready-made family connections in the Iberian 
peninsula increased their business, while those who did not have those all-important 
connections did not do as well. Still, in the mainland colonies, (those to the south of the 
borderlands) the merchant class had managed, through official and unofficial means, to 
become a dynamic organization by the end of the eighteenth century. It did not matter, 
however, whether the colony was wealthy or destitute, contraband was always welcome 
in American ports.7
Societal change affected trade as well. By the mid-eighteenth century, most of 
Latin America’s frontier, conquest society and its attempts at recreating Spanish 
feudalism in the Americas had given way to a “commercially integrated system” of 
plantations, mining and merchant houses.8 During the late 1600s, African slave labor and 
sugar revived the depressed Caribbean economy and in time came to encompass tobacco, 
indigo, cochineal, cacao and other colonial products from the mainland. It was precisely
6In fact one of the principle chores of the committees under the Bourbon reforms 
was to change the monopoly system in Cadiz and reform the port-fleet system.
7See D. A. Brading, Miners and Merchants for a discussion of alternative routes to 
wealth and the growth of the American merchant society and Roland Dennis Hussey’s, 
The Caracas Company for a look at monopolistic trade in the Americas.
8Knight, Caribbean. 106.
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this triangular trade in sugar, slaves and rum which engendered many new navigational 
acts in Europe, especially in Britain.9
The benefits of the sugar and slave economy were particularly dynamic in Cuba. 
They reinvigorated trade in the island which had long been eclipsed by the discoveries of 
the mainland and its abundant silver mines. Cuba’s primacy had barely been maintained 
by theflota or royal fleet system whose ships were forced to congregate at Havana. The 
island's only other “claim to fame” within empire was its unique defensive position 
astride the Caribbean and Gulf. Sugar production reactivated the long island’s long 
suppressed economy. While it hardly reached the production of the French and British 
islands, Cuba’s sugar production more than doubled in the two decades between the 
1740s and 1760s.(See Table 13). The new economy also re-intensified the smuggling 
between the French and Spanish islands.
Because of the increase in sugar and the new arrangement to purchase slaves 
from the British Antilles, in the late eighteenth-century Havana received many of the 
slaves sent to the Caribbean and redistributed them to the surrounding Spanish 
possessions. Prior to 1763, the slave trade had devolved through different Spanish ports. 
Santo Domingo was the foremost slave market until 1560. In the Papal Bull of 1493, the 
Spanish colonies were excluded from the African slaving coasts. After the middle of the 
sixteenth-century, when African slave labor became important to Latin America, an 
asiento, or the privilege to bring slaves into the Spanish empire, was given to various
^ id ,  111-115; See also Herbert S. Klein, African Slavery in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. (New York: Oxford University Press, 56-67.
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European countries. For a century after the asiento was installed, all slaves entering 
Spain’s colonies had to come through the port of Cartagena de Indias in Colombia.10
TABLE 13
Sugar Production in the Americas, 1741-1770
Annual Average in Tons
Colonv 1741-1745 1766-1770
French West Indies 64,675 77,923
British West Indies 41,043 74,452
Brazil (Portuguese) 34,000 20,400
Virgin Islands (Danish) 8,230
Suriname (Dutch) 9,210 6,800
Cuba (Spanish) 2,000 5,200
Sources: Jan Rogozinski, A Brief History of the Caribbean from the Arawak and the 
Carib to the Present (New York: Meridian Books, 1992), 105; Richard Sheridan, The 
Development of the Plantations to 1750 (Aylesbury, England: Ginn and Company, 
1970), 22.
10Jan Rogozinski, A Brief History of the Caribbean from the Arawak and the 
Carib to the Present (New York: Meridian Books, 1992), 101; Hubert Herring, A History 
of Latin America 3d ed, (New Yo±: Alfred A  Knopf, 1968), 105.
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At the end of the War of Spanish Succession, when the Bourbon dynasty took 
over Spain, the British received the asiento. The British were forced to give it up after 
the War of Jenkins Ear (1748). Charles HI tried to create a Spanish monopoly slave trade 
based on Puerto Rico that would compete with the slaves coming from British Jamaica 
but it failed because the Spanish colonists did not welcome the change in their “system,” 
and also didn’t want to pay the King’s 40 peso tax on Spanish slaves." After that, the 
Crown contracted with foreigners to import slaves. This encouraged the British and 
French islands of the Caribbean to smuggle slaves and other contraband to Cuba and 
other Spanish possessions. Cuba’s coast was replete with tiny, hidden bays and coves 
which could conceal the small boats used to bring illegal slaves, and contraband into the 
island. Slaves were a particularly expensive commodity and could bring smugglers a 
quick and lucrative return on their investments. By the mid-eighteenth century, Havana’s 
French neighbor, Saint Domingue became the riches sugar producer and the largest slave 
island, thereby adding to the general smuggling of slaves in the Caribbean.
Slavery also became a high lucrative and legitimate industry. Introduced by the 
English who brought 10,700 African slaves into Cuba during 1762, the base population of 
10,000 in 1770 slaves grew to 44,300 in 1774. Licensed ships left Havana regularly for 
Jamaica as early as 1772 carrying Spanish silver to exchange for flour and slaves.12
"James F. King, “Evolution of the Free Slave Trade Principle in Spanish Colonial 
Administration,” HAHR. 22 (1942): 41.
,2Entradas and Salidas, AGI Cuba 1216, Folio 169.
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Spain managed license the slave trade but smuggling in general continued. Sugar 
and slaves brought wealth to Havana. As Cubans grew wealthier they sought to 
accumulate foreign goods and opportunistic merchants were more than willing to chance 
bringing contraband goods into the island. It is a great irony that the one man, Martnn de 
Arana, who knew in advance of the British invasion of Havana was a Cuban smuggler 
who was promptly jailed upon his return to the island before he could warn the 
governor.13
Vigorous entrepreneurs from France and Great Britain also attempted to enter 
Havana’s harbor under the pretense that their ships were damaged or taking on water or 
needing food before they continued their journeys. Some ships which initially required 
only minor repair managed to stay docked for over a month. Ships which stayed for over 
a week were quite possibly involved in illegal commercial transactions because other 
ships with similar problems made their way back to the Gulf almost overnight14
The Cuban governor’s reports during the tenure of the Marquis de la Torre (1772- 
1776) speak more of illicit commerce discovered at sea and the Circum-Caribbean than of 
domestic smuggling and de la Torre allowed far more ships to enter the port than did
13Klein, African Slavery. 86-87; Barclay, Havana.103.
,4Entradas and Salidas from AGI, Cuba 1220 and 1221; by 1775 and 1776 some 
of this pretense may have been used by the British to observe what was going on in 
Havana as well. An inspection of the cargo aboard ships which sat for a month in harbor 
might provide further answers to the length of stay but at present that information is not 
available.
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Bucareli. This may be because de la Torre intended to use them as weathervanes for 
English activity or because he, like Unzaga, found them economically useful.15
In contrast to Havana’s economic recovery, the dearth of supplies and settlers in 
the borderlands meant that French and Spanish settlements in those areas remained small, 
often isolated and even more dependent on illicit trade. Smuggling was deeply rooted in 
real necessity. The Spanish in both S t Augustine and Pensacola traded regularly with 
French Mobile and New Orleans for supplies. S t Augustine even bought or traded for 
weapons and ammunition from the English in Carolina, regardless of the state of 
hostilities between the colonies. The market in St. Augustine was so good that even when 
their mother countries were at war, many Carolina merchants refused to attack St. 
Augustine for fear they would disrupt their profitable exchange. Indeed, merchants as far 
away as New York and Providence exchanged British goods for “gold, silver, deerskins, 
and oranges from Florida.”16
Sometimes war produced money-making opportunities. During the colonial wars 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, British merchants entered French New
I5Reports range from captured French and English boats to reports of illicit 
commerce at other islands like that of the local official at Santiago de Cuba who reported 
to Captain-General de la Torre that the English were illegally doing business in Puerto 
Rico, Juan Antonio Ayano de Urete to Torres, April 21,1774, AGI, Cuba 1144, No. 198; 
or the regular reports of English and French ships which “needed assistance” in the port 
of Havana and stayed anywhere from overnight, to a week and even to a month before 
they left, Entradas and Salidas, AGI, Cuba 1216, 1217,1220,1221.
I6Surrey, Commerce of Louisiana. 418-27, William S. Coker, Financial History of 
Pensacola’s Snanish Presidios 1698-1763. (Pensacola: Pensacola Historical Society, 
1979)2, TePaske. The Governorship of Spanish Florida . 204-205: Weber. Spanish 
Borderlands. 176.
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Orleans under a system called “flags of truce.” These merchant parlementaires, as the 
French called them, were commonly used to exchange military prisoners. Colonial 
governments allowed the ship captains to offset the expense of transporting the prisoners 
by allowing them to sell otherwise “illicit” goods in enemy ports. New Orleans and 
Mobile afforded such a lucrative operation that by the late 1750s, “British mercantile 
houses . . .  came to dominate the trade of the Gulf C oast. . . ” Many Englishmen even 
settled in New Orleans.17
In colonial Louisiana, French settlers, slaves and Indians alike welcomed all 
opportunities to obtain European goods and food . During the French regime this 
necessity was so acute that the French fought with the English over the southeastern 
Indian trade, often pitting one tribe against another. Trade at places like Natchitoches and 
the Arkansas Post disturbed the balance of power in the west by bringing new Indian 
groups down from the Great Plains and into the Red and Mississippi River Valleys, who 
were in search of better hunting grounds, European dry goods and weapons. In the 
process, they disturbed other groups like the Big and Little Osage, setting off a number of 
intertribal wars. Spanish officials harangued French settlers who gave the Indians guns 
because too often those same arms were turned against Spanish settlements, yet the 
Spanish were not above arming the Indians themselves if the need arose.18
17Abraham P. Nasatir and James R. Mills, Commerce and Contraband in New 
Orleans during the French and Indian Wan A Documentary Study of the Texel and Three 
Brothers Affairs (Cincinnati: American Jewish Archives,1968), 6-7,166-67; Fitzpatrick, 
Letterbooks. 9.
18Stanley Faye, “Arkansas Post,” 635; Elizabeth A. H. John, Storms Brewed in 
Other Men’s Worlds. 304-374;Weber, Spanish Borderlands. 178.
119
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Unzaga, like other governors in Spain’s borderlands, found smuggling and illegal 
commerce firmly entrenched in Louisiana. Even after Ulloa’s arrival, the frontier 
economy of Louisiana’s hinterlands had remained oblivious of the changes in the Atlantic 
trade. Indians, settlers, and slaves continued their frontier exchange of contraband goods, 
resisting change and prospering collectively in relative peace and harmony. Despite 
O’Reilly’s dismissal of the British merchants in New Orleans, the informal system of 
trade in the frontier struggled to remain intact, hoarding goods until better times returned, 
and seeking other outlets. Although Unzaga slowly turned the domestic economy toward 
New Orleans and legal commerce, his colonists found new “outlets” for their goods.
The Louisiana province was a sieve. Major apertures were at Spanish Illinois 
(Missouri) along the Northern Mississippi; British Manchac, approximately 1500 yards 
north across the narrow Bayou Manchac, which connected Lakes Pontchartrain and 
Maurepas to the Mississippi through the Amite River, the Arkansas Post at the junction 
of the Arkansas and Mississippi rivers; New Orleans; and Natchitoches, just across the 
border from the fort of Los Adaes in Spanish Texas. The smaller holes of the sieve, 
furthermore, could be easily entered and exited by Indians, experienced traders and 
trappers, or any settler with a pirogue (or a horse to reach Los Adaes).
British Manchac was one of the worst offenders in contraband. It had developed 
on the abandoned ruins of old Fort Bute. Named after the Earl of Bute, George Hi’s tutor 
and unpopular secretary of the treasury, the fort had originally been positioned to guard 
the entrance to the chain of lakes and waterways that ran east from the Mississippi. After 
the 1766 the British government abandoned it. The Lieutenant Governor of British West
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British West Florida, Montfort Browne, in 1768 recommended that his government 
establish a town there to deflect the fur trade going to New Orleans.19
During Unzaga’s tenure, British merchants believed that the settlement at 
Manchac would entice many people not only to trade with them, but also to emigrate 
from Louisiana to British West Florida. The British government concurred, and in 1771 
drew up plans for such a settlement although the town was never officially built. The 
settlement grew nonetheless. Manchac was not a pleasant place to live. It was low and 
swampy and flooded regularly. Still, as early as 1770, British merchants like John 
Fitzpatrick, Isaac and Manuel Monsanto, and Thomas Bentley moved in, cannibalizing 
wood from the old fort to build homes and stores and using the fort for a warehouse.20
Settlers from the areas around Point Coup6e, Natchitoches, Attakapas, and 
Spanish Illinois favored Manchac because it cut ten days off the normal trip to New 
Orleans and the British paid better prices for furs and produce. Manchac was a magnet 
for contraband. As has been noted, Unzaga faced continued smuggling with the few 
British merchants at the old fort during the New Orleans “famine” of 1770. While 
Unzaga argued with his post commandants over the supposedly devastated com crops, 
the Acadian fanners in the Iberville district and the German Coast were caught, not once,
19Joseph Barton Starr, ‘Tories, Dons, and Rebels: The American Revolution in 
British West Florida,” (Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1971), 51; Fitzpatrick, 
Letterbooks. 13; Robin Fabel, “Governor George Johnstone of British West Florida,” 
Florida Historical Quarterly. 54 (April, 1976): 501.
“ James Jones, (a New Orleans Merchant) wrote to General Frederick Haldimand 
in 1770 that he believed the abandoment of Fort Bute was a mistake and that a town there 
would entice many Louisianaians to come across the river to British West Florida, 
Fitzpatrick. Letterbooks. 13.15 and 19
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but twice, smuggling with the British at Manchac. The farmers found it useful to tell the 
commandant that the first crop had failed, or the seed had rotted in the ground. Even 
more common was the deliberate miscalculation of how much they produced. The 
frustrated and angry governor chastised both commandants Dustind and Verret because 
the Acadians and other farmers were selling their com and rice to the British for good 
prices in exchange for otherwise unavailable manufactured items. Even worse, the 
Acadians in the St. James district were giving gunpowder and lead shot to the Tensas and 
Houma Indians.21
British merchants continued to do well in Manchac. In 1772 merchant Rufus 
Putnam passed through the settlement noting that there were a number of good homes 
with “very good gardens.” He also noticed the absence of any soldiers, a strange 
occurrence for a frontier settlement. Manchac’s famous swamp still plagued the 
settlement, however. When it was not flooding, the swamp dried up and the fish died, 
giving off an almost intolerable stench.22
Swampy land notwithstanding, Manchac continued to pose a problem for Unzaga. 
British merchandise also attracted a large number of Indians and the merchants tried to 
entice other, supposedly Spanish-allied tribes, into trade with British West Florida. They
“ Unzaga to Dustin6, August 11,1770, AGI, Cuba 193-B, Folio 281; Judice to 
Unzaga, August 28,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio 1 d/21. Unzaga to Verret, August 30, 
1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio 44a.
“ Albert C. Bates, ed., The Two Putnams. Isreal and Rufus, in the Havana 
Expedition 1762 and in the Mississippi River Exploration 1772-73 with some account of 
the Company of Military Adventurers (Hartford, CN: Connecticut Historical Society, 
1931), 174,245. The lack of soldiers would be “fixed” in the late 1770s.
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did not have a hard argument Their wares included “knives, axes, scissors, combs, 
blankets, shirts, hats, and cloth, as well as firearms, gunpowder, and flints.”23 Liquor 
added fuel to the fire and the merchants often deliberately enticed their Indian patrons 
with alcohol, a practice decried by both British and Spanish officials. It appears that 
some of the alcohol consumed at Manchac was actually brought by Unzaga’s colonists.
In 1772, a series of letters between Descoudreaux and Unzaga discussed the continual 
occurrences of smuggling between the Acadians and Manchac. In a letter dated February 
6th the Post Commandant at the small Spanish fort across from Manchac indicates that the 
boats also carried beer, as well as foodstuffs.24
The merchants continued unabated and ungovemed in Manchac throughout 
Unzaga’s tenure. Any attempt by the British to apply “legal” restrictions was “dealt with 
summarily” by the merchants themselves. Such was the case with John Thomas, 
commissioned as an Indian agent and Justice of the Peace, who moved into Manchac in 
October of 1771. Thomas was pompous, dictatorial and thoroughly unpopular with both 
the merchants and the Indians. He abused his authority with the former and ignored 
custom and decorum with the latter (see Chapter 6).25 The merchants had no use for him
23We her. Spanish Borderlands. 178.
^Descoudreaux to Unzaga, January 15,1772, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folios 565-566 
and Descoudreaux to Unzaga, February 6,1772, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 563. The 
letters continue into 1773 and 1774.
“ Robert Rea, “Redcoats and Redskins on the Lower Mississippi, 1763-1776: The 
Career of Ll John Thomas,” LH, 11 (1970): 5-33.
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and in 1772 had him dismissed from his post, but not before Luis de Unzaga had a chance 
to uncover British plans to settle Natchez.
Both Unzaga and Thomas used Manchac as a source of information. Unzaga, 
recruited the help of James O’Kelly, an Irish Catholic from Manchac who requested 
Spanish citizenship for religious reasons. Through O’Kelly, the governor traced the 
whereabouts and plans of both British Indian agents, John Stuart and John Thomas. 
Thomas himself used the Indian tribes to glean information about Spanish fortifications at 
New Orleans. The disagreement between Thomas and Unzaga became so heated that the 
governor threatened to arrest him if he entered Louisiana.26
The liquor which flowed at the taverns and merchant shops in Manchac also 
created other problems for Unzaga. Frontier life was boring and tough and alcoholic 
drinks softened the dirt and grime of an otherwise brutal existence. Trappers, traders, 
settlers, slaves and Indians enjoyed drinking, often to excess. Manchac’s taverns 
encouraged the local settlers in St. James Parish to begin running their homes as cabarets 
where they could sell liquor, play cards and indulge themselves. As early as November 
19a> of 1771, Abraham Landry petitioned Post Commandant, Louis Judice, for a license to 
open such a cabaret in his home. Three days later the governor approved the licenses. 
Unzaga hoped that by licensing Spanish cabarets he might divert some of the drinking at 
Manchac, and also some of the smuggling.27
^Fitzpatrick, Letterbooks. 18; Cummins, Spanish Observers. 14-15.
^Judice to Unzaga, November 19, 1771, and Unzaga to Judice, November 22, 
1771, AGI, Cuba 188-C, Folio 93.
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Unzaga’s hopes to stop smuggling at Manchac were in vain, but the cabaret 
licenses became a hit with the locals. The next year home-cabarets were so popular that 
the governor decided he would auction off the licenses, thereby gaining another meager 
source of income for the government Licensing was big business by 1775 and had 
spread to other parishes.28 Unfortunately, the cabarets led to gambling and other illegal 
activities which had to be either ignored or dealt with. It appears that Unzaga ignored 
such activities during his tenure, although later governors like Carondelet had to deal with 
citizens complaining about the gambling. For the moment the government turned a blind 
eye to the proceedings.
British contraband exacerbated Unzaga’s problems and added to the drain on 
empire. By the end of his tenure, in 1776, some twenty houses hugged the Mississippi at 
British Manchac. The New Orleans merchants ousted by O’Reilly had been joined by 
men like John Blommart, Thomas Barber and James Willing. These men tied London, 
Pensacola and even Jamaica to New Orleans, Natchitoches, St. Lotus and sometimes even 
Santa Fe. They openly sold contraband goods and slaves to Louisiana’s colonists and 
drained the economy of coin. Indeed, Spanish pesos entered the colony in large amounts, 
large enough to offset many of the problems the colony faced. Much of the specie, 
however, immediately left the colony through the large hole called “little Manchac.”29
“ Judice to Unzaga, September 20,1772, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 436 and 
Dutisnd to Unzaga, June 23,1775, 189-B, Folio 234.
Fitzpatrick, Letterbooks. 20; Arthur P. Whitakers, “The Commerce of Louisiana 
and the Floridas at the End of the Eighteenth Century,” HAHR. 16 (1936), 203.
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The smuggling at Manchac was only a portion of what that entered Louisiana. 
Slaves and other goods from the Caribbean were commonly smuggled in along the Gulf 
Coast of Louisiana which contained the same kind of small coves that Cuba had. 
Moreover, the Louisiana coast was deltaic and possessed entrances to numerous rivers 
that flowed from the colony. This was prime smuggling country for slaves and 
contraband from the Caribbean and would continue to serve privateers and smugglers like 
Jean Lafitte well into the nineteenth century.
Slaves were never a large element of legal commerce in the first two decades of 
the Spanish period, although all three of Louisiana’s first Spanish governor’s backed 
slave importation. Indeed, slave sales to Louisiana lagged far behind those to the sugar 
islands of the Caribbean and even to the British colonies in North America. In fact, the 
only Circum-Caribbean colony with lower slave imports was Spanish Santo Domingo 
(See Table 14).
There are several explanations for this phenomenon. Sugar did not become a 
large portion of Louisiana’s economy until Etienne Bord brought in a chemist from Saint 
Domingue to show the colonists how to properly granulate sugar in the 1790s. Louisiana, 
therefore, was never part of the eighteenth-century sugar boom in the Caribbean. Also, 
slave revolts in Saint Domingue during the Seven Years War retarded slave sales because 
Louisiana strictly forbade the importation of “domiciled slaves from the Antilles.”30 
Bruto or bozal slaves, those imported directly from Africa, were the only ones accepted.
“Thomas N. Ingersoll, “The Slave Trade and the Ethnic Diversity of Louisiana’s 
Slave Community.” LH. 37 (Spring, 1996): 141.
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Slave traders, however, did not find Louisiana’s sales large enough to justify the risky trip 
from Africa, across the northern Caribbean and then another hundred miles up-river to 
New Orleans. It was far easier to sell slaves to the sugar islands. Still, before O’Reilly 
removed them, several merchants established themselves in New Orleans and sold slaves 
to the planters.31 Sales were never extensive even though Ulloa had tried to encourage 
slavery in order to induce agricultural expansion. He even offered his “mark of 
protection” to English merchant James Jones of Pensacola if Jones would sell to 
Louisiana’s planters on credit.32
Unzaga encouraged African slavery. He wrote to Bucareli in 1770 that the colony 
might yield a number of crops and only needed the proper “labor to increase production, 
especially Indigo.”33 Still, the majority of Louisiana’s colonists could not afford many 
slaves, especially during Unzaga’s governorship. Only the planter elite along the lower 
Mississippi could purchase large numbers of slaves and their plantations did not expand 
until late in the Spanish period. Also, the colony’s planters could draw from a number of 
labor resources, including vagrants, to harvest crops. Using such seasonal labor was less 
expensive than the purchase price, housing and feeding of slaves. Slaves were a precious 
commodity and smuggled slaves sold legally for three times their purchase price. The 
limited legal sales therefore also reflect the fact that smuggling Africans was still
3‘See Abraham P. Nasatir and James R. Mills, Commerce and Contraband, for a 
larger discussion of British merchants and slaves sales in New Orleans.
32Ingersoll, “Slave Trade,” 141.
33Unzaga to Bucareli, July 8,1770, Dispatches, vol. 2,54-55
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TABLE 14




Leeward Islands 142.4 159.5
Jamaica 263.8 398.5









Santo Domingo — 6.0
Cuba — 139.2






Spanish Colonies 271.2 167.6
Source: Figures taken from Rogozinski, Brief History. 124.
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profitable until well into the nineteenth-century when towns developed along the old 
slaving rivers used by Jean Lafitte.
The Mississippi offered many avenues for contraband, from Balize at the mouth 
of the river to the forts in Spanish Illinois. Contraband could come ashore at any number 
of places. One of the more favored locations was the Arkansas Post Arkansas, which 
means “south wind” in the Algonquian language, had three locations during the colonial 
period.34 In 1756, the fort had been moved downstream and rebuilt on the northern bank 
of the Arkansas at the junction of that river and the Mississippi. The deltaic region 
contained abundant wildlife and natural resources. Elm, cedar, and cypress grew for 
building materials, and the loamy soil of the delta gave rise to huge canebrakes, reeds and 
thickets which hosted thousands of birds, rabbits and deer. Even remnants of the once 
plentiful buffalo still could be found on the Arkasas river. The move also made it more 
convenient to receive trade coming downriver from Spanish Illinois.35
The choice had not been a wise one for several reasons. The new location was 
swampy and flooded, having none of the good agricultural land of the older site.36
34Arkansas is an abberation of Ak a kon ce or south wind, sometimes seen as 
Akakanze the same Siouan tribe which produced the Kansas Indians, Samuel Morris 
Dickinson, “Colonial Arkansas Place Names,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly (hereinafter 
called AHQ), 48 (Summer, 1989): 138.
35Harold K. Grimmett, “Early Plant and Animal communities of the Arkansas 
Delta.” AHQ. 47 (Summer, 1989): 103;
“Despite its defensive position the fort was relocated up river to the Grand Prarie 
grasslands in 1779 in hopes that it would finally grow and produce another barrier to the 
English. See Monis S. Arnold, “The Relocation of Arkansas Post to Scores Rouges in 
1779.” AHQ. 42 (Winter, 1983): 317, 319.
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Settlers tended, therefore, to pursue their traditional trade in hunting and fur trapping 
rather than raising crops and the post remained relatively undeveloped. Instead of 
fanning, most male occupants at the village eked out a living hunting, while their families 
depended on foodstuffs from the Indians, and grain (specially wheat) and drygoods from 
Spanish Illinois.37 The residents of Arkansas, to quote French commandant Alexandre de 
Clouet, were “not truly settlers,” and “not a single resident had an outdoor oven.”38 
In truth, the settlement at Arkansas never grew very large during the Spanish 
period. The census of 68 whites and 31 slaves taken in 1768 changed little within the next 
decade. In 1771 it read 62 whites and 16 slaves and by the end of Unzaga’s term the 
count had dropped to 50 whites and 11 slaves.39 The families continued to hunt, trap and 
fish. Development was so slow that it there were no grist mills in the community before 
1791, and the first sawmill didn’t appear until after the Spanish period. Still, some hardy 
souls managed to produce small amounts of tobacco and send it downriver to New 
Orleans or better yet, to Concordancia.40
37Salted buffalo tongue was a big trade item for hunters. When wheat wasn't 
available, the residents turned to sagamit6 (boiled com mush with bear oil and tallow) as 
a substitute accompaniment to their meal of birds eggs, wild game and buffalo tongue.
38DeClouet to O’Reilly, October 6,1768, AGI, Cuba 107 and Morris S. Arnold, 
“The Significance of the Arkansas Colonial Experience,” AHQ. 51 (Spring, 1992): 73.
39Census material found in AGL Cuba 107 and 190 and Arnold S. Morris,
Colonial Arkansas. 1684-1804: A Social and Cultural History. (Fayetteville: University of 
Arkansas Press, 1991), Appendix II, 179-181. The census, of course, did not include 
solitary hunters who lived away from the post for the majority of the year and might 
number anywhere from 50 to 100 men.
‘“’Arnold, “Significance of Arkansas,” 73-74; Stanley Faye, “Arkansas Post,” 635.
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Another problem was that the Indians objected to the move, and even more to the 
change of ownership-French to Spanish. The post commandants had been given 
monopoly rights to trade among the Quapaw but the removal of the fort stressed trade and 
the tribe petitioned the governor to allow them to move to a more suitable site on the Red 
River. This was a serious problem because many of the French and Spanish commandants 
were actually merchants who also happened to be officials. Some received their 
monopoly trade rights before they received their military commissions.41 The 
commandants at Arkansas post, therefore, often focused on the fur trade rather than 
agriculture.
Because of its isolation and position among the Indians, contraband had long been 
a part of business at Arkansas Post. During the Spanish administration, settlers not only 
traded furs illicitly they also had a large business in salted buffalo tongues which were 
extremely popular with the British. Then too, Arkansas attracted a great many men 
considered the “wrong element.” According to Athanase de Mdzi&res the people who 
hunted and trapped around the Arkansas post were the lowest of scum, “hunters, 
murderes, rapists, and fugitives from justice.”42 This was perhaps too harsh a judgment 
of the men at the Post, but many hunters did commit crimes. Hunters often did a double 
business-one with the Spanish colony and another with the Indians. In 1770 one hunter
4lIbid, 69,79, Morris S. Arnold, Unequal Laws Unto a Savage Race: European 
Legal Traditions in Arkansas. 1686-1836. (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 
1985), 107-108.
42Bolton, Athenase de M6ziferes. 1,166.
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was caught not only selling illegal goods to the Indians but also acting as a gunsmith to 
the local tribes. The Spanish government frowned heavily on arming the Indians and the 
hunter lost his license, his possessions and his freedom.43
Some hunters fell into the trap of accepting powder and shot in exchange for a 
contract to provide their “backers” (often post commanders or merchants from New 
Orleans) with the first lien against the gross profits of their catch. Hunters at Arkansas 
post frequently fell heavily into debt to their creditors due to poor hunting seasons or the 
many accidents which befall men in the wilds. Hunters who owed too much money 
sometimes just never returned to Arkansas post. They might contract out at another post 
trying to recoup their losses before they returned home or they might just stay in the 
wilderness living among the Indians. Those who stayed in the wilds frequently turned to 
lives of desperation which included murder and thievery.44
The land west of Arkansas post and south toward Natchitoches was filled with 
Indians, (Osage, Quapaw, Caddo and others), where a man could get lost. Among the 
Indians one could find isolated hunters, and colonists who served the Indians by repairing 
guns or giving them access to European goods. One could also find any number of 
deserters from the military. Many ex-military men had already experienced smuggling 
with the Indians or the British and chose to disappear among the tribes. These men, 
indebted hunters, smugglers, criminals and deserters gave Arkansas Post its bad 
reputation.
43Arnold S. Morris, Colonial Arkansas. 64.
“ Faye, “Arkansas Post,” 637-638
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Post commandants and merchants also became debtors because of the hunting 
contracts. Commandants in charge of licensing hunters also invested in outfitting hunters. 
Some commandants like Captain de Villiers, appointed to the Post in 1776, had fallen 
into financial straits from such contracts and could barely make their payments on their 
loans. Because of the poor return on their investments, Arkansas post was subject to 
many changes of leadership. It was considered a hardship post and had the most changes 
in leadership of any post during Unzaga’s governorship.45
The English settlement of Concordancia built on the Mississippi just across from 
the mouth of the Arkansas exacerbated both the Indian problem and contraband trade in 
furs and tallow. British manufactured goods and liquor soon lured the Indians and then- 
vital com and furs away from the Post. All the Spanish commandants had trouble halting 
the gradual migration of Indian trade into British territory. They had few gifts and smaller 
medals than the English and often had to make illegal deals with the tribes to give them 
whiskey in order to keep the Indians on the right bank of the Mississippi.
The French at the post thought liquor necessary to keep the Indians happy, an 
important point since many of the people at the post depended on them for food during 
hard times. O’Reilly had strictly forbidden liquor sales and the first Spanish commandant 
at Arkansas had refused to give the Indians liquor, hi 1770 commandant DeClouet 
reported to Unzaga that one woman in Concordancia sold liquor to the Indians and had 
been known to enter Spanish territory with her assistants, traveling several miles up the
45Faye, “Arkansas Post,” 345.
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Arkansas to trade with the Indian villages. He also complained of an Englishman who 
had dared settle among the Quapaw, trading illegally and ridiculing the Spanish.46
By 1772, with increasing influence from the British, the Indians began 
demanding liquor from the little Spanish post at Arkansas. The tribe informed governor 
Unzaga that they preferred the French commandants who treated them better, and that 
Captain Fernando de Leyba, a Spaniard, didn’t even speak French, which was their 
language of trade. The Indians were also incensed because earlier that month Leyba had 
arrested Nicholas Labussi&r, a favored French trader living with the Quapaw, for selling 
liquor and “other trade violations.”47
Unzaga defended his commandant but as time went on was forced to admit that it 
was probably wiser to license liquor dealers than to forbid liquor altogether. That rule 
seemed to maintain some peace at Arkansas Post although it never stopped the Indians 
from “double dipping” at Arkansas and at Concordancia.48
Illicit trade between the settlers, slaves and Indians of Arkansas Post and the 
British continued unabated by Spanish rule or attempts at law enforcement. It became 
such an important way to supplement colonial lives that in 1777 Athanase De M6zi6res
46Demaselli£re to O’Reilly, January 15,1770, AGL Cuba 107. The trader stayed 
among the Quapaw until 1774 when the new guns and fortifications at the Arkansas post 
impressed the Indians enough that they chose to believe the Spanish and evicted him. De 
Leyba to Unzaga, November 22, 1771, and October 26,1773, AGI, Cuba 107; Orieta to 
Unzaga, July 14,1774, Ibid. (See Chapter 5).
47Amold, Colonial Arkansas. 155; Leyba to Unzaga, June 15,1772, and Leyba to 
Unzaga, June 25, 1772, AGL Cuba 107.
^De Villiers to Galvez, September 15,1779, AGL Cuba 192.
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reported to Unzaga’s successor that the English at Concordancia had built a block house 
which could store larger amounts of trade goods.49
South of Arkansas three posts guarded the western regions of lower Louisiana.
On the Mississippi itself Pointe Couple guarded the south bend of the river below the 
English fort at Natchez and traded among the small tribes. Its commandant presided over 
a number of the small Acadian settlements and coasts built and occupied during Unzaga’s 
tenure. North of Point Couple, and into the wilderness along the Red, Black and then 
Quachita Rivers, was a small trading station among the Caddo that became known as 
Ouatchita Post Farther west Natchitoches guarded the colonial boundary between New 
Spain and Louisiana. Together these posts controlled most of the Indian trade in the West 
O’Reilly had given a Lieutenant Governorship to the commander at Natchitoches because 
of its sensitive location near the fort of Los Adaes in Spanish Texas.
Of the previous posts, Point Couple and Ouachita carried no military 
significance to Captain-General O’Reilly, who appointed a series of tenientes particulars, 
or militia captains who acted as government agents for such areas. In reality, during the 
1770s, Ouachita post was merely a meeting ground for the French courier de bois who 
went up the Ouachita River to trade with the Ouachita, Osage and Quapaw Indian. 
Unzaga’s report to Arriaga, Noticia General de lo que produse la Provinacia de la 
buisiana, October 26,1771, stated that the Ouachita lands afforded settlers litde 
agricultural area and less in the way of wildlife. In fact, the only thing they yielded were
49Bolton, Athanase de M6ziferes. 2: 141.
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medical plants like fems for making cough medicine (syrop de capillare), sarsaparilla and 
ipecaguana, and except for foxes, few animals capable of making good pelts for sale.50 
Most residents were semi-permanent, subsistence hunters whose sole property was a rifle 
and powder hom.
The Ouachita settlement stayed small and insignificant until 1785 when it was 
removed to a new location at present day Monroe and renamed F t Miro. Few works, 
other than Unzaga’s report describe the early colonists. Most discuss the life of Jean- 
Baptiste Filhiol, commandant at F t Miro who didn’t reach the Ouachita country until 
1782, after Unzaga’s tenure. Still, by Filhiol’s time the people on the Ouachita River 
remained subsistence hunters and could not easily be coerced into agriculture. These men, 
he said, had the same reputation as the hunters at Arkansas Post Many were fugitives and 
deserters, and their independence was more important than any loyalty to god or king.51
The post at Ouachita was probably rife with contraband, particularly goods the 
Indians might have been able to bring from Spanish Texas (northern New Spain). There 
are no records on the subject however, and any military importance the post received 
happened only after its move down river during Mfro’s time.52
50Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, Noticia General de lo que produse la Provincia de 
la Luisiana, AN (Havana), Cedulas y Ordenes, v. 284 in Faye, “Arkansas Post” 635.
51 Arnold, Colonial Arkansas. 159; for Filhiol’s description see Jean-Baptiste 
Filhiol, “Description of the Ouachita in 1786,” LHO 20 (1937): 476.
52See James Fair Hardin, Don Juan Filhiol and the founding of Fort Miro the 
modem Monroe Louisiana (New Orleans: T. J. Moran’s, 1937) and E. Russ Williams, 
Spanish Post d’Ouachita: The Ouachita Valiev in Colonial Louisiana 1783-1804 and 
Earlv American Statehood. 1804-1820 (Monroe, LA: Williams Genealogical 
Publications, 1995).
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Unzaga disagreed with O’Reilly about the importance and leadership of Point 
Coupde. The post was situated only sixteen leagues south of the junction of the 
Mississippi and the Red River (across from present-day St. Francisville) which opened 
into the western frontier. Point Couple regulated all river traffic and licensing in and out 
of the western area between the Mississippi and Natchitoches. In 1770, Unzaga replaced 
Captain of the Militia, Francisco Allain, with a military commandant, Captain Balthazar 
de Villiers, recently of Natchitoches.53
As the entrance into western Louisiana, the primary problems at Point Coupde 
surrounded the Indians, and English attempts to get through to the western tribes. On 
April, 1770, Francois Allain wrote Unzaga that the English had sent Chickasaw and 
Indians of “La grande nation,” (perhaps Creek) across the river into Spanish territory. 
These English-allied tribes “drank continuously” and in that condition perpetrated raids 
on the fort. It appears the Choctaw were also stirring up problems and Allain was 
delighted when they retired back into English territory. Both the Chickasaw and Choctaw 
continued to trouble Allain and his successor Devillier. They also continued going to 
Manchac for liquor before they began their campaigns of terror.54
Indian depredations hurt many Louisianans’. For example, Point Couple 
continually had property damage and livestock stolen by such Indians. Even the British 
suffered at the hand’s of their erstwhile allies. Allain reported in September of 1770 that
53Faye, “Arkansas Post,” 645.
^Allain to Unzaga, April 20,1770, AGL Cuba 188-A, Folio 16 and Unzaga to 
Allain, April 26,1770, Ibid., Folio 17. Allain openly accused the English of such 
offenses in 1771, Allain to Unzaga, January 4,1771, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio 24.
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an Englishman named McIntosh sought refuge at the post because he feared death at the 
hands of the Choctaw.55
Smuggling at Point Coupee varied. The primary spots for smuggling near the post 
were the English settlements at Manchac and Natchez and both Allain and Devillier 
reported smuggling by the Acadians with the English across the river. Natchitoches also 
passed along contraband goods, especially horses, as well as certain criminal elements.
As early as September of 1770, commandant Allain informed the governor that the post 
had received a number of mules and horses. Unzaga replied that he must check them 
carefully for those branded with a “B.” That brand belonged to the Baron Juan Maria de 
Riperda which meant that the cattle might have been stolen from Spanish Texas, a 
common occurrence.56 Then too, as Point Couple became a tobacco producing location, 
illicit trade in that item began.57 To date there has been almost no examination of the post 
and setdement at Point Coupde. Considering the importance of its location and the 
continued trade in illegal goods further investigation is warranted.
The Post at Natchitoches has elicited a number of historical works including the 
famous Bolton translations of the letters of Lieutenant-Governor Athanase de M^zidres. 
De M6zi&res was a Frenchman who had been appointed commandant of Nachitoches by
55Allain to Unzaga, September 25,1770, AGL Cuba 188-A, Folio 37 
^Ibid.
U nzaga to Allain, November 15,1770, AGL Cuba 188-A, Folio 45.
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O’Reilly in 1769. He continued to act as a diplomat and Indian agent under the Spanish 
regime until his death in the 1770s.58
Natchitoches had been an important fort in Louisiana since its founding by Louis 
Juchereau St. Denis in 1714. Originally called St. Jean Baptiste, its location near the 
Natchitoches Indians earned its present name. St. Denis felt that Louisiana would profit 
from trade with Spain’s borderland colonies despite the ban on inter-colonial trade. He 
even ventured into Spanish territory, winning a bride and an audience with the Viceroy. 
The outcome of that conversation was further Spanish movement into eastern Texas to 
place a buffer of four mission/presidio settlements between the French and New Spain. 
These settlements became a constant source of illegal trade between the French and 
Spanish. New Spain experimented with moving the missions around to remove their 
temptation, but nothing worked. Also, since both Spaniard and Frenchmen profited, and 
the settlements were in isolated locations, little was done about the inter-colonial traffic 
during the French period.
Increasing Indian attacks pressured New Spain into re-examining the missions in 
Texas and the Southwest The crown ordered field-marshal, Marquds de Rubf, to inspect 
the area in the late 1760s. Accompanied by Spanish engineer, Nicolds de Lafora, Rubf 
toured the missions, reporting in detail the dilapidated conditions of the settlements east 
of San Antonio de Bdxar (present day San Antonio). The missions frequently housed 
only one priest and some had no Indian converts residing with them. The garrison at Los
“ Louis R. Nardini, No Man’s Land.. 76; for a complete biography on de Mdzifcres 
see Julia Vivian, A Cavalier in Texas. (San Antonio, TX: The Nayor Company, 1953).
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Adaes hosted only sixty-one ragged and shoeless soldiers. Between them the soldiers 
could produce only two working muskets and only twenty-five of their horses were 
healthy enough to be used. Part of the reason for these conditions was the post 
commander’s embezzlement of the soldiers’supplies and pay.59
Rubf recommended that the viceroy rearrange the presidios to form a string of 
strong fortifications between Bahfa del Espfritu Santo in the east, and the Gulf of 
California in the west, with San Antonio and Sante Fe holding the middle-ground. This 
area he really felt was the border of empire and other mission/presidio holdings were 
“imaginary possessions.”40
In response to Rubf s recommendations the King issued a Royal Cedula which 
created a New Regulation of Presidios, dated September 10,1772. The Regulations 
called for the redistribution of missionary and military personnel in northern New Spain 
and the abandonment of the easternmost presidio. The following year the viceroy of New 
Spain sent L l Col. Hugo O’Connor to officially reorganize the Provincias Internets, as 
the area was called.61
While New Spain reorganized, Unzaga investigated the trade between 
Natchitoches and Los Adaes. The leader at the settlement of Los Adaes was army officer, 
Gil Y’Barbo, a notorious smuggler who had already been arrested for selling mules and
59Carlos E. Castaneda, Our Catholic Heritage in Texas 1519-1936 vol. 4 (Austin, 
TX: Von Boeckmann-Jones, 1936-58), 238-39.
“ Lawrence Kinnaird, ed. and trans., The Frontiers of New Snain: Nicolas Lafora’s 
description 1766-1768 (Berkeley: Quivara Society, 1958), 166.
6IWeber, Spanish Borderlands. 217.
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horses, stolen from other presidios, to the French, in exchange for supplies and food.62 
During Ulloa’s tenure, Viceroy Marques de Croix, had written to Ulloa regarding 
contraband at Los Adaes. In 1770 the governor questioned De M6zi£res about such trade. 
De M6zi£res replied that Los Adaes was destitute and that the long established trade was 
humanitarian in nature. He also reported the exchange of supplies for mules and horses 
which Louisiana badly needed. The lieutenant-governor was bold enough to send a bill 
for goods (cloth) sent to Los Adaes in hopes that the governor would pay for his “lost” 
supplies. Unzaga, however, had already received notification from the Baron de 
Ripperda in Texas regarding the return of stolen animals. The governor gendy chastised 
the commandant for the contraband. While the governor chided De Mdzi&res about the 
horses, he applauded his efforts and recommended that any further “exchange” between 
the two setdements be in the form of “foodstuffs or humanitarian aid.” In regard to the 
bill, Unzaga reminded De Mdzifcres that he could not spend the money from the treasury, 
though he would like to, because it was “against the order of His Majesty whose will he 
[was] to inviolably execute.”63 He also couldn’t pay for the bill because it was for goods 
being used in inter-colonial trade, an illegal activity he would be forced to report if De 
M£zi&res pressed his claim.
De Mdzi&res reported the return of some horses, stolen from the Arkansas Indians 
by the inhabitants of Natchitoches. He again asked for money to pay courier Juan
H erbert Eugene Bolton, “The Spanish Abandonment and Reoccupation of East 
Texas, 1773-1779,” Texas Historical Association Quarterly. 9 (1935), 85.
63Unzaga to De M6zi£res, September 20,1770. AGI, SD 81, Folio 216.
141
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Baptiste Biebel’s expenses for returning them. A wily Unzaga congratulated his officer 
on keeping the peace with the Indians, but refused again to pay the bill from the treasury 
because he said “thieves and any other criminals must make restitution from their own 
interest.”64 He admitted that the Indians could not be expected to pay such expenses but 
the thieves could and should be charged the twenty pesos for the courier’s services, 
adding that “the monies of the King [were] a sacred deposit in the hands of his ministers 
and they may not be touched without his majesty’s express mandate and grace.”65
Unzaga’s position on contraband with Spanish Texas was vacillating at best 
Officially he condemned contraband of all kinds and only permitted humanitarian trade 
because the people in Los Adaes were, after all, Spanish. Reading the governor’s letters 
one gets the opinion that the man followed the rules, as closely as possible, and saved the 
king money at all cost
Unzaga’s position on contraband depended on the situation at hand. In fact he 
was not above such trade himself! The need for horses, mules and cattle led Louisiana’s 
governor to defy official policy in 1773. He authorized a colonist named Jean Hamilton 
and two “English carpenters” to penetrate Baron de Ripperda’s province and “keep an eye 
on things.” Hamilton actually began to engage in surreptitious trade for horses and cattle. 
The news of Hamilton’s deals reached the ears of the Baron who questioned Gabriel 
Fusilier de la Claire, then post commandant at Attakapas Post The commandant replied 
that such rumors were greatly exaggerated. Unfortunately, Ripperda caught Hamilton and
^Unzaga to De M6zi6res, September 20,1770, AGI, SD 81, Folio 215.
“ Ibid.
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his spies and threatened to hang them. Louisiana’s governor pleaded ignorance of the 
whole affair until Fusilier de la Claire found invoices and permits in the bottom of 
Hamilton’s boat bearing Unzaga’s signature.66
That same year Ripperda ordered the evacuation of Los Adaes and the other 
eastern missions. In a cruel forced march, the settlers abandoned their crops and homes 
with only five days to prepare for the long journey to their relocation in San Antonio. In 
their absence the Indians reclaimed the tiny settlement. Over the next two years Unzaga 
had to look elsewhere for horses, and the Indians frequendy stole horses from one post to 
sell to another.67 In 1775, Unzaga tried another tack. Acting through Alexandra de 
Clouet, the current commandant at Atakapas, the governor sent five men to San Antonio 
with trade goods, hoping to exchange them for livestock. The Viceroy intervened this 
time circumventing the illegal trade and frustrating Louisiana’s governor.68
With the loss of Los Adaes the main problems at Natchitoches consisted of 
increased disturbances among the Indians and intra-colonial difficulties between the 
hunters in the west and the setders at the western posts. De Mezi£res spent his last 
remaining years in Louisiana bringing peace to the western tribes.
Unzaga’s vacillating policies on contraband continued throughout his career in 
Louisiana. His real attention was drawn by the English on the Mississippi. Up-river in
“ Fuselierto Unzaga, March 1,1773, AGI, Cuba 189-B.
^Nyal C. King, “Captain Antonio Gil Y’Barbo: Founder of the Modem 
Nacogdoches, 1729-1809,” (M A  Thesis, Stephen F. Austin College, 1949), 16-18.
“ Holmes, “Problems of Spanish Governors,” 528.
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present day Missouri, Spanish Illinois, lay the two fortified settlements of St. Louis and 
Ste. Genevieve. Ste. Genevieve had been one of six small French settlements in Upper 
Louisiana near Ft. Chartres, before the advent of Spanish rule. French Illinois “was 
linked to the center of America by water routes: the Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, 
Tennessee, and Illinois rivers and their tributaries.”69
Ste. Genevi&ve was perhaps one of the poorest and most ill-placed of the six 
towns. It suffered from constant flooding, a fact which prompted Pierre Lacl&de Liguest, 
and his partners in 1764 to found the settlement of St. Louis in a drier location just south 
of the mouth of the Missouri River. (See Chapter Six)70 O’Reilly had placed Lieutenant- 
Governor Pedro Piemas at St. Louis and given its merchants the monopoly on the fur 
trade with the Missouri and Osage. The two settlements also mined lead, produced food 
and, more importandy, flour for the colony.
Smuggling and contraband came to Spanish Illinois two ways. The French 
setdements had been a wealthy agricultural community known as Le Pays des Illinois. 
The colonists had been wealthy enough to buy their clothes from France and accumulate 
many material possessions prior to the Seven Years War. Their biggest difficulty had 
been labor, which they answered with the purchase of Indian and African slaves. With 
the transfer of Louisiana to Spain, Ste. Genevieve suddenly became Spanish and the
65The other setdements were Cahokia and St. Philippe, north of the Fort; Chartres 
and Prairie du Rocher, just to the south and Kaskaskia near the Indian village and fortress 
of the same name, across the river from Ste. Genevieve. Winstanley Briggs, “Le Pays 
des Illinois,” William and Marv Ouartelv. 3ri series, 47 (1990): 33-34.
70See John Francis McDermott, “Pierre Laclede and the Chouteaus,” Missouri 
Historical Bulletin 21 (July, 1965): 279-83.
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other, once French settlements, English. Many French settlers crossed the river to escape 
what quickly became English military rule. This influx was accompanied by Indians 
seeking trade with their usual partners. Cut off from its usual stream of manufactured 
goods and its normal market, Ste. Genevieve continued to trade with its French neighbors 
across the Mississippi. As the flow of European goods dried up, all of these small towns 
stagnated and the inhabitants of St. Louis and Ste. Genevieve were reduced to a frontier 
existence. By the time of Unzaga’s tenure, the two towns stood isolated in the North, 
dependent upon their own agriculture, lead mining and trade with the Indians. Piemas’ 
arrival stifled trans-Mississippi trade. Despite these problem, translations of 
Piemas’letters in Louis Houcks’ collection of documents related to Upper Louisiana, 
show that St. Louis and Ste. Genvifcve prospered on their own. New Orleans was 
dependent on their wheat, com and flour.71
The contraband the Spanish couldn’t stop was trade with the Indians. Part of the 
problem was that the Big and Little Osage and the Missouri wanted firearms. The 
monopoly on trade in Spanish Illinois pushed many tribes like the Big Osage into a 
pattern of migratory behavior much like the normal seasonal round of mobile Indian 
tribes, except this one was based on predation. They arrived in Missouri in late winter 
and early spring, received their gifts and while they were there sold Indian slaves (despite 
their illegality), stolen horses, furs, tallow, and herbs. While in the north they also traded 
for illegal powder and munitions. Having finished, the Osage returned South, strafing
71Briggs, “Le Pays de Illinois,” 54-55. See also Louis Houck, ed. Spanish 
Regime in Missouri. 1:50-52.
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Arkansas post on the way with a few raids, and then settling in for the summer near 
Natchitoches where they preyed on the Caddo Confederation and its association tribes. 
They stole everything possible, but favored horses and captives which they could sell. By 
fall they returned to Arkansas post just as the hunters set up camp along the river. There 
they took firearms and replenished their ammunition, taking captives and killing others. 
By late winter and the following spring they returned to St. Louis to repeat the cycle.72
The Spanish struggled to control the Osage’s contraband. However, the 
merchants at S t Louis continued to trade guns, powder and munitions to the Indians, 
making their predation possible. Even when, in 1774, Unzaga finally ordered that trade 
with the Osage must be cut off so that they would be forced into more peaceful ways, the 
merchants at S t Louis never stopped trading with them. Piemas reported in Spring of 
1775, that although the Osage trade was forbidden it still accounted for over forty per­
cent of the furs which arrived in St. Louis.73 Thus the problem of contraband at S t 
Louis was perpetuated by the merchants of that city in the same way that Arkansas 
perpetuated its problems by continuing to trade whiskey to the Quapaw. Unzaga’s orders 
from New Orleans had little impression on the lives of those at Arkansas Post and St. 
Louis; therefore contraband and Osage depredations continued.
72There were several different bands of Osage. The Little Osage and the Missouri 
stayed near St. Louis while bands of the Big Osage were more mobile. See Gilbert C.
Din and Abraham P. Nasatir, The Imperial Osaees. (Norman, OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1983) for a larger view of Louisiana’s problems with this group of 
tribes. See Chapter 6 for a larger view of Indian problems in S t Louis.
^Piemas’ report to Unzaga, May 19,1775, AGI, Cuba 2358 in Kinnaird, SMV 1: 
228 and Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osaees. 96.
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The easiest contraband for Unzaga to control was that aboard British ships when 
they passed by the pilot house at Balize. With O’Reilly’s departure in 1770, British ships 
began gradually to reappear along the Mississippi, ostensibly bringing goods to the 
traders at Manchac. The British had the right to transport goods on the Mississippi as 
part of the Treaty of Paris. Once merchants passed New Orleans there was little the 
governor could do about trade with the plantations in lower Louisiana. Ships ascending 
the Mississippi fought against the current They had to carefully hug the bank to avoid 
the faster waters of the main channel and navigate the numerous curves on the river. This 
often necessitated landing men on shore with ropes who literally helped to drag the ship 
upstream. At night exhausted from the fight the captain and crew took refuge at the 
nearest private dock, especially at local plantations74 Once tied to the dock, a ship 
immediately became one of the floating warehouses described by Louisiana’s historians. 
As long as the such ships had the right to transport goods on the river, British trade with 
the plantations and the settlers of the Acadian and German Coasts was inevitable. 
Louisiana’s colonists deemed the trade a necessity.
Unzaga was frustrated but not defeated. He used several different strategies with 
these ships, keeping in mind the need to act solicitously toward the British. In July of 
1770, he encountered two British vessels carrying food from West Florida who entered 
the Mississippi. At the same time he received a goleta (small Spanish ship) from Merida 
with letters from the governor and the cabildo requesting food (maize) because after a 
recent hurricane they were in “misery.” They were especially concerned about the tribute
74Hoffinan. Luisiana. 136.
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Indians who had gathered into small bands and were disappearing into the interior,
“eating the roots of trees to keep alive.” Many were dying, poisoned by their attempts to 
forage. The famine, they complained, had stripped away the people necessary to work for 
Royal Service. The captain of the goleta had instructions to find food in Louisiana and 
return as quickly as possible (within 15 days).75 Unzaga decided to furnished the British 
captains with letters of recommendation and send them to the colonists in the Yucatan. 
Food was already tight in New Orleans and the governor couldn’t spare any. He could, 
however, solve two problems at once, supplying the people in the Yucatan with food and 
preventing contraband trade along the Mississippi at the same time. Knowing that he had 
skirted official policy, the governor quickly excused himself on the grounds of 
expediency, writing to Bucareli, “I have freed myself from the interchange which these 
vessels would have made in this vast country, the English having great freedom in going 
to and fro through this river; it would have been almost impossible to avoid it.” He 
further excused himself reporting that the locusts were eating Louisiana’s crops and the 
langostdi (crawfish?) were destroying the rice. The governor would have had to wait for 
other crops to come downriver to New Orleans before he could help the Yucatan. Surely 
the British were the most expedient answer to the problem.76
In writing to Bucareli, Unzaga knew that his superior could not stop or reverse his 
fait accompli. In fact, he had deliberately resorted to the old colonial ploy obedezco pero
75Unzaga to Bucareli, July 8,1770, AGI, Cuba 1055, attachment to Foliol 12.
76Unzaga to Bucareli, August 3,1770, Dispatches and Unzaga to Bucareli, August 
31,1770, AGI, Cuba 1055, Folio 117.
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no cumplo (I obey but do not carry out) to avoid laws which did not fit colonial reality. 
Colonial correspondence from the colonies took months to reach Spain and months to 
return. Even mail to Havana and back had a slow turn around time. The very slowness 
of the Spanish system of command and correspondence allowed Spanish administrators 
like Louisiana’s governor to act first and seek permission later. Bucareli did litde more 
than mildly reprimand Unzaga, admonishing him not to do it again.77
Turning two ships aside did little to stem the rush of the British to the Mississippi. 
By the next year more and more ships appeared, asking for passage by Balize and New 
Orleans. Unzaga wrote in frustration to Bucareli:
These same vessels, which from time to time pass in front of 
this city with the pretext of going to their settlements of Manchac 
and Nachez have no other object than that of obtaining what commerce 
they can on this river, and the purpose of finding out news, and in order 
to prevent this they cause me a lot of vigilance. These ships [are] going 
from one side of the river to the other in small groups, and I caution 
the captains of these ships to observe their conduct and their ships, not 
having other means to impede the free entrance which they have on 
this river and to preserve harmony with a nation so delicate and 
touchy.78
The governor’s frustration did not last long. He soon pieced together a plan to 
keep peace with the British merchants, limit the amount of contraband flowing through 
the mouth of the river and follow the imperial directive to keep a surveillance on the 
British. British merchants were now stopped twice on their way up river. At Balize the 
pilot house sent messages to the governor of the nature of a ship’s cargo and her captain.
^ a g g , Latin America. 167-71.
^Unzaga to Bucareli, January 22,1771, Dispatches.
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Upon receipt of the report, Unzaga could, if he wished, invite several of the captains into 
dinner where he could also carefully glean information from them about the British in 
Pensacola and the eastern seaboard. He could also stop them on the way back from 
Manchac to ask them about the progress there. For instance, in May of 1771, he dined 
with the captain of a British barge returning from the Illinois country. He noted the cargo 
of the barge and also extract information about the growing settlement at Natchez.79 By 
piecing together this news with reports from French and Spanish traders, as well as his 
commandants, Unzaga, in New Orleans, had a clearer view of the Mississippi and the 
movements of the British.
Unzaga also developed a network of spy/merchants like James O’Kelly who could 
enter and leave Manchac without suspicion. Many Irish Catholics preferred to live under 
the Spanish crown and Unzaga rewarded their “efforts” to spy on the British with the 
required papers for citizenship. Even after the Malvinas crisis passed, Unzaga in 
Louisiana and de la Torre in Havana continued to build their network of spies (See 
Chapter 8).80
Unzaga appears to have continued using the merchants in New Orleans for more 
than surveillance. In May of 1775 he bought flour from British merchants in New 
Orleans because of the paucity of the commodity. He also continued to buy flour from 
Oliver Pollock, a merchant found “acceptable” even by O’Reilly. In September of 1776 
he sought to explain himself to the new Minister of the Indies, Jos6 de G£lvez, explaining
^Cummins, Spanish Observers. 15-16.
“ Ibid, 22;
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that he knew he was not supposed to buy flour from foreigners, but “because of extreme 
need” he had done so. He promised not to do it again, adding that he would seek in the 
future to supply himself from Veracruz and Havana.81
Not all of Unzaga’s subordinates appreciated the governor’s economic strategy. 
One such person was the treasurer, Martin Navarro. As a representative of the crown, 
Navarro wrote lengthy letters to the Minister of the Indies deploring Unzaga’s pragmatic 
approach to Louisiana’s economic woes. He agreed, however, that the colonoy needed 
immediate assistance, admitting that trade with Spain was not the answer to Louisiana’s 
difficulties. Instead, he suggested ways to implement better control of contraband along 
the Mississippi. Unfortunately, the tone of Navarro’s letters suggested that Unzaga’s 
laxity concerning contraband and the British was also part of the problem. His plans, 
while interesting on paper, were not always practicable given the manpower and money 
available. It is also quite possible that Navarro was not appraised of the governor’s plan 
to use merchants for secret surveillance of the British. Unfortunately, Unzaga was not 
tolerant of Navarro’s penchant for “going over his head” and an enmity developed 
between the two officials which lasted until Unzaga’s departure from Louisiana.82
hi contrast to Navarro’s complaints, allowing trade with British merchants to 
help revitalize the economy in Louisiana and supplement the needs of his colonists did 
not mean that the governor accepted blatant disobedience. He must maintain order in the
8lUnzaga
“ For a larger discussion of the problems of Navarro and Unzaga, and of Navarro’s 
plans, see Brian E. Coutts’ previously mentioned dissertation on Navarro as treasurer, 
contador, and intendant of Louisiana between 1766 and 1788.
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colony and continue to establish Spanish authority. Accordingly he chose certain cases to 
make an example of what happened to those who attempted overt smuggling. One such 
case was that of John Nash, a Rhode Island merchant caught selling merchandise to 
soldiers above New Orleans in 1774. Unzaga’s officials intercepted and arrested Nash, 
sending his belongings to New Orleans where they were sold. The British governor of 
West Florida interceded on behalf of Nash but the merchant only managed to retrieve part 
of his confiscated property. As the story of Nash’s misfortunes circulated, the severity of 
the penalty became magnified. One merchant at Natchez named Richard Carpenter, 
wrote a friend in Newport that five or six British ships had been confiscated.83
The amount of British ships and goods taken into custody was minimal compared 
to the smuggling that actually happened and British ships were not the only ones of which 
Unzaga made an example. Records indicate that many of Louisiana’s ships were also 
seized, their captains arrested or fined and the illegal goods confiscated, including slaves 
taken aboard an illegal French ship. Among those involved was prominent merchant 
Bartolomd Toutant Beauregard. Unzaga apparently did not favor even the most 
prominent citizen who overtly flaunted his disobedience. This list, again, is small, 
indicating only nine cases brought to trial between 1771-78. Even among his citizens 
Unzaga sought merely to make an example because he did not have the forces or the 
funds to do otherwise.84
“ Unzaga to Arriaga, September 7,1774, AGI, SD 2482; Testimonio del proceso 
contra Joseph Nach & Co., ibid; Hoffman, Luisiana. 137; Clark, New Orleans. 178.
“ For an extensive look at testimony concerning the illicit commerce brought 
through New Orleans see Collecci6n al Documentos Indditos para la testimnnia de
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Louisiana historian Charles Gayarrd states that the early economic reforms under 
Charles ID, created an “oppressive system [which] was exceedingly foolish, as it could 
benefit neither the colony nor the mother country.”85 His statement, while harsh, has been 
supported by others, most notably Clark’s economic study of New Orleans. Unzaga, in 
charge of New Orleans, had to work within the empire and the imperial vision within 
which Louisiana was only one part and an impoverish one at that In many ways, the 
reforms reinforced the smuggling and contraband trade already entrenched in the Gulf 
Coast if not the Caribbean. Indeed, as Havana’s economy bloomed, Louisiana’s began to 
wither, and its population turned to contraband and smuggling to survive. Unzaga strove 
to work within the confines of empire to maintain and revitalize Louisiana’s failing 
economy and fight illegal commerce at the same time. Given his manpower and financial 
problems Unzaga could never have controlled the ingrained, inter-colonial trade, nor the 
illicit trade with the colony’s Indians.
The historical records supports claims that Unzaga “winked” at illegal commerce 
and contraband but that comment is too narrow a vision of a complex problem. Unzaga 
rightly believed that attempts to disrupt the informal economic system would have 
angered not only the British but many of Louisiana’s Indian allies as well. As his 
experience grew, he endeavored, instead, to use the colonial system to further imperial 
goals of colonial growth and security. He also circumvented impractical crown policy 
through obedezco pero no cumplo, managing to help both Louisiana and empire. In
Hispano- America. AGI, Cuba, legajos 1389,1393,1396, 1398-99,1401,1405,1410.
“ Gayarrd, History of Louisiana. 44.
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particular, he, like his superiors in Havana, took advantage of British ships passing 
through the capital to maintain a constant surveillance of the British. Through these 
merchants Unzaga gleaned important information for the Spanish crown regarding the 
British along the Mississipi, in Florida and the eastern seaboard. Unzaga’s greatest 
frustration, and perhaps his greatest failure, was his attempt to control contraband and 
establish regulated trade through licensed traders and a system of post monopolies with 
Louisiana’s Native American population.
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Chapter Six 
The Indians
“The Indians shift their loyalties to the person or persons that have most recently 
given them gifts, without paying any attention to what they had received before, even 
though it might have been a thousand times more. ”
Pedro Piemas, St. Louis, 12 June, 1771
Spanish Louisiana’s security was based on an informal defense system of militia 
men, small numbers of troops in a few strategically placed forts, and a stable population. 
Unzaga was also aware that only peace with neighboring Indian tribes, or at least a truce 
based on gift giving, would guarantee his colonists’ safety. Native Americans also 
affected the economic progress of the colony as traders, trappers, customers and part of 
the population engaged in contraband.
Historian Patricia Galloway pointed out that a major part of Louisiana’s narrative 
on Indians and Indian diplomacy was hidden away in the letters from various post 
commandants. Galloway was referring to French Louisiana, but the same holds true for 
Unzaga’s time. This study of Louisiana’s Native Americans, therefore, focuses on both 
the governor’s and commandants’ letters, with special attention to the latter. In them it 
appears that during the 1770s many American Indian tribes regrouped into various 
confederations to play encroaching groups of Europeans against each other. Despite 
treaties, truces and gifts, the Indians, not the Europeans, continued to hold the upper hand 
in the Trans-Mississippi West Because of their power, freedom, and semi-sedentary
‘Piemas to Unzaga, June 12,1771, AGI, Cuba 81.
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nature, Louisiana’s Indian allies often frustrated Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga in his 
attempts to keep the peace, control contraband and defend his colonists.2
The Spanish inherited three separate Indian problems with the Louisiana territory. 
East of Mississippi the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek (the major tribes of the Muskogee 
language group who made forays into the colony), the Tallapousa and the “petite 
naci6nes”or “small tribes,” (the general term for a loose confederation of Indians living 
within a hundred-mile radius of New Orleans), were restive or in open conflict with each 
other. Northward along the Mississippi, Arkansas and St. Louis struggled with the Little 
and Big Osage and Quapaw whose continued depredations against each other and the 
posts kept the frontier in an uproar. These Native American tribes were also constantly 
engaged in contraband and illegal trade which stretched from Upper to Lower Louisiana. 
Finally, to the west there was trouble between the Osage and the Caddo Confederacy, as 
well as incursions by plains Indians pushed eastward from Spanish Texas.3
The colony’s Indian problems began in the French period. From the last decades 
of the seventeenth century onward, colonization, slavery, disease and the colonial wars
Patricia Galloway, “Louisiana Post Letters: The Missing Evidence for Indian 
Diplomacy,” LK[ 22 (1981): 31-45.
3See Alice B. Kehoe, North American Indians: A Comprehensive Account 2d 
edition, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992) for a regional and chronological 
history of Indians in the present day United States; The classic compendium of Native 
Americans is the series by John R. Swanton done with the Smithsonian Institution’s 
Bureau of Ethnology, especially his volume on The Indians of the Southeastern United 
States (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institutuion Bureau of American Ethnology, 
Bulletin 13,1946); Fred B. Kniffen, Hi an F. Gregory and George A. Stokes, The Historic 
Indian Tribes of Louisiana. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987) has a 
good general description of culture but his chronology should be checked against other 
sources).
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uprooted, economically impoverished and/or eradicated many of the southeastern Indian 
nations. In the Mississippi Valley, the French maintained a policy of inter-marriage and 
trade, while at the same time encouraging intertribal warfare. Native Americans slowly 
elicited a “diplomacy” of gift giving with the French because they habitually engaged in 
trade and political alliances with the highest bidder, as represented by medals of 
recognition and annual gifts-preferably manufactured European goods.
In the first decades of the seventeenth century the French establishing missions 
and trading posts in the Mississippi Valley to monopolize the fur trade. Between 1703 
and 1704 French missionaries founded a mission at the junction of the Kaskaskia and 
Mississippi Rivers (near present day Utica, Illinois). The missionaries Christianized the 
Illinois Confederacy and courier de bois intermarried with the tribes, making them 
steadfast French allies. Fur trappers, traders and missionaries brought with them the 
common European problems of disease and alcohol. Trade created factionalism in the 
Confederacy. Before mid-century a population of some six-thousand Indians was reduced 
to two thousand. As Canadians settled into French Illinois, expeditions headed by 
Bienville and others pushed northward from the mouth of the Mississippi following its 
tributary rivers westward.
As the French moved into the Mississippi Valley some tribes resisted. For 
example, in the north, the Fox Wars (1712-1736) decimated the Masquackies (Fox) and 
their allies the Sauk, Kickapoo and Dakota, setting off a decade of warfare around the 
Great Lakes. Eventually continued French depredations led the remaining Fox and their
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allies to shift their fur trade to the English.4 In the South, the Natchez revolted (1727- 
1731) under their leader, Great Sun. The surrounding tribes refused to join the Natchez 
and some, like the Choctaw and the Tunica, fought on the side of the French. By 1731 
the war had reduced a tribe of four thousand to approximately three hundred. The 
survivors were enslaved or scattered among the major tribes to the east-the Chickasaws, 
Creeks and Cherokees. Giving refuge to the Natchez in time increased existing friction 
between the Chickasaws and the Choctaw. War flared between the Chickasaws and the 
French from 1736-1739.5
Following the Natchez revolt the French re-evaluated their Indian policy. 
Constantly underfunded and virtually unprotected from Europeans and Indian tribes alike, 
the French leadership in Louisiana, after 1731, realized that increased Indian diplomacy 
through gift giving was necessary for survival, especially against the encroaching English 
to the east However, the ministers in France and the treasury officials they sent to the 
colony fought against expenditures on gifts for “savages.” The Indians understood the 
colonial official’s difficulties and often took advantage of the colony by selling their 
services to the highest bidder, which was frequently the English.6
4Judith Nies, Native American History: A Chronology of a Culture’s Vast 
Achievements and their Links to World Events (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), 
168-169; See also Charles J. Balesi, The Time of the French in the Heart of North 
America 1673-1818 (Chicago: Alliance Frangaise Chicago, 1991).
sKehoe. North American Indians. 191.
6Michael J. Foret, “Irresolution and Uncertainty: French Colonial Indian Policy in 
Louisiana, 1699-1763,” (Masters Thesis, University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1982) 7.
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The French also faced constantly changing Indian populations along the 
Mississippi, as groups moved west to avoid slavery and death at the hands of the British 
or Indians allied with them. Thus tribes from the British seaboard colonies moved into 
the Ohio Valley, displacing others who subsequently moved into the Mississippi Valley 
and across the river. In the southeast, the English, Spanish and French fought for control 
through their mutual Indian allies. The smaller tribes, the Biloxi, Alabama, and 
Pascagoula were pushed westward through the Gulf South to the Isle of Orleans. At the 
mouth of the Mississippi the portage area near Bayou St. John witnessed the extinction of 
the Tangipahoa and the Acolapissas. By the 1720s it became home to Biloxi and Houma 
who came seeking trade and were followed by other diminishing tribal groups. Those 
Indians, joined on occasion by the Choctaw, became migratory populations, appearing 
and disappearing on either side of the Mississippi. They followed seasonal game 
resources and attempted to stay away from danger, rather than settle in one area.
War and migration also brought with it an expansion of trade in European 
merchandise and weapons. The new availability of goods and weapons in turn changed 
traditional tribal politics and inter-tribal alliances. It created new chiefs, separated and 
dispersed tribes, and thus helped destabilize and decimate once stable groups. Smaller 
groups created confederacies to make up for their lack of strength. The Indians refocused 
their economies and lifestyles, using their greater mobility to take part in the changing 
market
The changing population of the southeast was created primarily by the 
“diplomacy” of the British and their colonists along the eastern seaboard. This
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“diplomacy” was based on trade, inter-tribal conflict and debt-slavery. At the end of the 
seventeenth century the English raided Spanish Georgia with the aid of Indian Allies. The 
inability of the Spanish to protect their mission Indians at Guale began the end of the 
Spanish mission system in Florida. Devastating raids in 1704 destroyed the Apalachee 
missions and caused them and Yamassee living with them to disperse in several 
directions. One group of Apalachee moved west across the Gulf South, eventually 
becoming one of the migratory tribes along the Mississippi. Some of the Yamasee moved 
northward to South Carolina in search of European products and trade.7
In 1715, unable to pay their debts to the English, the Yamassee lost their wives 
and children to debt slavery and revolted. In the ensuing conflict the English pitched their 
allies, the Creeks, against the Yamasee. The Creeks invited the Cherokee to join the war, 
believing that together they could turn the tables and push the Europeans (especially the 
English) out Unfortunately, the British paid the Cherokee to murder the Creek and then 
cut off their ammunition. The Yamasee lost8
Following the Yamasee war, a new problem appeared in the form of an increasing 
European population. Population pressure accelerated intertribal hostilities and 
competition among the Native Americans in the Gulf South. English families soon 
populated the Carolinas and pushed the Spanish southward towards what would become
7Kehoe, North American Indians. 190-191. See also John TePaske, “French, 
Spanish, and English Indian Policy on the Gulf Coast 1513-1763: A Comparison,” in 
Spain and Her Rivals on the Gulf Coast, eds. Ernest F. Dibble and Earle W. Newton 
(Pensacola: Pensacola Preservation Board, 1971), 9-39.
8Ibid.; Weber, Spanish Frontier. 179.
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Georgia in 1733. War in Europe brought more immigrants into the Carolinas until, by the 
1740s, South Carolina held ten times the European colonists who lived in Spanish 
Florida.9
Population pressure presented Native Americans with the additional problem of 
infectious disease. Typhus, dysentery, smallpox and other epidemics changed Indian 
demographics, wiping out whole tribes that had existed in the early 1700s. The remnants 
of many decimated tribes joined together forming new tribes and moving westward away 
from the devastation. By the mid-eighteenth century, these movements, and ensuing 
epidemics disrupted the trade network in deerskins and changed tribal warfare, as well as 
traditional Native America lifestyles and alliances. Once sedentary tribes became 
migratory gypsies who wandered steadily westward, appearing with more and more 
regularity in the Mississippi Valley.10
During the first half of the eighteenth-century Native Americans along the 
Mississippi and to the west of the valley also experienced the same disruption in trade, 
lifestyle and alliances. Pressure from European populations and hostile tribes moving
T’eter H. Wood, “The Changing Population of the Colonial South: An Overview 
by Race and Region, 1685-1790,” in Pow hatan ’s Mantle: Indians in the Colonial 
Southeast edited bv Peter H. Wood, Gregory A. Waselkov, and M. Thomas Hadey 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 38, indicates that the Carolinas held 
20,300 Europeans, to 2,100 in Florida. European migration was influenced by the civil 
war in England and also by the War of Austrian Succession in Europe (1740-48). See also 
Robert S. Cotterill, The Southern Indians (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1954)
l0Daniel H. Usner, Jr. “American Indians in Colonial New Orleans,” Powhatan's 
Manrie: Indians in the Colonial Southeast. See also Henry F. Dobyns, Their Number 
Became Thinned, for demographic change due to disease in the Southeast
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across the river or pushing eastward from Spanish Texas was exacerbated by the demand 
for European trade goods, especially weapons.11 Spanish mission Indians in Texas also 
sought out the French along the Red River at Rapides and further west at Natchitoches to 
trade stolen horses for arms and ammunition.12 They used the arms to pursue their own 
political ventures either against the Spanish or each other and sometimes with Louisiana’s 
Caddo confederation, Witchita tribes or the Shoshonean Comanches who were new 
arrivals in the colony.13 European weapons increased intertribal warfare and disrupted the 
normal trading patterns among the western tribes as they had done in the east
Further north the Arkansas Post, the Quapaw, the Big and Litde Osage and the 
Missouri tribes offered the French both trade and trouble. The French offered trade and 
gifts for Indian allies, holding an annual gift giving ceremony for friendly tribes. The 
Quapaw quickly became dependent on French firearms and fire-water, moving out of 
their traditional trading patterns to obtain the desired European goods. Their villages and 
agricultural products subsidized nearby families throughout the French and Spanish
"Ibid.; Also see Herbert Eugene Bolton, Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century. 
Studies in Spanish Colonial History and Administration. (New York: Russell & Russell, 
Inc., 1962).
l2The Red River hosted four Caddo nations: the Kadohadoches, Petit Caddos, 
Yatasis, and Natchitoches and the Neches River held the Hasinai confederacy comprised 
of the Nabedaches, Asinais, Nacogdoches, and Nadocos. See F. Todd Smith, “Indian 
Policy in Spanish Louisiana: The Natchitoches District, 1763-1803,” The Spanish 
Presence in Louisiana 1763-1803. edited by Gilbert C. Din, Vol. 2 in The Louisiana 
Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History, Glenn R. Conrad, General Editor, 
(Lafayette, LA: Center for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana, 
1996), 285.
"Collectively these tribes were known to the French and Spanish as the 
“Nortenos” or Northern Nations.
162
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
periods, but they often threatened the small fort on the Arkansas. The Missouri began 
raiding European settlements to gain merchandise the easy way and entered an uneasy 
friendship with the little Osage north of the post Once again, shifting populations 
brought about shifting alliances. The Osage, however, were particularly predatory on 
both Europeans and other tribes. Europeans meant easy access to weapons which could 
be used against other Indian groups. As French trappers moved into the wilderness the 
Osage began to attack them for their weapons. The normal seasonal round, south in the 
winter, north in the summer now took on a different meaning for both the Osage and the 
people they attacked.14
The Seven Years War and the consequent change of ownership in the Mississippi 
valley further disrupted Louisiana’s tribes. Tribes who had previously been Spanish 
enemies were now “Spanish” tribes subject to new boundaries and laws. Many of these 
tribes realized that the change in ownership meant they had lost their negotiating leverage 
between what had been French and Spanish communities. Previously legitimate French 
trading partners were now no longer “legal” and the Indians had to trade with “official” 
traders licensed by the Spanish government in New Orleans. Indian slavery was no 
longer a welcomed practice. Only the familiar annual gift-giving stayed the same because 
Antonio de Ulloa realized that the best method of benefitting from Louisiana’s Indians 
was to retain the previous French policy. Necessarily, however, he moved the annual
l4See Gilbert C. Din and Abraham P. Nasatir, The Imperial Osaees for 
comprehensive account of Osage problems.
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presentation ceremonies from Mobile to New Orleans and ceased to court the Choctaw 
and Creeks unless they came to New Orleans.15
French allied Indians also scrambled to avoid British persecution east of the 
Mississippi. They flooded into Spanish Louisiana especially near New Orleans whose 
“petite nacidnes” were refurbished by Indians moving out of the previously French area 
of Mobile. In the north, French allies suddenly found themselves among the British and 
sought refuge on the western bank and its settlements. Some tribes moved across the 
river into Spanish territory and others fought against the British. The best example of the 
latter is Pontiac and his allies who tried to continue the war to gain land and expel the 
Europeans, but ran out of ammunition and had to halt the conflict.
Spanish rule between 1764 and 1769 was still uncertain, however, and while the 
tribes waited to see who gained control of the colony old tribal agendas emerged. In the 
east the Chickasaw and Choctaw became predatory on the “petite naciones” and in the 
west the Osage continued to steal horses from the Caddos and Wichitas, but now with 
smuggled British arms.16 An example of the conflict created during this time period can 
be seen at St. Louis which had held the monopoly on the trade with the Big and Little 
Osage under the French. The Indians were supposed to visit the post annually to receive 
their appropriate gifts and medals, hi 1764 Pierre Laclfede Liguest and the Chouteau 
family were established in the new town of St. Louis nestled at the entrance to the
15Usner, “American Indians,” 299. See Moore, Revolt in Louisiana, for a full 
discussion of Spanish Indian policy.
16Smith, “Indian Policy,” 286.
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Missouri river and close to all the major Indian groups in the area. (See Chapter 5)17 
There he attracted trappers, traders and Indians. As the French began to evacuate Fort de 
Chartres and cross the river the Missouri Indians moved to the Mississippi where they 
treated with Louis St. Ange de Bellerive, the aging French commandant and Pierre 
Laclede to protect them from a band of some three hundred Osage who were marauding 
in the area. The two Frenchmen created a small peace between the two tribes but it was 
not the last the citizens of S t Louis would hear of the Osage and their depredations.
The Osage were supposed to be the swom enemy of the English across the river 
from S t Louis. Like other tribes along the Mississippi, however, they clandestinely made 
alliances with British commandants in order to receive gifts on both sides of the river.18 
This double dealing proved troublesome for the Spanish who by 1767 were finally taking 
control at S t Louis under Captain Francisco Rfu y Morales. Ulloa’s orders were to 
license traders for the Indians, continue gift-giving and use the Indians as a weapon
17Lacl£de, a prominant partner of Maxent, Lacl&de and Company in New Orleans 
had been granted an eight-year monopoly on trade along the Missouri River including the 
Big and Little Osage. The French government eventually denied the monopoly but that 
news had not reached Lacldde in 1763 when he left New Orleans. See Mdmoire of Sieur 
LaclMe, AE, Correspondence Politique, Espagne, IV; John Francis McDermott, “The 
Exclusive Trade Privileges of Maxent, Laclfcde, and Company,” Missouri Historical 
Review. 30 (July, 1936): 272-78; and Gilbert C. Din and Abraham P. Nasatir, The 
Imperial Osaees. 52-53. The story of the founding of S t Louis can also be found in John 
Francis McDermott, “Pierre Laclede and the Couteaus.” Missouri Historical Bulletin. 21 
(July, 1965): 279-83 and John Francis McDermott, “Myths and Realities Concerning the 
Founding of St Louis,” in The French in the Mississippi Valiev (Urbana, IL: University 
of Illinois, 1965).
18Clarence W. Alvord and Clarence E. Carter, eds.. The Critical Period. 1763- 
1765 (Springfield, IL: The Trustees of the Illinois State Historical Library, 1915 ), 481- 
83.
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against the English if necessary. Rfu immediately began the military reorganization of 
Upper Louisiana, directing the building of two forts on either side of the mouth of the 
Missouri, much to the consternation of St. Ange. The British, who by now had an 
organized Indian policy under William Johnstone, were busy regaling the Osage and 
Missouri with medals and gifts, and promises of more in the future. Local tribes who 
visited the new Spanish leader in St. Louis were suitably un-impressed with his gifts and 
said as much.19
In 1768, Ulloa made a critical mistake concerning the Osage and other Indians in 
Upper Louisiana. He chose to cut expenditures by keeping traders away from the Indians 
villages along the Missouri and tried to keep the gift-giving at a minimum by keeping the 
Indians away from the posts. His policy allowed the licensing of traders only out of New 
Orleans. This upset both the merchants in S t Louis and the Indians. Worse, the meager 
Spanish gifts insulted other tribes who came to treat with the Commandant at S t Louis. 
The necessity of the moment overrode Ulloa’s orders and Rfu wrote to the governor 
explaining that if they did not give good merchandise to the Indians they would probably
19Rfu to Ulloa, November 12,1767, AGI, Cuba 109; and Rfu to Ulloa, AGI, Cuba 
2357 in Louis Houck, ed. The Spanish Regime in Missouri: A Collection of Papers and 
Documents Relating to Upper Louisiana Principally within the Present Limits of Missouri 
During the Dominion of Spain (2 vols. Chicago: R. R. Donnelley, 1909; Rpr. New 
York: Amo Press, 1971) I: 1-11. Louis Houck also covers the history of S t Louis in a 
narrative history, A History of Missouri from the Earliest Explorations and Setdements 
until the Admission of the State into the Union 3 vols. (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley,
1908). Information on William Johnstone, is in Abraham Phineas Nasatir. Indian Trade 
and Diplomacy in Spanish Illinois. 1763-1792 (Berkeley: University of California, 1921- 
22), 19.
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take it by force. Ulloa acquiesced, allowing merchants who had already been licensed to 
trade that year, stating they would have to go through New Orleans the following year. 
Clearly neither the Spanish, nor the French held the upper hand on the Missouri.20
Rfu was an argumentative and overbearing commander, whose leadership 
promoted insubordination among his troops and disorder among the civilians. His 
manner was so harsh that twenty soldiers and the fort’s storekeeper deserted in the first 
year of his command.21 Ulloa then appointed Captain Pedro Piemas to replace him but 
when Piemas arrived at Fort San Carlos el Principe in March he was forced to turn the 
fort over to St. Ange because of the French insurrection.22 Spanish leadership did not 
return until 1770. In the meantime the Indians had developed a system to play the 
English, French and Spanish against one another for the benefit of the Indians.
With the absence of Spanish authority in the north between 1769 and 1770, the 
Osage had made it a point to visit the Arkansas Post repeatedly to ask for gifts and trade, 
despite the monopoly held by S t Louis. Arkansas Post was a haven for illegal traders, 
especially the British, who openly traded guns and whiskey to the Indians. Both of the 
items lured the Osage to the Arkansas River where they threated the Quapaw. 
Commandant Le Chevalier Alexandre DeClouet, found it impossible to keep the Osage
20Din and Nasatir, Imperial Qsapes. 62-63; Rui to Ulloa, June 25,1 768, AGI, 
Cuba 109; and Nasatir, Indian Trade. 25.
21Rfu to Ulloa, December 13,1767, AGI, Cuba 109.
“ Nasatir, Indian Trade. 24; Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osaees. 67-68. Rfus’ report 
is dated October 29,1769 and Piemas’ is dated October 31,1769, both in AGI, Cuba 
2357.
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out of the Arkansas River valley. Worse, they began to attack other Indians in the area. 
DeClouet had written earlier in July of 1769 that the trade in liquor must stop, and the 
British be expelled or the Osage would continue their depredations.23
The confusion over leadership in the colony stopped in 1769 when Alejandro 
O’Reilly firmly re-established Spanish rule. He then initiated a firm program of licensed 
traders, agents and laws against Indian slavery.24 He also hosted diplomatic meetings 
with the tribes in Lower Louisiana in the fall and assigned both Athanase de Mezi6rfcs and 
Pedro Piemas as Indian Agents in their respective territories. These men, in turn, licensed 
traders in their areas to bring annual gifts and to trade with the Native Americans for 
pelts, crops or other items. O’Reilly’s policy was to use friendly Indian tribes to prevent 
English intrusion along the Mississippi and to maintain peace in Louisiana’s western 
territories. His main concern was that the Louisiana tribes did not set off conflicts with 
the British whom he saw as a far greater threat Further, he felt that a formal policy of 
licensed traders and post monopoly systems would gradually evolve into a peaceful co­
existence between the colonists and the tribes. In that he was wrong.
O’Reilly began with ceremonies of recognition and gift giving among the eastern 
tribes. From September 1769 through the following year he and Governor Unzaga 
received delegations from the Tunicas, Taensas, Pacanas, Houmas, Bayogoulas, 
Ofogoulas, Chaouchas, Ouachas, Chitimachas, Chatos, Biloxis, Pascagoulas, Mobilians
“ DeClouet to Ulloa, February 27,1768, AGI, Cuba 107; DeClouet to Monsieur, 
July 14,1769, ibid.; and DeClouet to O’Reilly, September 1,1769, ibid.
“ See Stephen Webre, “Problem of Indian Slavery,” 117-35, for a full discussion of 
the difficulty during the change to Spanish rule.
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and finally the Quapaws.25 In respect to the west, both Captain-General O’Reilly and the 
new governor of Spanish Texas, the Baron de Ripperda, agreed that peace with their 
mutual Indian allies must be preserved. The experienced commandant at Natchitoches, 
Athanase de Mdzi£res, suggested to Louisiana’s leaders that an alliance with the 
influential Kadohadachos was the key to peace in the west. O’Reilly agreed and allowed 
the lieutenant-governor to begin annual gift-giving ceremonies at Natchitoches and to 
license experienced traders to visit their villages. By April of 1770, the Caddo formally 
became Louisiana’s allies.26
As stated before, O’Reilly’s Indian policy was far more conciliatory than Ulloa’s. 
He authorized Piemas to license traders in Spanish Illinois and allowed him to distribute 
gifts to the Indians annually at St. Louis. He also ordered Piemas not to incite the Indians 
against the British and prohibited licensed Spanish traders in British territory. O’Reilly 
wanted no trouble with Gage and Great Britain. Piemas took O’Reilly at his word and all 
seemed tranquil in Spanish Illinois because he reported no disturbances with the Osage 
for over a year. It was an illusion. The Osage had merely moved to a better vantage point 
near the Arkansas post To combat the Osage O’Reilly replaced the aging DeClouet with
“ Kinnaird, SMV. 2:185,258 and 3: 141-43. Many of these tribes wanted to 
continue their familiar practice of meetings with the post commandants. Both O’Reilly 
and Unzaga instructed the commandants on the German Coast the Acadian Coast, Point 
Couple and elsewhere that all tribes must go to New Orleans and meet with the governor 
to swear their allegiance to Spain. See Unzaga to Allain, order for the Tunica, November
14,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio: lg/45 and Unzaga to Dustind, regarding the Taensa 
and Alabama Indians, December 24,1770, ibid:lc/l 1.
“ O’Reilly to De Mdzifcres, September 23,1769 in Bolton, Athanase de Mdzi&res. 
1: 130-131. De Mezieres to O’Reilly
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Captain Francois Demasellieres, who stayed at the post through the end of 1770 although 
Captain Joseph de Orieta became active commandant on July 21,1770. Arkansas 
received a large number of Spanish commandants but none were able to deal 
appropriately with the Osage.27
By the time of his departure O’Reilly had firmly instituted Spanish policy 
regarding the Indians in Louisiana. He had befriended and, he felt, suitably impressed the 
“petite naci6nes” of Lower Louisiana. Through his Lieutenant-Governor, Athanase de 
M6zi£res, the important Caddo confederation had become allies in the West. Finally in 
the north, the Osage and the Quapaw traded under a monopoly system of licensed traders 
from Arkansas Post and S t Louis. Spanish policy, however, was not always Spanish 
reality in its American colonies and Louisiana was not an exception.
As he took office, Unzaga found O’Reilly’s policy problematical. O’Reilly’s 
main goals, it will be remembered, were to establish gift-giving ceremonies to maintain 
alliances, to enhance trade through a series of licensed agents, to end Indian slavery, and 
most of all to keep peace among the tribes and not endanger the tenuous peace with the 
English along the Mississippi. The new governor divided his problems into three 
geographical areas: the lower Mississippi inhabited by the petite nacidnes; Upper
27Demaselli6res was governor of the Arkansas Post from December of 1769 to 
December of 1770. He was replaced in December of 1770 by Lieutenant Josef Orieta. 
See Morris, Colonial Arkansas. Appendix 1.178; See appointment of other commandants 
in Table HI; on O’Reilly’s position regarding the Indians and the English see O’Reilly to 
Lieutenant-Governor of Illinois district, February 17,1770 and O’Reilly to Arriaga, 
March 1,1770, both in AGI, SD 80.
170
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Louisiana whose main tribes included the Quapaw, the Big and Little Osage and the 
Missouri; and finally the Caddo, Witchita and Shoshone in the West
He focused first on the “petite nacidnes” residing near New Orleans, whose ranks 
by now encompassed the Apalaches, Taensas, Pacanas, Mobilians, Biloxis, Chahtos , 
Pascagoulas, Houma, Chitimacha, and Tunica, most of them previous French allies. The 
smaller nations who crossed the river into what was now Spanish Louisiana strung out in 
a long line starting in New Orleans and the German Coast and then northwest along the 
Mississippi into the Acadian Coast, Pointe Coupde, and Rapides on the Red River. 
Settlements of Apalachee, Mobile and Alabama resided at Rapide Post and were later 
joined by the Pascagoula and wandering bands of Choctaw. Pointe Coupde and the 
Acadian coast played host to shifting villages of Taensa, Pacana and Hoctchaya Alabama, 
and Houma. Other Pascagoula, Houma and the Chitimacha settled closer to New Orleans. 
The Mobile and the Choctaw pushed across the Mississippi near the Amite River to gain 
access to the best of both worlds, the English at Manchac and the rich lands of the 
Acadian and German Coasts.28
With their normal fur trade activities disrupted by war and migration, the “petite 
nacidnes” created a seasonal cycle of activities designed to enhance their position and 
opportunities. Native Americans supplied New Orleans with a number of necessary trade 
items including game, bear fat, deerskins, and other furs, as well as woven items, herbs
^Locations gathered from the census of several posts, including report of Louis 
Judice, September 5, 1768, AGI, Cuba 187-A, Folio 194; Census of the Apalachee at 
Rapide, 1774, AGL Cuba 189-A, Folio 1108, and Usner, “American Indians in Colonial 
New Orleans,” 301; also see Wood, “Changing Population,” 73-76.
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and firewood. They also provided a source of inexpensive labor, entertainment and 
gambling.29
Gift-giving was necessary and individual Indians loved wearing Spanish medals 
and vying for European recognition which legitimized their own power in the tribe. Like 
the French, unfortunately, the Spanish in Louisiana never received “awe-inspiring” 
merchandise for Indian presents. This was especially deplorable considering the 
importance of gifts in maintaining alliances. When the governor received an Attakapas 
delegation in April of 1770 the importance of gifts became startlingly clear. They wore 
English medals and demanded the Spanish produce a better product.30 He could never 
really be sure of the “loyalty” of his tribes without the appropriate merchandise, 
especially since many of them contrived to play the Spanish in Louisiana off the British in 
West Florida or in the Ohio Valley area. Native American alliances with Europeans, 
therefore, continually shifted during Unzaga's tenure.
Another problem in the lower Mississippi was how to keep the peace among his 
allied Indian tribes and protect them from the depredations of the British and their allies. 
Across the river in British West Florida, Unzaga contended with a particularly callous 
English Indian agent named John Thomas for the loyalty of the “petite nacidnes.”
29 Usner, “American Indians in Colonial New Orleans,” 301; James A. Robertson 
(ed.) Louisiana Under the Rule of Spain. France, and the United States. 1785-1807.2 
vols. (Cleveland, 1911), 2:81-83.
U nzaga to Judice, April 9,1770, AGI, Cuba, 188-A, Foliol d/1.
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Thomas’ scandalous treatment of Indians and colonists caused Louisiana a great deal of 
trouble. He encouraged English tribes to prey upon tribes who were Spanish allies.31 
Because of Thomas’ continued actions against the Spanish allied tribes, Unzaga decided 
that peaceful neutrality was no longer the best diplomacy. His concern was heightened by 
the growth at the English settlement at Manchac which sold liquor and guns to the local 
tribes and by the enlarging English settlements around Natchez. Manchac and the 
English also exacerbated inter-tribal conflict by funneling contraband into Louisiana and 
instigating attacks on Spain’s allied tribes. They frequently fed the Choctaw and 
Tallapousa whiskey, driving them into murderous rages against Louisiana’s colonists and 
its Indian allies.32
As his commandants dealt with Indian problems along the lower Mississippi, in 
1771 Unzaga began a concerted effort to entice the English tribes over to the Spanish side 
of the river. It seemed to the governor that Indian allies in Louisiana might also help 
create a buffer against the English. At the same time he invited L t Thomas to visit him 
in New Orleans where he assured the British agent that the Spanish had no interest in 
“his” Indians. Thomas left unaware of the conspiracy but soon became enraged when he 
found Spanish gifts and medals among tribes on the eastern bank, of the river. He angrily 
protested to several Spanish commandants but his threats accomplished nothing. Thomas’ 
unfeeling attitude toward the tribes in his jurisdiction eventually cost him their loyalty
31Robert R. Rea, “Redcoats and Redskins on the Lower Mississippi 1763-1776: 
The Career of Lt. John Thomas,” LH 11 (1970): 12-35.
U nzaga to Judice, April 9,1770, AGL Cuba, 188-A, Folio 1 d/1.
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and respect. Many “petite nacidnes” transferred their allegience to Spanish Louisiana 
because they preferred its licensed traders and its prohibition of Indian slavery.33
English allied tribes also kept alive the constant threat of Indian attack on Native 
Americans and Europeans alike. This forced more tribes into Lousiana. For example 
Unzaga contended with Choctaw aggression against smaller tribes. The Pacana and 
Otcheangas (?) sent delegations to visit the governor in New Orleans asking his 
permission to relocate their families to Opelousas because they feared the Choctaw.34
In reality the Choctaw remained tom between Louisiana and British West Florida 
and troubled both colonies. As former allies they attempted to remain friendly with 
familiar French traders in Louisiana. In British territory they suffered mistreatment by 
abusive Indian agents and domination by the now powerful Creek whose trading zone 
extended from Georgia to Mobile.35 Frustrated and denigrated, the Choctaw sometimes 
even robbed local settlements in West Florida. When “liquored-up” however, they 
carried out depredations on both sides of the river. The Spanish tolerated the Choctaw in 
their territory because they acted as a counterbalance against their mutual enemy the 
Osage, whose predation had by then reached the Red River territory.36
33Rea, “Redcoast and Redskins,” 34-35.
MJudice to Unzaga, April 10,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Foliol d/6.
35See Kathryn Holland Braund, Deerskins & Duffels: Creek Indian Trade with 
Anglo-America. 1685-1815. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), especially 
chapter five on trade.
“For more on the Choctaws in Spanish Louisiana see Lawrence Kinnaird and 
Lucia B. Kinnaird, “Choctaws West of the Mississippi, 1766-1800,” Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly 63 (1980): 349-370.
174
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Trouble with another group called the Talapoussas (Creeks) became incessant in 
Lower Louisiana. In June of 1771 both Commandants Descoudreaux and Dutisnd wrote 
the governor that they were having trouble with colonists because of hostile incursions by 
that tribe. The next year Commandant Judice informed Unzaga that his colonists and the 
Houma Indians in his district at Cabannoce were growing more afraid of Talapoussa 
assaults and that he was fortifying the post against such an attack. All the residents of the 
Acadian and German coasts feared them and their depredations increased. The following 
June Spanish Manchac asked Judice for aid against the same tribe and he detached thirty 
men to aid the fort37 Unlike the Choctaw, the Talapoussa never became friendly to the 
Spanish.
The “petite nacidnes" who moved in Spanish territory were not always peaceful 
and immigrants didn’t always get along. Native Americans traded with each other, stole 
from one another and vied for land. Several post commandants reported murders among 
the tribes. The settlements of the Houma and the Alabama became openly hostile by the 
fall of 1770 because of a murder. Commandant Louis Judice informed the governor that 
he had given refuge to the Houma Indian accused of murdering an Alabama brave with a 
tomahawk. The Alabama now wanted to kill the Houma in revenge. Judice was forced 
to mediate between the tribes to keep the peace.38 As stated before, immigrants to the
^Judice to Unzaga, June 1,1771, AGI, Cuba 188-B, Folio 218; Descoudreaux to 
Unzaga, June 1,1771, AGI, Cuba 188-B, Folio 231; Unzaga to Judice, September
12,1772, AGI, Cuba, 189-A, Folio 438; Judice to Unzaga, June 15,;1773, Cuba 189-A, 
Folio 478.
“ Judice to Unzaga, September 13, 1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio 1 d/27.
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lower Mississippi were not always peaceful and neither did they immediately sign peace 
treaties with the Spanish until they found it appropriate. The Apalachee, for example 
moved into Louisiana at the end of the French period, locating their settlement on the Red 
River at Rapide near a group of refugee Alabama families. Spanish Florida had become a 
dangerous place for the tribe because they assisted the Spanish in capturing a Tallapoosa 
brave. The Apalachee feared Tallapoosa reprisals because the Spanish could not or 
would not protect them. When Etienne Marafret Layssard the Spanish Commandant of 
the newly designated Rapide Post arrived he found the Apalachee contemptuous of 
Spanish government because of their experiences in Florida. At the time the Native 
American population overshadowed the French and Spanish at Rapides and the 
Apalachee therefore held the upper hand in political negotiations concerning land or 
trade. They had also refused to make peace with Governor Ulloa whom they said 
“considered them dogs.”39 During Unzaga’s tenture, however, the Apalachee changed 
their minds. Threatened by constant English raids and influence by other “petite 
nacidnes,” they made peace with the Spanish.
The trouble with the British and their allies continued unabated through the next 
two years, hi 1773 other “petite nacidnes” moved across the Mississippi to escape raids 
by the British allied tribes. Rapides Post welcomed settlements of Mobilians, Choctaw 
and Pascagoula Indians. In April, however, the Chief of the Mobile Indians began 
spreading rumors of an English threat to all the tribes on the Spanish side of the
39Donald G. Hunter, “Their Final Years: The Apalachee and Other Immigrant 
Tribes on the Red River, 1763-1834,” The Florida Anthropologist. 47 (March, 1994), 3- 
45 gives a complete story of the Apalachee, Biloxi, Mobile and Taensa at Rapides..
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Mississippi. He and a Chickasaw brave visited the camps of the Choctaw and Biloxi 
telling them that after 26 days the “large nations” in English territory would kill all the 
Indians left in Spanish territory. Lassayrd explained to Unzaga that:
The Chief of the Mobilliens is a bad subject, he comes from Manchac
where he received a present from the English and has held here many talks He
brought two Tchactas who cause much worry among the Apalaches, Chactos, 
Alibamons, Pascagoulas, and Biloxis who are in this p a r t . . .  And their chief 
Gaspar (Choctaw) came to tell me that the English threaten to destroy all the small 
nations that I name if they do not come over to their land.40
The “petite nations” around Rapides were suitably impressed with the British
threat and in 1773 the Pascagoula, Biloxi, and Choctaw re-settled on the English side of
the Mississippi just below the mouth of the Red River. The Apalachee remained.
Unzaga and Layssard slowly wooed the Pascagoula and the Biloxi back into the Red
River area. The Chief of the Pascagoula played both the Commandant at Rapides and
Governor Unzaga off the British, arguing for larger medals and secredy trading with the
English when it suited him. Unzaga blundered by giving both the Apalachee and the
Alabama one annual present which might have cost him the loyalty of both. The Chiefs
of each tribe needed recognition and they complained to Layssard but remained loyal to
the Spanish.41 The Biloxi Chief never became totally loyal to the Spanish, continuing to
wear British medals and failing to remain allied to the Spanish under the threat of attack
by other Indians. Perhaps he had a point.
40Layssard to Unzaga, April 22,1773, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folios 1084-1085, 
translation in Hunter, “Their Final Years,” 9.
41Layssard to Unzaga, AGI Cuba 189-A, Folios 1084-1085, translation ibid, 14.
177
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Another problem the “petite nacidnes presented Unzaga was that even established 
and loyal tribes did not always condescend to abide by Spanish policies, particularly 
concerning land. They did not really understand land ownership or boundaries and if 
asked to move from one area merely relocated a small distance away, sometimes on a 
setder’s property. Often such movements partitioned tribes into separate groups which 
then tried to gain recognition, changing the balance of power and threatening the integrity 
of the tribe.
The prime example of these problems was the prominent and loyal Houma tribe, 
with two villages near New Orleans. During Unzaga’s tenure, the Houma began to sell 
land to local colonists. In 1774 they sold land to a man named Patrick Conway. The 
Indians, led by a young chief named Calabee and twenty braves, eagerly accepted 
Conway’s payment but merely moved a small distance away (about two leagues). Three 
different groups of Houma Indians suddenly emerged and began to address the 
commandant separately. They wanted to speak with the governor. Judice tried to explain 
to the new “chiefs” that Unzaga was “indisposed.” The creation of new tribes was part 
of a competition to be recognized by the governor to gain more material wealth as each 
tribe could expect to receive separate gifts from the Spanish government. Judice 
reasoned, however, that this kind of separation was not useful and cautioned Unzaga 
against recognition of the new “chiefs”. He believed that keeping the Indians in one area 
was tantamount to continuance of the tribe. Once they separated and gained individual 
chiefs the competition would separate them even further. Smaller tribal units actually
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meant less chance of survival for each group and less defense for Judice. He tried to stop 
them from leaving the area but a division had already begun.42
The problem of Indian slavery also concerned the “petite nacidnes.” Such slavery 
had been abolished with the advent of Spanish government, although many Indian slaves 
remained in the colony. The new law required current owners to report their slaves to the 
local authorities for census purposes 43 The laws did not, however, remove current Native 
Americans from their owners. Stephen Webre concludes that part of the reason was the 
ambiguousness of Spanish policy and a wish not to generate disputes over debts “incurred 
in slave purchases prior to the cession.”44
Several things made freeing currently owned Indian slaves difficult. The first 
problem surrounded the idea that the French colonists in Louisiana saw slaves, Indian or 
African, as immovable property rather than people. Stephen Webre points out that during 
the Spanish period the courts continued to protect slave owners against damage to such 
property. It was also easy to sell current Indian slaves by listing them on the bill of sale 
as “mulattoes.” Webre also notes that with enforced avenues to freedom, the Indian slave 
population in New Orleans almost entirely disappeared during the Spanish period. One 
of the reasons may have been that they became “Africans.”45
42Judice to Unzaga, October 1, 1775, AGI, Cuba 189-B, Folios 284 and 285. In 
time the Houma broke apart, intermarried and disappeared as an individual tribe. They are 
presently trying to regain recognition as Native Americans.
43See Kinnaird, SMV. 1:189-92.
44Weber, “Problem of Indian Slavery in Spanish Louisiana,” 355.
45Ibid; Usner, “American Indians,” 298.
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Unzaga’s work with the “petite nacidnes” produced mixed results. The Biloxi and 
Choctaw never became true Spanish allies. Truly independent, despite their “small” 
status, the Biloxi took neither the British or Spanish side during the late 1770s, moving 
north toward Pointe Coupde to avoid “other men’s” wars. The Choctaw continually 
plagued both sides of the Mississippi for trade and recognition in a changing world.46 
Other tribes, like the Apalachee, became permanent residents whose loyalty eventually 
allowed the Spaniards to lead them into battle against the British. Despite their 
disappearing acts and uncertain allegiances, the “petite naci6nes” remained a necessary 
part of Louisiana’s trade and its defense. Indian slavery plagued the governor throughout 
his tenure. He walked a particularly thin line between enforcement of Spanish law and 
the realities of Louisiana’s labor systems. In the long run he reduced slavery but never 
eradicated it
Sales and ownership of Indian slaves allows us to focus on Unzaga’s second 
geographical location, Upper Louisiana. In 1770, the governor ordered Commandant 
Pedro Piemas to enforce the new slave codes and to have the citizens at S t Louis and Ste. 
Genevifcve formally declare any Indian slaves in their possession. Piemas sent back a 
census of sixty-nine Indian slaves in S t Louis and twenty-eight in Ste. Genevieve. He 
also noted that there were problems in enforcing the slave code because several of his 
citizens had already advanced money toward the purchase of such servants. Unzaga 
pragmatically skirted the law. He allowed all sales in progress to be consummated and
46For more information on the Choctaw see Jesse O. McKee and Jon A.
Schtenker, The Choctaws: Cultural Evolution of a Native American Tribe (Jackson: 
University of Mississippi, 1980).
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instructed Piemas not to allow any future enslavement of the local tribes. Once again, 
those who had slaves were not deprived of their property.47
The loneliness of life at outlying posts in Upper Louisiana added to the problems 
of enforcement. Toward the middle of the eighteenth-century Indian women became the 
prime subject of slave sales at places like Arkansas post. Such slaves often became 
concubines of their owners and in some cases their wives. Native Americans also 
undermined Spanish policy on Indian slavery. In some cases they deliberately sold 
women to Europeans because of the possibility of marriage. Such intermarriages could 
be used as leverage by the tribes to obtain trade connections and maintain or increase 
diplomatic power. Such slavery therefore continued.48
Indian slavery was not the greatest issue which concerned Unzaga’s commandants 
in Upper Louisiana. For these men, diplomacy with the Osage tribe was the constant they 
shared. The Osage occupied an area in the Great Plains from the Missouri and Arkansas 
River Valleys to the Rocky Mountains. They settled mostly along the Osage River south 
of the Missouri, but they were an extremely volatile and mobile group that murdered and 
pillaged from the borders of British Canada to Spanish Texas. If they found the Spanish 
unwilling to sell them firearms and munitions in St. Louis it was easy enough to remove 
themselves from the area and raid the Arkansas and the Red River valleys.
“"Piemas to Unzaga, May 26,1771, AGI, Cuba 81; Unzaga to Piemas, n.d., ibid.
^See Arnold, Colonial Arkansas. Chapter 3,53-72 for a discussion of 
intermarriage with the Quapaw.
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As Unzaga took command of Louisiana, the Osage began a double-pronged 
attack, this time in the west, where they attacked hunters near the Arkansas Post and 
Natchitoches. At Natchitoches, Lieutenant-Governor, Athanase de M6zi£res wrote 
Unzaga blaming the lascivious behavior by the hunters in the area for the problems with 
the Indians, claiming most of the hunters were deserters, robbers and rapists and 
recommending that the Osage be removed from the Osage and Arkansas Rivers and 
confined to Upper Louisiana to isolate them from the influence of such men. He also 
recommended that the Caddo and their allies be confined to the area below the Arkansas 
to keep them away from the depredations and bad influence of the Osage.49
Unzaga responded quickly to de M6zi£res’ report. He instructed Demaselli&res at 
Arkansas to order all hunters back to the post in hopes that their removal from the river 
would induce the Osage to move north again. Before the men could regain the post, 
however, seven war parties of Osage attacked the hunters along the river, looting guns 
and ammunition. In the next two months, hunters and their bedraggled families began to 
return to the fort. Demasellidres reported that most of the men had Indian “squaws” and 
children in such a sorry state that the people at the fort took up a collection to buy them 
clothing. He requested a priest be sent immediately to perform marriages and refused to 
resupply the hunters lest they leave the post again.30
49De Mdzifcres to Unzaga, Natchitoches, May 20,1770, AGI, Cuba 100, Folio 227 
in Bolton. Athanase de Mdzferes. 1: 166-68.
50Demassil£res to General (O’Reilly), no date, AGI, Cuba 107; id. to id. May 14, 
1770, June 2, 4,6,15 and 16,1770, ibid and Arnold, Colonial Arkansas. 158-159.
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In July of 1770, Unzaga changed tactics. Removing the hunters had not stopped 
Osage attacks, they merely chose different targets-mainly other Indians. Furthermore, 
they had not left the Arkansas River Valley. Unzaga’s first step was to replace 
Commandant Demaselli£res with Joseph de Orieta. The governor ordered him to try and 
use the Quapaw to drive the Osage out of the valley. The Quapaw had been staunch allies 
at Arkansas post during the French regime in Louisiana but they had little faith in the 
Spanish. The Spanish, after all, had already been ousted from New Orleans once by the 
French. It might happen again. Worse, the Spanish commandants didn’t speak the proper 
language of trade and tried to withhold their favorite trade item—whiskey. Still, the 
Quapaw saw in Unzaga’s plan an excuse to take vengeance on their enemies, the Osage. 
The great leader of the Quapaw, Cozenompoint, arrived at Arkansas post on September
12,1770, to obtain permission to send out war parties against the Osage. Permission 
granted, his warriors set about hunting the Osage but they were not successful and their 
fervor soon died. The next year the Osage were back again, ravaging and plundering the 
hunters along the Arkansas. Orieta suggested depriving them of weapons since the armed 
Indians attacked both Indians and traders.31
A frustrated Unzaga changed tactics and commandants again. He appointed 
Captain Fernando de Leyba to the post in March of 1771. Along with the appointment, 
the governor issued a special set of instructions Leyba was to follow in his dealings with 
the Osage. The instructions included orders to deprive the Osage of any weapons and 
further to “reprimand them kindly” on their behavior and bad faith with the Spanish and
51Orieta to Unzaga, January 26, and February 2 and 6,1771, AGI, Cuba 107.
183
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the Quapaw.52 These “kind reprimands” would be a hallmark of Unzaga’s relationships 
with both the Indians and his commandants.
For their part, the Osage had already begun to make a small peace with the 
Quapaw and the post before de Leyba arrived. Baffled by the sudden turn of events, 
Orieta reported to the governor he had given them a Spanish flag to remind them who 
commanded in Louisiana. In the summer of 1771, the Osage returned to the Arkansas 
post to treat with the new commandant. Going directly against the governor’s wishes, de 
Leyba gave the Osage gifts which included guns. He quickly regretted his mistake when 
the Osage used the guns to rob hunters for more weapons and ammunition Still, he 
suggested that it might be possible to send the Quapaw after the Osage again if the 
Spanish promised to reward them with munitions.53
Unzaga refused to arm the Quapaw. All the Arkansas valley needed was a full 
blown Indian war enhanced by European weapons. He maintained his tactic of “kind 
reprimands” and ordered de Leyba to secure several Osage hostages to maintain the 
peace. Neither de Leyba, nor the governor understood the power of the Osage. The 
governor least of all. Commandant de Leyba had no leverage with which to order the 
Osage to appear at the post for a reprimand and he definitely had no means to demand 
hostages. Unzaga clung fiercely to O’Reilly’s belief that peace could be accomplished
52Unzaga to Orieta, March 8,1771, AGI, Cuba 107; and “Special Instructions 
which the Captain of Infantry, Fernando de Leyba, Commandant of the Post of Arkansas, 
is to observe,” signed Luis de Unzaga, March 11,1771, AGI, Cuba 131-A. See also Din 
and Nasatir, Imperial Osages. 74-75.
53Leyba to Unzaga, July 5 and September 11,1771, AGI, Cuba 107; For a larger 
discussion of Leyba’s plan see Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osages. 75-76.
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through proper negotiations. He restrained both the Quapaw at the Arkansas and the 
Caddo near Natchitoches from retaliation against the Osage lest they interrupt what he 
considered the peace process he had begun.54
From Natchitoches, De Mdzi&es warned Unzaga that peace would not work with 
the Osage. As if to underscore his warning, the Osage began trouble again. They robbed 
and killed the local tribes and stole horses from both Indians and colonists. Moving up 
into the Arkansas valley they began to attack and kill the hunters who moved their camps 
to the river during the fall. Not only were they not ready to make peace with de Leyba, a 
large war party was headed for the small, dilapidated stockade that de Leyba called his 
fort Unzaga’s reaction was diplomatic. He understood de Leyba’s fears and frustrations 
but wished to continue Spain’s policy of neutrality which placed them in a defensive 
position with the Indians. He repeated his earlier orders to de Leyba to try and treat with 
their chiefs and if possible to take hostages. If the Indians continued their hostilities they 
would fall back to Unzaga’s previous plan of arming the Quapaw against the Osage. 
Unzaga desired peace with the Osage but their behavior made him believe it might be 
impossible.55 Unzaga’s gamble with the Osage paid off briefly only because the Osage 
split into two parties heading back to Illinois and up the Osage River. No truce had been 
struck between the Indians and the Spaniards at Arkansas Post
^Draft by Unzaga to de Leyba, September 22,1771, in Din and Nasatir, Imperial 
Osages. 76.
55De Leyba to Unzaga, December 26, 1771, AGI, Cuba 107 and Id. to Id., January
4,1772, Ibid. See also Unzaga to de Leyba, January 26,1772, AGI, Cuba 107 in Din and 
Nasatir, Imperial Osage. 78 as well as the warning from Natchitoches.
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Unzaga issued similar orders to St. Louis regarding the Osage. The Lieutenant- 
Govenor was to continue annual gift-giving ceremonies but he was required to stop 
giving them weapons. Piemas did not trust the Indians of Upper Louisiana. He found 
them thankless and treacherous, writing to the governor that “The Indians shift their 
loyalties to the person or persons that have most recently given them gifts, without paying 
any attention to what they had received before, even though it might have been a 
thousand times more.” He also reported that the British had continued to “court” the 
Little Osage and the Missouri, supposed Spanish allies. Further, he noted the Indians 
were adept horse thieves who continued to expand the already troublesome contraband 
trade in the area. Despite his fears, Piemas followed the governor’s orders, issuing 
presents and requesting that the governor send him Spanish flags to give to the Osage and 
Missouri. 56
Osage attacks in the Arkansas River area caused Unzaga to warn Piemas in early 
1772 not to retaliate. He again issued orders that Piemas was to treat with the Indians and 
quietly reprimand them for their unfriendly and untrustworthy behavior. He also required 
that the Osage appear before the Lieutenant-Governor in St. Louis and account for the 
murders they had perpetrated. If, however, they did not comply, Unzaga would then 
consider them a hostile enemy who needed to be eradicated. He repeated the same orders 
to de M6zi6res at Natchitoches.57
^Piemas to Unzaga, June 12 and 23,1771, AGI, Cuba 81; Piemas to Unzaga, 
November 6, 1771, AGI, Cuba 81; Nasatir, Indian Trade. 37.
^Unzaga to Piemas, March 14, 1772, AGI, Cuba 81, and Unzaga to de Mdzi&res, 
April 3,1772, AGI, Cuba 111. Piemas to Unzaga, November 19,1772, AGI, Cuba81.
186
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In 1772 the Spaniards began to distinguish individual groups among the Osage, 
especially the difference between the Little and Big Osage. The worst offenders seemed 
to be the Little Osage, egged on, of course, by the Missouri. That summer the two groups 
attacked the fort in Missouri stealing weapons and food. During the perpetration of the 
crime they carried and flouted the British flag, insolently planting it on the river bank 
afterward. The Missouri also attempted to steal horses from Ste. Genevieve and 
Kaskaskia but were caught in the process by both the Spanish and the British. Piemas 
suspended trade with the groups although it meant the possibility they might turn to the 
British.58
The Indian tribes surrounding Missouri and the Arkansas Post decided to take 
matters into their own hands. Patience was not working. In July the Saulteaux and 
Potawatomi killed two Little Osage chiefs and cut the arm off another. The Little Osage 
were forced to turn to their intended victims for protection. Further west, the Big Caddo 
and the Quapaw caught and killed a number of Osage who had been stealing their 
horses.59
On the Arkansas, the Big Osage began to sue for peace. Chief Clermont wrote to 
Piemas that he wished to come to St. Louis but was afraid of the other Indians. Piemas 
wrote to Unzaga saying he believed the only troublesome band was the Little Osage, 
whom he considered thieves and who “by treacherous acquaintance. . .  find themselves
58Piemas to Unzaga, November 19 ,1;772, AGI, Cuba 81, and Nasatir, Indian 
Trade. 41-42; Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osage. 81.
59Piemas to Unzaga, November 19,1772, AGI, Cuba 81; Josd de la Pena to 
Unzaga, July 14,1772, AGI, Cuba 111.
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in war with all the nations of this continent, who desire their destruction.”60 Piemas was 
somewhat mislead, because at the same time other bands of Big Osage were attacking, 
killing and capturing hunters who ventured near their camps. Yet Chief Clermont 
pursued peace with Piemas in St. Louis. In August, he arrived with his representatives in 
St. Louis for the annual gift-giving ceremony. Piemas ventured to reprimand them for 
earlier atrocities and was surprised when Clermont offered to find those who had killed 
the hunters and bring them to the post The ploy worked to stay the hand of the Spanish 
for a while but Clermont did not speak for all the Osage. In October the Little Osage 
struck in Missouri again, killing three men. The infuriated governor gave his permission 
for Piemas to retaliate. Horse stealing by the Big Osage in the Natchitoches district 
elicited an order from Unzaga in early January of 1773, to make war upon the bands 
involved “even to the point of destroying them . . .  without cost to the royal treasury.”61 
In order to view the picture of the Osage properly, it is necessary to bring into the 
picture Louisiana’s third geographic territory-the west which was governed by Athanase 
De Mdzi&res. Indeed, while Unzaga dealt with Osage depredations in Upper Louisiana 
between 1770 and 1773, De M6zferes was busy handling similar problems in the post at 
Natchitoches. De Mdzifcres was only too familiar with the Osage who used guns acquired 
at the Arkansas post to attack and rob the Indians and settlers of his district, stealing
“ Piemas to Unzaga, July 8,1772 and November 19,1772, AGL Cuba 81.
6IPiemas to Unzaga, September 1,1772, ibid; Nasatir, Indian Trade. 44. Unzaga 
to De MSzifcres, January 10,1773, ibid and March 19,1773 in Din and Nasatir, Imnerial 
Osages. 83.
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horses and taking captives for slaves.62 At the time De Mdzifcres was involved in 
negotiations with the Caddo on the Red River and the Osage had killed an important 
Caddo leader. Despite inter-tribal war, De Mezi&res managed to bring the Caddos into 
an alliance with the Spanish in April of 1770 as Unzaga was dealing with the Osage in 
Arkansas and S t Louis.63
This treaty was quite a coup for Unzaga, since the Nortenos (the Caddo 
Confederated tribes, the Witchita and the Comanche) had not been friendly with the 
Spanish in Texas previously. In fact an attack on Los Adaes in 1767, had been turned 
aside at the last moment by St Denis, then Commandant at Natchitoches. It had been 
O’Reilly, working with Baron de Ripperdl to secure a peaceful frontier between their 
colonies that sent De Mdziferes to the Caddo in the first place. After the treaty, De 
Mdzi&res arranged an annual gifting ceremony at Natchitoches, inviting the Natchitoches, 
Yatasis, Petit Caddos, and Kadahadoches. After licensing traders to visit the tribes, he 
singled out two chiefs to receive and officially wear Spanish medals.64 Unzaga distrusted 
his French commandants at first, including the Lieutenant-Governor at Natchitoches. 
Used to running things with a free hand, De Mdzi&res angered the governor by holding
•“De MdziSres to Unzaga, May 20, 1770, AGL Cuba 110, Folio 227, in Bolton, 
Athanase de Mdzifres. 1:166-68.
63See also Samuel Dorris Dickinson, “Caddos Moved to the Little Missouri,” 
Arkansas Historical Journal 49 (Autumn, 1990): 240-248.
64 F. Todd Smith, “Indian Policy in Spanish Louisiana,” 288. The two chiefs 
were the famous Tinhioiien of the Kadohadachos and Cocay of the Yatasis. For a full 
discussion of the Caddo and Spanish authorities see F. Todd Smith, “A Native Response 
to the Transfer of Louisiana: The Red River Caddos and Spain, 1762-1803,” LH 37 
(Spring, 1996):163-185.
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court and passing sentence without his approval. Still, O’Reilly had believed that the 
Frenchman was the most knowledgeable man in his district concerning the Indians.65
After his work among the Caddos, Unzaga grudgingly sent De M6zi6res to make 
peace with the remaining tribes among the Nortenos-the Wichita and Comanche. He also 
sent along a Spaniard to keep and eye on him in the process. De Mdzifcres talked his new 
allies, the Caddos, into influencing the Wichita and Comanche. It wasn’t hard. The 
Kadahodoche and the Yatasis were now dependent upon the Spanish for trade and 
realized their relationship with the local posts would be enhanced by tranquility and their 
position as peacemakers. They promised not to trade with the other tribes in order to 
show them that only Spanish allies would receive much sought after European goods. In 
August of 1770 the Witchita sent word to the Caddo that they desired to negotiate with 
De M^zidres.66
Tinhioiien, chief of the Kadahadoches, arranged a meeting with the Lieutenant- 
Governor, asserting his position as middleman between the Spanish and the other 
Nortenos. To assuage the doubtful governor, De M6zi£res took several Spaniards with 
him to treat with the Wichita including a priest, Franciscan Father Miguel de Santa Maria 
y Silva, who noted that the Indians were extremely friendly with the French but remained 
aloof with the Spanish, a holdover from their problems with Spanish Texas. De MSzi&res 
carefully flew the Spanish flag during his negotiations to leave no doubt in the minds of
“ The relationship between Unzaga and the Lieutenant Governor can be found in 
Bolton’s biography of De M6zi£res, and is discussed further in the following chapter.
“ Ibid.; De Mdzifcres to Unzaga, February 1,1770, in Bolton, Athanase de 
Mgziferes. 1:140-42. and Smith, “Indian Policy in Spanish Louisiana,” 288.
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the Indians with whom they were negotiating. He explained that Louisiana was now 
Spanish and that if the Indians wished to trade they must stop their attacks on the 
missions in Spanish Texas and become allies. The two medal chiefs added their own 
arguments in favor of the new government and its representatives.67
The Wichita explained to the Spanish that they were still angered by the Missions 
in Texas which had been established for their enemies the Apache. The Wichita also 
feared retaliation by the Comanche and therefore refused to sign a treaty with De 
Mdzi&res or the Missions in Texas. They agreed, however, to return the next spring to re­
negotiate. Unzaga was discouraged and angered by what he considered a failed meeting. 
Believing his trust had been misplaced, he refused to allow De Mdzidres to return in the 
Spring but the Frenchman quietly persisted and was rewarded in September with formal 
alliances with the Hainai, Kichai, Iscani and Tawakoni. Encouraged, Unzaga allowed 
him to treat with the Wichita and Comanche in 1772. Once again, De M6zi&res was 
successful.68
The peace in the west helped ease part of Unzaga’s Indian problems but it did not 
stop the problems with the Osage. In 1772, De Mdzidres suggested that he use the Caddo 
and their allies to eradicate the Osage. Unzaga, as previously noted, had refused his offer, 
instructing De Mdzi&res to try peaceful methods first Although he was busy with peace 
negotiations, the Lieutenant-Governor was constantly aware of the Osage. In July, he
^From the Report by De M&ifcres of the expedition to Cadodachos, October 26, 
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contacted Unzaga again, suggesting that he prevent all Spanish allied tribes from trading 
with the Osage, create a buffer zone between the colonists and the Osages, and again 
induce the Caddo to wage war on them.69 Finally, in December of 1772, Unzaga agreed 
with De Mdzi&res that he could not longer proceed with a peaceful solution to the 
problem. Heartened by the governor’s decision the Frenchman reminded him that the 
Caddo and Quapaw were united against the Osage and could, therefore, could be sent to 
fight them. He planned a surprise attack at the end of the summer when the Osage would 
return to their villages.70
Mysteriously, Unzaga reneged on his proposed eradication of the Osage. At the 
beginning of 1773, he ordered both Lieutenant-Governors in Natchitoches and St. Louis 
to return to a defensive diplomacy. Din and Nasatir note that Unzaga probably did not 
wish to upset the other Indians with inter-tribal warfare. This is probably part of the 
answer. Finances were also a possible factor. De M6zi£res letter to the governor 
indicated that he could promote this war if he had the money for munitions and gifts. 
Unzaga’s discretionary income was small enough that funding an Indian war could not be 
part of the agenda. He, therefore, for several reasons reverted to a conciliatory 
relationship with the Osage. Threats of eradication soon turned to terms of imprisonment
^Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osages. 80.
70 De Mdzferes to Unzaga, February 10,1772, AGI, Cuba 2357, in Bolton, 
Athanase de Mdziferes. 2:24-27. De Mdzi£res to Unzaga, February 28,1772, AGI, Cuba 
81, Folio 5; De Mdzifcres to Ripperdd, July 4,1772, in Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osages. 
78; De Mdzi&res to Unzaga, Natchitoches, December 15,1772, AGI, Cuba I31-A; and 
Unzaga to De M6zi£res, January 10,1773, AGI, Cuba 81.
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and fines where the Indians were concerned. The only method which seemed to keep the 
Indians in line was to ban trade with them, a gamble which could backfire at anytime.71
The gamble paid off in April when the Big Osage lived up to their promise, 
bringing the parties responsible for the murders along the Arkansas to S t Louis. Piemas 
chose to follow his governor’s example and was lenient with the criminals. Instead of 
death he imprisoned them, and sent to Unzaga for a decision. In his letter he reported his 
hope that all would end favorably, “without bloodshed or expense.”71
In 1773, the seeming peace created by Unzaga’s conciliatory policy seemed to be 
working. It was only a lull in the conflict In Lower Louisiana, as mentioned previously, 
rumors spread by the Mobile had caused several of the “petite nacidnes” to flee toward 
the English, upsetting the remainder. Simultaneously in Upper Louisiana, the Quapaw 
began retaliation raids on the bands of Big Osage who were once again attacking hunters 
along the Arkansas River and the Caddo turned on the Osage in Natchitoches district It 
became disturbingly clear to Unzaga that his Indian policy had not been successful.73
The Quapaw also would not listen to or obey de Leyba at Arkansas Post any 
longer. By following Unzaga’s orders the commandant appeared two-faced to the 
Quapaw he was supposed to protect They chastised him for his weakness against the
7IUnzaga to de M6zi£res, March 19 and April 17, 1773, AGI, Cuba 18 and Draft 
to Piemas, February 19,1773, ibid., in Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osages. 84.
S e rn as  to Unzaga, April 24,1773, AGI, Cuba 81.
^To make matters worse the Acadians in S t James Parish began to agitate to 
leave the colony or relocate in Opelousas. (See Chapter 7) Unzaga was faced with unrest 
at all points of the compass.
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Osage and went after their enemies with the very knives Unzaga had given them during 
the gift presentations in New Orleans. In April they took five Osage scalps and captives, 
a fact which, in reality, did not displease the governor. Unzaga wrote to de Leyba that he 
should thank the Quapaw for doing what he could not because “the Osage Nation has 
been so insolent that it is necessary to applaud all those who try to destroy i t ” Having 
said that, the governor banned Chief Clermont from returning to Arkansas P o s t74
At Natchitoches, Jos6 de la Pena reported that the Osage attacks and looting had 
caused the tribes of the Caddo confederation to move toward each other for safety. Some 
of them had returned to their former locations to remove themselves entirely from the 
Osage. The Caddo, like the Quapaw, would no longer go on without retaliation. They 
pursued the Osage, killing several and capturing another who informed them that hunters 
along the Arkansas River were still providing them with munitions !75
The Litde Osage in the Missouri district completed Unzaga’s disillusionment 
when they failed to appear at S t Louis to atone for several murders near Ste. Genevieve. 
Tribes made hostile by their continued abuse now began to reciprocate and the Little 
Osage fled the Missouri toward the Arkansas. Unzaga sent much the same message to 
Piemas as he had to de Leyba, saying that he should force Indian chiefs to execute the 
criminals in full view of the post and other Indians to make an example of them. Fearing 
retaliation if he killed the captive, Unzaga had de Leyba return him with threats that this
74De Leyba to Unzaga, April 30,1773, AGI, Cuba 107 and quote in Unzaga to 
Leyba, June 18,1773, AGI, Cuba 81, and Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osages. 88.
75Jos6 de la Pena replaced De M6zi£res at Natchitoches while the later was in 
Europe during 1773. Jos6 de la Pena to Unzaga, May 5,1773, AGI, Cuba 111.
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was the last indulgence they merited. There followed a “tragedy” of errors. Attacks by 
their intended victims had shocked and briefly demoralized the Osage.76 In August the 
Little Osage and the Missouri visited Piemas at his fort in Upper Louisiana and entered 
into peace negotiations. By the end of the year the Big Osage also returned to re-establish 
themselves with the Spanish.
As peace terms were concluding in St. Louis, the Quapaw again attacked the 
Osage. Now they would not listen to de Leyba or Unzaga. Firm in the belief that the 
only good Osage was a dead Osage, three war parties of Quapaw left the post in early 
October. A few weeks later reports came to de Leyba that the Osage were about their 
seasonal robbery along the Arkansas River. He promised the governor to try and rein in 
the Quapaw but speaking frankly he felt the same way they did about the violent tribe. 
Peace in Missouri obviously had little to do with peace at the Arkansas Post.77 It had 
even less to do with Natchitoches which by September was ablaze with Osage 
depredations. These set off retaliatory raids by the Kichais, in turn causing fresh attacks 
by the Osage who finally dispersed the Kichais. The Osage then turned their attacks on 
the Big and Little Caddo. Unzaga’s plans for peace were clearly a failure yet he strove 
one more time to extend the “kindly reprimand” before he ordered an offensive.
76Piemas to Unzaga, July 6,1773, AGI, Cuba 81. Unzaga to Piemas, August 14, 
1773, Cuba 81, and Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osages. 90.
^Piemas to Unzaga, September 14,1773, AGI, Cuba 81, and December 12,1773, 
ibid. De Leyba to Unzaga, October 6,1773, and Unzaga to De Leyba, October 26, 1773, 
AGI, Cuba 107.
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The Osage began what by now was a seasonal retreat In the spring of 1774, they 
disappeared. Rumor claimed the Big Osage were building further up the Arkansas.
Trade increased in the absence of the terrorists and new Indian groups along the Missouri 
sent representatives to become allies of the Spanish at S t Louis. Unzaga sent word to 
the Arkansas that it was okay to trade with the Big and Little Osage again, but there could 
still be no bullets or powder.78 Not all was well, however. Once again, as the fall 
returned and the hunters reappeared along the Arkansas, the Osage returned. Again the 
Quapaw reacted to their pillaging with violence, hunting them down and killing three 
braves. Unzaga also replaced de Leyba with Joseph Orieta in 1774. Orieta experienced 
much the same disrespect that de Leyba had from the Quapaw. This was made worse by 
the British across the river and a trader who boldly set up a store among the Indians, 
stocked with merchandise from Concordia. Dressed like one of the Indians he paraded 
himself at the post, helping to convince the Indians that the dilapidated state of the fort 
and its guns meant that the Spanish really didn’t control the west bank of the River. The 
Quapaw were not united in their like of the British but they were used to playing the 
British off the Spanish. Somewhat confuted, they went to see Orieta who decided to give 
them a show of strength. In answer to their questions about ownership the commandant 
fired his canon, which shook the surrounding buildings. The Quapaw were satisfied: they 
returned to their village and ejected the trader.79
^Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osages. 95; Nasatir, Indian Trade. 55.
^Orieta to Unzaga, July 14, October 17 and October 30,1774 in Morris Arnold, 
Colonial Arkansas. 109-111.
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Other than the problems with the Quapaw, the Osage gave little trouble to the 
colony in 1774. Both Piemas and the returning De Mdzferes reported increased trade and 
quiet throughout the year. Piemas remained confident of peace as both the Big and Little 
Osage provided some forty-percent of the fur trade with Missouri the following Spring.
In the southwest, at Natchitoches, De Mdzidres warned the Osage would return once they 
had built another village. And the Caddos grew restive waiting for the next attack.
The following spring, Unzaga’s attention was directed to increased activity along 
the Mississippi and the impending hostilities between the British and their colonists on 
the eastern seaboard. He beefed up his defenses along the Mississippi, refurbishing and 
manning the small fort at Spanish Manchac in particular. With the governor’s attention 
thus diverted, the merchants and traders in Missouri returned to their old habits of trading 
guns and ammunition with their “peaceful” Osage neighbors. These weapons were put to 
no good use by the Osage. In May the Osage returned to the Natchitoches, attacking 
French hunters camped near the Caddo, taking four lives. They also resumed their attacks 
on the Wichitas and the Caddo. They also terrorized the hunters near Arkansas post in 
early fall. De M6zi6res wrote disgustedly that peace treaties meant nothing to the Osage 
and that his Indian allies only awaited the governor’s permission to mount an assault on 
their hated enemy. The supposed peace also meant little in Missouri where the Osage 
continued to steal horses and make war upon other Indians.80
“Smith, “Indian Policy in Spanish Louisiana,” 290; De Mdzifcres to Unzaga, June 
6, 1775, AGI, Cuba 111; Din and Harkins, Imperial Osages. 97.
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The following year (1776) brought little change in Osage behavior although their 
trade with the post at St. Louis increased. Francisco Cruzat, who had replaced Piemas in 
1775, reported he expected a huge increase in furs from the Big Osage. At Arkansas, 
Balthazar de Villiers, who replaced Orieta as commandant, reported several Osage bands 
continued to raid and kill hunters in the area but the hunters had begun to strike back A 
quiet war continued to rage in the Arkansas river valley though the Quapaw “appeared to 
be moving toward a peace with the Osages.” Like Unzaga, however, de Villiers was 
more concerned with the British, who now openly crossed into the Arkansas district, and 
with refurbishing his small fort on the Arkansas River. At Natchitoches, De M6zi£res 
wrote that nothing had changed between the Osage and his Nortenos.81
Luis de Unzaga’s attempts to create a network of defensive Indian allies at best 
remained incomplete. His conciliatory nature had created more confusion than loyalty 
among the tribes. Many saw his efforts at peace as a weakness on the part of the Spanish. 
The Caddo and Quapaw had viewed it as a betrayal. Economically the colony benefitted 
from increased trade with the Indians although contraband also increased. This financial 
benefit, however, came at the cost of continued attacks by the Osage, despite their peace 
treaties. With the exception of the pacification of the Nortenos and Caddo under De 
Mdzi&res and the alliance between Lays sard and the Apalachee at Rapides, little changed 
between the Spanish and their Native American neighbors.
As the American Revolution began in the east, Native Americans once again 
chose sides as they had done in the Seven Years War between France and Great Britain.
81Ibid, 98.
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This time the choices were somewhat more difficult hi 1776 many Native Americans, 
including those in Spanish Louisiana, had become more dependent on trade with 
Europeans. Some tribes saw little difference between the two contestants in the 
approaching conflict and hoped to continue their ploy of playing to the highest bidder. 
Along the Mississippi, the conflict elicited several responses from the “petite nacidnes.” 
Some of the tribes, such as the Apalachee, moved permanently into the Spanish sphere 
becoming staunch allies against the British in the ensuing fight. Others, like the Biloxi, 
sought to escape northward into more unsettled portions of Spanish Louisiana. Still 
others, like the Choctaw and the Pascagoula, grew more restive, their loyalties constantly 
changing.82
While the commandants at St. Louis and Arkansas Post prepared for war, the 
Quapaw began a peace council of their own with the Osage. The Spanish, now under 
governor Galvez, hoped the united tribes would help in the defense of Upper Louisiana. 
Not all the Osage complied, however, and other bands continued their depredations in 
Natchitoches, to the frustration of De M6z£res and his Indian allies. It seemed 
impossible that the Osage would ever come in peace to the Red River, though Unzaga’s 
policies had come close.83
As Unzaga struggled with Louisiana’s Indians he also worked toward another of 
O’Reilly’s commands-that he develop a colony of loyal subjects. This was a formidable
82Layssard to Unzaga, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 1105, and 1109-1110, in Hunter, 
“Their Final Years,” 10-11.
°De M6zi£res to Unzaga, May 2,1777, AGL Cuba 112, in Bolton, Athanase de 
Mdzi&res. 2:130-131.
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order considering the recalcitrant independence of Louisiana’s citizens. The governor 
believed that loyalty was an abstract quality, one which he could not demand or 
necessarily produce. He could bring order to the populace, implant the rule of law, and 
thereby continue to reconcile his colonists to Spanish rule. He would see about loyalty 
afterward.
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Chapter Seven
Order and Loyalty
“I heartily approve some of the instructions . . .  which are such as to secure the 
rights and interests of the king, the object of which is to retain his subjects under his rule 
by conforming as much as possible with their genius, their character, and manners.”
Luis de Unzaga to the Bishop of Havana, September 2 6 ,17721
Luis de Unzaga’s managerial skills remained his most important talent for king 
and colony. His attempts at establishing a viable economy had been successful given his 
circumstances. The governor also had to attend to O’Reilly’s command to create a colony 
of loyal subjects. He believed, however, that loyalty could not be achieved without order. 
Through just and consistent, if not always impartial rule, Unzaga created a stable, 
growing population reconciled to Spanish rule. He applied enlightened, Bourbon ideas to 
centralization of government and separation of church and state, and lastly implanted the 
rule of law. At the end of his tenure, he had carefully and deliberately shepherded his 
colonists toward loyalty.
Unzaga’s attempts at order included re-organizing and stabilizing the population, 
acting as the colony’s chief judicial officer, attending Cabildo meetings, and filling the 
spiritual and education needs of his community. These duties meant that Unzaga spent 
the majority his governorship in the seat of goverament--New Orleans. As he gradually 
settled into the routine of life in the Crescent city his own personality and leadership 
emerged. The governor was not a member of the elite in Spanish society. Hard work, 
bravery and good leadership capabilities had brought him to his current position. Unzaga
‘Gayand, History of Louisiana. 3: 84.
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did not carry the imperial authority vested in O’Reilly, nor his pomposity. Neither did he 
have the social advantages of his well-heeled successor, Bernardo de Gflvez. Still, by 
1772, his titles included Brigadier, Inspector, Intendant and Governor General of the 
Colony. Such weighty titles meant that the governor must now have his interests 
represented at the Spanish court Accordingly, on September 25,1772, he gave his power 
of attorney to Don Andrds Lid6n and Don Thomas Peres de Arroyo, “of the city and court 
of Madrid,” to “represent him before the King, Royal Councils, Tribunals, and 
Audiencias for all business.”2 This allowed him to focus on the colonial government 
without constant worry about his family, property and reputation in Spain.
One of the ways that Unzaga won the following of his colonists was to marry 
among them, an act not particularly sanctioned by the crown concerning its officials in the 
Indies. The marriage in some ways allowed the governor to act within the colony’s 
society instead of always acting upon i t  As a member of society, rather than its foreign 
governor, he became party to useful information about his colonists, their habits and 
needs, at dinners and social gatherings. As their governor, and the representative of the 
King, he could use such information to establish a stable and effective colonial 
government
Unzaga became friendly with many elite members of Louisiana’s society. Not all 
of the French planters had been adverse to Spain and many had willingly supported their 
new governors. Among these was Gilbert Antoine de S t Maxent, head of one of the
2Andres Almonaster y Roxas, Notarial Archives. January to December 1772, Act 
No. 26, September 25,1772.
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wealthiest and most prominent families in Louisiana. The governor was an intimate 
friend of the St. Maxents. Unzaga was a particularly handsome man, with long dark hair, 
a high brow and flashing eyes and within the first years of his tenure he married the S t 
Maxent’s eldest daughter, Marie Elizabeth, then about nineteen years old.3
Little else exists in the records of the couple’s life in New Orleans. No diaries of 
either have been found and Unzaga’s correspondence is confined to business matters or 
requests to the crown. The notary’s records do not indicate the purchase or sale of any 
homes or land in their name either when they were married nor upon their departure from 
the colony in 1776. It is probable that the pragmatic officer and his young wife moved 
into government housing in the city which was available, cost-free and “close to the 
office.” It is also probable that Unzaga did not know how long he would be in Louisiana 
and did not wish to have the responsibility of large amounts of property.4
Indeed, the only commercial transactions the notarial records record are Unzaga’s 
buying and selling of several slaves in the city. In 1773 he sold a twenty-year-old female 
slave named Marian whom he had brought with him from Havana, to Miguel Almonasy, 
the Adjuntant Mayor of the New Orleans Battalion. It is quite possible that 1773 is the 
year he married Marie Elizabeth de Maxent and was removing a possible “problem” to
3Marie’s birthdate is February 3,1752 in Monsignor Earl C. Woods and Charles 
E. Nolan, Archdiocese of New Orleans Sacramental Records. Vol. 2,1751-1771, (New 
Orleans: Archdiocese of New Orleans, 1989), 201. The church records for the marriage 
have burned and an exact date is not known, though its is believed to have been between 
1771 and 1772. See also James Julian Coleman’s 1968 biography of St. Maxent
^ e  notary records indicate that Elizabeth had one piece of property which may 
have been her dowry, yet it was small and she sold it two years before they left for 
Caracas.
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their marriage. Again, in 1775, he sold two other slaves to Miguel Almonasi and 
Geronimo La Chappelle.5
We do know that the couple had one daughter, Maria Rafaella Elois de Unzaga y 
Amezaga de St. Maxent, who was baptized in 1775, though the sacramental records give 
no day or month and no birth date. Her sponsors were Martin Unzaga, the governor’s 
brother and Victoria de St. Maxent, Gilbert de S t Maxent’s daughter, who was twelve at 
the time. Martin was Canon of the Cathedral Church of Malaga and therefore in absentia 
at the baptismal ceremony. His proxy was Unzaga’s friend, Captain Major Jacinto Pams.
Sadly, Maria’s life seems to have been extremely brief. She lived long enough to 
become the baptismal sponsor of her cousin Marie Elois Mercedite Maxent the last child 
of Gilbert and Elizabeth Maxent bom in September of 1775. Unfortunately, both Marfa 
Rafaella and her namesake appear to have perished the following year. The markings in 
the sacramental records indicate that both girls received the church rites at home on June 
23, 1775, which was usually done for children who were extremely ill or near death. No 
further instance of their names is noted.®
The governor’s personal life reflected, if somewhat mutely, the tragic stamp of 
early colonial life in Louisiana. Like any frontier colony, life in Louisiana was often 
tenuous, especially for women and children. Unzaga’s personal life, however, allowed
3Andres Almonaster y Roxas, Notarial Records. January to December 1773, Act
No. 135. Sale to Almonasi and La Chappelle respectively in ibid., January to December,
1775, Acts 248 and 399.
6Sacramental Records. 3:97, for Marfa Rafaella Elois and 206 for Marfa Elois 
Mercedite.
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him a special vantage point and Unzaga used his position to promote order in the colony 
with the least amount of resistence.
Colonial order also required stability in Louisiana’s declining population and 
acceptance of the law. Stabilizing Louisiana’s population was a difficult and lengthy 
process which included immigration and land grant policies, orchestrating and controlling 
the internal migration of his colonists, and stabilizing and pacifying Indian groups. At the 
beginning of the Spanish period the census indicates the population of the colony at 
11,500 souls with 32% living in New Orleans.7 In 1771, the official census shows a 
population total of only 11,344.8 Thus the population declined from Ulloa’s tenure to the 
beginning of Unzaga’s, despite immigration and importation of troops. In the decade that 
followed the population of the lower colony rose to 17,926 persons with a shift in the 
population density showing only 20% living in New Orleans.
Historians have generally attributed the rise in population during the 1770s to 
immigration and the introduction of African slaves. Other factors must be considered. 
The initial immigration of the Acadians may partially account for the increase, but many 
of those early colonists succumbed to local diseases. Too, numerous colonists exited the 
colony following the hurricane of 1773. Neither can the rise be accounted for by a huge 
increase in slaves as less than two-thousand were imported (legally) in the decade
’Census of 1766 in AGI, Cuba 2357.
8Census figures from Antonio Acosta Rodriguez, La Poblacidn de Luisiana 
Espanola 1763-1803 (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores. Direction General de 
Relaciones Culturales, 1979), 17-130.
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between 1766 and 1777.9 The density of population setdements by the end of Unzaga's 
tenure gives the impression that population growth, outside of New Orleans, had more to 
do with a stabilized economy and the implementation of Spanish land policies than with 
immigration. It is to those subjects that we must now turn.
Throughout the French period surveys of land claims were extremely sporadic and 
often left incomplete. Their form changed with each new government and there was no 
official French Surveyor General. It was not until John Law took the colony that land 
concessions were truly defined and then they were just a little better because they fixed 
only the amount of land and its location, not actual on-the-ground boundaries.
Improvements in defining land grants began after the 1730s when the arpent was 
introduced as a measure of land in the colony. It continued to be used throughout the 
Spanish period.10 The arpent is a French word derived from the Latin arepinnes (Gallic) 
which was an ancient agrarian measure.11 The arpent measure was characteristic of land
’Census figures from Acosta Rodriguez and slave figures from Gwendolyn Midlo 
Hall, Africans in Colonial Louisiana: The Development of Afro-Creole Culture in the 
Eighteenth Century (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 
graph on page 279; her figures derived from Acosta Rodriguez also.
10Carolyn Oliver French, “Cadastral Patterns in Louisiana: A Colonial Legacy" 
(Ph..D. diss., Louisiana State University, 1978,3,42.)
"According to the Sebastian Vincente Pintado Papers. 1771-1818, Vol. I, Part I, 
Baton Rouge: State Land Office,). “the arpent of Paris, of which use was made in 
Louisiana and West Florida during the Spanish domination, is a square whose side is of
10 perches and, or course contains, 100 sq. perches. The lineal perch of Paris is 18 feet of 
the same city.” According to John Whitling Hall, “Louisiana Survey Systems: Their 
Antecedents, Distributuion and characteristics” (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 
1970), 24, the Square arpent was 180 x 180 French feet which equals 192 x 192 
American feet French indicates in “Cadastral Patterns” that the arpent was .845 of the 
modem acre and was a linear and superficial measure.
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grants along the navigable streams in Southern Louisiana but extended into Northern 
Louisiana along the Mississippi, Ouachita and Red Rivers.
During the Spanish regime other survey systems were introduced in areas where 
the land was under different use. In the western portions of Louisiana where stock raising 
was common (including the Opelousas and Attakapas Posts) the Spanish sitio was 
employed, a square grant, one league on each side.12 Spanish Missouri, Arkansas and the 
lands west were also often given in the form of general concessions much like the old 
French system. A general concession described a certain amount of land granted to a 
settler who could “locate” it upon reaching an appropriate place. The description of the 
location was then filed with two granting officials. In Upper Louisiana this not only 
allowed people to select tracts of land convenient to their style of life but also near the 
valuable mines.13
During O’Reilly’s brief stay in Louisiana he further defined the land grant system 
in a decree dated February 18,1770, which detailed the rules for receiving and keeping a 
grant O’Reilly’s system attempted to encourage residents along the Mississippi, and 
especially in Lower Louisiana, to settle contiguously. To accomplish this only tracts of 
to land next to land that was already occupied could be granted so that no vacant land was 
created. Furthermore, land could only be transferred through inheritance and more 
particularly, only to heirs who maintained their residence in Louisiana.14
12Hall, “Louisiana Survey Systems,” 25,34. A square league is 84 x 84 arpents.
13Eugene Morrow Violette, “Spanish Land Claims in Missouri,” 174.
14Instructions from O’Reilly’s land ordinance in AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folios 2-8.
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Spain’s laws required that all land recipients be Catholic, married, and farmers or 
fanning someone else’s property. Immigrants were required to swear their allegiance to 
the King of Spain. Married settlers got two-hundred arpents with an additional fifty for 
each child and twenty for each slave. The total land any one family could own was 
limited to eight-hundred arpents. New settlers were allowed to bring in duty free any 
implements, and slaves and enough provisions to last for two years. O’Reilly directed 
that recipients of such grants farm the land for four years although this was reduced to 
two years for men who married the daughter of “an honest father with her father’s 
consent” and it was totally waived if the settlers had slaves.15
Grantees were expected in the first year to construct levees against flood and 
canals parallel to the property line. Additionally, they had to maintain a public roadway 
at least thirty feet wide and build bridges a minimum of fifteen feet wide over the canals 
and ditches. All settlers were required to have cleared and cultivated their land (the 
standard grant being approximately eight to ten arpents on the front and 40 arpents deep) 
to at least two arpents depth within the first three years or it returned to the crown. These 
stipulations were made specifically to prevent the sort of land speculation which occurred 
under the French and which produced large areas of land owned by those who never set 
foot in the colony. During the Spanish period some lands were actually confiscated for 
lack of “tenure." Harassment was not common, however, because the Spanish were more
15Francis Andrew Elliot, “The Administration of the Public Lands in the 
Greenberg District of Louisiana, 1812-1852,” (Masters Thesis, Louisiana State 
University, 1961), 12, and 110; Gayerrd, History of Louisiana. 3:387-388; and Hall 
“Louisiana Survey System,” 36. See also Francis P. Bums, “The Spanish Land Laws of 
Louisiana.” LHO. 11 (1928): 557-81.
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interested in settlement and population density rather than enforcement of laws which did 
not fit the colony’s needs.16 A denser population meant, after all, a better defense.
Claimants could apply to the local commandant for permission to receive a grant 
If the commandant found no conflicting claims to the land he forwarded the application 
or requite to the governor with the quantity, preferred location, amount of land for 
grazing and the size of the family (including slaves). The governor then issued the 
authorization for a survey and plat to be made at the settler’s expense. Once the survey 
was made the governor’s office issued a grant of land. The decree also required that 
claimants of existing land grants show proof of ownership on paper, buy the land or 
substantiate somehow that they had occupied and farmed the land for ten years.17
All these procedures were good in theory but Unzaga found that many 
requirements were impractical in Lower Louisiana. Among his new settlers, the Acadians 
were a freedom-loving group of individuals who didn’t like the compulsory closeness of 
their neighbors. More than once during his administration Acadian families abandoned 
their original grants for larger and more solitary tracts of land. There were a number of 
reasons for these desertions including the repositioning of previously agreed upon 
boundaries, frustration arising from improper surveys, and grants of land which were 
either not good agricultural plots or that slowly sank into the rivers.
16Hall, “Land Survey System,” 40; French, “Cadastral Patterns,” 46. See C. 
Richard Arena, “Land Settlement Policies and Practices in Spanish Louisiana,” in John F. 
McDermott (ed), The Spanish in the Mississippi Valiev. 1762-1804. (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1974.)
I7Ibid., 45-46.
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Unzaga began surveying and re-granting land during his first year in Louisiana.
He was forced to rush the project because of the wreck of the Britain at Matagorda Bay 
which introduced a new group of Acadians into the colony. These survivors wished to 
settle the rich agricultural lands along the Mississippi.18 By April of 1770 seven Acadian 
families from the Britain incident migrated from Natchitoches to the Iberville district 
where they were each given six arpents fronting on the Mississippi just above the mouth 
of Bayou Plaquemine. Land granting became strategically important in 1770 to keep the 
Acadians in a close knit and therefore defensible community.19
Unfortunately, a lack of understanding regarding the shifting nature of the 
Mississippi led to grants along the insides of curves on the river where the flooding and 
the natural flow of the water eroded the banks, causing colonist's homes to slide into the 
river. Other settlers were given property that was unfit to farm or uninhabitable. 
Examples are Paul and Pierre Hebert who complained they had rebuilt their homes twice 
in two years and Ignace Babin, whose land grant had no depth because the property was 
laced with bayous. Before the surveys were even finished the post commandants on the 
Acadian Coast and Iberville were writing to the governor to request he re-grant land on
18De M6zi6res to Unzaga, March 22, 1770, AGI, Cuba 110, Folio 113; Unzaga to 
De M6zi&res, April, 1770, AGI, Cuba 110, Folios 398-399.
19A s early as March of 1770 the Acadians settled in the lower parishes and began 
building a church in their new community. In April they asked Commandant Judice to 
request land grants. Judice to Unzaga, April 1,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio l/d3. The 
seven families from Matagorda Bay were settled on the west bank of the Mississippi 
River where Unzaga designated. Unzaga to Dutisnd, April 10,1770, AGI, Cuba 193-B, 
Folios 283-284; ibid., April 26,1770, AGI, Cuba 193-B, Folios 290-291.
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the opposite bank of the river for their settlers. Unzaga complied with the wishes of his 
colonists.20
Surveying proved difficult Discussing lines on a map was far different from 
dealing with settlers on their own lands. Many resented and/or mistrusted the presence of 
the surveyors. Others complained that the surveyors were destroying their crops and 
requested that the survey stop until they had a chance to harvest In Cabannoce, S t James 
Parish, Commandant Verret petitioned Unzaga to stop surveying until harvest because the 
locals were afraid wild animals would ruin the com if it was left standing in the field 
while the survey was completed.21
Not all the surveyors were accurate nor did they care about the property being 
surveyed A large scandal arose over the improper measuring techniques of a surveyor 
named De Bellevue in March of 1771. He ignored the local settlers and took careless and 
sometimes arbitrary measurements. Complaints continued to flow into the governor’s 
office during the year and Unzaga finally removed De Bellevue in December. The De 
Bellevue fiasco continued to haunt the governor through January of 1772 when the 
settlers called public meetings at the local church to petition for new surveys which they 
were willing to pay for if the survey was done professionally.22
“ Francois Scimars de Bellile (German Coast) to Unzaga, May 20,1770, AGI 
Cuba 188; Louis Dutisnd (Iberville) to Unzaga, July 1770, AGI Cuba 188-A; Ignace 
Babin to Unzaga, October 18,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-B, Folio 175.
21Verret(Cabanocey) to Unzaga, September 25,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio 1
d/46.
“ Chevalier de Bellevue to Unzaga, March 3,1771, AGI, Cuba 192, Folio 329; 
Bellevue to Unzaga, May 27,1771, AGI, Cuba 188-C, Folio 64; Judice to Unzaga, May
211
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Despite set backs such as these, surveyors completed their inspection of much of 
lower Louisiana between 1771 and 1772 and turned their findings over to the governor. 
This was only the beginning of the process for Unzaga. Now he had to integrate the new 
system of boundary lines into the present settlements and acclimate his colonists to the 
change. Again he faced a demanding and diplomatic task. Grants of unoccupied land, 
especially away from the rivers, generally caused few problems, but the repositioning of 
boundaries along the river created real headaches for colonial officials. Spanish tradition 
required that the surveyors draw their boundaries in lines perpendicular to the river.
Along large curves and oxbows these boundaries created pie-shaped wedges of property 
where the best land, the part near the river, was smaller on the outside curves of the 
rivers. Previous owners became infuriated when they actually lost land along the 
riverbank.23
The new boundaries also robbed many landowners who had labored years to clear 
their land but could not produce any proof of ownership. Others were given property 
deserted by previous owners, which caused trouble between neighbors. Settlers, 
particularly the Acadians continually petitioned Unzaga for permission to migrate. Many 
of the colonists in S t James and Iberville parishes moved, legally or illegally, to the 
Attakapas district to enlarge their land, remove themselves from flood zones, or to be
28, 1771, AGI, Cuba 188-B, Folio 90; Judice to Unzaga, December 4,1771, AGI, Cuba 
188-A, Folio 278; Judice to Unzaga, January 1772, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 418.-A
23Judice to Unzaga, April 1, 1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A: Folios 1-3 and Judice to 
Unzaga, June 3,1771, AGI, Cuba 188-B, Folios 94-98.
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nearer to family.24 Both Unzaga and his commandants frowned upon this migration 
generally because it depopulated areas the governor deliberately settled for defensive 
purposes. Still, if family was involved Unzaga usually allowed it.25
The Acadians were only part of the new population filling lower Louisiana. 
Indians seeking refuge from English tribes requested the governor give them asylum on 
the Spanish side of the Mississippi. Like the tribes in the west who feared the Osage, the 
small tribes feared the Choctaw and Chickasaw. Indians appealing for asylum promised 
more trade for Louisiana and less for the English. The British-backed tribes, however, 
were a real menace. Several times Unzaga had to check the migration of his colonists, 
Indian and Acadian alike, who sought to remove themselves from the real or implied 
threats by Indians.26
Unzaga continued to support immigration as a stabilizing factor in Louisiana and 
the Acadians were only one group of many who found their homes along the Mississippi. 
Others included Irishmen who favored a Catholic colony over the new English landlords 
on the eastern banks of the Mississippi, and other Europeans who gradually drifted 
westward, e.g. the French who gradually moved into Spanish territory in St. Louis from 
the Illinois side of the river. The governor often used the Irishmen as spies and 
translators. For the most part Unzaga welcomed any settler who promised to abide by
24Verret to Unzaga, February 15,1771, AGI, Cuba 188-B, Folio 76.
“ Verret to Unzaga, November 5,1770, AGL Cuba 188a, Folio 1 d/49; Dutisn6 to 
Unzaga, January 20,1771, AGL Cuba 188b, Folio 195.
26Descoudreaux to Unzaga, June 1771, ibid., Folio 231, and Dutisnd to Unzaga, 
June 1,1771, ibid., Folio 218.
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Spanish land policy, accept Roman Catholicism and remain peaceful. The more 
colonists, the better the defense. Peaceful Indians were also welcomed as more Indians 
meant more trade. By 1775, Unzaga had the land grant system firmly in place and a 
growing population in the lower Mississippi parishes as well as the western parishes like 
Attakapas.
Order required more than denser populations Another problem was the 
ecclesiastical and social disorder caused by the introduction of the Spanish clergy. 
Clerical problems had existed in Louisiana during the French period when the Capuchins 
and Jesuits fought each other for control of the province. With the expulsion of the 
Jesuits in 1766 the colony fell under the jurisdiction of the French Capuchins headed by 
Father Hilaire de Gdnoveuax. G€noveaux was removed by the Superior Council because 
he refused to join the rebellion in 1769 and was replaced by Father Dagobert.27
Dagobert was a kindly priest, if somewhat corrupt in the eyes of the Spanish 
Capuchins who swore vows of poverty and meant them. He was not, however, unusual 
for a priest in a remote, frontier colony. The man was tolerant of colonial life and 
considered peace his main goal as opposed to conversion and preaching. Mass was said 
on all holy days if not every Sunday as there was a dearth of priests in the territory. He 
was loved by his parishioners and favored by many of the Spanish governors. He even 
stood as godfather for the children of many of New Orleans’ elite families.28 It had been
27An overview of the French Capuchins before the advent of Spanish rule can be 
found in Claude Lawrence Vogel, The Capuchins in French Louisiana. 1722-1766 (New 
York: J. F. Wagner, 1928.
MHe was godfather to St Maxent’s child. Sacramental Records, vol. 2,201.
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to Dagobert that O’Reilly turned to make his list of necessary clergy for the colony in 
1770.29
Unzaga’s ecclesiastical problems, however, surrounded the integration of Spanish 
priests into the current colonial reality. A pragmatic man, the governor recognized that 
there were not enough churches or clergy in the province and that many of his colonists 
only saw a priest every six months or on special occasions. He also assessed correctly 
that the growing population needed priests amenable to Louisiana’s circumstances, not 
those who required strict adherence to orders created in the metropole which were not 
based on colonial realities.30 Louisiana, like many other portions of Spain’s empire, 
received the gospel primarily from missionary orders rather than secular clergy, a fact not 
lost on the governor who had suggested more secular clergy be sent as soon as he took 
command.
The governor became enmeshed in the difficulties of the clergy and the settlers as 
a point of colonial order. Of the French priests who remained in the colony and the 
Spanish clergy serving Louisiana in 1770, many served the people well but others had 
already caused trouble among his “parishioners” despite the colonists’ willingness to 
build and maintain churches. During the first year of the governor’s tenure, Father
MSee AGL Cuba 2357, Folio 408, “Nombre des Religieux que nouse coryons 
ndcdssaires dans la colonie pour desservir les paroisses et pour les devoirs Spirituels des 
Habitans”, February 14, 1770.
““Relacidn del Gobiemo actual de la provincial de la Luisiana en lo espiritual y 
noticias de su constitution y establecimiento por don Luis de Unzaga. (Sobre el modelo 
que ha dado el Gobemador de Luisiana Unzaga a aquel Diocesano para el gobiemo 
espirituel, 1772-1774)”, New Orleans, November 14,1772, AGI, SD 2594, Folios 748- 
97.
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Valentin, a French Capuchin moved from Opelousas to Cabanocey, where, with great 
forbearance, the priest lived in an outbuilding (kitchen) of Nicolas Verret’s property and 
served his parish while the presbytery and church were constructed.31 In S t James Parish, 
Louis Judice assessed church taxes and had the local families hew the lumber and 
construct their church and a presbytery as well as kitchen for the priest’s residence. In 
Natchitoches, Athanase de Mdzidres had his parishioners reconstruct the local church, but 
the local missionary, a Father Stanilas, pull out anyway, leaving Natchitoches without a 
prelate or missionaries by 1774.32 Despite requests for more churches and clergy, 
especially in areas where the population was increasing, many priests complained about 
the indignities of serving under such circumstances and often refused to deal with the 
backward areas and their anomalies.33
The Spanish priests, led by Father Cirilo de Barcelona (recently from Havana), 
were particularly annoyed at the French settlers who seemed uncivilized and ignorant of 
the rules of conduct concerning the church. They grumbled that the parishioners didn’t 
tithe to the Church properly. They complained about the farmers who stood outside the 
church on Sundays swearing and drinking and especially about the forwardness of the 
women who rode astride their horses. They complained in general that the people of the 
outlying parishes did not act in a sedate, civilized manner concerning the church, but
3lVerret to Unzaga, May 21,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio 1 d/40.
32Athanase de Mdzi&res to Unzaga, February 1, 1770, AGI, Cuba 110, Folio 96.
33Judice to Unzaga, August 18,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio 1 d/18; id. to id. 
August 27,1770, ibid., Folio 1 d/20.; the refusal to serve can be found in Judice to 
Unzaga, April 22,1771, AGI, Cuba 188-B, Folio 80.
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these clergy offered little in the way of accommodation.34 The settlers, on the other hand, 
did not differentiate between Spaniard or Frenchman as long as the priest was willing to 
serve them33 These generalizations can be illustrated with the following examples.
The lives of farmers of St. James and Ascension parish or any frontier parish had 
little to do with those of the people Father Cirilo served in Havana or those he served in 
New Orleans. Many settlers in the frontier had to travel miles, even to another parish, to 
see a priest These colonists sometimes saw a priest once or twice a year. Following 
certain customs of the church was impossible in such areas. One of the largest 
complaints by the Spanish surrounded the collection of indulgences (a problem which lost 
the Catholics half their flock in Europe during the 1500s). In the colonies priests were 
supposed to collect the Santa Cruzada, an indulgence given to persons who waged war 
against infidels (an extension of support for the Reconquista) or contributed alms. 
According to Gayarr6, the indulgences sold for 21 quartos a piece (about 14-15 cents 
each). A papal Bull ordered that all Catholics within Spain’s empire must purchase these 
indulgences or they were considered suspicious and became a target for the Inquisition.36 
The indulgence itself provided the parishioner with the right to eat meat, or use eggs and 
milk on fast days. The colonists disregarded the indulgence. It was not a part of the
^Judice to Unzaga, October 6, 1772, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 448.
35Verret to Unzaga, April 25,1772, ibid, Folio 130.
36There was no real office of the Inquisition in Louisiana until the 1780s, although 
those suspected of heresy were sent either to Mexico or Havana during Unzaga’s tenure. 
See Richard E. Greenleaf, “The Inquisition in Spanish Louisiana, 1762-1800,” New 
Mexico Historical Review 50 (1975): 45-72.
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French church and they found no real benefit from such a tithe. This attitude made it 
almost impossible for Dagobert and other priests to collect the “alms.”37
The complaint about the laxity of parishioners in outlying parishes can be traced 
to an old anticlerical attitude among the French which included low church attendance 
(especially by men), marriage as a formality rather than a necessity, use of the church as a 
meeting hall (which including drinking), and a healthy disrespect for the clergy 
themselves. This laxity extended to their slaves, who often did not receive baptism or last 
rites nor did they practice marriage. Slaves, after all, were often sold away from each 
other and the French didn’t “make” families they would soon separate.
When possible, the settlers “attended” church regularly, but the men and v/omen 
of the frontier areas could did not have the same social patterns of the colonists in New 
Orleans. The men, who worked six to seven day weeks, from sun-up to sun-down, 
enjoyed relaxing on the steps of the church with friends, catching up on the local gossip, 
which they couldn’t do any other time. Joking and misbehavior were relaxing and 
drinking was more common at parish meetings then on Sunday mornings. Still drinking 
was as common to these colonists as it was to others in the English colonies who found it 
necessary to relieve the tensions and frustrations of the brutal frontier with com whiskey. 
Women and children attended church far more often then the men but they lacked
^Unzaga to the Bishhop of Havana in Gayarrd, History of Louisiana 3:87-88.
One reason the Bull was not important was that the French priests allowed their flock to 
eat Teal (small ducks) which they decided were aquatic and therefore could be substituted 
as fish on holy days or Lent.
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refinements and carriages of their town cousins. This led them to ride to church astride 
their horses, an act seen as lewd behavior by the Spanish priests.38
The Spanish priests were far less tolerant than the French concerning any laxity 
on the part of their parishioners. The colonists, especially those outside of New Orleans, 
were apparently a shock to the Iberians. The Spanish Capuchins whose whole raison 
d’etre for being in the New World was conversion really shouldn’t have been so appalled. 
Stanley G. Payne’s work on the church in Spain notes a decided anticlericalism on the 
part of Iberians extending from time of the Reconquista. The Iberian-Americans in 
Spain’s earlier colonies often exhibited the same distrust of the clergy.39 Still, the 
problems over control their flock brought the Spaniard’s into open conflict with the 
French, a clash which included Louisiana’s governor.
It had been at Unzaga’s request that the Bishop of Havana had sent Cirilo and his 
assistants to help “Hispanify” the Capuchin order in Louisiana. Arriving in July of 1772, 
the new priests were met in New Orleans by Father Dagobert and the Governor. 
Louisiana’s historians have long repeated Gayarr6’s notable chapter devoted to the 
argument between the French Father Dagobert and Spanish Father Cirilo de Barcelona. 
According to Gayarrd, upon arrival Cirilo immediately wrote a long letter to the Bishop 
condemning the French Capuchins. The letter spoke at length about the problems
“ Judice to Unzaga, October 6, 1772, AGL Cuba 189-A, Folio 448.
39See Stanley G. Payne, Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview (Madison, 
WL University of Wisconsin Press, 1984).
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mentioned above but included a vitriolic attack on Dagobert and his abilities as a priest40 
Dagobert, of course, wrote the Bishop in his own defense on the 14th of September, 
thanking the prelate for extending his privileges as Vicar-General and express his desire 
to work with the Spaniards 41
Father Cirilo was a remarkable and hard working man who, like his assistants, 
was used to an austere life. As the Superior of Louisiana’s missionaries he immediately 
learned French and set out to serve his new flock. He frowned at the French priests’ 
seemingly leisurely existence and was disgusted with Father Dagobert who housed slaves, 
including a female “mulatress” who served and lived in his household. It has been argued 
that according to a French rule, established in 1743, clergy were not to have slaves or 
obtain money from their sale. Dagobert’s violation of this was behind Cirilo’s anger.
This is a curious point since the clergy (especially the regular orders) in other Spanish 
colonies owned African slaves.42 The Spaniards’ orders, however, were to help preserve 
order, which in their eyes required strict compliance to Spanish religious practices within 
the colony. Any priest guilty of laxity or moral turpitude was to expect punishment43
“ See Gayarrd, History of Louisiana. Vol. 3, Chapter 2, for Unzaga’s 
administration in which he translates a long letter by father Cirilo to the crown 
concerning the anomalies and abominations in Louisiana.
4IIbid, 72-82; Alfred E. Lemmon, “Spanish Louisiana: In the Service of God and 
His Most Catholic Majesty,” in The Spanish Presence in Louisiana 1763-1803. Volume 2 
of The Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History (Lafayette, LA: 
Center for Louisiana Studies, 1999), 517-529.
42Lemmon, “Spanish Louisiana”, 520.
43Roger Baudier, Catholic Church. 181.
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One can then understand the reactions of Spanish priests performing under such orders. 
Spain’s legacy of fiery missionary efforts and the Spanish church’s long relationship with 
the crown as a pacifying force must also be brought into the argument
Unzaga viewed the complexity of the problem in his usual objective manner. He 
was intent on enforcing O’Reilly’s commands that Louisiana’s priests follow the 
regulations of the Catholic Church. He also knew that the local clergy included men who 
did not attend to their duties properly and that many of his parishioners demanded special 
treatment if they were to be wooed into compliance with Spanish religious customs. Still, 
as protector of the faith he still had to establish ecclesiastical order and support the church 
if he was to use the church as a stabilizing factor to promote colonial order.
His response was twofold. He immediately rebuilt the Capuchin rectory to house 
the new missionaries and directed Cirilo to increase the power of the church. On the 
other hand he refused to allow the prelate to annihilate the work of Father Dagobert or 
other local clergy and sought to acclimate the new clergy to the seeming “deviance” of his 
colonists. On September 26,1772, Unzaga wrote his own letter to the Bishop of Havana 
in order to settle the argument and maintain control of the situation. In that letter the 
governor explained while he approved of the Bishop’s instructions to the new 
missionaries,
“the object of which is to retain his [the King’s] subjects under his 
rule by conforming as much as possible with their genius, their character, 
and manner. This is what I call acting in accordance with the spirit of the apostolic
mission working for the service of God by assuming the
garb of the Jew among the Jews, of the pagan among the pagans.. .  your 
Grace will no doubt infer that many of the synodical regulations cannot be 
applied to this province without injury to the interests of the king, the
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number of whose vassals might be diminished considerably, if those 
regulations were attempted to be carried into execution, and your Grace 
will easily understand that it is not always that the laws made for one 
region can be safely adapted to another.”44
The problem between Cirilo and Dagobert continued into 1773 and Unzaga 
remained firm in his defense of both Dagobert and the colonists, to the point of angering 
the prelate in Havana. In another letter the governor admonished the Bishop, insisting 
that he should consider the difficulties involved in Hispanifying a stubbornly French 
population. Truly it was not the same thing as converting the heathen, although the 
Spanish Capuchins often felt that’s exactly what they were doing. Unzaga remained 
conciliatory toward both the Bishop and Cirilo. He assured them that things would work 
out given time and patience on the part of both parties. Secretly, he told Arriaga in Spain 
that the Spanish priests were far too severe and misrepresented the reality of the situation. 
He informed the minister that the colonists could be submissive and loyal if their customs 
were not undone by zealousness-a daring statement for a colonial governor.45
Unzaga’s solution to the controversy exemplified the governor’s willingness to act 
on behalf of his colonists and to assert his legal authority despite pressure from the church 
heirarchy. His defense of the French Capuchin’s maintained peace in the colony through 
1773 and even generated support from some members of the local elite. City officials in 
New Orleans, such as Andr£s Almonester y Roxas, responded by supporting the
“ GayarrS, History of Louisiana 3: 84.
45Ibid., 96-97.
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governor’s advocacy of proper housing and new churches for Louisiana’s clergy. In 
outlying Parishes the commandants refurbished clerical domiciles and churches.46
With Unzaga’s assistance and moderation the arrival of Father Cirilo and his 
Spanish missionaries actually began a new expansion for the Catholic Church in 
Louisiana. Three new parishes were created in the 1770s.47 Cirilo and his missionaries 
continued to do their work with limited means and men. As the fight between the priests 
faded into the background Unzaga realized that the real problem was a continual 
deficiency of secular clergy in the colony. Not all missionaries were priests who could 
administer sacraments and as a result no confirmations were made during the governor’s 
tenure. In Louisiana, as in many other parts of colonial Latin America, the regular clergy 
were given special powers to serve as secular clergy, but this did not happen during 
Unzaga’s tenure. In fact it was not until the later part of the 1780s that Cirilo was granted 
power as an auxiliary bishop under which he finally organized the “proper” religious 
education of the colonists and their slaves.48
As governor of Louisiana, Unzaga sought the ecclesiastical well being of his 
community. As a Bourbon official, the governor applied enlightenment ideas of 
separation of church and state to the colony’s administration. Not all of the governor’s
“ Lemmon, “Spanish Louisiana,” 521; Baudier. Catholic Church. 188-189.
47The three parishes established were at Ascension, S t John the Baptist and 
Opelousas. See Cross. Crozier and Crucible: A Volume Celebrating the Bicentennial of a 
Catholic Diocese in Louisiana. General Editor, Glenn Conrad (Lafayette, LA: Center for 
Louisiana Studies, 1993), xxiv.
■“Lemmon, “Spanish Louisiana,” 523.
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decisions were popular and sometimes they were improvident This was the case in his 
handling of the Ursuline nuns and Charity Hospital. The Ursuline sisters arrived in 1727 
and established a convent-school in a small set of buildings in New Orleans, across town 
from Charity Hospital. While waiting to build a larger convent next to the hospital in 
order to serve the sick, the nuns expanded the small school into both a boarding-house 
and an orphanage.49
The Ursulines provided very important services. Their school was the first of its 
kind. The sisters taught young girls, including blacks and Native Americas.50 Working at 
long dining tables the students learned their lessons in two languages during the French 
period. The school offered writing, spelling, household management, mending and 
sewing, embroidery and tatting, etiquette, and of course, religious instruction.51
After the new convent was built near the hospital the nuns began their service to 
the sick and remained the only nurses until 1770 when Unzaga relieved them of that 
position. The governor was concerned about “professional” health care attendants. 
O’Reilly had ordered that only licensed physicians be allowed to serve in the hospital.
49Joan Marie Aycock, “The Ursuline School in New Orleans, 1727-1771,” in 
Cross. Crozier and Crucible. 213; See also Roger Baudier, Through Portals of the Past: 
The Storv of the Old Ursuline Convent of New Orleans (New Orleans: s.n., 1955).
“ A boys school had been established earlier under Father Raphael in 1725 but 
was poorly attended. The elite sent their sons to France and the poor taught their sons a 
skill or put them to work in agriculture.
51 Aycock, “The Ursuline School,” 213-215. See also Barnett T. Kane, The 
Ursulines. Nuns of Adventure: The Storv of the New Orleans Community (New York: 
Vision Books, 1959 and Henry C. Semple, The Ursulines in New Orleans and Our Ladv 
of Prompt Succor: A Record of Two Centuries. 1727-1925 (New York: P. J. Kennedy 
and Sons, 1925) for a larger overview of the sisters and their convent
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The nuns, however, had given a great deal of assistance to both the doctors and patients 
and the hospital became impoverished without them. After their dismissal, the sisters 
focused their energies on educating young women in the colony. Unzaga’s attempts to 
separate church and state in this particular instance were not necessarily beneficial to his 
colonists.
As an enlightened administrator Unzaga tried other means to create order. Some 
of which were well meaning but either didn’t work or as in the case of the Ursulines 
created more problems. One of those endeavors was an attempt to expand public 
education in New Orleans. The Spanish administration of the New World held a long 
history of educating its charges. Under the “enlightened” Bourbons, the administrators 
sought public education as opposed to ecclesiastical education. In 1772, Unzaga brought 
a Spanish school master to the capital to begin education for colonial boys outside of 
convent or monastery schooling. With this school he hoped to create a group of educated, 
enterprising young men in the colony who favored order and Spanish rule. A year later, 
however, his plans fell apart when the maestro quit because of low enrollment and a lack 
of interest. Unzaga’s attempt at creating an enlightened populace seemed to have failed.52
Another example where the governor’s attempts failed to serve his colonists 
involved the administration of Charity Hospital in New Orleans. Built in New Orleans in 
1718, its administration was originally placed under ecclesiastical control. With the 
advent of Spanish rule, however, O’Reilly decided that the hospital should be
52See Stuart G. Noble and Arthur G. Nuhrah, “Education in Colonial Louisiana,” 
LHQ32 (1949): 759-76.
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administered through the governor’s office. He appropriated a fund of four hundred 
pesos per year from taxation on New Orleans’ taverns and businesses to run the hospital 
and requested that the public make contributions for further expenses.53 The hospital 
declined after the removal of the Ursulines
When Unzaga took office Charity suffered further damage from Spanish 
administration. Unzaga often acted judiciously to cut government expenses. Part of his 
cuts, unfortunately, included reducing the governmental allowance for Charity from four 
hundred to two hundred pesos. He expected the citizens of New Orleans to fund the rest. 
It was a good decision for government but not for the hospital. Tax collections was 
problematical and the hospital endured hardships when taxes didn’t meet the needs of the 
patients and staff. In fact, tax collection continued to be uncertain until 1775 when the 
governor granted a monopoly on the collection and administration of the funds to Pedro 
Morris and Raymond Escote.54
Between the loss of its nursing staff and drastically reduced funding the hospital 
limped along on beneficence. It became such a disreputable institution that the Attorney 
General suggested it be dismantled. Only public outcry saved i t  Finally protests from 
New Orleans’ citizens brought the hospital more government funding and better 
administration, but not until the late 1780s.55
53Stella O’Connor, “The Charity Hospital of Louisiana at New Orleans: An 
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Unzaga’s decisions, however faulty, usually reflected the necessity of the moment 
The removal of the Ursulines and funding cuts, should be viewed in the light of Spanish 
Louisiana’s constant privation. Equally as important was the need to keep as much 
money available as possible for defense while simultaneously building the treasury.
These necessities often overruled civil expenditures. His failure at public education can 
be placed firmly on the shoulders of the populace who disdained such a gift Lack of 
public acceptance could make any endeavor, no matter how important unsupportable.
Expediency and a desire for order also led the governor to chastise the citizens of 
New Orleans and to remind them of their responsibilities. As previously described the 
city was filled with buildings of wooden construction and fire was a considerable 
concern. The Spanish government had no extra money for a real fire department 
Unzaga was, therefore, extremely concerned that the populace seemed lackadaisical about 
keeping the necessary equipment to fight such conflagrations. Incensed at their 
indifference, the governor promulgated an ordinance which claimed their actions were 
tantamount to being indifferent to humanity. He felt he had no other recourse than to 
order all citizens to keep the proper equipment (ladders, gaffs, pick axes, and buckets) in 
their homes for emergencies and fine those without them. He further ordered that at the 
first sound of the bells announcing a fire, all carpenters and joiners, be they white, black 
or slave, must come with their equipment to the fire and join in the fight This simple 
ordinance exhibits Unzaga’s commitment to the general welfare of his colony and his 
attempts to create a sense of community spirit among a disparate population. It also
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further enhanced the power of his office.56 While Unzaga sought to engage his citizens in 
their own best interest he also realized the necessity to maintain his authority, especially 
if he was to centralize command of the colony.
Historically there had always been a propensity in Louisiana to amplify the 
powers of the governor. Under Spanish rule, the authority of the governor expanded, a 
fact which reflected the centralizing tendency of the Bourbon reforms, but more 
importantly the necessity to establish control over a huge and unwieldy territory. Unzaga 
was protective of his position and all that it represented in empire. He was also 
apparently unhappy if he felt his power was being usurped or undermined. As top 
military official he instituted the governor’s authority over his commandants early in his 
tenure. While he expected subordinates to handle normal matters at their posts, he also 
expected them to report to him before making decisions on matters considered his 
purview. Immediately after O’Reilly’s departure, the colony’s commandants often 
found their new governor extremely critical of their decisions. It was not until after 1770 
that Unzaga felt he could trust these men to carry out “his” wishes rather than the 
traditional status quo. Still, it is apparent that after having confirmed his authority he 
began to help establish theirs, and by extension Spain’s. He generated this authority in his 
local commandants by funneling appropriate legal cases and decisions back to them.
For their part, the commandants strove to established a fresh working relationship 
with their new commander-in-chief, during Unzaga’s first year in office. More often then
“ Henry P. Dart, “Fire Protection in New Orleans in Unzaga’s Time,” LHO 14 
(1931): 349-60.
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not the governor began with reprimands to remind the men of the chain of command and 
then congratulated them on their proper handling of a local affair. For example, it took 
Lieutenant-Governor, Athanase de M6zi£res, a full year to create a relationship built on 
trust with Unzaga. De Mdzi&res had been appointed Spain’s Indian agent in Louisiana’s 
western territories before Unzaga took office. Natchitoches was a long distance from the 
capital and the Frenchman was accustomed to making independent decisions concerning 
his colonists at the post and then informing the government in New Orleans. This 
behavior was not tolerated by Unzaga.
In May of 1770 de M6zi£res informed the governor that he had allowed a man 
accused of murder to go free because the suspect had served a seven year “sentence” 
among the Indians. At the local chiefs request, the commandant cancelled the man’s 
trial and placed him in the custody of the tribe with whom he had lived. Believing that 
Spain’s needs would be served by keeping peace with the Indians, de Mdzifcres requested 
the governor’s sanction in his resolution of the problem. The answer was unexpected. 
Unzaga informed his lieutenant-governor that he would not sanction his decision. He 
further reminded de Mdzi&res that O’Reilly’s instructions concerning such crimes were 
that the commandants at S t Louis and Natchitoches were to hold trials locally and send 
the perpetrators to New Orleans where the governor would pronounce sentence.57
Unzaga couched his words carefully. At stake was the establishment of Spanish 
authority and the creation of loyalty between commander and lieutenant-commander. The
^De Mdzifcres to Unzaga, May 15,1770, in Bolton, Athanase de M6ziferes. 1:160- 
162; Unzaga to de Mdzferes, June 1,1770, ibid.
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governor was dealing with Frenchmen in a former French colony who not only had ruled 
their locales before his arrival but were often tied to the area by marriage and property.
He appended his instructions with a note that the letter “caused him much pain” but that 
“proper” procedures must be followed.58 De Mdzidres reaction is not recorded.
It was a full year before Unzaga began to trust the commandant at Natchitoches in 
his handling of both Indian affairs and criminal offenses. He grudgingly accepted de 
M6zieres appointment as Indian Agent but sent along a Spaniard, Josd de la Pena, to 
oversee his operations throughout 1770. Unzaga was, quite frankily, skeptical of the 
Frenchman’s intentions and his abilities. It was not until the lieutenant-governor finally 
negotiated treaties of peace and alliance among the Nations of the North the following 
year that the governor finally began to trust him completely. Even so, Unzaga was 
careful to take credit for his subordinate’s actions, writing to de la Torre in Havana that 
“under my orders peace was officialized by the lieutenant governor of Natitoches with 
the various nations bordering this place, and with the Presidios de Adaes and Sefior 
Antonio de Bucareli (the Viceroy of New Spain).”59
De M6zi£res was not the only commandant to receive such a rebuke. Iq August of 
1770, Unzaga angrily reprimanded commandant Louis Judice for “usurping the 
governor’s authority” by granting colonist, Marc Molet the right to sell tafia in S t James 
Parish. All licenses were to be issued by the governor’s office. Unzaga, however, was 
less concerned with Judice’s handling of criminal affairs because the commandant made a
“ Ibid.
“ Unzaga to de la Torre, December 17,1771, Dispatches.
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habit of inquiring about the crime and making suggestions regarding the outcome rather 
than passing judgement out of hand. Several letters between governor and commandant 
include Unzaga’s approval of his subordinate’s leadership.60
The governor’s determination to institute his authority also surrounded the need to 
keep lines of communication open with commandants unused to such a formal system. 
This becomes apparent upon examining his different treatment of various commandants. 
In lower Louisiana, Unzaga dealt with long-standing French authority in the forms of 
local French land owners who became commandants. He was firm with these men in 
instituting the requisite chain of command within the Spanish system. His letters to 
Arkansas and St. Louis, however, do not contain reprimands. This may be accounted for 
by the fact that these commandants were Spaniards used to the Spanish military and 
governmental system. Furthermore, Pedro Piemas, at St. Louis, had received his post as 
a promotion under O’Reilly and was, therefore, in Unzaga’s eyes, a trusted servant of the 
crown.
Letters from the post commandants in lower Louisiana and in Natchitoches 
indicate that Unzaga’s early attempts to establish centralized rule in the office of the 
governor did, in fact, open the lines of communication between Spanish authorities and 
their colonists. The letters also give insight into the practice of colonial jurisprudence 
and the judicial travails of the governor. It was through the courts that Unzaga finalized 
his attempts at instituting order in the form of the rule of law.
“ The reprimand is contained in Unzaga to Judice, August 11,1770, AGI, Cuba 
188-A Foliol d/17; example of approval found in Unzaga to Judice, July 20,1770, ibid., 
Folio ld/15.
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Earlier studies of the colony’s jurisprudence have asserted that the governors were 
often unaware of the majority of crimes committed outside New Orleans. This opinion 
was largely based on information gleaned from the few records available at the time. In 
studying only court records, past historians missed the countless letters forwarded to the 
governors asking their approval of the decisions of local commandants or the governors’ 
decision’s in judicial matters. While only part of these crimes were actually tried in New 
Orleans (and therefore appeared in the records), they were still “dealt with” one way or 
another by the governor. Either he sent it back to his commandant to be handled, and 
officially supported the commandant’s position, or he accepted the case in the Governor's 
Court of the Cabildo, or sent it to the court of last appeal in Havana. Unzaga’s 
correspondence with his commandants provides ample evidence of the multitude of 
decisions made by Spain’s military governors in frontier posts. Indeed, contrary to the 
belief that the governors knew little of their colonists’ day to day lives, the records 
indicate Unzaga was appraised on a daily basis of the ongoing lives of his colonists, their 
desires, their arguments, their crimes and their achievements. Those lines of 
communication allowed him, in return, to gain their confidence and finally their loyalty to 
Spanish authority.61
Louisiana’s governor maintained civil and judicial authority through several 
courts. While the Spanish system was more complex than the French combination of
61 AGI, Cuba Legajos 188-A, 188-B, and 188-C contain hundreds of letters 
(primarily in French) which given tremendous insight into the lives of local Louisianians 
throughout Unzaga’s tenure. See especially the letters of commandants Verret, Dutisnd 
and Judice..
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superior council and military justice, it was also more efficient. The governor presided 
over a civil, criminal and a military court. His authority was ostensibly absolute, and 
subject only to the King, yet he was limited by realities and practicalities. Beneath him 
were the courts of the alcaldes ordinarios, and the alcaldes mayor provincial and the 
commandants, and the court of the intendant and ecclesiastical courts.62 The efficiency of 
the court system and the Cabildo meant that Unzaga actually knew as much of the daily 
lives of the planter class and those residing in New Orleans as he did of his colonists in 
surrounding territories. It was also through the courts that Unzaga struggled to establish 
the rule of law in the colony and to educate its leaders in Spanish government.
The Cabildo, according to the Code O’Reillly, assembled every Friday to oversee 
such various functions in New Orleans as policing, taxation, supervision of the local 
markets, regulating licenses for building, health regulations, land distribution and local 
festivals.63 On a larger level it was supposed to act as a court of justice for the whole 
colony, though it more frequently served New Orleans and its immediate environs. 
Unzaga served at the Cabildo and in his personal court on a regular basis. This 
consistency, combined with the regular meetings of the Cabildo, created a constant 
judicial presence in the colony. This served in turn to support Unzaga’s attempts to 
create the rule of law and implant Spanish administrative systems.
62Along with these were, of course, the lesser or inferior courts of the 
commandants and syndics in outlying districts. Most maritime cases and those dealing 
with the treasury were sent to the court of the Intendancy. The ecclesiastical court tried 
cases dealing with church fuero and the inquisition. See Kerr, “Petty Felony,” Chapter 
One on the court system.
“ Din, Cabildo. 56.
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The governor’s court convened in a plain room with a raised platform at one end. 
Atop the platform the court’s officials presided from various tables and desks, overseen 
only by a crucifix to remind them of God’s justness.64 Governor’s courts in the 
Borderlands generally handled cases appealed from the lower courts, criminal cases 
which threatened the welfare of the colony such as murder or slave offenses, treason and 
any cases concerning foreigners. Kerr noted that the kinds of cases the governor actually 
saw also depended on his “desire to make an example of an offender or his availability to 
handle the court.’’65
Unzaga made himself available for court on a regular basis where he stood as a 
constant example for the other courts and his colonists. In his court in New Orleans, the 
governor tried various cases which included debt collections, family successions, slave 
offences, slave emancipations and damages to slave and/or property, contraband, 
smuggling, the appointment of officials to the Cabildo and fines on their offices, and 
heard appeals from the commandants. Transcripts of the trials and hearings indicate that 
Unzaga remained constantly in touch with the social realities of his colony.66
Problems surrounding debts and debt collection were the most common cases 
heard by the courts. A review of the court transcriptions indicates, for instance, that of 
fifty-four cases tried by the governor himself in 1774, twenty-nine (54%)were for debt
“ Laura L. Porteous, “The Gris-Gris Case,” LHO 171 (1934): 49.
65Kerr, “Petty Felony,” 19.
“ Abbreviated transcripts of the trials for the Spanish Period can be found as a 
series, translated and published in the Louisiana Historical Quarterly, those for Unzaga’s 
period are found in volumes 71 through 11.
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collection and several others were suits on broken contracts or damages to goods. The 
following year eight out of thirteen cases (62%)were for debt collection. Spanish law 
favored the creditor and many cases sought help in collecting from debtors in a timely 
manner. The court frequently required the debtor to pay within a three-day period. 
Debtors found guilty of non-payment were also required to pay the court costs.67
If they did not pay within the required time Unzaga and the other judges lost no 
time in sending the sheriff to collect the money or something appropriate to serve in lieu 
of the cash. Sometimes the sheriff was sent to bring defendants who dodged their debts 
into court to stand trial For example, on October 7,1773 militia soldier Juan Bautista 
Chateau appeared before the governor asking that he help collect a bill from one 
Christoval de Liza who claimed to have nothing with which to pay Chateau. Unzaga 
decided that de Liza had had more than enough time to pay the debt. The governor sent 
the sheriff to de Liza’s domicile to collect the money. He instructed the sheriff to ask for 
cash but take possessions if necessary and if de Liza didn’t point anything out to choose 
something himself. De Liza, apparently still penniless, stood aside, refusing to point 
anything out, so the sheriff collected his straw chair as payment68 In another case from 
December of 1773, unpaid creditor Nicolas Longueval was given permission to enter 
debtor M. Lamorandier’s home with the commandant in Opelousas to collect either
•"See Court Docket 5, December 18,1773, Collection of debt, court ordered 
payment within three days in “Index to Spanish Judicial Records of Louisiana-Sep-Dec, 
1773,” LHO 10 (1927): 154. Cited further as SJR with volume and page numbers.
“ Juan de la Fitte vs. Christoval de Liza, October 7,1773, Docket No. 17, “SJR,”
10:131.
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money or possessions worth the same amount69 A final example came on March 3,
1775, where Unzaga agreed to order the collection of a debt By the following week 
when the debt had not been paid, Unzaga sent the Sheriff to bring the man to court to 
stand trial, pay the debt and pay court costs.70
Spanish law also allowed debts assessed on third parties if the debtor was 
deceased. In January of 1775 a creditor sought payment for a slave from a third party.
The original owner was deceased and the current owner hid the slave to escape the 
former’s debts. The record does not indicate if the slave was inherited or given away, or 
even confiscated by the third party but in February, the governor’s court required the third 
party to produce the slave or pay the debt Unzaga sought also to enforce the seriousness 
of skirting the law and the courts. Because the defendant sought to conceal the slave the 
governor assessed him for the court costs.71
Unzaga honored debts owed before the Spanish take-over. His work with his 
father in-law and the merchants is commonly cited as proof of his integrity. It is also 
worth noting that the governor worked with the French crown to insure that the Company 
of the Indies could collect from its former colonists and their estates, although he 
protected his colonists against wrongful collection. In February of 1774, Salmon 
Prevost, newly appointed to oversee the affairs of the Company of the Indies in 
Louisiana, sued the widow Francisca Ruella in the governor’s court to attach the estate of
69Nicolas Longueval vs. M. Lamorandier, December 19, 1773, ibid.
70See Collection of a debt, Docket 3749 March 11,1775, “SJR,” 11: 159.
71See Docket Nos. 3744 and 3745, January 16 and February 25, ibid., 155-156.
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Membrede Ruelland, for “an ancient debt of 22,400 livres.” Membrede had been dead 
thirty seven years but Francisca remained the guardian of the estate under the right of 
usufrux. In March the governor’s court determined that the widow did not owe the sum 
asked for, nor any debt, and collection was denied. The same was not true for Charles 
Mareet de la Tour, however. His estate was charged not only the amount owed to the 
Company of the Indies, but also taxed for the court costs. In July of 1774, Unzaga ruled 
again in favor of Saloman Prevost and the Company of the Indies against the heirs of the 
estate of Gerardo Pellerin. Clearly the rule of law was to be upheld, even if it had been 
the law previously established by the French crown.72
It was apparently common to tax such estates for court costs whether in debt suits 
or in successions. In many cases surrounding inherited estates or those attached for 
payment of debt the court taxed the estate for its own costs.73 Even when estates 
produced so little that taxes could not be assessed, the court taxed it for costs. For 
example, in a succession heard August 31,1775, for an estate to be relieved of debts and 
taxes because it was such a small inheritance, Unzaga agreed to the former but took his 
court costs out none-the-less.74
^See Salmon Prevost vs. Francisca Ruelland, February 26, Docket No. 3790, 
“SJR/T1 (1928): 283, for the original suit, and March 14,1773, Docket No. 3788, ibid., 
for the court’s refusal. On payment see Salmon Prevost vs. Charles Mareet de la Tour, 
May 19,1774, Docket No. 3791, ibid. Saloman Prevost vs. Heirs of Gerardo Pellerin, no 
docket no. ibid., 589.
^Docket No. 3831 “SJR", Ibid, 466
74 “SJR," ibid, 165.
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Unzaga was not fond of debt suits and he encouraged his citizens to settle out of 
court if they could. The threat of having to pay court costs apparently was one of the 
weapons Unzaga used to get individuals to settler their disputes privately, as the 
following cases will show. In some cases they settled out of court but in others they were 
forced to stop the suit because the legal costs were prohibitive. In January of 1774, a wife 
sued her husband, living separately, to pay her room and board since they were still 
married. The governor's court stalled on any decision, the parties cancelled the suit and 
the husband paid the wife’s board the following day.75 In another case Alexander Baure 
and Vincente Fangui petitioned the governor saying that “for the service of God and to 
escape further costs they desire[d] to drop the suit” Unzaga agreed. Family arguments 
which ended in court also were frequently setded out of court as in the case of Antonio 
Cavelier who sued his brother-in-law Santiago Carriere for a debt in March of 1774. The 
brothers-in-law eventually decided not to prosecute through the courts and Santiago paid 
Antonio as well as another creditor, Henry Voix, within the month.76 Another amusing 
case was a debt instantly dismissed because the governor was given proof, in the form of 
a reciept, that the debtor had already paid his bill! There is no indication as to whether 
the creditor was just forgetful or if he intended to deliberately cheat the man.77
75See Docket No. 5, January 18,1774, “SJR" 11: 285.
76Alexander Baure vs. Vincente Fangui, July 11,1775, Docket No. 3745, “SJR,” 
ibid., 165; Antonio Cavelier vs. Santiago Carrier, Docket No. 74, “SJR,” ibid., 304. 
Santiago paid Henry Voix on March 14,1774, Docket No. 12, ibid.
^Henrique Desprez vs. Francisco de la Bane, April 11,1774, Docket No. 3767, 
“SJR,” 10:438.
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Not all claims of debts were easily settled and many cases went undecided until a 
later date when more proof could be brought to the courts. Instead of becoming frustrated 
by a lack of evidence the governor used some of these hearings to re-establish the 
authority of the post commandants by referring such cases back to them for final 
judgement. For example in September of 1773, Henry Voix sued Pablo de la Houssay for 
a debt. De la Houssey said that his agent, Garic, was liable for the debt but Garic swore 
in court he was not the man’s representative. Having no further information on who 
actually represented de la Houssay the governor allowed the case to be sent to the 
Commandant at Opelousas, Fuselier de la Claire, who knew the case and the people 
involved. In this way, more information could be brought into play to establish liability 
and the governors actions fostered Fusilier de la Claire’s authority in such cases.78 This 
did not mean his commandant had a completely free hand in Opelousas, as seen in a case 
where Joseph Moreau petitioned the governor’s court to get back land granted to him 
during d’ Abbadie’s administration. Fuselier de la Claire had taken it upon himself to 
evict Moreau from the land and give him another plot. Unzaga, acting as a court of last 
resort for his colonists, upheld the French land grant because Moreau showed the 
conveyance to him from the original owner Pellerin which described the property he 
possessed. With this evidence the governor ordered Commandant de la Claire to restore 
Moreau’s property.79
78 Enrique Voix vs. Pablo de la Houssay, September 11, 1773, Docket No. 26, 
“SJR,” 10:130.
^Petition of Joseph Moreau, January 21,1774, Docket No. 3704, “SJR" 11:287. 
The governor frequently referred cases which pertained to the posts back to the
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While the governor sought to establish a centrality of command he also allowed 
the court system to grow as it accepted Spanish law. He upheld the decisions of lower 
courts and referred appeals back to the appropriate court of first instance. Thomas 
Ingersoll erroneously claims that, under Unzaga, Louisiana was returned to the rule of 
traditional Spanish borderlands military governorship. Under such leadership, Ingersoll 
claims, the governor answered to no authority other than Havana and the King and the 
“planter class lost their right to representation in a local organ of colonial government” 
because the Cabildo offered no provisions for the people “to challenge the Spanish 
system from within.”80 The Cabildo was filled with planters who bought offices and 
fought to serve in the judicial system, assuring themselves a voice in government 
Additionally, while Unzaga overrode decisions by the earlier Superior Council based on 
French law, he also stood back while the new Spanish Cabildo expanded its powers to 
overturn his own decisions, as in the case of Joseph Loppinot vs. Juan Villeneuve, where 
Unzaga had ruled against the plaintiff. Loppinot appealed to the Cabildo and the Cabildo 
overturned the governor’s decision. The governor declined to interfere, allowing the case 
to go to Havana as a last court of appeal. Havana upheld the governor’s original decision. 
In the end, Unzaga’s patience accomplished the growth of the court system in Louisiana
commandant because he could verify and deny information given to the court in New 
Orleans. In April of 1773 accusations of stolen dairy cattle were settled by sending the 
case back to Opelousas for trial where the suit was eventually dismissed. Case of Judith 
Chenal, April 23, 1773, Docket No. 35, “SJR,” 9:442.
^Ingersoll, Old New Orleans. HI, 456.
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and helped tie it to the Havana judiciary, thus cementing Louisiana more firmly into the 
greater Spanish system.81
Citizens of New Orleans strove to become active in the Cabildo. As in any 
colonial territory public service meant more business contacts and a higher social rank in 
the colony. Serving in the Cabildo was taken as seriously as serving in the militia. Those 
citizens who did not do their duty lost their office. In one case, the governor auctioned 
off the seat of an absentee official named Denis Braud. Braud was New Orleans’ first 
printer and as such had come under suspicion because he printed materials for the French 
Superior Council and the rebels of 1768. O’Reilly arrested him and attached his estate. 
Exculpated of any crime Braud applied for the office of Regidor but later left the colony 
for France, never to return. In November of 1773 Unzaga prosecuted Braud for absenting 
himself after applying for the office and fined him. On January of 13, 1774, the governor 
declared the office vacant and five days later the office sold at auction to Daniel Fagot for 
the fines in the amount one-thousand two-hundred and two pesos, a tremendous deal for 
Fagot since the actual price of the office was over nine-thousand pesos. Public service 
offered a great many opportunities in Louisiana but it also brought with it responsibilities 
which Unzaga and the courts seemed willing to enforce.82
8,Joseph Loppinot vs. Juan Villeneuve, April 15,1774, Docket No. 3780, “SJR,” 
9:438. See also Henry P. Dart, “Civil Procedure in Louisiana Under the Spanish Regime 
as Illustrated in Loppinot’s Case, 1774,” LHO 12 (1929): 33-120.
“ See Henry P. Dart, (ed.) “The Adventures of Denis Braud, the First Printer of 
Louisiana, 1765-1773.” LHO 14 (1931): 349-60; also Prosecution of Dionisio Braud, 
November 23, 1773,Docket No. 12, “SJR,” 10:422. For auction of office see the case 
tried January 18,1774, Docket No. 20, ibid. 11: 282.
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The records also indicate that both the governor and the courts took measures to 
protect colonists’ inheritances and private property. Unzaga oversaw numerous cases 
concerned with the rights of wives, widows and especially children in the event of their 
parents’ deaths. Under Spanish laws all wives kept control of their dowry (whatever 
property they brought to the marriage). By law that property remained theirs and was 
inherited by their children, although their father might have the usufructs of it in his 
lifetime. A wife also had use of her husband’s estate in her lifetime though it belonged to 
his children. Many men in Spanish Louisiana sought escape from debt, from prison, or 
just from responsibility by fleeing into the colonial wilderness. Sometimes men who 
were hunters or worked with cattle left their homes never to return. In such cases the wife 
could approach the court for the rights to her husband’s property. For example, in 
January of 1774, a wife asked the court to authorize her to sell her husband’s “real 
property” because he had not returned in over a year and in his absence the family had 
become destitute. After affirming her story with witnesses to her husbands disappearance 
Unzaga granted the wife the right to sell their house to support herself.83
The governor also upheld the right of women to their doweries even while 
married. One of his female colonists sued for her property while still married because she 
refused to live with her husband on the grounds of “bad treatment.’’ Until the hearing the 
husband had refused to support his wife or to give back her property. The governor’s
“ See case of January 17,1774, Docket No. 10, “SJR,” 11: 286.
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court required that the man answer his wife and upon assuring itsself of his improper 
treatment granted the wife’s request for her property.84
While women’s rights to property were based primarily on the idea that the law 
was inevitably protecting her children’s inheritance, they sometimes protected the mother 
from the children. One widow was granted the right to inventory and divide her estate 
without interference by the children’s curator. In another case a mother-in-law claimed 
and was granted her property from the estate of one of the leaders of the 1769 revolt85 
The case of Henrique Desperez vs. Bagriel Dubertrand, shows where the new husband of 
a widow even successfully sued to collect her inheritance from the estate of her first 
marriage.86
Spanish law strictly enforced the right of female colonists to their property but the 
governor was especially interested in the rights of children to their inheritances. An 
example can be found in Docket No. 3774, May 20,1774, where the children of a 
deceased father were allowed to sue their step father to get their father’s inheritance. 
Unzaga ordered the children’s rightful inheritance produced and taxed the stepfather’s 
estate for the court costs.87 It was common for children, especially minor children to be
“ See Philippe Flotte vs. Marie Theresa Leiveille, May 25,1773, Docket No. 10, 
“SJR,,” 10: 534.
“ See Docket no. 3802, June 15,1773, ibid; and Docket No. 3806, July 24,1773, 
“SJR,” 10:747.
“ Henrique Desperez vs.Gabriel Dubertrand, December 10,1773, Docket No. 24, 
“SJR," 10:155.
Petition for inheritance, Ana and Elena, daughters of Isaac Guinault vs. 
Alexandra Reboul, May 20,1774, Docket 3774, “SJR,” 10: 444.
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represented by adults in the family who served to guide them and protect their interests. 
Sometimes it was necessary to seek that help outside the family, especially since Spanish 
law did not recognize the right of “family meetings” to decide important controversies 
concerning inheritance, hi several cases the governor allowed minor children to appoint 
curators to protect their inheritances and under special circumstances allowed the 
children’s early emancipation.88
The protection of inherited rights extended also to slave children. In an unusual 
case on January 17,1774, Unzaga ruled on the succession of a free black woman named 
Martha Marton who died leaving a small estate of personal property to her son Pedro. 
Martha had emancipated herself but apparendy had not been able to do the same for 
Pedro who belonged to Father Bernabe, pastor on the German Coast Despite his social 
status, the court upheld Pedro’s rights to inherit his mother’s property. The property was 
sold at auction to pay off the mother's creditors and the governor assigned the remainder 
of the estate to Father Bemabe for safekeeping.89
Emancipation was an extremely important element of the Spanish judicial system 
which saw all persons as human beings and creatures of God whether free or enslaved.
“ In several instances the governor required that curators of children’s inheritance 
explain their actions and account for the inheritance. See May 25,1774, Docket No. 
3793, “ ”SJR,”10:452. January 2,1774, Docket No. 3758, ibid.
89The remainder of Martha’s estate was small indeed. Her original property was 
sold for the amount of one-hundred sixty-four pesos and two reales. Afterwards the 
estate was charged one-hundred fifteen pesos and three reales for her debts and seventeen 
pesos six reales for costs. Other small bills were presented, subtracted and the remainder 
given to the good Father. See Succession of Martha Marton, January 17,1774, Docket 
#3787, ibid, 292.
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Several slaves bought their freedom in Unzaga’s courts though the court placed obstacles 
against other emancipations. In 1775, the eighty-year-old slave of the deceased William 
Dupre gained freedom for the amount of twelve pesos which he had saved. To do so, 
however, the man had to submit to public auction as part of Dupre’s personal property to 
make sure that he was not counted as part of a debt against the estate.90 It is evident that 
despite the view of Spanish law that all persons had souls and rights, once enslaved a 
person also became moveable property and both Spanish and French law strongly 
protected personal property. More often, than not, the courts found a way to keep slaves 
from gaining their freedom. For example, Anonio, a mulatto slave of the Deshotel estate, 
petitioned the courts for his freedom in 1774. He produced a paper which granted such 
freedom on the death of his masters. Upon examining the papers, the courts denied his 
emancipation on the grounds that the paper was not notarized and the writing was not 
formal. Anyone, they said could have forged such a note and there was no way to prove it 
was the deceased’s writing. A sad Anonio was sold at auction with the rest of his 
master’s property.91
The notarial records indicate other ways that slaves could be denied their freedom. 
Spanish law provided masters with a legal recourse to maintain the labor of their slaves 
even after emancipation. The term obligation referred to the legal requirement that 
slaves remain on the property of their former owners and serve for an allotted time before 
they were granted complete freedom. Obligation was common in the Spanish colonies.
90No Docket No. “SJR,” 11:155.
9lPetition of Anonio, March 7,1774, Docket No. 3757, “SJR," 10:288.
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It had originally been set up to smooth the transition from slavery to freedom for both 
slave and master. It was, however, an abstract theory and as such could be twisted to 
deny freedom, despite the right of emancipation. An good example is the account of 
Luisa. After serving her master well for twenty years, the owner rewarded her with 
emancipation (libertad). They recorded the act with the notary’s office, but on the 
following day Luisa was required to swear to continue serving her master another four 
years under the rule of obligation, “obeying as she should everything he ordered, 
recognizing him as lord.” In the end, her master was not satisfied with her behavior 
during obligation and her emancipation was rescinded.92
Luisa was not alone. Many owners twisted the terms of contracts and legal 
arrangements to keep what they felt was their property. Indeed the legal theories of the 
protection of private property and the right of contract became the most common 
arguments to hold onto slaves under the Spanish system.93 Free blacks and slaves 
understood this point of law and therefore the most common form of emancipation during 
Unzaga’s tenure came at the hands of other Africans who literally bought slaves and freed
92Andres Almonaster y Roxas, Notarial Archives HI January-December, 1772, 
Act No. 96, dated March 3,1772, gave Luisa her freedom. The following day, Act No. 
98, she swore to the act of obligation . In September, Act. 348, her emancipation was 
rescinded.
93The idea of property was strong enough to protect new buyers against the sale of 
damaged “merchandise” as in the case of Juan Baptista Richard who sued Joseph Roth in 
1774 for the selling him a slave named Marie and her infant daughter. Richard claimed 
he had been deceived in the sale because Marie was not of good character and the infant 
daughter was crippled. The court supported Richard’s claim and ordered Roth to take 
back the slave and her child and refund Richard’s money. January 7,1774, Docket No.
4, “SJR,” 10:281.
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them afterward, carefully notarizing the emancipation. Unfortunately there were ways 
around such sales as in the case of Antonio Albert and his nineteen year-old son Juan sold 
by Geronimo La Chappelle in January of 1772, who rethought the sale in the court room 
and had the sale recinded on the same day because it “inconvenienced” him. Freedom 
came to African slaves more under the Spanish system than the French, but it was still 
difficult to obtain.94
In volume two of his work on class and race in New Orleans, Thomas Ingersoll 
claimed that the French planters of Louisiana rejected Spanish culture and its attitude 
toward slavery and that the growth of a free black community threatened their ideas of 
slavery. Other historians, however, note that there was already a firee black population 
under the early French regime which gave rise to stricter slave codes by the end of the 
French period. Further, Spanish law supported the right of slaves as property while 
applying humanistic ideas of the slave’s rights to legal representation and emancipation. 
Many Spaniards in Louisiana, including governor Unzaga, were slave owners and 
approached the application of the new slave regulations cautiously.95
94Andres Almonaster y Rojas, Notarial Archives IE, Jan-Dee, 1772, in Act No. 
192, a free black man named Joseph bought a twenty-seven year old slave also named 
Joseph (no relation mentioned) and the slave was henceforth freed in the act of sale. In 
Act No. 16, January 28,1772 , Antonio and Juan were sold, and Act No. 17, dated the 
same day, rescinding of previous act because it inconvenienced the original owner.
95Ingersoll, Old New Orleans II: 454; See Mathe Allain, “Slave Policies in 
French Louisiana,” LH XXI (1980): 127-37, and Carl A. Brasseaux, “The Administration 
of Slave Regulations in French Louisiana, 1724-1766,” Ibid, 139-58; the Notarial 
Archives in New Orleans note the sale or purchase of several different slaves by Unzaga 
during his tenure: one previously noted before his marriage, the purchase of a thirty-nine 
year-old slave Theodora in 1774, Notarial Archives Act No. 136; and sale of slave on 
April 27,1775, to Miguel Almonasi, ibid., II: January 2 to May 1,1775, Acts 1-270; Act
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Emancipation cases were not the only court cases regarding slavery Unzaga heard. 
During his administration he oversaw cases regarding property and murder, additionally 
ruling on commandants’ decisions regarding slaves in their jurisdiction. His attitude 
toward enslaved Africans was mixed. As a slave owner, he upheld the right of property 
and supported strict discipline where slaves were concerned. As the representative of 
Spain’s judicial system, he oversaw numerous cases where slaves were allowed to defend 
themselves in court against their accusers. Unzaga exhibited enlightened leadership in 
many of these cases, interfering only to steer the Cabildo and courts toward Spanish 
law.96
Tackling the problems of African slavery in Louisiana required patience. While 
Unzaga could be brusque he began the installation of Spanish slave law by issuing a 
proclamation on November 3,1770 requiring that all sales of property, including slaves, 
be notarized in order to be considered valid by the courts. That action supported the 
French idea of slaves as moveable property but reduced illegal practices within the 
system. The governor also fought to lessen the amount of fugitive slaves in the colony 
and actually strove to curtail many allowable freedoms which he felt threatened the order
No. 248 and finally a slave sold to Unzaga by Juan Lafitte, Cadet, on May 1, 1775, Ibid. 
Act No. 271.
96The following cases concern slaves of African decent, although numerous Indian 
slaves applied for and were granted their freedom. In fact the attitude of the Spanish 
toward Indian slaves led many slaves to claim Indian decent in order to gain their 
freedom. See Weber, “Problem of Indian Slavery,” 118-119.
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of the colony. He supported the actions of Lieutenant-Governor Athanase de M6zi6res 
against fugitive slave bands which disrupted the community in Natchitoches.97
In De Mezieres letter to the governor on the first of February of 1771, the 
Lieutenant-Governor indicated that there were two kinds of slaves causing problems: 
“Africans” and “Creoles.” This differentiation was commonly made when selling slaves. 
Newly arrived slaves were considered Africans and were seen as “uncivilized.” As 
previously noted, most of the slaves sold in Louisiana after the Spanish take over were 
African slaves who hadn’t been tainted with other ideas. Creole usually referred to 
second generation Africans, but could also indicate a mixture of Indian or European 
blood. The crown considered Africans or “brutos” (sometimes called bozales) less 
troublesome but court documents indicate that the crown’s ideas did not fit colonial 
reality. Many “Africans” still harbored ideas of freedom and retaliation. The wilderness 
gave slaves ample opportunities to disappear, sometimes for years, and the exceptional 
relationship between some masters and slaves in Louisiana’s settlements outside New 
Orleans created still more problems. Plantation slaves and more especially those in the 
hinterlands were often in possession of firearms, despite the regulations against such 
possession. Trusted slaves were expected to hunt and protect property but the possession 
of weapons often got them into trouble or increased the means by which they might
97See Hans W. Baade, “The Formalities of Private Real Estate Transactions in 
Spanish North America: A Report on Some Recent Discoveries,” Louisiana Law Review 
38 (Spring, 1978): 686-95 on slaves as moveable property.
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“retaliate” against bad treatment98 Unzaga’s main concerns were order and the 
enforcement of law. He echoed de Mdzieres belief that fugitives should be punished 
quickly and severely to prevent other such actions and therefore supported the Lieutenant- 
Governor’s application of one-hundred lashes each to the six fugitives at Natchitoches.99
If law was to create order, Unzaga realized that the promulgation of law must be 
particularized. In dealing with the colony’s various needs, he learned that law in New 
Orleans did not necessarity fit the reality of frontier posts. Accordingly, he left the every­
day administration to the commandants. These men could create laws to suit the 
particular needs of their posts. One example was De M6zi£res’ ordinance dated January 
21,1770, which forbade the sale of alcohol to slaves and their possession of weapons, 
whether it be sticks, knives or firearms. He added his own rules which applied to a 
territory on the edge of civilization. In the document de Mdzifcres forbade slaves from 
engaging in public meetings whether for dances, games or other reasons. This was an 
ordinance that would never have been allowed in New Orleans. Slaves continued to meet 
at Congo Square and slaves were some of the best customers for New Orleans’ 
merchants. The Lieutenant-Governor also forbade slaves the ownership of horses which 
of-course would have eased illegal flight Punishment was to be sure and swift Slaves
"See Gilbert C. Din, Spaniards. Planters and Slaves. 48; Ingersoll, Old New 
Orleans 2:552, indicates that one women caught in the Attakapas area in 1771 had been a 
fugitive for two years. See Usner, Indians. Settlers and Slaves, on the arming of favored 
slaves.
"Din, Spaniards. Planters and Slaves. 50.
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breaking the regulations were to be lashed and masters who violated such regulations 
were to be fined. It was assumed that masters were responsible for their property.100
Control over slaves in New Orleans was a thornier problem. In the city many free 
blacks engaged in sales, purchased goods and had businesses. Slaves also ran businesses 
for their masters and dealt with merchants on a regular basis. The businessmen and 
planters in New Orleans were, therefore, divided over the treatment of slaves. Many 
wanted to retain a certain freedom for their slaves to a free day on Sunday and the right of 
slaves to earn money for themselves while others sought to maintain stricter control over 
the movement of slaves.
Fugitive slaves grew in number in the city and in 1773 the Cabildo and the 
planters moved to try and control both marronage and insubordination of slaves whose 
lax treatment allowed such behavior. Din notes that Unzaga allowed the Cabildo to act 
on its own regarding these new regulations.101 The councillors of the Cabildo agreed to 
establish a special tax whose funds could be used to compensate owners whose slaves 
were removed from their ownership through the courts. At Unzaga’s prompting they 
opened the discussion of the tax, which affected all colonists, to a wider vote. On August 
26, the citizenry of New Orleans and the surrounding parishes met to discuss the tax and 
changes to laws affecting slaves and fugitives. They eased the burden of reporting 
maroonage and suggested that the funds also be used to reward those who captured
100The ordinance can be found in AGI, Cuba 188-A, its date is January 21,1770. 
101 Actas del Cabildo, 2:109-12; Din, Spaniards. Planters and Slaves. 58.
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runaways. The Cabildo and the governor immediately implemented the councils’ 
suggestions while forwarding the new laws to the crown for approval.102
The compensation fund was an excellent example of the growth of law and a 
sense of community in the colony but it was not completely successful. Claims for 
compensation arrived from slave owners all over the colony. Collecting the tax was 
difficult and when compensation didn’t immediately follow a claim the claimants in 
surrounding parishes reneged on their tax assessments to support i t  Still, the governor 
gained valuable information from the fund. To assess the tax, census materials were 
generated and reports flowed into New Orleans regarding mis-behavior on the part of 
both slaves and owners. With that information the governor could more easily oversee 
the plantation areas surrounding New Orleans and even the outlying parishes. Stricter 
slave codes could be enforced. This reporting also strengthened ties between the 
governor and his post commandants, whom he allowed to enforce the regulations.
Fugitive laws did not, however, stop the loaning of slaves and their labor, or the 
right of slaves to sell their own labor on Sundays. In the Loppinot case a valuable slave 
lost his life on the way back from working for a neighbor on Sunday. He was durnk, 
having been given alcohol by the neighbor as part of his reward. The owner sued, 
denying the right of his neighbor to endanger his slave. He was actually after more 
control of the slave’s life than was possible under the law. Unzaga’s unpopular decision 
in the Loppinot case upheld the portions of Spanish law which gave slaves Sundays to be
102Actas del Cabildo, 1: 109-12, and pages 113-14, for the August cabildo abierto. 
Din gives a larger discussion of the rules for the slave fund and the actually employment 
of persons used to hunt down runaways in Spaniards. Planters and Slaves. 58-61.
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used as they saw fit (within the law). This case exacerbated the problems over congress 
between slaves and between slaves and freedmen which some planters felt threatened 
their authority. In this instance the governor bent the colonists to the law not the other 
way around.103
As an eighteenth-century leader the governor tried to use enlightened methods to 
expand the rule of law in Louisiana and truly instill justice in the system. At the same 
time he had to use stem measures to back the letter of the law. He imposed severe 
punishment on offenders including the use of torture on the rack to extract confessions, 
flogging, and drawing and quartering in cases of murder. In such cases, the governor also 
enforced scientific investigation of crimes, using appropriate authorities to discuss 
evidence, and every defendant was allowed to speak in court in his own defense.
Several cases heard by the governor show the complexity of the problems Unzaga 
faced in bringing justice. Francisco Bellisle’s slaves and a “bruto” slave from Guinea 
named Carlos were tried for engaging in African “gris-gris” to try and poison their 
overseer and master. During the hearing all of the slaves were allowed to give their 
testimony (some of which was coerced through torture) and translators were provided for 
those who did not speak Spanish, including Carlos. The poison was examined by three 
doctors who gave their deposition as to the nature of the concoction. The investigation 
began in the governor’s court in June of 1773 and ended in a trial during January of the 
following year. In the end, the governor ruled that most of the slaves had been guilty only
103See Laura L. Porteous, (trans.), “The Documents in Loppinot’s Case, 1774,” 
LHO. 12 (1929): 39-120.
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of conspiracy and failure to report such a conspiracy to their owners. Since Carlos, the 
culprit who concocted the poison, had died in prison Unzaga dropped the case with the 
understanding that all of the other slaves were to be separated and sold. The “creole” 
slave accused of being the ringleader was given his time already served in prison as 
punishment and ordered sold away from the others. In the case of Carlos it becomes 
apparent that having “bruto” slaves did not guarantee one’s safety or that “creole” slaves 
were less guilty of committing crimes against their masters.104
In another poisoning case in July of 1774, the accused poisoner, Pedro was also a 
Guinea bom African. Accused of killing his black overseer, Pedro swore he never gave 
the man anything to drink. Without corroborating witnesses Unzaga chose to address the 
case scientifically, ordering an autopsy which indicated the man might have been 
poisoned. The governor ordered a trial. When Pedro continued to deny the poisoning his 
defense attorney suggested the man might have died from other cases. With no new 
evidence to indicate the cause of death Unzaga finally ordered that Pedro remain 
imprisoned for ten years. In 1777, Pedro’s owners abandoned him to prison which meant 
he would be allowed emancipation once he completed his sentence. The courts had tried 
a criminal and jailed a possible offender who, if guilty, at least would not be able to 
perpetrate another crime for ten years.105
104See a complete description of the testimonies and trial in Laura L. Porteous, 
(trans.), “The Gri-Gri Case,” LHQ 17 (1934): 48-63.
,05See Porteous, ‘Torture in Spanish Criminal Procedure,”5-22.
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In the case of Temba and Francisco Mirliton in 1771, two slaves fired their 
master’s hayloft and shot him as he emerged from his house to put out the fire. Unzaga 
extorted the testimony of both slaves with the use of torture on the rack and condemned 
both to the hangman’s noose. The dead bodies of the criminals were left hanging and 
Temba’s hands were nailed to a post on the road. Two other slaves implicated as 
accomplices were tarred and feathered as an example of what happened to those who 
helped criminals. Unzaga withheld punishment, however, on other slaves he suspected of 
being accessories because he did not have evidence to convict them. Despite his 
vehemence toward slave crime and his determination to halt its growth, Unzaga did not 
move outside of the law to enforce his will on the populace.
Din interestingly notes in a footnote to the Temba case that torture was not 
common in Louisiana’s courts and that the Spanish did not use “the heinous instrument of 
torture and death called ‘the wheel,’ as the French had done, or any other similar 
device.”106 In his attempts to defend the Spanish system Din perhaps overlooks the fact 
that the “rack,” an extremely painful device, was the favorite instrument of torture used 
by the Spanish to extract confessions from slaves. Accused criminals like Carlos 
sometimes died in prison from mistreatment while awaiting trial during Unzaga’s tenure.
A more meaningful point might be made by stressing that the governor’s court 
and those of the alcaldes mayor often served to disseminate justice before a trail was 
necessary and that fines often took the place of imprisonment. As a Spanish official, 
Unzaga sought to mete out justice and order in the colony, not revenge or tyranny. This
106Din, Spaniards. Planters and Slaves. 262, note number 12, to Chapter 2.
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last position can be seen particularly in the trial of several soldiers accused of allowing 
deserters to escape prison. In November of 1773 the case of Pablo Augraud and Asa 
Daniels, escaped prisoners, appeared in the governor’s court. Unzaga heard the testimony 
of several soldiers accused of allowing the escape. The soldiers apparently were 
hoodwinked by an English Captain who plied the grenadier on guard, Antonio Gossen, 
with alcohol and then stole the keys, allowing the soldiers to escape. During the trial in 
April of the following year several soldiers were implicated and imprisoned along with 
Gossen. The accomplices pled innocence and petitioned the governor for their release. 
On April 22 Unzaga released and absolved the accomplices. He did not absolve Gossen 
but added that the man had acted with carelessness, not malice, adding that time already 
served was enough although Gossen must pay court costs. Justice was served. An 
example was set and court costs paid.107
During the 1770s Unzaga steadily worked to create a colony of loyal subjects. He 
correcdy judged that order must be established before loyalty could be expected. To 
affect order, setded and resettled colonists through surveys and land grants in the lower 
Mississippi Valley, thereby creating a denser and larger population capable of defense 
and domestic industry. More importantly for the creation of loyal subjects, he bent 
Spanish law to fit colonial realities where necessary to protect the colony and enforced 
the law where it benefitted the people and the king. Enlightened vision led him to 
enhance his colonists’ opportunities for education and worship and religious disputes
l07Trial of Pablo Augraud and Asa Daniels for fleeing public prison. November 1, 
1773, “SJR,” 10:133.
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allowed him to enhance his position as defender of the faith and his colonial charges. By 
mainta in ing a strong and constant presence in the courts he used Spanish justice to 
systematically implant Spanish law in the colony. At the same time he indelibly etched 
the figure of the governor as the central authority. Indian slavery lessened considerably, 
though it did not disappear entirely. Planters continued to fight what they considered 
lenient Spanish law concerning their slaves but they also increasingly sought to use the 
courts to settle their claims. Emancipation remained tenuous for Louisiana’s black 
slaves, their fate decided more by the owner’s manipulation of legal codes than protection 
by the courts. The real emancipator, as always, remained cold, hard cash. Spanish codes 
defending slave’s rights to employ themselves on Sundays opened fresh avenues to 
freedom. Unzaga left a sound system of justice, an enlightened Cabildo and court system, 
and a network of commandants able to serve justice in outlying areas. Justice gradually 
brought with it loyalty to the Spanish crown and a grudging obedience to the Spanish 
system. The greatest challenge for Unzaga remained the protection of the colony with a 
small, indefensible line of deteriorating forts, an untrained, undisciplined militia and an 
underpaid military.
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Chapter Eight 
In Defense of Crown and Colony
“These thoughts revolve in my head everyday so that I may be able to elect the best 
defense should the occasion present itself and as is dictated by my limited prudence and 
experience.”
Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, June 8 ,17701 
The Bourbon Crown’s reform of its defenses in the Indies rested heavily on 
restructuring the army in the Indies and rebuilding certain defensive outposts. Spanish 
minister Esquilache and his successors gradually replenished treasury funds to support 
such defenses through increased taxation and better revenue collection. Posts in the 
Caribbean received funding to buttress their defenses, although the crown recognized that 
military responsibility for safeguarding the Indies must be transferred to a disciplined, 
colonial militia system.2 Alejandro O’Reilly applied his remarkable skills to the 
reorganization of defenses in Cuba and Louisiana. In both colonies he cut expenses, re­
arranged troops, re-built fortifications and created an armed, better disciplined militia of 
Creoles and free blacks. In both instances, Spain’s officials were successful in integrating 
the colonial elite into a stable and loyal relationship with the Crown. Indeed, Louisiana’s 
military reorganization began in and extended directly from O’Reilly and Havana.
The results of the reform varied in the empire. This variance depended on the size 
and energy of the Crown’s expenditures, as well as the importance and economic stability 
of the colony. The importance of Havana in Spain’s imperial plans led Carlos HI to
‘Unzaga to Grimaldi, June 8, 1770, AGL SD 2543, Folio 999.
2Kuethe, Cuba, ix.
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invest large sums toward its defense during the late eighteenth century. Allan J. Kuethe’s 
work on Cuba also indicates that under Alejandro O’Reilly, the king allowed the island to 
create a large, independent militia of Creoles and free blacks which shifted the burden of 
defense to the colony. Works which cover similar attempts in Mexico and Peru suggest 
Cuba’s stability and growth was actually an anomaly.3 Lyle N. McAlister’s work on 
Bourbon New Spain also shows that the extension of the fuero militar or military 
privilege to the colonial militia often created more conflict than appreciation and loyalty.4 
Indeed, Carlos D3, openly faced the possibility of having created a well armed and 
supplied army of insurrection in the colonies, yet he continued to construct such forces. 
This is most understandable when seen in the light of the continuing tensions among 
Spain and England and their colonies in North America.
Working under imperial and sometimes secretive orders, Luis de Unzaga y 
Amezaga, refurbished and re-manned Louisiana’s deteriorating defenses. He 
concentrated on building and maintaining the army and militia O’Reilly had created, 
despite illness, desertion and limited payrolls. Using his unique methods of adapting 
imperial necessities to colonial realities he also created a network of merchant spies and 
informants to funnel information on the British to Spain.
3Both Archer, in The Army in Bourbon Mexico and Campbell, in The Military in 
Colonial Peru, indicate a constant influx of funds and troops and a continual re-institution 
of such militia groups elsewhere in empire.
4See Lyle N. McAlister, The “Fuero Militar” in New Spain. 1764-1800 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1957).
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This examination of Louisiana’s defenses compares it to both Havana and the 
remaining Spanish borderlands in which it existed. In Cuba, O’Reilly rebuilt the regular 
army, establishing several fixed regiments including dragoons and artillery companies.
He lowered the military budget, although he was forced to make concessions later. The 
Captain-General also worked, with tremendous success, to create a reserve army in the 
form of a disciplined militia which remained a stable portion of Cuba’s military for 
another century. Pragmatic management produced a well integrated military 
establishment using all the available resources. In Havana, and its environs he created 
white, pardo (mulatto), and moreno (free black) militias. The officers of such militias 
had to live within the district of the company they commanded. To enhance militia 
training he offered higher pay to regular army officers willing to command militia units. 
The militia companies also drilled regularly and received standardized equipment 
Finally, under the Conde de Ricla, they received the fuero de guerra militar, permitting 
the men to appear before military tribunals instead of civilian courts and creating a certain 
esprit de corps and a feeling of upward mobility.5
O’Reilly, like other military officials, contended with problems surrounding pay 
for the soldiers and militia, desertion (a constant problem in the Indies), proper supplies 
and equipment, uniforms and food. Later, the governorship of the Marqu6s de la Torre 
oversaw the creation of local funding for uniform replacements and armaments, as well 
as promulgating new regulations regarding deserters (both soldiers and sailors) and
5See the chapter on Reform in Kuethe, Cuba. 3-23; McAlister, The “Fuero 
Militar.” 5-6 covers the social consequences of extending the fuero to the militia.
260
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
penalties for those who aided them.6 Pay for the soldiers continued to be a problem into 
the 1780s and 1790s although Havana received far more subsidization than other 
locations in Spain’s empire.
Cuba’s militia units numbered 5,558 men by 1779 and volunteers were common. 
Accompanying the militia were a veteran infantry regiment of some 1,358 men both 
fusiliers and grenadiers and extra staff and command. The militia included white and 
pardo battalions, a cavalry regiment and a dragoon regiment.7 Outnumbering the Spanish 
troops, the militia created under the Bourbon reforms guarded one of Spain’s most 
important outposts.
While O’Reilly refurbished Cuba’s armed forces and fortifications, Spain’s 
ministers attempted to create a net around the Caribbean which would catch possible 
spies. As early as 1764, Minister of the Indies, Julian de Arriaga ordered all Spanish 
governors to maintain a cautious but continual discipline against any possible attack by 
the British.8 Despite the supposed peace between the two nations, Carlos in was 
determined not to be embarrassed by the English again. In 1766, agents in Europe 
informed him of a possible spy, a Frenchman named Pottier, who had been sent by 
England to spy in the Spanish colonies. Arriaga ordered Ricla to arrest and detain Pottier
6Kuethe, Cuba. 79; Royal order, El Pardo, March 10,1785, AGI, SD 2160; and 
Marquds de la Torre, Cartas y Bando, July 6,1776, AGI, Cuba 1221.
7Kuethe. Cuba. 179-182.
8Arriaga to the Conde de Ricla, September 22,1764, AGI, SD 1194.
261
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
if he were spotted.9 To curtail such spies the crown issued orders in 1768 to cordon off 
the empire by restricting the traffic in Spanish ports. The injunction was aimed 
specifically at the British, who were allowed entry only in emergencies and allowed 
shelter just long enough for repairs. Questionable ships were to be detained, the ship 
seized, and the crew sent to the closest British port with the expenses to be bome by the 
British or other foreign crown. The King admonished all governors not to allow 
contraband especially if it meant that “hard specie” might leave the empire10
This order was followed in Cuba as long as it didn’t interfere with the normal ship 
traffic and apparently with the expected trade in contraband items. Captain-General 
Bucareli followed the crown’s wishes as closely as possible, forbidding entry to British 
ships and admonishing other governors to do the same. Captain-General de la Torre 
“elasticized” such restrictions to benefit Cuba (see Chapter Four). Thomas E. Chdvez 
finds in his work, The Ultimate Gift: Spain and The Independence of the United States. 
that Spain’s officials also managed somehow to distinguish the difference between 
British spies and the regular colonial practices of trade in the Caribbean. They 
differentiated, therefore, between English colonists who merely “subverted” the Atlantic 
mercantile system and British attempts at subterfuge."
9Arriaga to Ricla, January 24 and March 24, 1766, AGI, SD 1194.
l0Grimaldi to Bucareli, April 30,1768, AGI, SD 1195.
"Thomas E. Chlvez, The Ultimate Gift: Spain and the Independence of the 
United States, (unpublished manuscript, 1998), 54.
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Between 1770 and 1771 the Malvinas crisis heightened tensions and Spanish 
suspicions in Cuba and the Caribbean, hi Cuba, de la Torre stepped up intelligence 
gathering along the Mosquito Coast and contacted the governor in Louisiana. The 
English could become a threat at any time, and their proximity on the Mosquito Coast 
continued to make that a possibility. While Spain found the English presence 
inconvenient it did not wish to openly confront them, either in Europe or the Americas. 
Arriaga informed the Marques de la Torre, that he could do nothing but keep up the 
surveillance.12 With Ricla and O’Reilly’s reforms in place, and a continued vigil by his 
colonial governors, the monarchy’s desire for a self-supporting defense had been 
answered in Cuba. The borderlands, however, posed a different problem.
Carlos IH’s long range plans for the Borderlands included the reorganization of 
defenses in New Spain, the creation of a defensive barrier in Louisiana and eventually the 
retaking of Florida. Actual reconstruction of the Borderlands can be divided between the 
provinces of New Spain and Louisiana in both theory and application, as Florida was not 
retaken until the American Revolution. As previously discussed, the Marques de Rubf s 
crown-sponsored investigation of the northern boundaries in New Spain initiated a series 
of reforms under the Regulations o f1772. These included re-organizing the mission- 
presidio defenses between California and Texas.13 By the third year of Unzaga’s tenure in 
Louisiana, Hugh O’Connor had reconstructed the frontier provincas intemas of New
,2Arraiga to Marquds de la Torre, June 9,1772, AGI, SD 1211.
13See Max L. Moorehead, The Presidio: Bastion of the Spanish Borderlands. 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1975).
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Spain. The colony’s northern missions and presidios were relocated and garrisons 
rebuilt. The reforms also included the standardization of uniforms, pay, supplies and 
military conduct, and a number of regulations to prevent further corruption among the 
officers.14
As the colonial border withdrew and realigned itself, the Indians moved into the 
vacuum, attacking settlers and raiding other tribes. That is, the reorganization did little to 
defend the Hispanic communities on the frontier. In the short run, the King favored 
further immigration into the Texas borderlands to build a defense through denser 
population. The depredations of the Apaches and Comanches combined with the 
indifference and inability of the viceroys, made it difficult to implement such 
immigration, however. The north was left poorly defended.15 It would not be until after 
1776, under the able Viceroy Teodoro de Croix, that the presidio system recommended 
by Rubf was modified to meet the real needs of the frontier.16
As Rubf investigated New Spain in 1769, Alejandro O’Reilly realigned 
Louisiana’s military defenses according to the realities of its own frontier. He focused 
mainly on the English threat in the east and the contraband at New Orleans and
14Ibid., on corruption and military standards; See Weber, Borderlands. 204-218 on 
reconstruction and standardization of dress and supplies. The reforms did little to better 
the lives of soldiers on the frontier. They were paid small sums out of which they were 
expected to buy specific, and inappropriate clothing, horses, and food. In fact, most 
soldiers pay was in the form of clothing and supplies whose prices were commonly 
inflated
15See Bolton, Athanase de MdziSres. on the Apache attacks and Bobb’s biography 
of Bucareli, for the inability of the viceroys to do more with the frontier.
16Moorehead, Presidio. 87-91; Weber, Borderlands. 225-227.
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Natchitoches. As he had done in Cuba, the Captain-General restructured the forts as 
described earlier, strengthened the regular troops and created a militia for colonial 
defense.
The regular troops consisted of a newly developed fixed Louisiana infantry 
battalion formed from the Regiments of Guadalajara, Aragdn, Milan, and Lisbon, 
approximately 412 men.17 The new battalion included a grenadier company and seven 
fusilier companies each with a captain, a lieutenant and a sublieutenant
O’Reilly set monthly pay for the soldiers at 70 pesos fuertes for captains, 44 for 
the lieutenants, and 32 for sublieutenants. Headquarters staff such as Francisco Bouligny 
received more compensation. Lieutenant colonels received 146 pesos and lieutenants at 
headquarter 51 pesos instead of the requisite 44. There were also two flag sub-lieutenants 
whose salaries stood at 30 pesos. Pay scales for enlisted personnel were much lower and 
varied with time served.18
Officers in the battalion were expected to perform a number of functions in the 
community. In addition to their normal duties they were required to serve at military 
trials, on councils of war, and as commandants in isolated communities. Additionally, 
these men frequently served in naval positions because of an absence of officers. The 
enlisted personnel were expected to act as a local police force in New Orleans and hunt
l7Holmes. Honor and Fidelity. 18.
18“Reglamento que explica todas las obligaciones de esta Provincia que se deberdn 
satisfacer por cuenta de la Real Hacienda,” O’Reilly, New Orleans, February 23,1770, 
AGL Cuba 1055 and Coutts, “Martin Navarro,” 554-555.
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down runaway slaves as well. Militia captains and soldiers acted similarly in their posts 
and commandants were also in charge of economic development19
The formation of a fixed battalion followed O’Reilly’s original intent to create a 
self-supporting defensive system in the Indies and prevented the constant and costly 
rotation of troops previously necessary in such garrisons. He realized the necessity of 
more able bodied soldiers because both weather and disease took horrendous tolls on 
colonial regiments everywhere, most especially in the Circum-Caribbean. Yellow fever, 
malaria and a large assortment of internal parasites sapped the strength of armies and 
caused the continual rotation of soldiers which undermined the stability of the army. 
Larger regiments allowed for less rotation and made up for the normal desertion problem. 
The Captain-General, therefore, requested 100 more soldiers, plus guns and ammunition 
from Spain for the colony.20
The new battalion was eagerly joined by many of the colony’s ex-French officers 
and the sons of the local planters and merchants.21 Colorful service uniforms, crown pay 
and the extension of the juero militar to Louisiana, provided certain social and monetary 
benefits otherwise unavailable in Louisiana. The French had previously established the
19Holmes, Honor and Fidelity. 77; see Araham P. Nasatir, ed., Spanish War 
Vessels on the Mississippi. 1792-1796 (New Haven: Yale University Press 1968), 1-145 
regarding army officers in the navy; and Arnold, Colonial Arkansas, for economic 
problems of commandants.
20Holmes, Honor and Fidelity. 20.
2lMany soldiers accepted commissions not only in the army but also as militia 
captains which gave them greater status and more land. See testimony to the idea of 
French soldiers retiring to be settlers and militia in Louis Judice “Proc6s-verbal of the 
examination of a drowning victim, July 9, 1770, AGL Cuba 188a:l d/14.
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idea of using the military as a form of social mobility and it was quite natural, therefore, 
that Louisiana’s colonial elite continue that behavior. To assure a “professional” army 
and fit officers, O’Reilly issued instructions which required cadets to train in 
“mathematics and military subjects.’’22 He also established pensions for the families 
(wives and children) of deceased soldiers and pensions for disabled veterans. He 
encouraged regulars and non-commissioned officers to stay in the service by establishing 
bonus payments in addition to their regular salaries, and further rewarded men who 
served honorably for a minimum of twenty years by allowing them to retire with 
pensions. Officers also were enticed to perform their duties by the promise of being 
allowed to join one of Spain’s Royal Military Orders, increasing their prestige at home 
and abroad.23
Paralleling his efforts in Cuba, O’Reilly supported the fixed Louisiana battalion 
with a colonial militia. The militia originally embraced 1,040 men in thirteen companies. 
He instructed their leaders that the men were to be drilled by regular officers every 
Sunday and supplied by the crown. He hoped the discipline of marching and target 
practice would create some sort of esprit de corps among the men.24
“ Ibid., 76, who indicates that O’Reilly’s instructions are listed in his “Memoire 
sur I’Instruction des cadets” Barcelona, May 25, 1767, and can be found in the 
Bibliotheque National (Paris), MSS. Espagnols, Vol. 363 (Esp. 423), folios 242-45; Ulloa 
to Grimaldi, July 20, 1768, AGI, SD 2542, No. 5 notes that the French were already 
engaged in this behavior and “appreciated” military positions.
23These advantages were actually created for all royal troops, in the crown’s order 
of September 29, 1761, see Holmes, Honor and Fidelity. 76.
MBjork, “Establishment of Spanish Rule,” 246.
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In Louisiana, O’Reilly needed to distribute one-third the number of troops 
available in Cuba across a territory at least five times as large. He began by concentrating 
the majority of the soldiers at the capital in New Orleans, with smaller detachments in the 
immediate area. At Balize, he posted troops to intercept any advance up the Mississippi. 
He also positioned sixty-five soldiers in twin forts further upstream at English Turn to 
catch anyone who might get past Balize. The remainder of the New Orleans forces were 
stationed at the old French barracks. These were actually the third set of barracks built 
during the French period and O’Reilly chose them because they were large, two-storied 
buildings of brick with an ample arcade and brick flooring, and were capable of housing 
1200 to 1500 soldiers.25 It was at these building, incidently, that O’Reilly chose to 
execute the traitors of the rebellion in 1768. The barracks was positioned parallel to the 
river near the military hospital. Outside the building a brick wall surrounded a fairly large 
parade ground for drilling the men and showing off to the general public. The barracks 
also contained a powder magazine and an armory. The dragoons were placed at another 
building located at the present-day comer of Chartres and Toulouse a site now occupied
^Bienville built a second barracks to replace the dilapidated barracks erected 
sometime before 1723. See Villers Du Terrage, Les Demiers annees. 45 for a plan of the 
second barracks in the Place d’Armes or present day Jackson Square; these however were 
made of wood, with no flooring, or chimneys, and lifted off the ground on piles, all of 
which rotted. The last French barracks were finally constructed of durable materials and it 
is those that O’Reilly confiscated for his troops. See John Smith Kendall, History of New 
Orleans. 3 vols. (Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 1922) 1:88 for the plan of the 
third and final French barracks.
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by one of the Pontalba buildings. Four companies of militia resided in New Orleans but 
as locals did not need quartering..26
The military hospital originally erected in 1733 was a one-story brick affair which 
acted as the infirmary for wounded and diseased soldiers. These hospitals were extremely 
important. As previously mentioned, disease took a terrible toll on new Europeans 
entering Louisiana. In addition to tropical fevers and “bugs,” soldiers and others 
contracted a variety of serious health problems including, but not limited to “pink eye,” 
gout, hernias, epilepsy, “apoplexy,” hepatitis, abscesses, “pleurisy, cholera, dysentery, 
“milk-sickness, goitre, typhus, dyspepsia, measles, small-pox and scarlet fever'’ and 
severe diarrhea.”27 Too, the soldiers in New Orleans were near bars and houses of 
prostitution, both of which they visited. Consequently the hospital treated a good number 
of military men who had been wounded during a brawl or had succumbed to venereal 
disease (the curse of serving in the Americas).28 Venereal disease became quite a severe 
problem among the soldiers, although it attacked colonists and Indians alike. By the 
1790s English Colonel John Pope noted that most citizens in Spanish ports enjoyed good
“ Powell A. Casey, Encyclopedia of Forts. Posts. Named Camps, and Other 
Military Installations in Louisiana. 1700-1981 (Baton Rouge: Claitor’s Publishing 
Division, 1983), 129-131: Holmes. Honor and Fidelity. 19; Kinaird. SMV. 1:158-159.
“ Jack D. L. Holmes, “Medical Practice,” 334.
“ For a complete copy of O’Reilly’s instructions see Douglas C. McMurtrie, “A 
Louisiana Decree of 1770 Relative to the Practice of Medicine and Surgery,” New 
Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal 84 (1933): 7-11.
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health except for the garrison whose “mode of living” and imprudent diet of rich foods 
and alcohol drunk with “lewd” women would corrupt anyone’s health.29
A. P. Nasatir, notes in his discussion of royal hospitals that these institutions 
housed:
stocks of curious old remedies and equipment,... often depleted and 
replaced only after long delays and petitioning. Nevertheless the royal hospitals 
were important havens for the sick and injured of the whole province. Their 
establishment and maintenance was one of the fine, humanitarian acts of the 
Spanish paternalism which was otherwise too prone to stifle the economic and 
intellectual life of the colonials.30
After establishing the regiment in New Orleans and its environs, O’Reilly 
distributed the remaining militia at Louisiana's forts at the posts. One militia company 
was established at St. Louis, serving under the Lieutenant Governor, Pedro Piemas, and 
another for Ste. Genevieve, serving under Don Francisco VaM The remaining 
companies were ordered for Cabahonocy or St. James Parish under Nicolas Verret, at 
Natchitoches under Lieutenant-Governor, Athanase de Mdzi&res, at Point Couple with 
Francisco Allain, (who would be replaced by Balthazar de Villers whom O’Reilly 
transferred from Natchitoches), at the German Coasts under Roberto Robin de Laugni, 
and Captain of the Infantry, Francisco Simard de Bellisle, at Attakapas, or Opelousas to 
serve with Gabriel Fuselier de la Claire, and at La Fource de Chetimachas, under Don
h o lm es, “Medical Practice,” 333.
30A. P. Nasatir, “Royal Hospitals in Colonial Spanish America.” Annals of 
Medical History. 3d ser. 4 (1942): 481.
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Luis Judice. Arkansas Post and St. Louis received detachments of soldiers which they 
kept throughout the Spanish period (see Table 3).31
The last step in New Orleans was to fortify the city. The palisades around New 
Orleans were a shambles in 1770 and O’Reilly was of the opinion that it was not worth 
the expense on materials and labor to replace palisades which quickly rotted, or dig moats 
which silted up.32 He further abandoned the French forts of S t Charles and St. Louis 
along the bend in the river South of the city as S t Louis was rotted and S t Charles was 
little more than a stockade.
The other decision O’Reilly faced was what forts to keep outside of New Orleans. 
The French created a number of forts and “posts” along the Mississippi, then westward 
along the Arkansas and Red Rivers toward Spanish Texas. With the exception of forts 
near Lakes Pontchartrain and the mouth of the Mississippi, the alignment of these posts 
had more to do with the fur trade and Indian diplomacy than they did with the threat of 
any European invasion. Moreover, after his tour of the colony, Ulloa had arranged to have 
a large number of forts built, including one near the Red and Black Rivers (1767) which 
never materialized.
As previously indicated in Chapter Three, O’Reilly kept the forts of S t Jean 
Baptiste in Natchitoches, San Carlos HI de Arkansas, and Forts St. Marie and S t Leon at 
English turn. He also changed the position of Ft. Real Catolica San Carlos which was 
sinking quickly into the mud at the mouth of the Mississippi and rebuilt it at the old
3‘There is a listing also for Don Estevan Mardeffet Layssard.
^Kinnaird. SMV. 2: 147.
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French location for Balize. He used the materials from Ft Real Catolica but did not 
“fortify” Balize. He abandoned Fort S t Gabriel de Manchac across the bayou from the 
abandoned English Fort Bute and a small French fort called Tigouyou on a bayou of the 
same name which connected Lakes Pontchartrain and Maurepas, which was curious 
considering the British penchant to enter the Mississippi via the lakes and the Iberville 
River. He kept Ft. St. Jean to the south of Lake Pontchartrain, though he never sent a full 
company to that location. He also continued the small fort at St. Louis and the stockade 
at Ste. Genevieve. All other forts, French or Spanish, were to be abandoned.
O’Reilly did not really have a chance to thoroughly understand Louisiana’s 
problems though he did a remarkable job considering he was there only one year. Luis de 
Unzaga y Amezaga, given more time and changing circumstances, modified O’Reilly’s 
plan and skirted his regulations. In particular, during the first two years of his tenure, 
Unzaga faced a widening dispute in the Atlantic between Spain and England. At the same 
time he dealt with increasing Indian problems in the west and heightened British activity 
along the Mississippi.
With the increased activity of the British in the Atlantic came reports that the 
British were planning to rebuild Fort Bute at Manchac which they had abandoned in 
1768, taking with them the guns and powder, destroying much of the fort but leaving the 
barracks.33 These last buildings were the ones that John Fitzpatrick and the other English 
merchants salvaged to build the new setdement at Manchac. British Manchac grew
33For more information on Pensacola and Fort Bute see Major General Frederick 
Haldimand Papers, British Museum. Film Ps8 16770(2), Louisiana State Archives, Baton 
Rouge.
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during 1769 and early 1770. Unzaga became increasingly uneasy, sending reports of 
British movements to his superiors. He wrote to Grimaldi that he could not defend the 
long expanse of the Mississippi with such meager troops and equipment. He was 
particularly concerned by the arrival of one thousand British troops to reinforce 
Pensacola. Accompanying the troops were boats with munitions and two frigates which 
had just returned from New York. Unzaga could not help but reflect that these troops 
might be thrust at Louisiana through Manchac and Natchez. He told Grimaldi that: 
“These thoughts revolve in my head everyday so that I may be able to elect the best 
defense should the occasion present itself and as is dictated by my limited prudence and 
experience.34
Unzaga’s fears were well grounded. The British were planning to attack New 
Spain through Louisiana if the Malvinas crisis became a war. Indeed, early the next year 
(1771), General Gage ordered the troops to prepare for an attack on New Orleans and 
mobilized British troops in New York.35
As the Malvinas crisis developed in 1770, an interesting exchange of letters 
ensued between Unzaga, Bucareli and Spain’s Minister Grimaldi. Bucareli reported to 
Grimaldi that he (the Captain-General) did not believe there were really three full 
regiments reinforcing Pensacola but that he instructed Unzaga to “always keep himself
^Unzaga to Grimaldi, June 8,1770, AGL SD 2543, Folio 999.
35See the secret dispatch from Lord Hillsborough to General Gage and his reply in 
Clarence E. Carter, Great Britain and the Illinois Country. 1763-1764. (Washington, 
D.C.: The American Historical Association, 1910),183-184 and James A. James, 
“Spanish Influence in the West During the American Revolution,” MVHR 4 (June, 1917- 
March 1918): 193-194.
273
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
aware of the troops that guard Pensacola although we’re at peace with the English."36 He 
added, that if the British did attack that troops from Havana could never reach New 
Orleans in time to defend it. He was also of the opinion “that the posts in Louisiana only 
serve[d] to sign the frontiers of the dominions of the King in both parts,” an opinion 
shared by Unzaga.37 Grimaldi’s answer to Bucareli and Unzaga was long and involved. 
He agreed with Bucareli that there might not be two battalions at Pensacola, adding 
however, that knowledge gained through London and the current condition in the 
Malvinas made British plans somewhat complex. Further, he made it clear that the King 
saw Louisiana as “useful and convenient” in its position as a buffer between the English 
and New Spain because Louisiana “made it more difficult for illicit commerce to take 
place on the frontier of Mexico and retardfed] the influence of the Indians that are 
situated on Louisiana’s frontiers who [were] provided with munitions [ostensibly by the 
British].” Grimaldi clearly stated twice in the letter that Louisiana’s final fate would be 
decided in peace and not war. He did not feel it would serve the King to mount any 
offensive from the colony.38
The upshot of the Unzaga-Bucarelli-Grimaldi correspondence was that Spain’s 
minister sent another letter to Unzaga which carefully delineated what he should do in 
case the British did actually become belligerent Having consulted O’Reilly, Grimaldi
“ Bucareli to Grimaldi, August 17,1770, AGI, SD 2543, Folio 1003.
37Ibid.
“ Grimaldi to Bucareli, San Lorenzo, October 24,1770, AGI, SD 2543, Folio
1005.
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again advised Unzaga not to worry about any offensive movements against the British, 
cautioning the governor that the King wanted to conserve Louisiana but not at the 
expense of having to “Employ forces there that are more needed in other parts, because 
no matter what, the fate of Louisiana will be decided in peace.” 39 Having received the 
request for troops and munitions from O’Reilly and being informed of the difficulties of 
defense, Grimaldi said he was sending Louisiana another hundred men, 800 guns and 
bayonets, and 1500 cartridge belts. Grimaldi informed the governor that he must try and 
defend the colony with the militia, retreating to Opelousas if the situation grew untenable, 
and admonishing him to begin the production of cattle at that post in case such a move 
was necessary. Given that Unzaga feared the British might outflank him on the way to 
Opelousas from Manchac or Natchez Grimaldi suggested that the governor station a small 
force somewhere along the Manchac-Amite connection. If that didn’t work Unzaga was 
to “conserve his troops” and retire to New Spain. Grimaldi added that he felt the 
Arkansas contingents, with aid from the local Indians, could defend their post or retreat 
toward Natchitoches. If the British threatened Illinois, he contended the men could “flee 
into the arms of the Missouri Indians whose friendship has been earned by his [Pedro 
Piemas’] good treatment” In the meantime, Unzaga was to continue a strict surveillance 
of British movements along the Mississippi.40
39Grimaldi to Unzaga, October 24,1770, AGI, SD 2543, Folio 1007.
40O’Reilly to Grimaldi, June 8, 1770, AGI, SD 2543; O’Reilly to Grimaldi, 
September 30,1770, ibid.; Grimaldi to Unzaga, October 24,1770, ibid., Folio 1007.
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Unzaga reacted to his orders in several ways. In response to the English 
settlement at Manchac, the governor reconstructed old Fort Saint Gabriel de Manchac and 
manned it with Commandant Descoudreaux and a small detachment of soldiers.41 
Descoudreaux’s letters indicate that his orders were to monitor British movements along 
the river and also to keep an eye on Louisiana’s colonists who might be “trading” with the 
British at Manchac (see Chapter Five on Contraband).
Considering the one-thousand men in Pensacola and the possibility of attack by 
Generals Gage and Haldimand, Unzaga ordered his veteran troops to begin training the 
militia.42 Because Grimaldi, Arriaga and Unzaga had reiterated O’Reilly’s order that 
Louisiana have thirteen companies of militia, with three at New Orleans and the other 
nine to be spread throughout the province, Unzaga tried to bring them to full strength by 
recruiting more Frenchmen into the militia companies. Britain was an old enemy to 
France and he felt these appointments would further engender loyalty and gratitude 
toward Spain.43
From March to May of 1770, while he trained the militia at New Orleans, the 
governor also armed the militia along the Mississippi. He sent guns with bayonets, 
cartridges (cartouches which were actually the little paper bags that held the powder), 
flints and belts for ammunition. There were few arms to go around. As Judice mustered
41 Casey, Encyclopedia of Forts. 193.
42Grimaldi to Unzaga, October 24,1770, AGI, Cuba 174, Folio 46.
43Unzaga to Grimaldi, June 30,1770; Grimaldi to Arraiga, October 19,1770, 
Secretaria de Guerra, Florida and Louisiana (1779-1802), AGS in Chlvez, Ultimate Gift. 
61.
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his militia, Unzaga sent more arms to the Iberville district through Pierre Brasseau, this 
time 30 muskets with Bayonets, “cartridges,” and belts with tin buckles. Commandant, 
and Captain of the Militia, Louis Judice, notified Unzaga that he had received the 
weapons and munitions and was preparing the men at the Acadian Coast (La Fourche de 
Chitemachas) to fight He had named three sergeants, four first class corporals and four 
second class corporals to the militia and stood poised for orders. The same was true for 
most of the posts. There were no bright uniforms and bright shiny buttons to go around. 
Every freeholder was expected to do his share.44
In order to receive a land grant from the Spanish government a colonist in 
Louisiana had to agree to serve in the militia. Those who chose to become captains of the 
militia stood to gain even more land in exchange for their position and responsibility.
The difference in land between a regular militia man and his officer was considerable. On 
the land grant maps the acreage commonly given to colonists on average was 
approximately 414 acres. Officers and commandants, however, commanded acreage 
anywhere from 1423.27 acres (a former French commandant) to 2,269 acres (Joseph 
Alexander Declout).45
“ Judice to Unzaga, March 28,1770, AGI Cuba, 188-A, Folio 1 d/2 and Unzaga to 
Dutisnd, May 27,1770, AGI, Cuba 193b, Folio 287.
45Acreage differences began in the French period but were amplified by the land 
grant system used under the Spanish administration, such was the case for Declouet who 
gained his large acreage in a land grant by Luis de Unzaga in May of 1772. See Gertrude 
Taylor Land Grants Along the Teche: Port Barre to S t Martinville (Lafavette. LA: 
Attakapas Historical Association, 1979).
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Positions in the militia were requisite but also desired. The commandants took 
their positions seriously and militia men who were unruly or recalcitrant were often 
disciplined. Those not showing up for militia drills were considered AWOL and would 
be “called upon” by their neighbors. If a colonist refused to serve he stood a good 
possibility of losing his land.4*5
While the commandants organized their militia units, Unzaga, amplified the 
troops at English Turn, bringing the total soldiers to 100 men (a full company). To 
enhance the defense of New Orleans, he placed eighteen, six-pounder canons on carriages 
by the city gates and gathered others into an artillery park.47 He also refurbished the 
defenses at Ft. S t Jean on Lake Pontchartrain, with cannon and a sergeant’s guard. It was 
essentially a facade, but the men might act as a warning in case of a large British foray 
through the lakes.48
There is no discussion in Unzaga’s correspondence of manning the small 
fortifications at Tigouyou, though it would not have been too difficult to send a sergeant 
and a few soldiers to scout the area from Spanish Manchac. A glance at a map of the area 
does afford a plausible explanation for this oversight. The Isle of Orleans, given to Spain
wEven as late as 1775 the commandants held their men responsible and drilled 
them every week. When Simon Broussard refused to appear before Alexandre DeClouet 
for drill, the governor and the Commandant gave orders to evict him from his land. 
DeClouet to Unzaga, May 1,1775, AGI, Cuba 189-B, Folio 234.
47Casey, Encyclopedia of Forts. 133.
^For a description of the fort in 1770, see Pittman, European Settlements. Also 
see Edna B. Freiberg, Bavou St. John in Colonial Louisiana. 1699-1803. (New Orleans: 
Freiberg, 1980) for a further history of the area.
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during the Treaty of Paris in 1763, was the only Spanish territory which lay east of the 
Mississippi. Located just south of the lakes it actually had formed a barrier of its own. 
Only the western portion of the Isle was habitable and arable, constituting the German 
and Acadian coasts. The eastern (or perhaps a better description is northern) portions 
were swamps which impeded travel and therefore attack. Also, while the “Iberville” was 
accessible it was not always navigable which meant a British advance up the rivers would 
have to be planned and executed “in season.” It is quite possible that Unzaga determined 
that the land along the Manchac-Amite Rivers, would be a form of natural protection 
augmented by the re-establishment of the Fort at Spanish Manchac and therefore did not 
expend soldiers or money on Tigouyou.
Little could be done with the mouth of the Mississippi. The new fort built by 
O’Reilly was not a real fortification although it had men and cannon to defend the mouth 
of the river. The Balize stood primarily as a sentinel checking the ingress and egress of 
shipping up and down the river and providing pilot services. The buildings at Balize 
suffered severe weather damage as did the cannon.
To complete his preparation at New Orleans, Unzaga decided that part of a good 
defense was to use the British visiting at New Orleans to obtain information rather than 
try to restrict their entry. La addition, as early as 1770 he began surveillance of the British 
colonists who left F t Pitt to settle the Natchez area. To further facilitate his vigil, the
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governor gave unwitting and un-licensed British merchants permission to sail up the river 
and often invited them to dine with him in New Orleans before progressing up river.49
Turning his attention back up-river to the areas near Manchac Unzaga 
encountered more difficulties. The post of Pointe Couple (just across from Bayou Sara) 
had a militia but little fortification other than a rough quadrangle surrounded by a 
stockade.50 This was not unusual. Many of Louisiana’s posts were litde more than the 
commandant’s house, his crib which was used as the local jail, and his bam, which served 
to billet soldiers in time of crisis,al though the local militia lived in their own homes.
Point Coupde was just another loose pearl on a broken string along Louisiana’s British 
frontier. The posts at Opelousas (Attakapas) and the German Coasts, held little in the 
way of defense other than the local militia. There is no evidence that any of these smaller 
areas even had more than a small palisade built during Unzaga’s tenure. All rotted 
quickly into nothing by Galvez’s term in office.
Northward, at Arkansas, a detachment of the Louisiana Fixed Regiment manned 
the post on the Red River. As previously described, however, Arkansas post was not well 
fortified nor populated. Grimaldi’s instruction to engage the Indians in its defense was 
built on faulty knowledge. The English had already established a settlement at the mouth 
of the White River near Arkansas post. The Quapaws with whom Arkansas had had a 
monopoly, were also trading with the British. Furthermore, in the summer of 1770,
49Commandant Juan Delavillebeauvre (Balize) to Unzaga, December 28,1770, 
AGI, Cuba 188; Unzaga to Delavillebeauvre, December 31,1770, ibid.; Cummins, 
Spanish Observers. 14-15.
^Casev. Encyclopedia of Forts. 162.
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Englishmen openly began to settle among the Quapaws. Demaselli&res could do little 
about it with so few troops.51 It was not realistic, therefore, to depend upon the 
ministrations or loyalty of the Quapaw. It was far better to plan a retreat toward 
Natchitoches and eventually Spanish Texas.
At St. Louis and Ste. Genevieve the situation also was different from what 
Grimaldi had thought. Piemas received Grimaldi’s orders from Unzaga in February of 
1771. In April, the Lieutenant-Governor informed his superior that he would follow 
Grimaldi’s orders, adding that he had little confidence, however, in the Missouri Indians. 
He wrote that the Indians’ loyalties shifted to the person or persons who most recently 
had given them gifts “without paying any attention to what they had received before, even 
though it might have been a thousand times more.”52 In another letter he explained that 
he also hesitated to retreat into a group of “miserable and irrational Indian nations” (the 
Missouri and Little Osage) who to Piemas were traitors because they were favorably 
“inclined toward the English for the last four to five years.” If the colonists did setde 
among these tribes, he stated, they would still be at the mercy of other tribes who were 
friendly with the British and were already attacking the Missouri.53
The last post Unzaga concerned himself with was Natchitoches. Fort S t Jean 
Baptiste was erected by the French in 1716 on a site settled by Louis Juchereau St. Denis
5IAmold, Colonial Arkansas. 109.
52Unzaga to Pedro Piemas, February 15,1771, AGI, SD 2543; Piemas to Unzaga, 
April 26,1771, AGI, Cuba 81.
53Piemas to Unzaga, June 12,1771, AGI, Cuba 81.
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two years earlier. Located first on a small island in the Red River it was relocated on the 
river’s west bank, somewhere between the 1720s and 1740s. Like the Balize fort, San 
Carlos El Real, the original fort experienced the same problem of its stockade literally 
sinking into the mud.54
In the Spring of 1770 the garrison at Natchitoches held a captain, two lieutenants 
and fifty soldiers under the command of Lieutenant-Governor Athanase de M6zi£res. 
Mounted on a small hill, the fort was basically a square palisade and a shallow moat 
which enclosed a number of cannons, the commandant’s house at one end, a powder 
magazine, guard house and soldier’s barracks.55 Natchitoches, as Ft. St. Jean Baptiste 
was commonly known, served mostly to deflect Indian attacks because of its western 
location. Still it was to Natchitoches that Unzaga and his men might have to go in case of 
an attack from the east
In the summer of 1771, Unzaga had prepared the colony for the coming onslaught 
and modified Grimaldi’s instructions in light of local conditions. He informed Arriaga 
that the roads from New Orleans to the Attakapas Post and Opelousas areas were clear 
and readied for troop movements or a forced retreat.56 4
In September of 1771 fifteen families from the Carolinas came down the 
Mississippi from the Missouri Area to settle at Natchez and Baton Rouge. Upon 
questioning the captain of the boat, the Spanish were informed that another fifty families
^Casev. Encyclopedia of Forts. 194-195.
55Pittman, European Settlements. 32; Casey, Encyclopedia of Forts. 196.
^Arriaga to Unzaga, June 20,1771, AGL Cuba 174, Folio 60.
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were to follow. Unzaga knew that more English settlers boded ill for Louisiana. More 
settlement meant more more English shipping on the river and more contraband.
Minister of the Indies Arriaga warned that Spain, and therefore Louisiana’s Governor, 
could do little but watch and wait57 Unzaga personally disagreed. The new settlements 
posed a direct threat to Louisiana and exacerbated the Indian difficulties along the 
Mississippi. Contraband would heighten and British tribes would plague the river.
The governor continued his surveillance as ordered. He gleaned information from 
incoming settlers and merchants alike. Sometimes the information was important and 
sometimes the information was faulty. Such was the case in 1772 when the British 
attempted to enforce the Quartering Act in New England. A French spy named Surriret 
had observed General Gage’s consolidation of the British forces, and their reassignment 
to New York.58 By the time Unzaga received the news it had been inflated to a British 
attack on New York.59 Despite the falsity of the information Spain continued to read all 
reports sent from its governors about the English with the inference being that it was the 
Spanish government, not its colonial administrators, who would make the final decision 
on what was important or unimportant Surriret did however, provide detailed plans of 
the British fort on Santa Rosa Island and calmed Spanish fears that the reinforcements at
^Bucareli to Arriaga, September 30,1771, AGI, SD 1211, Folio 49 and Arriaga to 
Unzaga, March 21,1772, Ibid, sin numero.
^ ‘Noticias adquiridos de los vecinos colonias ingleeses por Mr. Suriret vecino de 
Punta Cordtado...,” October 2,1772, AGL Cuba 1146.
59Unzaga to Arriaga, Three Letters in October 2, 14, and 24, 1772, AGL SD 1211.
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Pensacola were directed at Spain. Gage was trying to shore up his defenses of British sea 
lanes around Jamaica.60
In 1772, Lieutenant-governor Pedro Piemas wrote from St. Louis that the English 
were busily reinforcing Ft. Chartres. His suspicions were correct and Louisiana had to 
fend off a small attack by Jean Marie Ducharme (on behalf of the English) in 1772. The 
St. Louis militia, under Pierre Laclede, defended its post and ran Ducharmd off, capturing 
his supplies and equipment and a number of his men. Unzaga’s and O’Reilly’s faith in a 
militia of men defending their homes appeared to be well founded.61 By 1773 
surveillance by Captain-General de la Torre in the Caribbean and Unzaga in North 
America indicated that a direct English threat no longer existed. Spain’s ministers 
concurred.62 The decision Grimaldi and Unzaga feared never had to be made. The 
Malvinas crisis passed and England and Spain once again entered an uneasy truce. 
Despite peace, Unzaga continued his efforts to spy on the British and to man the colony’s 
forts against any possible attack
During the three years of the Malvinas crisis, as well as in the years of peace that 
followed, Unzaga was also required to deal with the day-to-day military matters, 
including arguments between and with the post commandants regarding their men and 
their territory, and the continued arming and drilling of the militia. This was exacerbated
“ Cummins, British Observers. 23.
6lFor a complete account of the Ducharme invasion see Abraham Pedro Nasatir, 
“Ducharmd’s invastion of Missouri,” Missouri Historical Review. 24,1 (October, 1929): 
3-25,2 (January, 1930): 238-60; and 3 (April, 1930): 420-39.
“ Torre to Unzaga, January 25,1773, AGL Cuba 1146.
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by increasing desertions and debilitating illness in the ranks. Last but not least were 
monthly promotions and re-assignments. Examples of each follow.
In May of 1770, Louis Judice on the Acadian Coast and Nicolas Verret at S t 
James began to argue over the boundary between their militia districts. Before O’Reilly 
refigured the parishes, St. James and the Acadian Coast (La Fourche) had been one large 
piece. Without firm boundary marks it was easy for the men to usurp each other’s 
territory. The controversy continued into June when Unzaga finally told both 
commandants that he would not rule on the dispute until both of them reported to him at 
New Orleans. He was busy with far more pressing affairs. It was not until October that 
Unzaga finally settled a definitive boundary between the militia districts for St. James and 
the Acadian Coast63
Constant illness among the soldiers continued from O’Reilly’s time into 
Unzaga’s tenure. Ships commonly left Louisiana with sick men to be returned to Havana, 
and from there to Spain. Some of Louisiana’s troops fell sick on the way to the fixed 
battalion, convalescing in Havana before proceeding to their final destination. This was 
the rotation problem inherent in much of Latin America.64
“ Judice to Unzaga, May 3,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio 1 d/7; Nicolas Verret to 
Luis de Unzaga, May 21,170, ibid, Foliol d/40; Unzaga to Verret, June 2, 1770, ibid; and 
declaration of Unzaga, October 10,1770, ibid, Folio 1 d/29.
wSee the notices from Antonio Jos6 de Aguiar regarding the sick prisoners in 
Havana waiting to be shipped to Louisiana. Aguiar to Josd Fajordo y Cobarruvias, April 
6,1772, AGI, Cuba 585, Folio 292. Louisiana paid for her sick soldiers, whether they 
were in Havana or New Orleans! See ibid., Folios 293,294 and 295.
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The worst problem affecting troops’ stability-both regular and militia men-was 
desertion. Desertion was already common when Unzaga took office. It became a more 
serious offence with a possible British attack in the offing. In September of 1770, 
Commandant and Militia Captain Louis Judice reported to the governor that a man 
without a passport had turned up at the post. Charles Bernard Lancelot, turned out to be a 
deserter. Judice arrested Lancelot and then sent him with three men (corporal Charles 
Babin, and two fusiliers (men who had muskets named Joseph Landrie and Joseph Babin) 
to take the malapert back to New Orleans.65 Lancelot died on the way to New Orleans 
and Judice ordered the militia Sergeant to pay the three soldiers for their time and trouble. 
Judice then apparently billed the governor for the cost of the escort In a curt letter, 
accusing his commandant of naivete and possible incompetence, Unzaga informed Judice 
that he must set an example and not allow this kind of laxity to create vagabonds and 
deserters and refused to refund Judice for his own negligence.
The government frowned heavily on desertion but it was such a prominent feature 
that it became a fact of life for Louisiana’s governors. Hardship posts like Manchac and 
Arkansas frequently reported deserters. Soldiers already disgruntled with being stationed 
in Louisiana found appointments to the outlying posts particularly distasteful. Manchac 
was a particularly easy place from which to “disappear.” It took very little for a soldier to 
“jump pirogue” as they called it and cross the river to the English where they could
"Judice to Unzaga, September 2,1770, AGL Cuba 188-A, Folio 1 d/23.
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readily go to work for local planters, moving up and down river to escape Spanish 
patrols.66
Soldiers fleeing from New Spain sometimes made their way across into 
Natchitoches and then up to the Arkansas post Unzaga warned the commandant there to 
return such men at once. Other men deserted and disappeared into the abundant 
wilderness west and north. These men frequently became the half-wild hunters that 
haunted the Arkansas post.67
Deserters who roamed the countryside around the Mississippi could be spotted 
more easily because moving from place to place within the colony required a passport 
from the governor. This was not new. The Superior Council had decreed in 1723 that 
passports were required for intra-colonial travel, even from post to post. Under Spanish 
governance travelers also were required to have passports and if they journeyed by boat 
were required to be licensed for such vehicles. It was quite easy, therefore, to distinguish 
legal travelers on business from ne’er-do-wells roaming the countryside-if you were
66Thomas de Acoste, the new commandant at Manchac advised Unzaga in March 
of 1775 that a new recruit, Bernardo NiPie(last name distorted) had arrived at the fort 
only to “jump pirogue” to the English side. Weeks later they were still chasing the culprit 
and the records do not indicate that they ever caught him and he remained working for the 
English somewhere near Pointe Coupde. In the end Acoste was forced to return the pay of 
12 pesos allotted for NiPie to the governor and asked for a replacement for the deserter. 
Thomas de Acoste to Unzaga, March 4,1775, AGI, Cuba 81, Folio 94; and Acoste to 
Unzaga, March 18, 1775, ibid., Folio 95 and 96.
61 See Arnold, Colonial Arkansas, for descriptions of the kinds of men who 
became hunters.
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diligent in your duty. Passports and licenses also enabled the governor to keep track of 
Louisiana’s citizens and their movements in an impossibly huge colony.68
Requiring and monitoring passports was good, in theory, and Unzaga enforced it 
vigorously. The reality of the immensity of the colony, however, meant that people could 
blend into the background and as long as they hired out as menial labor they could 
“escape” for years at a time. It took several months to track down most deserters. Most 
were found in the next post or in a small settlement nearby. Still others who trekked into 
the wilderness found death instead of solace. Lastly there were those who actual escaped 
and were never brought to trial. In August of 1770, during the Malvinas crisis, four 
artillery men and one infantry man deserted in a pirogue and were never captured. Again 
in January of 1771, Francisco Moreno, Sergeant of the Louisiana Regiment, deserted and 
was never captured.69
Of the sixty-two military hearings covered by Derek N. Kerr, in “Petty Felony, 
Slave Defiance and a Frontier Villany: Crime and Criminal Justice in Spanish Louisiana, 
1770-1803,” the offence of desertion was second only to “unknown” during Unzaga's 
tenure, amounting to only fifteen actual court cases. Desertion carried a number of 
sentences. Kerr indicates that deserters could expect anything from remittance (return to
“ See the Decree of the Louisiana Superior Council, November 13,1723, AC, A 
23:43-43vo; and Perier and La Chaise to the Company of the Indies, March 25,1729, AC, 
C 13a, 11:322; See a list of passports and licenses issued to colonists in 1771, AGL Cuba 
110, Folio 757.
“ “Dispatches,” Court Report 8/31/1770, Vol. m, 4; Ibid, Report 1/15/1771, Vol.
ffl, 21.
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duty) to deportation and imprisonment at Morro Castle in Havana.70 Examples are Juan 
Gallardo and Francisco Ochaita of the Louisiana Regiment who deserted from 
Natchitoches in 1769 and were not caught until 1772. When they were tried in New 
Orleans and remitted to their original post.71 Another interesting incident surrounds Jean 
Roubier who deserted in April of 1773 and then again in June of 1775. Upon leaving the 
second time he hid aboard an English ship leaving the colony but was found at Bayou 
Saint John. Surprisingly, Roublier was remanded to Puerto Rico to become part of the 
fixed regiment there.72
In the first year of his tenure Unzaga frequently returned deserters to Havana as 
many had come from that post Many of those desertions were sailors like Miguel Lopez 
whom Unzaga remanded to the Captain-General of Havana for arraignment and 
sentencing.73 Records indicate that in Cuba, deserters were treated to several different 
sentences such as imprisonment or the Royal Works (hard labor) rebuilding Havana’s 
fortifications and public works. Of interest is the difference in sentencing between 
deserters from New Orleans and those from outlying posts. All of the deserters from
70Derek N. Kerr’s coverage of military trials during Unzaga’s period, in “Petty 
Felony,” was based on the Dispatches of the Spanish Governors of Louisiana.Volumes 2- 
6.
7I“Dispatches,” 4:44.
^Ibid, 5:2 and 51.; the Dispatches lists his final desertion as 1776 but there is a 
letter from the Marquds de Torre to Arriaga which indicates that Juan Rubier was already 
in custody in 1775 and that Torre had been chastised for allowing the second desertion. 
Torre to Arriaga, November 3,1775, AGL Cuba 1221, Folio 982.
73Kerr, ‘Tetty Felony,” 382 and Unzaga to Bucareli, May 27, 1770, AGL Cuba 
1055, Folio 108.
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places like Natchitoches were remitted, perhaps a fitting sentence in itself. Others from 
the regiment or navy at New Orleans were more severely punished. The worst 
punishment seems to have been eight years in the Fixed Regiment of Puerto Rico for 
desertion of post and taking refugee in a church.74 Unzaga rewarded those persons who 
sheltered a deserter with six years of service in the royal dockyard at Havana.75
Monetary punishments awaited the regiments and officers who allowed the 
desertion to happen. Pay for deserters had to be returned and regiments could be back- 
billed for such costs. An example is a document from Miguel Almonares in 1773, which 
deducted the pay of nine soldiers who deserted backward to the date of their desertion in 
1770.76 While this may seem harsh considering the lack of money actually sent to support 
the regiment many commandants apparently reported deserters as sick in order to 
continue collecting their pay.77
A glance at the communications between the governors of Havana and Louisiana 
indicate that there was a continual turnover of deserters shipped from Havana to 
Louisiana, as punishment. Then many of those men were shipped to Puerto Rico, again 
as punishment An assignment to the Caribbean was not the best place to be. However, 
an appointment to Louisiana was close to the worst, apparently followed by Puerto Rico.
74This case was against Teodoro Medina, Juan A. Pombo, and Juan GonzSlez of 
the Louisiana Regiment, in Kerr, “Petty Felony,” 387, found in Dispatches, 6: 52.
75Ibid, 6:46.
76“Lista y Carta sobre battalion de Luisiana,” Miguel Almonares, May 8,1773 and 
18 May, 1773, AGL Cuba 1221, Folios 448,449.
^Ibid.
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A letter from Captain-General de la Torre to Arriaga in 1774 gives some insight 
into the real cause of desertions from Havana and Louisiana. Torre informed the Minister 
of the Indies that he had received three hundred and forty-three military deserters shipped 
from La Coruna, Spain, “to serve in the fixed regiment of this Island (Cuba), and the 
Province of Louisiana” Two of them had already deserted a second time in Puerto Rico 
and another fifty-eight were in the hospital at the same place. These Spanish deserters 
were being punished by assignment to the Dragoons, Artillery and the Fixed Battalion of 
Louisiana! Torre further argued that he needed more men, deserters or not, to support the 
fixed regiment of Havana.78
In 1775 the receipt of deserters continued. Treasurer Martin Navarro wrote in May 
to Cuba that the Louisiana Battalion had received its recruits from La Coruna. After 
settling the troops in he wrote that they were missing a deserter from the regiment of 
Toledo, one Andres Negro, who, after resting in Puerto Rico, finally arrived in August. 
Another, unexpected deserter named Diego Fernandes turned up without papers in June 
of 1775 demanding pay and a position in the Fixed Regiment Navarro was informed that 
he was one of 24 deserters destined for the New Orleans Regiment but had to recuperate 
briefly in Havana before joining his companions in their new location.79
^ o r re  to Arriaga, July 6,1774, AGI, Cuba 1219, Folio 681.
^Martin Navarro to Josd Fajardo y Coborruvias, May 15,1775, AGI, Cuba 585, 
Folio 333; Fajardo to Navarro, June 8, 1775, ibid, Folio 334 and Navarro to Fajardo, 
August 5,1775, ibid, Folio 335. A rich source of information on the receipt of deserters 
and their consequences can be found in AGI, Cuba 1054.
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Desertion and the constant exchange of men became such a time consuming and 
confusing task that the Governor General of Havana finally promulgated a document in 
1776 which covered all such men and gave explicit instructions for handling and 
punishing deserters. It also listed penalties for those who induced them to desert or 
harbored them. For knowing the whereabouts of a deserter and not denouncing him a 
commoner served four years in the deserter’s own regiment or the same amount of time in 
the work projects of the King. Noblemen were to be sent to a presidio in the Americas. 
Persons aiding a deserter were sentenced to six years of service in the arsenals or public 
works and if noble, six years in the Americas. If a woman, she was to be fined 30 pesos 
and if too poor would be sent to jail. The same penalties applied to those who induced 
soldiers or sailors to desert80
Monetary rewards awaited colonists and military personnel who helped the crown 
retrieve the scoundrels. Those who captured and turned deserters to their proper 
regiments were to be awarded twelve pesos, and six pesos went to those who established 
their whereabouts. A per diem expense of twelve pesos was also available for the 
maintenance and transportation of such prisoners (something Unzaga had steadfastly 
refused to do in Louisiana). Militia men capturing deserters were awarded two more 
years on their pension after twenty years of service plus sixteen pesos in hand. The latter 
was probably more of an incentive. Interestingly, the regiment of the deserter was to be 
billed for all expenses incurred to apprehend him. The list goes on to punish judges with
“ Orders of the Marquis de la Torre, Captain General of the Island of Cuba, “Sobre 
Desertores del Exercito y de la Armada,” July 6,1776, AGI, Cuba 1221, Cartas y Bando 
1134.
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the loss of their jobs and threatens captains of ships with six years in jail and trial in a 
military court for aiding and abetting.81
A different and even more important kind of desertion haunted Unzaga between 
1772 and 1773. Louisiana’s defenses rested heavily on its militia and therefore the 
governor needed to keep colonists in their respective areas of settlement in order to 
distribute the responsibility. In 1772 the Acadians in St. James Parish began seeking 
permission to leave the colony or to change their place of residence to move near family. 
They were unhappy with their land grants, with the requirements of military service in 
order to have land, and most of all with new taxes and requests to build a church in the 
area. The Acadians petitioned the governor through their commandant for permission to 
move some families near relatives in the LaFourche district and for others to leave the 
colony for Saint Domingue.82
While the bureaucracy digested the information, the families negotiated with a 
captain for passage out of Louisiana. Unzaga did not wish for them to leave because they 
presented a sizeable force against the English across the river. He threatened them with 
having to return the money invested in them by the Spanish Crown. In response, the 
Acadians claimed that they feared the local Indian tribes and that they had been given 
worthless lands. He still refused them passage.83 Undeterred, the Acadians had a few 
tricks in store for the governor. They immediately abandoned their lands in St James
81Ibid.
“ Judice to Unzaga, September 1,1772, AGL Cuba 189-A Folio 435.
wJudice to Unzaga, September 20 1772, AGI, Cuba 189A  Folio 436.
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rather than contribute to the church, moving illegally into Dusting’s district at LaFourche. 
From La Fourche, the Acadians requested Dusting’s permission to join their families in 
the Opelousas district. Unzaga restrained the urge to summarily arrest them. Instead he 
denied them permission to migrate. Dustisng wrote that he had finally convinced them to 
stay in the Iberville district84 The dispute continued to spread. The Acadians at 
Opelousas now argued about paying the cost of building a church. When that didn’t work 
they argued that the destruction of the hurricane of 1773 had devastated their land, life 
was too hard and they wanted permission to relocate to Cap Frangais, Saint Domingue-or 
the Attakapas district, which ever the governor would allow. Permission for either was 
denied. The Acadians finally gave up their hopes to migrate to Saint Domingue and 
seemed to settle down, disgustedly, on their appointed land grants.85
These stubborn settlers were not done with the governor yet Some of them sold 
their property without authorization and moved to Attakapas without a passport Judice 
urged the governor to punish one such colonist a Pierre Guidry. Unzaga complied but 
realized he was righting a losing battle. Rather than keep the countryside in an uproar 
and continue a useless struggle, he began slowly to grant a limited amount of immigration
“ Judice to Unzaga, March 2,1773, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 472; Dutisn6 to 
Unzaga, March 2,1773, AGL Cuba 189-A, Folio 358, Unzaga to Dutisnd, March 4,1773, 
AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 359; and AGL Cuba 193-B, Folios 250 and 252.
“ Unzaga to Dutisnd, March 1,1773, AGL Cuba 193-B, Folio 252; Unzaga to 
Dutisnd, April 1,1773, AGL Cuba 193-B, Folio 248.
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from one district to the next This prevented mass desertion and actually balanced out in 
the long run.86
Louisiana’s soldiers continually presented Unzaga with daily problems. Charges 
against soldiers and sailors, other than desertion, consisted of vicious behavior, theft, 
perjury, robbery, smuggling, leaving their posts, sheltering deserters, and, amusingly, 
being a “bad influence” on the Louisiana Regiment because of their past criminal records. 
Salvador Alvarez, Tom£s Camparolas, Juan Martmez, and Manuel Gatica, the soldiers 
charged with this last misdeed, could not have been too bad an influence as they were 
returned to service.87
The regular army also required day-to-day supervision of a different sort Many 
regimental men maintained a respectable life in the military and in time deserved pay 
raises and promotions. Several of the original officers brought with Ulloa, Lieutenant 
Pedro Piemas and Sub-lieutenants Jos6 Orieta, remained in the colony and received 
promotions under O’Reilly to captain and lieutenant. Others who came with the Captain 
General in 1769 received promotions such as the newly appointed Captains Fernando de 
Leyba and Francisco Cruzat, and Brevet Captain Francisco Bouligny, who became a 
major figure in Louisiana’s history. Many sergeants were married and did not womanize 
or drink terribly and many enlisted men followed their lead.88
“ Judice to Unzaga, February 7,1774, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 531; Unzaga to 
Dutisnd, February 18,1774, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 390.
‘"Kerr, 385-388.
“ Din, “Protecting the ‘Barrera’,” 191-92. In 1776 Orieta died while acting 
commandant of Arkansas Post, Unzaga to Sergeant Lucas Garcia, New Orleans, July 4,
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These men were willing joined by French army officers such as Francois 
Demasillidres, Francois Coulon de Villiers, and Jean de la Villebeauvre (seen as 
Delavillebeauvre in Spanish documents) who helped form the newly created Louisiana 
battalion. In some ways Frenchmen were less likely to cause trouble because they 
frequently had families and others were at least “connected” by family to the colony.
This family connection offered a support system outside the barracks and the corps.
These Frenchmen helped the Spanish maintain control through their knowledge of the 
colony and their understanding of its inhabitants.89
Soldiers in Spanish Louisiana expected pay raises and promotions for consecutive 
and distinguished service. Rising in the ranks depended on a number of things including 
seniority, ability, education, social standing and service. Seniority was extremely 
important among the officers. Many petitioned the Crown for promotions with the help 
of the local lieutenant governor, governor or captain-general when they (the soldiers)
1776, AGI, Cuba, 189-B; also see John Franics McDermott, “The Myth of the ‘Imbecile 
Governor’: Captian Fernando de Leyba and the Defense of St. Louis in 1780,” in The 
Spanish in the Mississippi Valiev. 1762-1804. ed. John Francis McDermott (Urbana, 
1974), 314-91; and Din and Nasatir, Imperial Qsages. 96-116, and 131-82 for Cruzats 
services as lieutenant governor in the 1770s and 1780s; see Gilbert C. Din, Francisco 
Boulirav: A Bourbon Soldier in Spanish Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1993).
^Gilbert C. Din, ‘“For Defense of Country and the Glory of Arms:’ Army 
Officers in Spanish Louisiana, 1766-1803,” Unpublished article, March, 2000.
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thought it was time for advancement90 Later in the Spanish period some men were even 
able to purchase their offices to ensure promotion.91
Because of the small size of Louisiana’s army (during Unzaga’s time it was only 
one battalion) promotion depended on more than seniority. Command was measured by 
more than the ability to endure and stay out of trouble. For officers to be promoted they 
must educate themselves and, according to some historians, they had to speak Spanish. 
While this last requirement may have been true during Galvez’s time and after, it was not 
heavily enforced during Unzaga’s tenure.92 The period from 1770 to 1776 contains a 
large number of instances where the governor communicated with his men in French 
and several of them were promoted despite the language barrier.93 Men who became 
commandants (and therefore officers in the militia) during Unzaga’s era found in some 
instances that being able to speak only Spanish was a handicap, especially when dealing 
with the Indians.94 Also, during Unzaga’s governorship, many French army officers who
^See Din, Francisco Boulignv. 121-27, 172-73 and Janet Fireman, The Spanish 
Corps of Engineers in the Western Borderlands: Instrument of Bourbon Reform. 1764- 
1815 (Glendale, CA: A. H. Clark Company, 1977), 45, regarding replacement of ability 
for seniority.
91See O’Reilly to Jos6 de Gflvez, May 7,1779, AGI, SD 2662 regarding prices for 
such offices.
92Din made this point about language twice, once in his paper with Janet Fireman 
on the Corps of Engineers and again in his work on the Cabildo.
93The great majority of Unzaga’s letters to Commandants Judice, Dutisn6, Verret, 
Fusilier de la Claire, and Logny are in French.
94The Indians at Arkansas Post announced to the governor that they thought very 
little of the Commandant who could not speak French “the language of trade.” See 
Chapter Six.
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opted for service under O’Reilly, realistically, took awhile to gain significant command of 
the language. That would have more easily been done by young cadets who entered the 
service at 16 years of age, or sometimes earlier.
A post at the plana mayor or headquarters, however, was different In order to 
saber despachar, (process paperwork) in a Spanish army knowledge the language was, of 
course, a must. Headquarters personnel in 1776 included a Teniente Coronel (Lieutenant 
Colonel), under whom served in descending order, an ayudante mayor (adjutant major), 
two subtenientes Banderas (Flag Sub-lieutenants), a Capuchin Father Francisco de 
Caldas, a Cirujano (Surgeon), a Tamborilero (drummer), two Ptfanos (fifers) and an 
Armero (gunsmith). The officers included, notably, only one Frenchman, Flag 
Sublieutenant Raimundo Dubr^vil.95
Promotion also depended upon social status. Status in turn depended on your 
family, your comportment and your marriage. If a soldier wished to become an officer he 
must not only be educated, but also maintain an unblemished record of service to the 
crown, and associate with the right people. Unblemished was a relative term in frontier 
post assignments where small acts of misconduct were often overlooked or deliberately 
kept off the record if the men were otherwise good soldiers. The fact that so many 
military court cases carry the term “unknown” under the charge bespeaks the need to 
guard the future of such men.
95“Carta y listas de Batalion de Unzaga,” April 27, 1776, AGL SD 2661, Folios 
118-124.
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Marriages, on the other hand, were extremely important and the proper wife was 
crucial. Unzaga (having married a local girl himself) encouraged marriage among his 
troops and personally oversaw the marriages of his officers. He investigated the 
background of any young woman marrying an officer, including her birth, her family 
connections, and her "limpieza de sangre” or purity of blood. A good example is the 
case of Jacinto Panis, Captain of the Infantry and First Ayudante Mayor in New Orleans. 
He applied to Unzaga to marry Margarita Wiltz in February of 1776. The girl’s father 
was deceased but Unzaga had both the girl and the mother investigated. He assured 
himself, through character witnesses and baptismal records, that the conduct of both 
women was good, that they had “limpieza de sa n g reand that they were of the “proper 
station” (property owners with slaves) to advance his officer’s career. After several 
months of questioning witnesses he finally forwarded Panis’ request for permission to 
marry to O’Reilly96 Jacinto Panis’ case was common and other requests for marriage by 
Louisiana’s officers were handled similarly. The governor wanted his officers to advance 
and realized that they might be transferred elsewhere where their marriage would be 
closely scrutinized.97
^Jacinto Panis to Unzaga, Februay 15,1776, AGL SD 2547, Folio 4; attendant 
documents dated February 16, 1776 include, a statement by Unzaga on the conduct and 
bloodline of the two women, a certificate of ownership of property and slaves and another 
certifying the bride-to-be’s birth records by the local priest The final attachment, dated 
April 12,1776 contains the answers of witnesses to Margarita’s character.
^The same legajo holds several applications for marriage by Unzaga’s officers, 
induing that of the Lieutenant of the 6* company, Manuel Perez who wished to wed a 
young French woman named Juana Catalina Dubois, Perez to Unzaga, March 5,1776, 
AGL SD 2547, Folio 153. Juana went through the same examination suffered by 
Margarita. The testimony of her character fills twenty folios (Nos. 30-50) in the legajo.
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Unzaga stayed busy during his tenure promoting many such men. One of his 
happiest requests for promotion was that of Captain Pedro Piemas to Lieutenant Colonel. 
In March of 1776, he forwarded Piemas’ documents and service record to O’Reilly, with 
his recommendation.98 Apparently the governor considered O’Reilly and Arriaga his 
superiors where military matters were concerned and totally bypassed the Captain- 
General in Havana on such matters. All of the military promotions and pay raises in 
Louisiana under Unzaga were signed by these two men.
This infraction of the chain of command clearly infuriated the Captain-General in 
Havana. In June of 1774 he wrote a terse letter to Arriaga blasting Unzaga’s improper 
behavior and reminding the Minister of the Indies that as Captain-General in Cuba, he (de 
la Torre), held the right not only to approve criminal processes in Louisiana but also 
“promotions, graduations, merits and other graces for soldiers.” Torre maintained that 
such promotions were the right of the position of Captain-General yet the only dispatch 
for such promotions which had “passed through his hands” was that which raised Unzaga 
to Brigadier. He also whined to Arriaga that he didn’t see where it was an inconvenience 
for such orders or promotions to be sent from Spain through him to Louisiana.99 Unzaga 
answered this complaint by sending a copy of all his requests for promotion to the 
Captain-General while he continued to send the requests directly to O’Reilly the man he 
obviously considered his superior, even after he assumed the governor’s seat.
"Unzaga to O’Reilly, March 5, 1776, AGL SD 2547, Folio 152 with attachments. 
"Torre to Arriaga, June 10,1774, AGI, Cuba 1219, Folio 676.
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Like his officers, Unzaga also wished promotion and recognition. One of the 
greatest recognitions an officer could get was admission into one of the “orders” or 
brotherhoods in Spain. In August of 1776 he wrote Minister of the Indies, Jos6 de 
Galvez, requesting to be received into the Order of Carlos m. He complained that as 
head of government in such a large territory it was difficult for him to deal with various 
officials, especially those who had received the French Cross of S t Luis, and still remain 
distinguished and powerful among such gentlemen. Apparently the request was still 
pending when he left Louisiana.100
The other constant in Unzaga’s military duties was the promotion of regular 
soldiers according to the Royal decree of 1766. Each year brought a list of soldiers whose 
good behavior and time in service demanded reward. Rewards were small, but under 
Unzaga, consistant Regular soldiers could expect a pay raise of 6 reales after fifteen 
years of service, and 9 reales after 20 years of service. Handicapped or ill soldiers could 
count on their pay and the governor took care to see that widows received their proper 
pensions.101
Careful attention to detail, constant reward, and fair treatment also helped Unzaga 
create strong, vigorous militia units in Louisiana. By the end of his time in office local 
commandants could chose to be picky about the men they commanded, often writing the
10OUnzaga to Jos6 de Galvez, August 13,1776, AGI, SD 2547, Folio 170.
101See Unzaga’s requests, O’Reilly’s confirmations and Arraiga’s certificates 
coinciding with Unzaga’s tenure in AGI, SD 2661. The special requests for the 
handicapped soldier and widows can be found in the same legajo, Folios 428-448.
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governor to send them less insubordinate or more competent men.102 The body of men 
entering the militia grew to the point that on the first of June, 1775, Unzaga was able to 
create a new unit, the Battalion of New Orleans Militia, with its own red, white and blue 
uniforms.103
Despite his achievements, the governor was not satisfied with his work in 
Louisiana’s defense. In a report of April 4, 1776, he forwarded the service rostsers of the 
Louisiana Battalion. An attachment noted that there were “only two professional grade 
officers in the entire province.” He also added that while “the militia company soldiers 
can fire their muskets, they have no military instructions; the only exception being those 
five companies stationed in the capital and the two companies of Germans.” Again he 
complained that there were not enough sabers for the Grenadiers and corporals, the 
fortifications were rotting, there were not enough cannon balls, and much of the shot they 
had didn’t fit the cannons.104
There were real reasons for Unzaga’s constant concern with Louisiana. While a 
general truce had been in place during 1773 activities on the Atlantic picked up in 1774. 
Great Britain’s problems with the colonies increased and the Spanish crown re-intensified 
its efforts to monitor British activity in North America and the Caribbean. Spain’s
l02See communications of Commandant, Thomas de Acosta to Unzaga, March 23, 
1775, AGI, Cuba 81, Folio 98.
103Holmes, Honor and Fidelity. 20-21 and Statement of the military, undated, in 
AGL Cuba, 184-A.
104The lists and notes of April 4th are contained in “Carta y listas de Batalion de 
Unzaga,” April 27, 1776, AGI, SD 2661, Folios 118-124.
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ministers reported that members of the English court supported and encouraged open war 
with the Bourbons to help “cool” the revolution brewing in their Atlantic colonies.105 
During 1774 and 1775 the bellicosity of English ships in Atlantic shipping lanes 
quickened and Spanish tempers flared. Spain “investigated” every British ship caught off 
the Iberian peninsula and even imagined insults led to fist fights.106
England’s bellicose behavior at sea, rumors of attack, and requests for assistance 
from the Americans in North America caused a rift at the Spanish court. Grimaldi 
favored covert aid to the Americans and public neutrality. He reminded the King that if 
the revolution went badly, British forces in America could easily be turned against Spain. 
On the other hand, the Conde de Aranda in Paris, and the French Foreign minister, 
Charles Gravier, the Comte de Vergennes, openly supported a combined French and 
Spanish attack on Great Britain while it was distracted by colonial discord.107
Spain’s court hesitated. The King wisely assessed that France had far less to lose 
in open confrontation since she had already lost the majority of her American colonies in 
1763. Accordingly, Spain acted to reinforce her defenses in the Caribbean, sending 
additional troops to both Cuba and Puerto Rico in the latter part of 1775.108 Both France
I05Cummins, Spanish Observers. 27.
106See numerous instances of British-Spanish confrontation in Spain’s waters in 
AGS, Estado 6988.
107The most comprehensive account of the diplomatic exchange between the 
French and Spanish can be found in Juan Fernando Yela Utrilla, Espana ante la 
inrfependencia de los Estados Unidos (2d ed; 2 vols.; Lerida, 1925).
10SIbid, 50.
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and Spain secretly accelerated their intelligence gathering in the colonies. The new 
Minister of the Indies, Josd de Gilvez, authorized the Captain-General in Cuba to use 
Havana as a base of operations to funnel aid to the Americans, and send word to Unzaga 
of his actions.109
In the Americas, Spain’s colonial governors acted surreptitiously to aid the 
rebellious colonists. Unzaga believed that aiding the colonists would help undermine the 
British threat to Louisiana. He became aware of the needs of the Americans through their 
merchant and ally Oliver Pollock.110 Requests for aid became more open with the events 
at Lexington and Concord. Commander Charles Lee of the Continental Army openly 
corresponded with Unzaga through Captain George Gibson, requesting aid from the 
Spanish and offering to “include” the Spanish in the “re-capture” of English settlements 
from Manchac to the Ohio and the Floridas Gong a dream of the Spanish Crown).111
I09Minister of the Indies, Julian Arriaga, died after a long and debilitating illness 
in 1775 and was replaced with Josd de Gdlvez in the late Spring but because of some 
confusion at the Spanish court he began active duty in December of 1775. Unzaga 
congratulated Gdlvez on his appointment in June of 1775, Unzaga to Gilvez, 19 June, 
1775, AGI, SD 2547, Folio 163.
u0PoUack’s life and aid to the American’s has been the subject of numerous 
articles and books including James Alton James, Oliver Pollock: The Life and Times of 
an Unknown Patriot (New York: Appleton Century, 1937); same author, “Oliver Pollock, 
Financier of the Revolution in the West,” MVHR. 15 (1929); and Light Townshend 
Cummins, "Oliver Pollack's Plantations: An Early Anglo Landowner on the Lower 
Mississippi, 1769-1824," LH 29 (1988): 35-48.
ulLee to Unzaga, May 22, 1776 (two letters) AGI, SD 2596.
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Unzaga favored such support He wrote to Josd de Gflvez that the recapture of 
Pensacola would also re-secure Spain’s sea lanes in the Caribbean. Torre agreed.112 
While Unzaga wrote for “permission” he actively began to secure supplies for the rebels. 
Assisting the governor was the wily Oliver Pollock who successfully slipped Captain 
George Gibson of the Continental Army and fifteen men down the Ohio and the 
Mississippi to New Orleans to purchase gunpowder from the Spanish.113 Unzaga, in a 
now famous exchange, covertly sold the rebels nine-thousand pounds of gunpowder from 
the royal storehouses. Publically, Unzaga “arrested” Gibson and returned him and the 
gunpowder to Philadelphia. The governor’s use of obedezco pero no cumplo eventually 
allowed the Americans to successfully defend both Wheeling and Fort Pitt against the 
British."4
Louisiana’s governor also used Philadelphia as a base of operations to spy on the 
British, hi 1776 he sent several merchant-spies including his old friend Bartolomd 
Beauregard, under the pretense of purchasing flour. us Once again he acted in Spain’s 
best interests and excused himself later. After sending the spies he wrote the Minister of 
the Indies that he apologized for breaking royal orders against buying from foreigners, but
l,2Unzaga to Josd de Gdlvez, September 30,1776, ibid; Torre to Jos6 de Gdlvez, 
October 9,1776, AGI, SD 1224.
u3Chlvez, The Ultimate Gift. 64-65; James Alton James, “Oliver Pollock, 
Financier,” 70-71.
II4Ibid.
lI5Unzagato Josd de Gdlvez, 7 September, 1776, AGL SD 2547, Folio 180.
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that he had done so under “extreme need,” and would not do so again, being content to 
supply himself in the future from Veracruz and Havana.116
Spain finally formed an allied front with France and moved forward to aid the 
Americans against their mutual enemy as 1776 drew to a close. Aid now came from 
Havana and Louisiana, despite protests from de la Torre that such action would strip 
Havana of the gunpowder and muskets necessary to defend his capital.117 A new network 
of spies issued from Havana to English ports in the Caribbean. Under Galvez’s 
recommendations de la Torre utilized a network of merchant-spies similar to that of the 
governor in Louisiana. Like Unzaga, Havana’s commander also extended his spies to 
Philadelphia to watch the emerging war. De la Torre additionally utilized more and more 
information from Louisiana where Unzaga’s commandants furnished him with troop and 
naval movements and the migration of English settlers in the Mississippi Valley.118
As the revolution between Britain and its North American colonies enlarged, 
command in both Louisiana and Havana changed. Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga had already 
requested his retirement in June of 1776. hi a long letter to Minister Gdlvez, the governor 
reminded the crown of his previous service record, his loyalty against the English in 
Havana, and gratefully thanked them for his governorship. He was, however, tired after
116Unzaga to Josd de Gdlvez, 7 September, 1776, AGL SD 2547, Folio 175.
117Jos6 de Gflvez to Unzaga, 28 February, 1776, Royal Order, No. 199, AGL 
Cuba 174-B and Josd de GSlvez to Torre, 28 February, 1776, Royal Order, No. 483, Ibid.;
118See Cummins, Spanish Observers, for a complete description of these spies and 
their locations, especially pages 35- 45. It is ironic that just as Spain began to actively 
move against the British, Havana became host to numerous British subjects (military and 
civilian) seeking refuge from the conflict
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thirty-three years of service in the Americas, and wished to return to Spain with the salary 
of a colonel and an assignment in his home province of Malaga.119
The Crown complied with Unzaga’s request to leave Louisiana, but not in the 
expected manner. The following September the governor received word that his time in 
the Americas was not finished. The Crown gave him the requested promotion, but to a 
higher command. Unzaga departed Louisiana as the new Captain-General of Caracas. In 
the midst of the American Revolution, he organized his papers, his family and 
belongings.120
In a lengthy letter to the Minister of the Indies, governor Unzaga made a final 
report on Louisiana and a plea for it independence from Havana. He openly argued that 
Louisiana and its defenses would suffer if the colony remained under the auspices of the 
Governor-general in Havana. He repeatedly and rather bitterly accused de la Torre of 
ignoring Louisiana’s defensive and financial needs. Having received a letter from Havana 
not to forward foreign prisoners but to sentence them in Louisiana, Unzaga advised that all 
prisoners should receive the same treatment which would quicken sentences and 
punishments and help discipline the troops. He further argued that Florida had requested 
and received independence from Havana and that Louisiana was a larger territory with 
more inhabitants and products and should be granted the same freedom of rule.121 As he
119Unzaga to Josd de GSlvez, June 22,1776, AGI, SD 2547, Folio 167.
120Unzaga’s promotion to Caracas is in Torre to Josd de GSlvez, December 1, 
1776, AGI, Cuba 1222, Folio 1202.
121Unzaga to Jos6 de GSlvez, 28 December, 1776, AGL SD 2547.
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left Unzaga could boast of a comparatively dense population of loyal citizens, a 
coordinated defense and a financially secure if not wealthy colony.
Bernardo de Gdlvez, the adventurous nephew of the Minister of the Indies, Jos6 de 
Gdlvez, arrived in Louisiana to replace Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga as governor in 
November of 1776. After a brief time with Unzaga to exchange information and 
command he assumed command on January 1,1777, whereupon he immediately adopted 
the former governor’s policy of aiding the American rebels. In time Unzaga’s suggestions 
and Lee’s promises bore fruit Bernardo de G£vez successfully led Louisiana’s loyal 
troops against the British to recapture Florida. The British attack on Havana which 
produced the slogan, beware the Mameyes, finally backfired in the American Revolution 
The fruit of the Mameyes, Louisiana and its governors, returned Florida to its former 
owner and for a brief time re-secured the Gulf of Mexico for Spain.122
122Bemardo de Galvez’s journey to Louisiana in and in Torre to Jos6 de GSlvez, 
24, November, 1776, ibid; GSlvez’s report of his command in Bernardo de Gflvez to 
Torre, 19 January, 1777, ibid, Folio 1341.
308
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 9 
Summary
As a result of the peace treaty following the Seven Years War, the Bourbon throne 
of Spain inherited the former French territory of Louisiana. Spain’s slowness in 
establishing its rule in the colony produced a series of events culminating in a rebellion 
which ousted the first Spanish governor, Antonio de Ulloa. The crown’s response to this 
insult was swift and certain. Captain-General O’Reilly took formal control of the colony 
for Spain in 1769 and quickly punished the ringleaders of the revolt.
O’Reilly had already been involved in a successful reorganization of the defenses 
and economy in Havana. He applied his considerable skill and experience to the defenses 
and government of Louisiana. Within a year he created a defensive barrier of forts and 
colonial settlements against the possible encroachment of the British along the Mississippi. 
He reorganized the government, and established Spanish mercantilistic rules in the 
economy. O’Reilly instituted Bourbon rule and reform in Louisiana. He hispanicized its 
government and reorganized its economy, but he did not engender loyalty or re-orient its 
colonists toward the Spanish Crown. The successful implementation of O’Reilly’s reforms 
and colonial re-orientation came under its next governor, Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga.
O’Reilly left Unzaga with instructions to create a viable defense, a colony of loyal 
citizens, and make it economically successful for the crown. Unzaga spent the next seven 
years working to integrate the Louisiana borderlands into the Spanish system and make 
the colony successful for both Spain and for its colonists. Spain’s mercantilistic rules 
devastated Louisiana’s trade as the colony produced very little that Spain wanted. From
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the colonists’ view the reforms were a disaster. Unzaga, however, saw an opportunity to 
put Louisiana back on its feet economically and create new industry. During his tenure 
he backed Louisiana’s tobacco growers, began a new industry in cypress lumbering, and 
even stimulated a domestic market While many historians have written about his turning 
a blind eye to contraband trade, Unzaga actually used an old Spanish custom known as 
obedezco pero no cumplo to glean public funds from illict trade and feed his hungry 
colonists. The governor’s efforts even began to integrate Louisiana’s frontier economy 
into the colony’s legitimate commerce and filled the colonial treasury, which showed a 
surplus at the end of his time in office.
Unzaga’s mandates to create loyalty and order were somewhat more difficult 
Within those two commands layers of smaller exigencies existed. Order required he 
create peace among both the Indians and his colonists. That meant maintaining a group 
of Native American allies as well as dealing with intertribal conflict and the aggressive 
Indian policies of the English across the Mississippi. Order also required a stable, 
growing, and law-abiding population.
Unzaga’s success with the Indians was limited by Crown funding. Alliances were 
made with the Nortenos and the Caddo in the west by Lieutenant-General Athanase De 
M6zi£res and between the Apalachee at Rapides but the remaining tribes along the 
Mississippi shifted their alliances between the British and Spanish to suit their own 
needs. The Osage threatremained a constant during Unzaga’s tenure and because of 
limited funding he could not arm his allies. As O’Reilly’s orders had been to keep peace 
at all costs, Unzaga refused to fuel intertribal warfare, an effort seen as weakness by the
310
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Quapaw, Missouri and Little Osage in Upper Louisiana and the Caddo in the West. 
Clearly, the Indians retained control of trade and alliances, and elicited the desired 
European response by playing the Spanish off the English and continuing conflict and 
contraband trade.
Creating a colony of loyal subjects was also a difficult task. To Unzaga's mind it 
required that he bring order and stability to the populace, implant the rule of law and 
reconcile his colonists to Spanish rule. He began by marrying into one of the colony’s 
elite families, a tactic often frowned on by the Crown, but successful in Louisiana. From 
this vantage point he used his considerable managerial skills to create trust He stabilized 
the population through a series of land surveys and official land grants, creating a denser 
and larger population capable of both defense and domestic industry. He also worked to 
enhance his colonists’ education and attended to their clerical needs, including the 
peaceful solution to a conflict between Spanish and French clergy. This confirmed his 
position as defender of the faith as well as his colonial charges.
Centralizing his authority had to be accomplished carefully in order to make 
Louisiana’s recalcitrant citizens abide by the rule of law and his orders. In his dealings 
with colonists, post commandants, and military underlings Unzaga was firm, but fair. He 
did not play favorites, even where family was concerned. Unzaga’s fairness in dealing 
with debts in the colony and his determination to place his colonists’ needs first 
engendered trust and then loyalty. He also refused to give up his authority over colonial 
affairs to his superior in Havana and often wrote directly to the Minister of ladies or 
O’Reilly in Spain, whom he considered his immediate superior
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Unzaga used flexible Spanish justice to implant Spanish law and m aintained a 
constant presence in the courts. In doing so he centralized authority in the person of the 
governor and tied provincial government to the courts in New Orleans, while at the same 
time supporting the authority of his commandants as Spanish officials. Justice too 
brought loyalty and a grudging obedience to Spanish rule.
Slavery changed under Unzaga. Indian slavery lessened and more lenient Spanish 
slave codes allowed a larger group of free blacks to emerge. Emancipation was limited, 
as always, by legal codes and the ability to buy one’s freedom.
Unzaga’s most pressing need was to continue a defense against any possible 
British attack. This included maintaining a strong network of Indian allies, manning and 
refurbishing Louisiana’s deteriorating forts and maintaining a fit army and a colonial 
militia. Unzaga drilled, armed and paid his militia regularly. He enforced the idea that 
ownership of land was dependent upon service in the militia, an idea backed by the local 
commandants. He even started a new militia company in New Orleans with its own 
uniforms. Although he was plagued by constant desertion, the governor treated his own 
soldiers fairly, advancing their pay and grade regularly and overseeing their marriages to 
respectable colonials. This encouraged Louisiana’s colonists to view the Spanish military 
as a chance at advancement. Lastly, the governor employed a group of merchant-spies to 
continue surveillance of British activities and help the Americans during the Revolution 
of 1776.
Although Unzaga considered his efforts at defense futile, he nonetheless created a 
loyal group of colonists who successfully helped Louisiana’s next governor fight against
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the British and recapture Florida for Spain. At the end of his tenure, Unzaga applied for 
retirement, but the Crown awarded his excellent management of Louisiana with 
promotion to the Captaincy-General in Caracas. Unzaga left Louisiana with its colonists, 
economy and defenses reconciled to Spain’s Bourbon empire and its reforms.
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Appendix A
Treasurer’s Reports for Louisiana 
Martin Navarro 1769-1775 
Bernard de Ortero 1776-1777
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Treasurer's Reports for Louisiana1 
Martin Navarro 1769-1775 
Bernardo de Ortero 1775-1777
Resume of the accounts of Don Martin Navarro:
September 1. 1769 until December 1.1770
Tres millones, setecientos, seiscientos ochenta y nueva
reales cuatro y dos tercios maravedis 3.700.689.4 2/3
dos millones, setecientos, setenta y dos mil ochocientos cinquenta
reales dos y once, quince maravedis 2.772.850.2 11/15
A favor de su excelentisimo-novedentos veinte y siete mil
ochocientos treinta y neuve reales y dos maravedis 927.839.2 Balance
January 1 1771 until December 31. 1771
un millon ochocientos noventa y dos mil, novecientos 
cincuenta y un reales, veinticuatro maravedis
ochocientos sesenta y seis mil, docientos veintiocho reales 
y ventiseis maravedis
Total-un millon, veinteseis mil setecientos veintidos reales 
y treinta y dos maravedis
JamiaTv 1 .1772 until December 31. 1772
a cargo de....
data de....
Total: un millon, sesenta y cinco mil dosrientos ochenta 
y un reales treinta maravedis













Total: un millon ciento setenta y siete mi, quinientos nueve 
reales y dos maravedis






'AGI, SD, Legajo 2628. Errors in math are those of the treasurer though I have added corrected 
figures in brackets.
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Total de existencia: de un millon trescientos cincuenta mil 
sesenta y ocho rales y cinco maravedis 1.350.068.5 Balance
Resume of the account of Martin Navarro from January 1.1775 untilMav4.1775 when he officially 
became Intendant and the treasurer's office was taken by Don Bernardo de Otro:
♦Apparently the treasury had not changed by May when he handed over his office.
Resume of the accounts from Don Bernardo de Otero:
Mav 5.1775 until December 31.1775
Acredita de cargo en la relacidn jurada: dos millones, ocho 
mil treinta y quatro reales veintesiete maravedis
y quarenta partes de otro 2.008.034.27 so/too2
La Data: quinientos treinta y ocho mil trescientos cinquentaj
y seis reales, un maravedis 538.356.1
Que resulta en favor de Su Majestad: un millon quatrodentos 
sesenta y nueve mil seiscientos setenta y ocho reales,
veinte maravedis y 40 partes de otro de existencia 1.469.678.20 40/100 Balance
January 1. 1776 until December 31.1776
El cargo segtin la cuenta dos millones, quatrodentos sesenta y cuatro 
mil, dento quarenta y cinco reales, veinte maravedis y
ocenta y ocho cien otors 2.464.145.20 88/100
La Data: nuevecientos veinte y quatro miL ochocientos
ochenta y nueve reales diez y seis maravedis, y tres
cien otros 921.889.16 3/100
La existencia de: un millon, quinientos treinta y nueve mil, 
doscientos cinquenta y seis reales, quatro 
maravedis, y ochenta y cinco, den otros
a cargo en el cuento reservado para su majestad 1.539.256.4 85/ioo Balance





^The jump here may be because Navarro bad been to busy to complete his accounts while be 
prepared to become Intendent
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
January 1. 1777 until December 31.1777
Cargo: dos millones, ochocientos setenta y cinco mil quinientos 
setenta y ocho reales treinta y un maravedis y
sesenta y tres partes de otro 2.875.578.31 65/too
Su data con arreglos del libro de caja: nuevecientos noventa y 
ocho mil, setecientos veinte y dos reales, un maravedis 
y ochenta y tres partes de otro 998.722.1 83/ioo
Exisentcia de un millon ochocientos setenta y seis mil ochocientos 
cinquenta y seis reales y veinte y nueve maravedis,
y ochenta y un parte de otro 1.876.856.29 81/100
351
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Balance
Appendix B
Entradas and Salidas at Havana, Cuba 
to and from New Orleans, 1772-1776
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Entradas and Salidas at Havana, Cuba to and from New Orleans 1772-1776
Year 1772 Entradas (from New Orleans)1 Salidas (to New Orleans)
Date No. Name Cargo No. Name Cargo
January 3 La Abundancfa frutas de aquella 3 El Sol frutos
provincia (Louisiana) San Antonio same
Alejandro same Nuestra Senora de el
El Sol same Amparo same
15 Ships In 9 Ships Out
February 1 Nuestra Senora del Carmen frutos 3 San Luts madera
San Miguel frutos
El Sol2 frutos
10 Ships In 14 Ships Out
March 2 La Esperanza arros, mais y madera 2 Nuestra Senora del Carmen frutos
San Antonio carne y frutos Nuestra Senora del Rosario frutos
20 Ships In 12 Ships Out
April 1 El Renombrado frutos 1 San Antonio frutos
8 Ships In 29 Ships Out1
'Figures from AGI, Cuba Logajo 1215, Nos. 57, 85, 111 and AGI, Cuba Lcgajo 1216, Nos. 139.
2ll is interesting that no record of El Sol's entrance into Havana was made, or reference to where it might have come from.






























news, mailSan Francisco 
Nuestra Senora de el 
Amparo (alias el Pr. de Orange) frutos 
Ships In
San Miguel frutos
Nuestra Sciiora del Carmen frutos
Ships In
Ships In
El Principe de Asturias *













4 SM el Principe
San Francisco 
El Renombrado 
Nuestra Senora del Amparo
18 Ships Out
2 San Miguel



















































December’s entradas and salidas are missing from the legajo. 
Total 156 Ships In (22 from New Orleans)





















149 Ships Out (22 from New Orleans)
♦There is no mention of the El Principe as ever having left Havana in August or September.














Year 1773 Entradas (from New Orleans)1 
Date No. Name
January 1 San Antonio
12 Ships In








Nuestra Senora del Carmen frutos de aquelle
Provincia 
Nuestra Senora del Rosario same 
Ntra Sen de la Consolacidn same 
San Antonio 
Ships In
cortes de cajas por sucre
Nuestra Senora del Rosario frutos de aquelle
Provincia 
San Miguel same
Nuestra Senora del Asuncidn same 
Ships In






La Virgen de Monte Negro frutos 
La Union frutos
Ships Out
El Cid Campeador frutos







'Figures from AGI Cuba, Legajo 1217, Nos. 347,437 
2Culs of wood for sugar boxes












Year 1773 Entradas (from New Orleans) Salidas (to New Orleans)
Date No. Name Cargo No. Name
August 2 Nuestra Sefiora del Carmen madurayalquitran1 1 Nuestra Senora del
Consolasidn
Alexandro (Beauregard) cortes de Cafia para
embasar azucar
28 Ships In2 15 Ships In
September 1 SM San Juan de Romuseno not mentioned3 2 Santisima Trinidad
San Luis (Beauregard)
11 Ships In 7 Ships Out
October 2 San Francisco registro4 2 San Francisco
Sun Antonio cortes de Ca jas pant San Antonio
embasar azucar
11 Ships In 23 Ships Out5
'Wood and lar.
^Several of llie.se ships were carrying the kings mail and silver from Veracruz, another with tobacco from another part of Cuba. 
’This was captained by Commander O'Carrol who generally delivered the siluado. He may merely be returning to Cuba.
4Registcr of items - used in place of frutos.




























Nuestra Senora de 
Consolacidn 
Ships In







cortes de cajas 
cortes de cajas 
cortes de cajas 
cortes de cajas
Ships In (18 from New Orleans)
Salidas (to New Orleans)
No. Name Cargo
1 Nuestra Senora del Regia reg.
11 Ships Out
1 Nuestra Senora de reg.
Consolacidn
5 Ships Out
104 Ships Out (11 from New Orleans)
u>LO
00
♦While these totals to not show all entradas and salidas (February-May being missing) they are sufficient to give a ratio of 
shipping from New Orleans to rest of Indies flowing through Havana.






















Entradas (from New Orleans)1 
No. Name
2 San Juan Nepomucena
Nuestra Senora de Regia 
19 Ships In
2 El Renombrado





2 San Luis (Beauregard)
San Francisco
18 Ships In
1 Nuestra Senora del Carmen 
21 Ships In
'Figures from AGI, Cuba Nos. 5 9 4 ,6 0 3 ,6 2 3 ,6 3 6 ,6 5 9 ..
Cargo
Salidas (to New Orleans)
No. Name Cargo








cortes de cajas 3
cortes de cajas
18
cortes de cajas 2
22
El Alexandro (Beauregard) en las.
San Francisco en las.





San Luis (Beauregard) frutos
Ships Out
San Josef frutos
Nuestra Senora del Carmen frutos 
Ships Out




















Ntra Sefi de Consol acidn 




Nuestra Senora de Regia 








cortes de cajas 2
carnes. tablas y brea 
troops, pertrechos para escudron 
cortes de cajas
cortes de cajas 
frutos
cortes de caja 
cortes de caja
frutos
cortes de caja 
not listed3
Name
Nuestra Senora de Velon 
La Perl a
19 Ships Out














5 San Marlin frutos
Santo (unreadable) frutos
Nuestra Senora del Carmen frutos
San Luis not
Nuestra Sn. de Consoleion frutos
32 Ships Out
‘Figures from AGI, Cuba Legajo 1219, Nos. 674, 698, 719, 733.
2The situado for Louisiana brought by Com. Andres Balderrama..



















San Francisco de Assis 
El Renombrada 
San Antonio 
Nuestra Senora de Belen 
Ships In
Cargo
cortes de cajas 
cortes de cajas 
cortes de cajas 
cortes de cajas




Nuestra Senora del Carmen cortes de cajas 
15 Ships In




Nuestra Sn. de Consolacidn 
San Francisco 
Nuestra Sn. de Montenegro 
Ships In
cortes de cajas 
frutos
cortes de cajas 
cortes de cajas
December Nuestra Senora del Rosario frutos
'Figures from AGI Cuba 1219, Nos. 733, 760, 779, 807.
2Does not include missing salidas from March.
Salidas (to New Orleans)
No. Name Cargo
1 San Francisco frutos
10 Ships Out
San Juan en las.
El Renombrada en las.





3 SM San Juan Baptista not listed
Nuestra Sn. de Consolacidn frutos 
San Francisco frutos
16 Ships Out












Year 1775 Entradas (from New Orleans)1
Date No. Name Cargo No.
January 3 Nuestra Senora del Carmen frutos 7
La Virgin de Misericordia cortes de cajas
El Renombrado frutos
17 Ships In 23
February 2 San Antonio cortes de cajas 1
M Nuestra Senora de
Consolacion frutos
20 Ships In 12
March 3 San Francisco frutos 2
Nuestra Sn de Montenegro frutos 
San Geronimo cortes de cajas
15 Ships In 13
Salidas (to New Orleans) 
Name
Scnor San Joseph 
Nuestra Senora del Carmen 
Santo Christo del Calvario 
San Geronimo
Nuestra Senora del 
Montenegro 




















'Figures from AGI, Cuba 1220, Nos. 829, 844, 865.





























San Luis (Beauregard) 
Santo Christo del Calvario2 
Santo Christo del Carlvario 
Nuestra Senora del Carmen 
Nuestra Senora del Carmen 




























La Luisa en las.
San Lorenzo “solcitud de maderas" 
San Antonio frutos
Ships Out
Nuestra Senora del Carmen frutos 
San Luis (Beauregard) frutos
Ships Out




'Figures from AGI, Cuba 1220, Nos. 876, 892, 912.





















San Luis (Beauregard) 











































'Figures are from AGI, Cuba Legajo 1220, No. 959 and Legajo 1221, Nos. 977, and 995.













Year 1775 Entradas (from New Orleans)1
Date No. Name Cargo
December 0
16 Ships In
203 Total Ships In (23 from New Orleans)
U>ON
C /l
'Figures from AG1, C uba, Legajo 1221, No. 1014.
Salidas (to New Orleans)
No. Name
1 San Vicente Ferrer
14 Ships Out































San Vicente Ferrer 
18 Ships In
2 Mariana





effectos de Europe3 













20 Ships Out 
1 La Maria 
23 Ships Out6
frutos
'Figures from AGI Cuba. Legajo 1221, Nos. 1014, 1046, 1059.
2Wlule il did not return to New Orleans the Nuestra Seflora de Regia sailed to Veracruz with the Papel de Cucnta. It appears that boats did 
not ferry back and forth between New Orleans and Havana the way they had in 1774. Instead they stopped in Havana to deliver a cargo and pick up 
another for elsewhere in empire.
^ h e  San Josefs voyage had originated in Santander, Spain.
4The San Josef left Havana bound for Campeche and the San Antonio went to Santander with "frutos."
*tar.


































Cuenta de Su Majestad 




























































Entradas (from New Orleans)1 Salidas (to New Orleans)
Name Cargo No. Name Cargo
2 San Antonio (Boutet) regist.
San Antonio (Chouriach) frutos
Ships In 20 Ships Out
San Luis madero 2 La Maria frutos
San Luis en las.
Ships In 6 Ships Out
SM Santa Catalina not listed 0
La Mariana frutos
La Luisa frutos
San Antonio (Foutet) madera
Ships In 7 Ships Out
NS de la Concepcion madera 2 San Antonio (Foutet) regist.
La Luisiana madera SM Santa Catalina none
22 Ships In 28 Ships Out
La Maria madera 2 El Guillermo y la Isabella none
La Luisia madera
Ships In 22 Ships Out
Total Ships In (25 from New Orleans) 239 Total Ships Out (16 to
New Orleans)
'Figures from AGI Cuba, Legajo 1221, Nos. 1198, 1216, 1259.
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San Fernando de 6moa tintas










Com. Juan Clavilero peltrechos
Santander y Cuba Jan/18
Bergantin/N.Sa. de la Antiguo
Joseph Ygnacio de Aspillaga arinas
Cadiz Jan/18
Paquelbot/Real Comp. San Miguel eleclos de
Matheo de Ollanvide europa
Tijon Jan/18
Bergantin/N.Sa. del Carmen efectos de
Diego del Collado europa
Tijon Jan/19
Bergantin/Com. Santo Ypto del Socorro efectos de 
Antonio Baldes europa
Laguna de termino, con escala em Campeche 
Balandra/ San Juan Nepomusera 
Juan Joseph Zenlero
Cadiz
Urea de SM/San Joseph 
Comd. Bnlenlin Cierto
Cadiz
Paquelbol/N.Sa. del Carmen 
Miguel de Herrera
Cadiz
Zactia/San Juan Bautista 
P. Jacinto Mont
Coruna
Fragata correo/iil Rey 
Domingo Queluraga
en lustre




tabaco de cucnla 
de S.M.
Correo
New Orleans frutos de Jan/19 Campeche





















Paquetbot/Com. La Abundancia 





Zaetia/El Spiritu Santo 
P. Joseph Boter
Cartagena de lndias
Fragata de Guerra/Santa Getrudis
Comd. Juan Garcia Romero
Cartagena de lndias
Fragata de Guerra, La Esmeralda
Comd. Fernando Cortrosas
Veracruz
Paquetbot correo/El Alvarado 
Joseph de la Parra
Campeche
Goleta/N.Sa. Santa Ana 
Juan Ronquillo
Veracruz







Goleta/San Francisco de Paula 






For January 1772 
plata Total of 15 Ships In







Paquetbot/N.Sa. de la Soledad 

































Gulf of Onduras (Honduras) 
Fragata/EI Pajaro 
Luciano Vicente de Salas
Coruna
Fragata correo/El Patagon 
Manuel Antonio de la Villa
Gulf of Honduras 
Paquetbot/San Nicholas de Bari! 
Joseph Bennave
Coruna
Fragata correo/El Quiros 
Joseph Solis
Campeche
Goleta/San Francisco de Paula 
Joseph Garcia
New Orleans
Balandra/N.Sa. del Carmen 
Joseph de Ayala































Bartholome Borigan( Beauregard) madero
Cadiz
Fragata de Guerra/Santa Getrudis
Comd. Juan Garcia Romero plata
Cadiz
Fragata de Guerra/La Esmeralda
Comd. Fernando Contreras plata
Puerto Rico
Balandra/EI Diamante (Reeal Hacienda de Negros) 
Bartholome Matamoros vacio
Veracruz
Bergantin correo/El Dcspacho 
































Bergantin/El Gran Poder de Dios 
Manuel Millan
Feb/29 Veracruz
Paquetbot/El Senor de los Milagros 
Joseph de Vrioslc
w  For February 1772
Total of 10 Ships In 











Feb/22 el mar (out to sea)






Paquetbol correo/SM Doha Marina 
Joseph Parra
Feb/27 Coruna




































C antain Cargo Date
Veracruz plata y frutos Mar/8
Goleta/N.Sa. de la Luz para Guaiyra
Joseph Antonio de Aspurua y Maracaibo
Veracruz transpose de Mar/8
Urea SM/La Peregrina regia de
Comd. Hernando Barona Flanders
Veracruz Mar/8
Urea SM/San Carlos misnui
Comd. Francisco Quevedo transporte
Veracruz Mar/9
Urea SM/San Juan misnio
Comd. Francisco Vauies de Morales transporte
Veracruz Mar/9
Balandra SM/La Uelona
Comd. Miguel de Aldexete not listed
Veracruz plata y efectos Mar/18
Navio/N.Sa de Begoha (alias el Vencedor) *bajo el c. de Navio 
Diego Galiano el Marq. de Cassinas
Veracruz
Navio/San Nicolas de Bari 
Juan Ignacio
Veracruz
Fragata SM/La Dorada 
Comd. Felix del Corral
plata y otras Mar/23
frutos *bajo el tnando







Fragata SM/Norima Sevilla y
Juan Clavifero Irlanda
Cadiz plata, tintos
Fragata/N.Sa. del Carmen (alias el Pajaro) 
Vicento de Salas y azucar
Cadiz madero
I’uquclbol/Suu Nocolas de Bari plata y 
Joseph Bennave tintas
Coruna
Fragata correo SM/F1 Colon correo de
Manuel Antonio de la Villa Sit Majestad
Veracruz




Diego de Alva frutos
Guaiyra y Maracaibo
Goleta/Urca SM/Senor de la Luz plata y 















Mar/3 La Sonda (taking soundings?) 
Fragata SM/La Dorada 











Fragata correo SM/H1 Quiros correo de
Joseph Solis Su Majestad






Bergantin/El Santo Cristo del Socorro 
Antonio Baldes frutos
Mar/7 Veracruz
Paquetbot/EI Postilion de Mexico 
Joseph Urda Aspilleta correo
Mar/31 Veracruz
Paquelbot correo/El Alvarado
1). Francisco Ambrosio Madera correo
u»-4CO










Mar/17 Cddiz y Cuba
Paquetbot/N.Sa. de Africa efectos de
Francisco de Ambrona Europa
Mar/22 Veracruz
Bergantin correo/El Despacho
Joseph Antonio Morantes correo
2The note following this entry says "same one that entered that port last 30,h." No entry was made of the Sara in February, which does not have 





















Vicente Antonio de Verrasueta
Cadiz










Bergantin/Santisimo Cristo de las Tres Caidas 
Pataval Dias de Europa
For March 1772 
Total of 20 Ships In 
















Apr/1 Puerto Rico y Cuba





Apr/17 Cartegena de lndias
Goleta/N.Sa. de Soledad 
Antonio la Rollet
Apr/18 Unknown
Balandra SM/La Belona 
Comd. Miguel de Alderela
Apr/21 Campeche




Don Manuel de Abona
Apr/22 Veracruz





Date Captain C argo
vacio
Apr/4 Campeche
Bergantin/N.Sa. de la Luz 
Bartholome Bui rciro fill los
frutos
Apr/5 Campeche




Navio SM/E1 San Rafael 








Navio SM/E1 Pedro Alcantara 
Comd. Martin de C'astarriva
Gidiz






correo con Apr/8 Cidiz con mismo
cartas de servicio Urea SM/San Juan transporte





Urea SM/San Carlos 













Bergantin Frances/el Aesop 
Juun Doecalsalbul
00
harina, vino, Apr/8 











Navio/La Begoiia (alias cl Vcncedor) 
Diego Galiano frulos
Cadiz
Navio/San Nicolas dc Barry
Juan Ignacio Gorriarian frulos
Cadiz
Vergantin/La Virgcn de los Dolores 
Manuel de Jesus Fernandez frutos
Cddiz
Zaetia/LI Espirilu Sanlo
P. Joseph Boler frulos
Cadiz
Zaetia/La Virgen de Misericordia 
P. Josef Favler frulos
Cadiz
Fragala/Jesus, Maria & Jose
Marlin de Fchegaray frutos
Cadiz
Zaetia/La Purisinia Concepcion 
P. Bartolome Monl frulos
Barcelona 
Zaetia/San Isidro
P. Isidro Vigo frulos
Cadiz
Paquebot de la Compahia/San Miguel 












For April 1772 
Total of 8 Ships In 
Total of 29 Ships Out
Further Salidas:
Apr/29 al mar




Goleta/N.Sa. de los Dolores
Miguel Fernanris vacio
Apr/30 La Comfia
















"accompanied the expedition until the canal"
Balandra de SM/a Bclona
Comd. Miguel de Aldcrcsc unkown
Guaiyra
Fragata/San Carlos plata y





Bergantin/N.Sa. de la Augustin 




a la mar (to sea)
Bergantin SM/lil Principe de Asturias 
Comd. Antonio O’Carrol unkown
en su compania (in his company)
Balandra SM/La Belona
Comd. Miguel dc Alderete unkown
Veracruz
Bergantin correo/El Despacho
Joseph Antonio Urda Uipillcsa correo
Apr/26 Gijon
Bergantin/N.Sa. del C armen




























Paquebot/EI Lspiritu Santo 
Vicente Urago
Cartagena de lndias y Trinidad 
13alandra/La Industria (slave transport) 
Julio Flowe
Unknown
Balandra SM/La Belona 
Comd/ Luis de Alberet
Unknown
Fragata SM/E1 Caymen 
Comd. Juan Francisco Moscosa
Unknown
Bergantin SM/el Principe de Asturias 
Comd. Antonio O’Carol
Tampico
Goleta/N.Sa. de Concepcion 
Ignacio Gil
Tampico



















Bergantin/San Juan Bautista frutos de
Gabriel Sistarc aquella isla
Guarico uyuila con
Bergantin Frances/El Aciivo pan, agua




Balandra de Real Hacienda/La Industria 
Comd. Juan Tauso vacio
May/20 CSdiz
Paquebot/N.Sa. del Rosario 
Bernardo Sepulveda frutos
carne, May/22 Boston
cuero y 2 British Balandras The Two Brothers and
sebo and Pluto under Benjamin Woppe
carne, May/26 Cadiz tabaco,
cuero y Bergantin/San Francisco Pavia cuero y
sebo Antonio Saens azucar
uoticias y May/29
pliegos de aquella 
provincia
Portobelo y Cartegcna tabaco de
Goleta/San Francisco de Asis cuenta























Fragata S. M./El Aluna 
JosefInvi
Veracruz













Zaetia/N.Sa. del Rosario 
Pablo Asme
(came taking on water)
Berganti/San Juan Bautista 











Pedro Dios Balandon frutos
Barcelona, Malaga, Puerto Rico y Cuba 
Zaetia/San Joseph efectos de
P. Bartholome Banaza Europa
For May 1772
Total of 19 Ships In 
Total o f 11 Ships Out
Puerto Rico
Bergantin Real Haciendo/La Minerva
Ram6n de la Husia 320 negros
Veracruz
Paquebot correo/El Alvaredo
Francisco Ambrosio Madera correo
Pensacola -
British Bergantin/El Ranger, madera



































Balandra/N.Sa del Camien 
Diego de Alba frutos
Jamaica (anchored in the mouth of the port) 
Balandra/'I'he Isabel
Asking for bread, meat and water to go to N.C'arolina
La Coruna
Zaetia/Santo Cristo del Calvario 
P. I’cdro Gay
La Corufia
Balandra SM/La Belona 
Comd. Luis de Alberete
La Corufia
Paquebot correo/El Cortes 
Juan Mat. de Irsullo
harina,
caldos y otras 




J u n /1 3
La Coruna 







































Paquebot/S. de los Mi lag! os 








J u n /1 5 Veracruz
?correo/El Postilion de Mexico



























Paquebot/San Juan Nepomuceno 
Diego de Montes Coca
Veracruz
Paquebot correo/El Sandoval 
Antonio Gonzales
Santo Domingo (Frances)




Bergantin/N.Sa. del Amparo 
Pedro Deas (Dias?)
For June 1772 
Total of 14 Ships In 




Zaelia/N.Sa. del Carmen 




Fragata SM/La Juno 
Comd. JosefTansi
plata, frutos 
y el Arzohispo de 
Toledo
harina
Jun/20 Santo Domingo y Puerto Rico 
Fragata SM/La Dorada 






La Guaiyra y Cumana unknown
Fragata SM/EI Caymen (probably the
Comd/ Juan Francisco Moscosa situado)
to check on trouble at the mouth of the canal 
Balandra/La Belona 
Comd. Luis de Alberete
cartas para Jun/20 








Goleta/N.Sa. de la Concepcidn 
P. Igancio Gil en lastra
Jun/26 La Coruna
Paquebot Correo/El Pisarro 
Manuel Abema cartas
Jun/28 Campeche
Zaetia/San Pedro y San Pablo 













Entradas Last Port Salidas
Ship
Date C aptain Cargo Date
Jul/2 Campeche Jul/1
Goleta/San Antonio de Padua (turtles)
Josef Gaonzales toi tugas
Jul/2 Campeche frutos de Jul/1
Goleta/Cristo del Buen Viaje la provincia
Juan Pino de Yucatan
Jul/11 Gij6n Jul/1
Paquebol/N.Sa. de Cavedonga efectos de
Antonio de Anderes Europa
Jul/10 C6diz Jul/7
Puquebul/I.a Santisima Trinidad efectos de
Josef Vitoni Ruropa
Jul/22 La CoruAa Jul/7
Paquebot correo SM/E1 Magallenes 





Paquebot Correo/Dona Marina 






Captain Diego tie Alva frutos
Cadiz
Bergantin de Real Asicnlo/La Minerva 
Ramon de la Hera frulos
Cadiz
Zaetia/San Josef 
P. Bartholome Ravasa frutos
Jul/25
Jul/29
lsla de Santa Cruz, anchored at the mouth of the port Jul/9 
Galeta Dinamorca? cartas para la
Josef Becuent Capitan General
Veracruz Jul/14
Bergentin Correo SM/ El Despacho
Josef Undapilletas cartas
Cadiz
Paquebot/Jesus, Maria y Josef 
Bernardo Septien frutos
para su deslino (for its destination)
French Fragata de Guerra (that entered this port 
the 29"* of last [month])
Jul/14 Cadiz
Bergantin/Sanla Gertrudis 
















Paquebot correoSM/El Alvarado 
Antonio Gonzales
Jul/28 Veracruz
Paquebot/Jesus, Maria y Josef 
Vicente Derrasueta
For July 1772
Total of 7 Ships In 
Total of 19 Ships Out
ooC/l
Zactia/San Antonio de Padua













Paquebot/FI Santo Lspirilu 
Vicent Uraga
Jul/21 Barcelona
Zaetia/Santo Cristo del C'alvario 
Felis(x) Grau
Jul/22 Santa Cruz de Tenerife
Fragata/La Justa de Canerias 
Pedro de Sosa
Jul/24 unknown
Balandra SM/La Belona 
Comd. Aguslin de Herrera
Jul/25 Tampico








Jul/27 para su destino (to his destination)
Golclu Dinamarque (that entered this port the 



































Bergantin SM/E1 Principe de Asturias under Antonio Ocarol 
(and following him a captured Goleta)
Cadiz
Zaetia/Santo Cristo del Calvario 
Julio Llaso
FI Batavano?
2 Balandras and One Goleta Captured by 
Sebastian Pornasio





Josef Coll y Solar
Veracruz
Fragata/San Miguel
Comd. Frandisco Antonio de Believes
La Coruna



























Paquebot correo SM/E1 Colon 
Martin de Oncullo
Campeche
Goleta/San Atnonio de Padua 
Julio Francisco Marin
Ciidiz
Paquebot/San Juan Nepomuceno 
Diego de Montes Coca
Veracruz
Paquebot correo SM/EI Alvarado 
Manuel Rodriguez
Santander









































































Zaetia/La Virgen de la Merced 
P. Francisco Jubari
Paquebot correo SM/E1 Postilion 
Josef de la Parra
Veracruz
Paquebot correo SM/Dona Marina
Francisco Anibrosio Madera correo
Zaetia/Virgen del Carmen azucar y 
P. Pedro Esparrago tabaco
Aug/21 Cadiz
Fragata/La Margarite azucar y
Julio Doudall tabaco
Aug/21 el Puerto de Ferrando
Goleta SM/E1 Santo Cristo del Buen Viaje 








Aug/29 British Balandra The Three Brothers under
Benjamin Wippi, conies "with powers" to 
Veracruz with grease?
Aug/29 Balandra caputred by La Belona and the
Principe de Asturia.
For August 1772
Total of 20 Ships In 













Entradas Last Port 
Shin
P a te  Captain
Sep/1 Veracruz
Paquebot/N.Sa. del Carmen y Santa Rita 
Francisco Montes Sapata
Sep/3 Santa Cruz de Tenerife
Fragata/N.Sa de la Rosa 
Josef Garcia
Sep/3 Campeche
Bergantin/N.Sa de la I.uz 
Lorenzo Basa
Sep/4 FI Ferrol and Puerto Rico
^  IJrca SM/San Antonio
oo Cnul. Ignacio Monlcro
Sep/6 Campeche
Zaetia/San Pedro y San Pablo 
P. Bartholome Sarda
Sep/16 • Cumani
Balandra/N.Sa. del Carmen 
Domingo Ja cinto de Anduva
Sep/17 Barcelona, Puerto Rico y Cuba
Zaetia/Santa Ana 
P. Isidro Fabregas
Sep/20 Puerto de San Fernando de Omoa 



















Date C aptain Cargo
Sep/5 Veracruz
Fragata SM/La Perla
Comd. Josef Bodega unknown
Sep/6 La Contna
Fragata Correo SM/EI Rey
Antonio de la Cuadra correo
Sep/6 Boston




Franisco Ismar en laslie
Sep/6 Cadiz
Paquebot/La Santisima Trinidad tabaco 





Bergantin Correo SM/EI Despacho
















Fragata/La Sanlisima Trinidad 
Francisco Magnon
Sep/25 La Corufla
Fragata Correo SM/E1 Quiros 







For September 1772 
Total of 11 Ships In 

























C aptain C argo Date
Anchored in the Port, taking water Oct/13





Veracruz con las misiones
Paquchol/San Joaquin y Santa Rita del Pachuca 
























Zaelia/EI Santo Espiritu 
P. Salvador Julia frutos
frutos
Cadiz y Barcelona
Zaetia/I.a Virgen de la Miscricnrdiu
P. Francisco Juhani liutos
Cadiz
Zaelia/Sanla Rosalia
I*. Pedro ( ialel frutos
Cadiz plata y tinta
Paquebol/La Purisima Concepcid del Golfo de 





Paquebot SM/E1 Sandoval 
Antonio Gonsales
Veracruz










Bergantin/N.Sa. de la Luz frutos de
Lorenzo Urosa Cuba
left for his destination "repaired"
British Fragata de Guerra which entered 
the port on the 10lh of this month
La Corufia















(Arrived with its major sail tom) 
Zaetia/N.Sa. del Carmen 
Francisco Jubary
Veracruz
Paquebot/N. Sa. de Guadalupe 
Ignacio Baralt
Oct/30 La Comfta
Paquebot Correo SM/E1 Pisarro 
Josef Theodoro Peres
Oct/31 Veracruz
Bergantin de Real Asiento de Negros 
Juan Bautista lramategui
vO
For October 1772 
Total of 12 Ships In 








Zaetia/Santo Cristo del Calvario 
Juan Llado frutos
Oct/20 La Comfta
Fragata Correo SM/E1 Guiros
Manuel Antonio de la Villa correo
Oct/30 Cadiz frutos y
Bergantin/El Bello Indio cartas de
Josef Castafieda Nueva Espafla
Oct/30 "repaired"
Zaetia/La Virgen (N.Sa) del Carmen 





Zaetia/San Vicente Ferrer 















P a te  C aptain







Goleta/San Francisco(alias La Esperanza) 
Josef Ayala
Nov/2 Campeche






Urea SM/Santa Ana 
Comd. Andres Balderranra
Nov/16 Veracruz (taking on water)
Navio/El Buen Consejo 
Juan Uresberueta
Nov/16 Campeche





































Zaetia/San Pedro y San Pablo 
P. Bartholome Saida frutos
Cadiz
Zaetia/Santa Ana
P. Isidro Fabregas frutos
Maracaibo
Paquebot/N.Sa de Guadalupe plata y
Igancio Baralt fmtos
Carolina "repaired and full of food"
Golcta de SMBritish/"which entered 
















Goleta/San Josef(Alias La Fortuna) 
Josef del Aguila








Pensacola, anchored in the mouth of the port
Goleta correo SMBritish/The Comet "needs repair
Genaro Maidonogft and food"
New Orleans 
Balandra/La Pastorina
Josef de Cues las frutos
orvOOJ Nov/25 Barcelona y MalagaZaetia/San Juan Bautista 
P. Luis Baralt efectos
Nov/25 Cartagena de Indias
Fragata de Guerra/El Caymen 
Comd. Juan Moscoso unkown
Nov/26 Cadiz
Fragata/N.Sa. del Carmen (alias El Soberbio)
Juan Bernardo Bergara efectos
Nov/26 Cadiz
Zaetia/San Bruno 
P. Josef Guisar efectos
Additional Entradas:
Nov/28 Cadiz y Cuba
Zaetia/San Josef 
P. Juan Bautista Codina efectos
Nov/28 Veracruz
Bergantin Correo SM/EI Despacho 
Josef Antonio llrda Aspelleta correo
Nov/29 Cadiz y Cuba
Zaetia/N.Sa. del Carmen 
P. Francisco Medin efectos
Nov/29 La Coruna
Fragata/La Santisima Trinidad (alias F.1 Caballo
Josef del Pecesilo harina
For November 1772 
Total of 20 Ships In 
Total of 7 Ships Out
For December 1772 *Missing from the legajo.
Totals for 1772
156 Ships In 
149 Ships Out
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